Situations especially in the international affairs arena, rarely fall into the handy "either/or" category. Much depends on how and who is defining the word "success" and as we all know the Neo-cons will define success one way and the rest of us (that includes the rest of the world) will define it another way. A likely scenario of this surge is that a heavy concentration of US and Iraqi troops in the Baghdad area will just push the violence out into provinces such as Anbar, so success could be claimed if Baghdad is quieter but any increase of violence in the provinces is ignored.

I agree that the dissolution of the former colonial empires provides some interesting examples and in many cases the departure of the colonial power was a step towards stemming the violence. Rebel groups focus on getting rid of the foreign invader first and resolve their own differences later. Phased withdrawal looks like the best course to follow.

It has always troubled me that Britain with so much colonial experience including a League of Nations mandate over Iraq, got sucked into this war - has no one in the Blair government read their own history. The French were smart and stayed far away from this conflict.

I think the key factor as to whether a given area will erupt in civil war or will go on its merry way has a lot more to do with the various ethnic groups that live in the area than it has to do with us.

Something 20th century Western political theorists never could quite seem to grasp is that it's not all about us. Most European powers learned this lesson the hard way, but the US still struggles with it, and George W. Bush is completely sunk in a narcissistic mire of thinking it's All About Him.

India sank into violence largely because it's really not an ethnically or religiously homogeneous place (indeed, the opposite is true - it is probably the most religiously diverse nation on the planet, esp. if we consider pre-split India that included large Muslim areas).

Iraq is going to be a mess for quite some time. The question that Americans should ask themselves is whether we want to be involved in this mess. Sadly, two differing motives imply "staying the course" - the side that refuses to admit that whatever ill-conceived plan the President had at one time is not working, and the idealistic side that thinks that the US has a responsibility to clean up after itself. While I have sympathy for the latter position, in the current situation I think we have to be realistic about the nature of the people in charge of the US effort, and realize that they are not capable of fixing the mess that they have made.

If a person is shot, it is generally considered better for his health if the bullet can be removed. The US military presence in Iraq is only serving as an aggravating factor, and in no way is bringing any realistic future peaceful resolution to the area.

Not only that, it's also costing the US hundreds of billions of dollars each year. That's not money well-spent.

Sure, but on the other hand, isn't what is happening now in Iraq, in the long view, caused by the colonial powers that were in the region pulling out? I mean, were it not for the Ottoman and British empires, there might be a more rational set of national boundaries in what we know as Iraq, and the nasty consequences that might have been avoided now are just the latest manifestation.

Not to say that I wish the sun hadn't set on the British empire, of course.  I don't know very much at all about the history of decolonization, but I do have the sense that not a lot of hand-wringing went into mitigating the damage implicit in the political structures they left behind.

If the current "Slow Bleed" Strategy of the Dems is used to hobble the surge, then a failure of the surge proves nothing.

I noticed nobody mentioned American pullout from Southeast Asia a clean outcome where about 5 to 6 million died.

J. McCutchen:

I just returned from 3 weeks in Taji, Iraq. I must say that the report from CFR you cited has the single best synopsis of the current situation in Iraq that I have ever seen.

At some point, our intervention there must be subjected to serious cost/benefit analysis, as opposed to political posturing.

The Vietnam analogies are inappropriate precisely because our pullout there was unmanaged. This report offers a rationale and a methodology to disengage militarily in a way that makes sense for both the US and the region.

Of course, it will not ever come to pass - the cupidity and callowness of this administration is historic. Instead, more tired and bewildered American troops will patrol the Iraqi badlands in a futile effort to bring peace.

It strikes me that life in Iraq now is a matter of survival. Because we are thin on the ground and likely to get thinner (pace surge), Iraqis are choosing affiliations based on a long-term need to survive. They aren't choosing us, we will withdraw at some point, probably in the next two years. Hence the political dynamic is against us, and our capacity to shape it militarily or diplomatically is decreasing. This doesn't require a statement from Washington; everyone understands that our withdrawal is a matter of time.

We need a plan that allows us to engage for the very long term, and it seems to me that the elements of national power that are conducive to such a plan involve diplomacy and economic/security assistance. We can shape the battlefield without being a large part of the battle.

I agree, that we would still convey our support to Israel and as I mentioned our relationship with the gulf states, but when hostile forces are under the impression that the American people have an open wound with regard to ground troops in the region, they will act with greater boldness in everything they do.

I can imagine occasional special forces type missions, air missions, and of course a naval presence for whatever reason, but they would be brief and limited in objective. If for instance there was a rare raid on an Al Qaeda hideout, the possibility of Blackhawk down type disasters would be greater because of the lack of fear of even greater escalations. More importantly Diplomacy would be severely hobbled. Diplomacy without the threat of Force would be severely limited and the lure of Oil would draw other countries into alliances with radical factions.

I am not sure I agree with your examples. We have not ignored Beirut, but our influence in 25 years has ben limited because most players know we will not put boots on the ground. Somalia I think supports my argument. We have advisors supporting Ethiopian troops, but if most americans heard we were sending troops there, the Horriffic images that enter their head would put a stop to that quickly. Kuwait and Saudi examples are not ones America associates with pullout and loss.

I also disagree with the importance of the region regarding SE Asia. If we had never had a presence in post WWII E. Asia, there would not have been the successes of S. Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and if there had been an impression that we feared military confrontations in the region, Japan would not exist as we know it.

The real reason we could so completely turn our backs on the region, was because the inner conflict was so great in the US that once the decision was made, for or against, we would not open the wound again.

You are right I should have clarified, I am sure we would still have interest in the area, and would have limited presence, but our ability to influence events, especially diplomatically would never be the same.

J. McCutchen

One faulty assumption is that Iran and its "mini me" Syria have any intention or interst in stability in Iraq short of a Client state in Baghdad.

It doesn't assume that at all, in fact, it assumes Iran's interest is a pro-Shiite government in an Iraq that is too weak to pose the threat that Saddam once did. As for Syria, it discusses at some length what Syria's interests, what they could deliver, what they can't deliver, what trades we might make.

As far as faulty assumptions go, I see two in your comment. First that Syria's some sort of satellite of Iran with identical interests and that neither have interests in stability. What do you think Iraq's going to be - a client of the US?

As far as containmet goes, you've said nothing more than if there's no will there will be no way.

Well, indeed. At bottom you've made no case against disengagement other than that continued engagement will produce different results than we've seen now for four years. Refugees are pouring across Syrian and Jordanian borders. Kirkuk and the Kurdish problem are a powderkeg waiting to blow. Kohbar Towers? We've 150,000+ troops in Iraq with targets on their backs right now.

Stay the course? That's what you argue. Could you have possibly managed a more flawed rejoinder?

Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results

J. McCutchen

Why do you think these brave, bold dems hopped all over the splurge like ducks on june bugs? Because they knew it wouldn't work before it even began. There aren't any Profiles in Courage running about the Demo Hill caucuses, I assure you.

State Condi Rice was told on her surprise visit to Baghdad that the Mahdi Army of young nationalist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has decided to cooperate with the security plan and that East Baghdad (Sadr City) is quiet. Why, the al-Maliki government asked, should resources be devoted to an area that is not a problem? This explanation aimed at excusing the sole concentration of the security plan on Sunni Arab areas in West Baghdad.

Cole

The Mahdi Army and other Shi'ite groupings have a different perspective. Once we understand what it is, we can see that it makes sense for them to avoid a confrontation with the U.S. military if they can. From the Shi'ite perspective, American forces are in Iraq to fight the Sunnis for them. Our troops are, in effect, the Shi'ites' unpaid Hessians.
Thus far, we have been willing to play the Shi'ites' game. Their challenge now is to make sure we continue to do so as Bush's "big push" in Baghdad unfolds. Originally, they wanted U.S. forces to control access to Baghdad, cutting the Sunnis' lines of communication and reinforcement, while the Shi'ite militias carried on their successful campaign of ethnic cleansing. With Bush insisting American forces work in Baghdad, the Shi'ites came up with an alternate plan, one we have seemingly accepted: the Americans will drive out the Sunni insurgents, leaving Sunni neighborhoods defenseless. As the American troops move on, they will be replaced by Iraqi soldiers and police, mostly Shi'ite militiamen, who will ethnically cleanse the area of Sunnis, just as in plan A. Again, the Americans will have fulfilled their allotted function, fighting the Sunnis on behalf of the Shi'ites. Aren't Hessians great? William Lind

Operation Impose Order's goin about as well as the other two battles for Baghdad Bush lost, maybe worse. Two blasts killed at least 56 again in Shiite areas. As Juan Cole speculateed yesterday, the militias and resistance having gone to ground each hoping the other will engage US forces, such bombings may become more common as the Sunni groups attempt to provoke the Shiites to retaliiate.

Muqtada,, didn't just fall off the turnip truck. His militias are quiet and indeed announced cooperation with the security sweep.

Aren't Hessians great?

J. McCutchen

Someone mentioned the poor Kurds - just another faction using our Hessians...The Cleansing of Kirkuk has begun and with it the next civil war....by my count that would make 6

Two bombs in Kirkuk on Saturday. Preview of coming attractions?

Uproar in the east, stike in the west. Sun Tsu(?)

J. McCutchen

al-Taji - Airbase? How appropriate to "After the Surge's " analysis!

I'd expect Taji to be handed over to the Iraqi Army in any drawdown. The Iraqi Army operates there now, and a serious drawdown would probably result in the concentration of our forces at the BIAP/Camp Victory complex and the IZ. The CFR report suggested limited operations in Anbar out of Jordan; it this is untenable then we'd probably retain and even build up a FOB in Anbar.

Even police face Indian Country in some neighborhoods, with a sort-of equivalent distrust of everybody. Admittedly they don't face booby traps and snipers.

That the situation has become that way argues for a different approach.

J. McCutchen

Says you but since I am the one that characterized your post as Dolchstosslegende, let me help you

The word means "stab in the back legend". You've managed a two-fer of lame excuses for failure - Vietnam and now prophylactically - Iraq.

The last I think a real howler - the Surge is lost before it begins thanks to the Democrats.

A legend by any other name

"...A legend by any other name. But your point about Nazis is not totally inapposite.

It reeks of the Fuehrer Bunker in the War Party these days.."

So if my point was correct with some exceptions, which part was the correct interpretation of your views?

The part about how You consider the volunteers that are the young men and women of our uniformed military and fighting overseas are Nazis? ...or the part about you thinking that our government has been seriptitiosly taken over by a secret society of Jews with names like Kristol, Wolfowitz, Perle, Feith, etc. which you call the Neo-Kahns and they are motivated by dual loyalties that eminate from a wicked place that could easily "stab us in the back", Mein Fraulein.

Absolutely.

I was suggesting that since the dynamic can happen here, it's much more likely there; essentially guaranteed.

J. McCutchen

What a crock!

What part of that do you not understand. I was very clear. Now back to your Bunker where you won't find any democrats with knives, the disaster is Bush's and Bush's alone - Bush and his claque that is

Crocodile tears? First you compare the troops to Nazis and then anybody that doesn't mock them as you do, is insincere. Your references to Nazis are offensive and if you want to be reckless with your comments then you can expect someone to point out your foul comparisons.