Thanks Jason and Yasemin for being the first two to weigh-in. Jason, I have to say, I never thought anyone would call RBNG a pleasant summer read. I’ll keep my eyes open for it on Lucy Vincent Beach in July.

In all seriousness, both posts were thought provoking. I’ll deal with Jason’s comments first and follow-up with some thought on what Yasemin had to say.

Jason asks, “Who is Steve debating?” I know from whence he comes. This is a variant on Robert Vitalis’ classic question, “Who’s your audience, man?” In brief, I am debating a surprisingly large number of policy analysts and foreign policy practitioners, notably the Secretary of State who told a group of Washington Post editors in 2005 that a central challenge of American foreign policy was the instability of the Middle East. It is correct to assume a lag between the production of knowledge and its consumption by non-academics, but we shouldn’t assume that these folks are going to buy into the argument. Eva Bellin, Steven Cook, Jason Brownlee, Stephen Heydemann, and a whole host of others may firmly understand the stability and durability of authoritarian political systems, but instability remains very much the “CW” in Washington policy circles.

Jason also raises the interesting question of how much ruling the Egyptian military does. The Egyptian case was the biggest challenge of RBNG and thus the most interesting. I am not afraid to admit that it is the one chapter where most of my questions remain. With the humility out of the way, it is fair to say that the officers clearly remain at the core of the Egyptian regime and consider themselves to be responsible for its integrity. The Egyptian officers have been able to take a relatively lower profile than their Algerian or Turkish counterparts for two important reasons. First, the President is a military officer who has guaranteed the officers’ parochial interests. Second, I called the chapter on Egypt, “Institutionalizing a Military-Founded System” for a very good reason. The institutions that the Free Officers “discovered” to help them consolidate power and build a new regime remain largely in place. Although the number of officers directly involved in the day-to-day governance of Egypt has declined precipitously since the 1970s, the institutions of the state ensure the status quo and their military’s central place as both the beneficiaries and ultimate guardians of the political order.

The question remains: What happens when Gamal Mubarak becomes president? Either I am wrong and I tear out the Egypt chapter or Egypt’s officers become relatively more autonomous if only to make sure their corporate interests are ensured.

Jason’s second core comment questioning the extent to which the Turkish military has been restrained dovetails nicely with Yasemin’s comments. It’s clear to me that the EU reforms of 2003-2004 clipped the officers’ wings, but they still had the means to influence the political system, which is what happened in late April. As I point out in the concluding chapter: 1) it will be a long time before the Turkish national security state is uprooted; 2) the relatively smooth (by Turkish standards) relationship between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the previous Chief of Staff, General Hilmi Ozkok, was based on a gentlemen’s agreement not to heat up the political arena. I warned that without the “institutional bridling” of the military, the situation could revert to previous patterns of civil-military relations; 3) In order to subordinate Turkey’s officers, a fundamental reevaluation of Kemalism will need to take place. My sense is that this national debate is underway, but is going to take a very long time.

The crucial issue for Turkey is, what next? What happens if AKP wins big in July? What does the TGS do when Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul is re-nominated and wins? If they acquiesce, they will in another “astonishing irony” essentially be conceding their central place in the pantheon of the Turkish political system. Yasemin, what do you think?