I appreciate Steve's point about addressing both conventional wisdom and academic scholarship -- especially if expectations of Mubarak's government democratizing remain as widespread as they were ten years ago. Ruling But Not Governing provides readers a sense for the government's unremitting campaign against opposition activists of all kinds. To fully understand the opposition's predicament, we should also note the ways Egypt differs from traditional military regimes (such as the old juntas in Latin America or the current one in Myanmar). Here I will pick up on Michele Dunne's post, plus the comments made by John Stuart Blackton and Ben Smith. If we are asked "Who rules?" in Egypt, I think we would answer that it's been a symbiosis of the country's military, its security services, and its ruling political organization (the National Democratic Party), with the weight increasingly falling on the last two...
One of the more counterintuitive findings from the authoritarianism literature is that pure military regimes are the shortest-lived: Officers intervene, set the country "on the right course," then return to the barracks. In contrast, regimes in which colonels become presidents and officers become cabinet ministers often last much longer. It's not only that they have a different mission than their counterparts who remain soldiers; it's that they develop the political organizations and coalitions for sustaining control over a long period The implication for Egypt is that the regime's "civilianization" has not made democratization more likely and may have actually impeded it.
Which brings us to Gamal Mubarak's status as heir apparent, something Steve and Michele alluded to. What are the political implications of a hereditary succession? Steve writes in RBNG that "a civilian president would be constrained from pursuing policies independent of the military..." but also that "The narrow band through which a civilian would be forced to operate by a more autonomous military would likely only reinforce the logic of regime stability" (p. 139). I agree with the overall point, but I'm not sure Gamal would feel pressured to heed the military. Rather his political interests in staying in power would mesh with the officers' interests in maintaining their privileges. Similarly, with the security services and police. Over the past two years we've seen the NDP's Policies Secretariat draft constitutional amendments and the Ministry of Interior ensure they pass at the polls. It's that synthesis of politics and repression that keeps Egypt stumping the conventional wisdom.
The entropic weight of low expectations.
Jason captures the puzzle of modern Egypt neatly when he writes “It's that synthesis of politics and repression that keeps Egypt stumping the conventional wisdom. “
Egypt is the country that:
• Liberalizes the economy just enough to get by;
• Democratizes its institutions just enough to get by; and
• Provides just enough public education, public health and other public goods to get by.
While at the same time Egypt manages to:
• Try just enough activists in military courts to keep them in check;
• break just enough heads amongst street demonstrators to instill caution;
• censor and occasionally jail just enough journalists and bloggers to remind folks who is in charge.
For a citizenry that has long thought of itself as the “mother of the universe”, Egyptians have been learning to get along with “just enough” for the past six decades. A little participation, a little politics, and a good deal of repression (albeit sometimes with a velvet glove and only infrequently with an iron fist) has taught Egyptians to expect very little from their leaders and the institutions of governance.
This works in part because of a tradition of servility and compliance. Egypt is not a culture of hot-headed-ness. It is a culture of acceptance and mild perseverance.
Set in an Old Testament neighborhood, Egypt is in some ways a New Testament society. The meek may not be first, but they get by. Mubarak’s party, his security services, and his inner circle understand this very well.
The question remains, however, whether the old formula will work forever. As more and more Egyptians get their news from Al Arabiyya and Al Jezira rather than from the staid, government dominated media, will they remain passive and accepting forever?
One would not expect a rapid transformation in this very old society where time is measured in pharaonic epochs. The old social science mantra of “the revolution of rising expectations” is probably not just around the corner.
Mubarak’s son may not, however, be able to count upon the entropic weight of low expectations to ensure him a stable 40 year reign. He knows a bit more about the wider world than his father, and he may well be called upon to make some use of that worldliness.
Professor John Stuart Blackton
May 23, 2007 7:59 AM | Reply | Permalink