Iraq Sit Rep: What Next?
[I received the following from a U.S. soldier who works in intelligence and has just finished his third tour in Iraq. He's a thoughtful soul and has the benefit of having fought on the frontlines in this madness. Since he wants to continue with his military career I am protecting his identity. He uses typical military jargon and I have tried to provide the appropriate explanation of the various acronyms. Larry Johnson]
FROM A U.S. SOLDIER:
I have a lot of assessments and opinions that are based on my experiences in Iraq, so keeping this document unclassified was difficult. I am limiting my suggestions to broad, theoretical statements and am avoiding very specific recommendations. To keep it unclassified, I am only using open source reporting (Public Affairs Officer [PAO] releases) as evidence for my assessments. I’ve deleted any statements that I think could be considered classified assessments. I am sure you understand the need for that. If in a more appropriate forum with security clearances, I could be more forthcoming. Of course, all of the opinions in this document are my own opinions and in no way reflect any official organizations.
These are the COAs (courses of action) that I see in your email:
- Go Big (Strong): Plus up forces and target Muqtada al Sadr (MAS) and Jayshi al Mahdi (JAM).
- Go Home: Just leave, phased withdrawal. This is already off the table, so I won’t waste time on it. I think this is inline with the ISG recommendations.
- Continue COIN (Counter Insurgency): Stay the course and focus on political, economic and security development. This is politically unfavorable because it will not appear to be a change in strategy.
- Marginalize MAS, Co-op JAM: My recommended COA (course of action). MAS is only as important as we make him. 90% of JAM want security for their families and money for food. It is gangland warfare. The other 10% are the extremists that must be isolated and destroyed.
I will focus on COA’s 1 and 4 because the POTUS (President of the United States) has already ruled out 2, and politically 3 is simply not acceptable.
Go Big: Plus up US forces in Baghdad in order to target MAS and JAM. This simply will not work. We can not solve COIN with more counter-guerilla. According the CF (coalition forces) spokesmen, the large “sweep, clear and hold operations” in Baghdad in 2006 were not successful despite a significant increase in CF and combined operations (Baghdad is not Tall Afar or Fallujah). We failed to sweep and clear the motivation for Iraqis to join the insurgency and likely made more enemies.
Why are we targeting MAS and JAM?
- MAS does not support sectarian violence. He is an advocate against it. He is as nationalist who wants to reach out to Sunni (despite the fact they want nothing to do with him).
- MAS is an influential player because the Coalition made him important in 2004 by talking about him. We gave him “street credit.” We and the press boost his reputation (and ego) every time we call him the “fire brand anti-American cleric.”
- Most JAM who attack CF are doing so against MAS’s orders, they are rogue. They consider MAS too soft on CF and too political.
- Most JAM members are gang members who simply want security and money. JAM has become a very bureaucratic organization (they publish orders/FRAGOs [fragmentary orders], have pay roll rosters, etc).
Our time to target MAS and JAM is passed. For almost 2 years (Fall 04 – Spring 06) JAM was not targeted, and the organization grew significantly not in numbers, but in organization and capabilities. The organization is too entrenched and too diffuse to make viable targets.
Expected results of increased offensive operations to target JAM in Baghdad and MAS:
- Increase in countrywide violence. This goes without saying, we saw it in 2004 on a couple of occasions.
- MAS will become even more popular simply due to the fact that he is wanted by the occupation forces. Killing or capturing him will make him a martyr like his dad, which is probably not far from what he wants.
- Further alienate the population of Baghdad who already feel threatened by sectarian violence and fear what the security forces will do to them as well.
The “Sadr City” problem: We are afraid to go into Sadr City, and the people of Iraq know it. MAS and JAM have been claiming since early 2006 that CF were planning on going into Sadr City, despite the fact that we had no intent or desire to do so. This was a very smart move on MAS’s part. He made CF look weak, timid and scared. The people of Sadr City believe that we will not go into the city for fear of high casualties, therefore they live with JAM as a reality of life. The problem is that we really shouldn’t go into Sadr City because no matter how many forces we throw at it, we will never truly be able to “separate the fish from the water.” JAM will initially fight back (or not), and they will then fade away and disappear into the city until we leave (which is inevitable). Just like in 2004, JAM will take casualties, many innocent Iraqis will be turned into anti-occupation insurgents, and we will leave. As a result, is it a Catch 22. If we go in, we will create more insurgents than we destroy, if we don’t go in, our credibility as an effective force is at risk.
Alternate COA: Marginalize MAS and Co-op JAM.
In my opinion, we have a classic chicken or the egg argument, which comes first, security (stability) or economy. Do you need stability and security to establish a good economy, or do you need a good economy to have stability? When left to military leaders, the correct answer is always SECURITY! It is, after all, a principle of patrolling. I argue that if you focus small, but effective security on key points of infrastructure, economy and key AQ targets such as Shia markets, holy sites (not trying to secure the entire country at once), that as the economy improves, the reason why Iraqis become insurgents will go away. That is our ultimate goal and that is the only way we will win.
MAS is what we make him. JAM is a very well organized gang-like security force to protect Shia areas from Sunni extremists and provide employment (even if it is illegal). I will use DIME to organize my thoughts:
Diplomatic:
- Let Iraq deal with their neighbors, we have nothing to offer Iran or Syria as carrots. Plus, Iran will NEVER back down, so it is wasted effort. The only thing we can take away from Iran is Iraq’s permission for Iranian pilgrims to visit Iraq. Saddam never allowed it because he knew that the pilgrims would be heavily infiltrated with Iranian IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps) and MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security), which is exactly what is happening to Iraq now.
- We should have more open diplomacy with moderate Sunni insurgents. What do they really want? Do we know?
- Take away MAS’s street credit by getting him back into the political arena. He has often refused to meet with any Americans because he knows it will destroy his credibility with the more extreme members of his following. Therefore we should make every effort to call MAS a “good guy” and meet with him openly. It will increase his political standing (in his own mind, most politicians want nothing to do with him), but it will actually alienate much of his supporters. MAS will feel important, but his importance will be lessened and he will fade away as a failed politician. What would be the harm to policy and CF reputation in Iraq if we try to reach out to him ,and MAS “stands us up?” The Iraqi government could put a spin on his refusal to meet as being an obstructionist, stubborn and not helping the Iraqi people.
- This will leave only the extremists (such as AQ and rogue JAM) who represent only a fraction of the insurgents. Isolate the extremists. We must get back to that, and that is done through diplomacy and control of information at many levels.
Information:
- We are getting our butts kicked in information. I don't even know where to start on this one except to say that COIN is won with ideas. Information is the poor man's nuclear bomb. Everyone plays lip service to it, but we do very little about it. All of the things listed below happen at some small scale, but there needs to be a dedicated effort to drastically improve the way we handle Information Operations throughout the military.
- For example: A classic example of how information operations can be more effective than kinetic operations. By saying that CF are coming into Sadr city, MAS increases the desire for protection (which JAM provides). When the CF don’t come, he uses the inaction to bolster his own credibility for providing protection. Well done. What could we have done?
- Information Operations (IO) needs to be thought of as more than a supporting effort, it is the Main effort. Everything else that we do either supports our IO campaign or our enemies’. This is contrary to what is taught in doctrine and in the war college and is very hard for senior leaders to accept.
- IO messages are very top driven and are very unresponsive (reactive). The creation of IO messages need to be delegated down to battalion commanders based on a set of approved themes.
- The IO plan needs to be briefed in every order at every level. No raid should ever occur without a preplanned message for the local population. No patrol should be allowed to leave the gate without either specific talking points with a specific target audience, or a list of IO information requirements to confirm or deny the delivery, comprehension, and reaction to previous IO messages. The patrols’ feedback must be streamlined to reach decision makers to update IO messages. (standardized reporting)
- Intelligence collectors (includes patrols) need to actively collect the threats’ IO messages. These messages need to be analyzed and countered immediately.
- Part of IPB needs to include: MLECOA (most likely enemy course of action) and MDECOA (most dangerous enemy course of action) for IO messages, how they will be delivered, what they will say and who will say them.
Military:
- Counterguerilla is the name of the game, but it is only a subset of COIN, yet we spend probably 90% of our time talking about it.
- I think we tried to do too much too fast, we tried to setup up IA Brigades and Divisions in a year using adhoc CF conventional army units (MiTTs aka Military Transition Team). It was way too fast. I think we should dissolve all Iraqi Army, National Police above the Company level and start over. Instead of a small military transition team with an Iraqi Battalion HQ, place an Iraqi company under the command of American Battalion. Let the American and Iraqi company commanders work together on every mission. Once each American company has an Iraqi counterpart working for it, start building Bn staffs with the American Bn Staff. Hand pick the Bn leadership and staff members from the companies.
- JAM are working as a security force. We should attempt to use them. Co-op JAM in Sadr City and make them an official National Police Brigade and confine them to Sadr City. Force them to hand over all of their records (for payroll reasons) and we will learn all about their structure and manpower. Hold them accountable for their actions by using the paychecks as a carrot. (JAM wants this, they want to be an Army) This will anger many Sunni, but that is where the Diplomacy comes back into the picture, it all must be interconnected.
- Checkpoints work! (Caveat, when manned by disciplined and competent soldiers). In the fall of 2006, PM Maliki was pressured to ask GEN Casey to take down the checkpoints around Sadr City. We did, and within a short time, VBIEDs (Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device) starting attacking Sadr City again. Insurgents, especially outsiders, fear checkpoints. Most munitions in Baghdad have to be brought in from outside the city. Sunni attackers who plan on attacking Sadr City must come from outside Sadr City. When we restrict their freedom of maneuver, we hurt them. When we see insurgents petition to have checkpoints removed, or we see checkpoints attacked, we should be reaffirmed that the checkpoints are in fact disrupting insurgent operations.
- Focus security efforts. It is not possible to secure everything at once like we are trying to do, so stop trying. Focus security efforts on high pay off areas such as Sadr City, the oil infrastructure and the government. Focus security efforts in support of diplomacy, information and economy. It is all interconnected and must be synced.
Economics:
- As cynical as this sounds, money is the cure for everything. Why are there no Kuwaiti terrorists, no attacks on Americans in Kuwait despite very high numbers for over 15 years? Partly because every Kuwaiti citizen gets about $60,000 a year for being a Kuwaiti.
Oil, we must fix the oil problem in Iraq. Once we do that, and the country has money, we can pour money into the trouble areas. - Infrastructure is broken. We can pour $100s of millions into Sadr City, but we are putting band aids on the problem. Sadr City has over 2 million people, and it was built for about 500,000. We should use oil-generated revenue and build new cities. There is plenty of land north of Sadr City, hire residents to start new construction with heavy oversight to ensure building standards are met. This will employ Iraqis, it will give them new places to live (fix the overpopulation problem).
- Crazy idea: Build a wall around Baghdad, or even around Iraq. The “Great wall of Iraq” will employ hundreds of thousands and will have additional bonus effect of limited points of access into Iraq making external influence more difficult.
- In order for a national army to work, or any work projects that take Iraqis away from home, there must a reliable Iraqi Banking system. Iraqis who only get paid hard currency are forced to travel home every payday to give money to their families. There needs to be a way that money can be wired home, or a direct deposit system. If families could go to a national bank and safely draw their husband’s paycheck, the husband can go away from home for an extended period of time to work. A husband who is not at home is not becoming an insurgent.
Additional thought:
It is hard to assess progress because we don’t have any metrics. It is very hard to map our progress because we don’t have a standardized system for reporting operational data to generate metrics. In Iraq, PowerPoint is the method of choice for operational reporting, however, PPT does not populate databases and does not reach national analysts. There is a very standardized reporting system for intelligence information (Intelligence Information Reports, TD’s, etc), however there is no standardized system for reporting operational results.
For example, an analyst in DIA is studying insurgent Abu X. He reads every HUMINT (human intelligence) and SIGINT (signals intelligence) report about Abu X. What he doesn’t know is that Abu X was captured two weeks ago. He doesn’t know this because he didn’t get on that unit’s OPSUM distro and didn’t see the PPT slide. He also doesn’t know what was found at Abu X’s house. Hopefully, if all goes well, the analyst later figures it out when he finds interrogation reports about Abu X and reads DOCEX (document exploitation) reports.
I had DIA analysts who worked at Camp Victory tell me in Spring of 2006 that no one patrols Sadr City anymore, that CF haven’t been there for months. Of course, that was completely wrong, we had several patrols a day in the city (these patrols were published in newspapers). The analyst is making assessments based on partial information because there is no system for putting operational information (patrol debriefs) into a database that the analyst can search.
We tried putting patrol debriefs (including raid results) into IIR (intelligence information reports) formats using the American Soldier as the source. G2X (Division HUMINT Intelligence Officer) shot us down because the reporting was circular because it was already on a PPT (powerpoint) slide. This is silly because the IIR can state that this information is also stated in a named PPT file.
"Let Iraq deal with their neighbors...."
He should have followed that thought to its logical conclusion, i.e., let Iraq deal with itself too. Is there any problem in Iraq we understand better than the Iraqis or anything we can accomplish in Iraq without Iraqis?
Leave them alone. Leave now.
December 28, 2006 4:25 PM | Reply | Permalink
The present situation in Iraq is an outcome of Bush's occupation and reconstruction policies.
It is not simply a matter of age-old sectarian conflict, which we know nothing about. It is about an occupation without security for the population and a reconstruction without significant results for the economy.
Bush's policy has been to keep Iraq so weak, that whatever Iraqi government formed, it would be too dependent on the U.S., to ask us to leave. Occupation and Reconstruction failed by design.
December 28, 2006 5:01 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks for the fascinating post.
Camp Victory? Should be renamed Camp Lost-At-Sea.
December 28, 2006 6:45 PM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen
1. Sadr only as big a deal as we make him? C'mon. He's a big deal to Bush new best buddy al-Hakim and if Cole's to be believed, the reason that SCIRI doesn't want to hold provincial elections per the constitution. Buddy buddy with Muqtada?? Who's he kiddin? Sadr didn't just fall off the turnip truck like this guy apparently has.
2. We have no carrots to offer Iran because the gardner won't go into the garden (apologies to Peter Sellers RIP)
3. Any effort of the US to play one side or the other is folly. Hasn't this guy learned anything? Look at this map. The notion that we can interject our fat butts into the Shiite morass which is becoming more and more fractured as time goes on is nuts. See those green areas on the map. See the orange an brown.....Go mess with the green areas. Smooth move ex-lax
4. The "oil problem" - Can't get it out of the north I hear. Can out of the south. WHy? Because it suits the smugglers and the militias.
5. Cal Perry CNN reporting that an Iraqi friend of his has been drafted into the local "neighborhood watch" (aka militia") spends several hours every night after work with an AK47 guarding the hood (I3B3 ready to move w/ bride?). Cal the Cutie says the people don't know who's going to kill em - Americans, militias, Iraqi police, Iraqi troops.
6. There is no Iraqi government to trengthen. "FUBAR".....this taxpayer would love to pay for a sign above this soldier's desk or better yet, his flight home. What a waste of acronymns.
7. What took this brainiac so long to come up with this "solution"
December 28, 2006 6:56 PM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen
In all of it, I found no reference to the mass exodus of Iraqis to Syria and Jordan.
It now appears to be a flood. Iraqis voting with their feet first a trickle, now a flood(NewsHour)- vital intelligence missing from this report.
They know something this guy doesn't?
December 28, 2006 7:06 PM | Reply | Permalink
If there is anything that stands out starkly from the soldier's report it is how underplanned this invasion has been, given the complexity that we find ourselves in now.
I'm far from knowing if the soldier's recommendations could work. My gut feeling, however, tells me that the overall package is far too nuanced to implement. I sympathize with the War College people who tend to favor kinetic action over an informational approach; especially in an invasion scenario in which neither the Sunnis nor the Shias are reliable partners in information-type operations.
I see information operations as being able to change people's minds or--in other cases--prevent people FROM changing their minds. Kinetic events have a way of focusing people's minds in unexpected ways. I tend to disagree with the soldier that information is the poor man's nuclear bomb in this particular case. It seems that since we don't have control of the kinetic situation in general, it is doubtful that relying more on an informational approach can do much to change the physical situation.
The soldier does seem to imply that the kinetic operations and the informational operations need to be synced.
My view is that the plan is overly ambitious and nuanced to be implementable withouth a thousand unexpected things going wrong. In short, I go with the conventional wisdom of the War College on this
December 28, 2006 7:21 PM | Reply | Permalink
SNAFU
December 28, 2006 7:27 PM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen
Left cold and wondering at whether this beautiful example of what I believe is called "stovepipe" analysis (rules out any alternatives thought unacceptable at higher levels) is as deficient as it seems or perhaps deceptive in its brilliance.
Perhaps it is meant to be transparently deficient. The author is attempting somee bizarre form of bureaucratic reverse psychology. Perhaps the real recommendation is for permission to analyze alternative X.
December 28, 2006 7:38 PM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen
The Bush Spin Machine has been planting news stories in recent days to the effect that the Troops Support Surge
Perhaps some folks still believe what they read in the Orchestrated Media.....
Many GI's Oppose Troop Surge
Sgt. Justin Thompson, a San Antonio native, said he signed up for delayed enlistment before the Sept. 11 terror attacks, then was forced to go to a war he didn't agree with.
A troop surge is "not going to stop the hatred between Shia and Sunni," said Thompson, who is especially bitter because his 4-year contract was involuntarily extended in June.
"This is a civil war, and we're just making things worse. We're losing. I'm not afraid to say it."
My advice to your young intel analyst Larry - NO FEAR
December 28, 2006 8:18 PM | Reply | Permalink
It seems obvious that without a new Iraqi dictator as sociopathic as Saddam, that country cannot be governed. When ever we decide to leave Iraq nothing will be in place to stop the various sects from resuming their war. Of course a sociopathic dictator can stop the fighting - just kill off enough people in a brutal enough way, making sure everyone knows how they died, and the sects will start to clarify their thinking.
So, why are we still there? Anyone?
Hoppy in Sacramento
December 28, 2006 8:20 PM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen
Operation "Together Forward" - Results Are In
Nov. 05/Oct 06 Results HereDecember 28, 2006 8:33 PM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen
They're going to hang their salvation and Bush's on Sunday
December 28, 2006 8:34 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks for passing this on Larry.
I'm assuming that this soldier is stationed in Baghdad? There is some interesting analysis here, but the analyst seems unduly fixated on the problems in Baghdad, Sadr City and the security of the people there and in the Maliki government. Granted, those are major issues, but they are only parts of a much beigger overall puzzle. There is no effort made here to take stock of the ongoing political evolution of the rest of the country, places far from the small shadow cast by the Maliki government.
"we have nothing to offer Iran or Syria as carrots"
This just seems like a bizarre statement. Carrots? Umm ... just off the top of my head: trade relations and an end to US sanctions, restored diplomatic relations, unfrozen assets, non-aggression guarantees. I guess the soldier means "we have nothing to offer Iran that my big boss in Washington is willing to trade." Institutionally, he is not permitted to think about any of these options, since Iran is officially the Evil Empire, so he has rationalized away the US failure to pursue its own interests through negotiations by imagining that our carrot cache is empty.
We should have more open diplomacy with moderate Sunni insurgents. What do they really want? Do we know?
Almost four years in Iraq, and our guys don't even know the enemy they're fighting and what that enemy is trying to achieve. Diplomacy, sure. But do we have any human intelligence at all in that country? Is everybody working for us locked up inside the Green Zone?
It is a little bit depressing to note how constricted the soldier's thinking is by the narrow boundaries of the mission as it is currently defined. Hosts of interesting ideas are thus "off the table" because they don't fit into failed and failing political and military objectives to which the White House is still commited. I understand this soldier is a professional, and has a mission. But the best ideas for new directions are likely to come from people who are actually there in Iraq and have a concrete understanding of the situation. The military mindset has clearly got this poor fellow's imagination wrapped in a straightjacket.
December 28, 2006 8:41 PM | Reply | Permalink
jexster,
Please, this is not just another random troll posting some incoherent rant. I am at least as frustrated with the current situation as you, and I understand that, having been subject to scurilous wingnut ad-hominem attacks for years, it's easy to follow that form. But this author has been on the ground over there for years, he has clearly given the situation a lot of thought, and whether we agree with him or not, he at least deserves a civil response.
December 28, 2006 10:00 PM | Reply | Permalink
there is .ppt and now PPT. Stands for Pentagon Point ?
December 29, 2006 12:01 AM | Reply | Permalink
I served for eighteen months in the Nixon-Kissinger Fig Leaf Contingent (Vietnam 1970-1972) so I think I understand the predicament facing this soldier in the Cheney-Bush Buy Time Brigade. But Nixon didn't make it with "Vietnamization." And Bush won't make it with "Iraqification." Too much fucking up for too long. Time's up.
Additionally, this warrior ward of the state -- or "soldier" as you call him -- seems to just assume that we taxpayers have no other use for our kids' and grandkids' money than to go on spending it (before they even earn it) on this man's monthly paycheck and associated costs of having him do something in Iraq that he has no business doing and doesn't appear very good at in any event. He's had four years. Time's up. If he knew what to do, he'd have done it already. If he could have, he would have; but since he didn't, he can't. FUBAR and SNAFU.
Time for option 2: troops home by ten -- as in bedtime tonight. Who gives a shit what Cheney, Bush, and the brass say about anything? They haven't got one thing right or told the truth once in almost four years. Time's up with these incompetent, lying, bureaucratic bozos. It's the old Vietnam "fuck up and move up" syndrome. America hasn't had worse political and military "leadership" in half a century. We don't have a small enough military if it still has room for people like this who can't tell the truth because they think someone above them in the food chain will find it embarassing or punish them for it. "Classified," my aching ass!
Prior to my deployment as a naval advisor thirty years ago -- technical MOS: electrician -- I had eight months of intensive language study and three months of counter-insurgency training as well. I know of few, if any, of our military forces in Iraq who has received that kind of training. Still, when the native trainees won't show up for training, fighting, and dying because corrupt officials and officers of their own government (not to mention ours) steal their salaries and basically live safely in some other country most of the time, then "standing up" these "fallen down" people fails -- as it obviously has in Iraq for the obvious reasons (and many others) stated above. Time's up. Enough of this Warfare Welfare and Makework Militarism. Neither America nor the world at large needs or wants it anymore. Time's up.
December 29, 2006 12:13 AM | Reply | Permalink
"We should have more open diplomacy with moderate Sunni insurgents. What do they really want? Do we know?"
No, obviously he doesn't know. Quite obviously he has confused Sadr City with a country named Iraq.
But his advice for Sadr City is pretty good. Accept that Muqtada al-Sadr is a force that will long outlive our occupation and thereby diminish him to his real status instead of the inflated boogyman status we've elevated him to. Accept the reality of the Mahdi militia and the fact that they have built the skeleton of a working civil society in spite of our every attempt to impose a vacuum in Sadr City to someday be filled by a cadre of freshly minted Republicans arriving from the Emerald City to take control. Pumping millions, perhaps billions through such a grass roots organization for job creation sounds smart to me, but surely even a soldier can find better investments for that money than building a stupid wall.
In other words, admit defeat. After 4 years do what should have been done 4 years ago. Ah, but of course the higher ups aren't listening to this soldier. My advice to this soldier then is straight forward - frag your CO and come home.
December 29, 2006 1:47 AM | Reply | Permalink
RE your analysis and as the flyboys say - BINGO! Maybe Dubya would understand that.
December 29, 2006 4:38 AM | Reply | Permalink
I was struck by this point:
... By saying that CF are coming into Sadr city, MAS increases the desire for protection (which JAM provides). When the CF don’t come, he uses the inaction to bolster his own credibility for providing protection. Well done. What could we have done?
Does that remind anyone of the (untrue) mantra about "no attacks on US soil" since 911 -- all because Bush, in taking away our civil liberties -- has kept us safe? First he puts Cheney out to say "Booh!" and then takes credit for the "booh" not happening! Amazing how blowhards tend to use the same line of thinking.
Jan Knaus
December 29, 2006 5:44 AM | Reply | Permalink
Don't bet on it!
Jan Knaus
December 29, 2006 6:10 AM | Reply | Permalink
Wars are not won with PowerPoint presentation, but if you can get the other side to start using them, you may have a pretty good chance.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
December 29, 2006 7:17 AM | Reply | Permalink
Quite interesting to read a report from the field. It underscores that what we are doing is not and will not working. But his "solutions" are unpersuasive.
The problem is that he has taken one option off the table (withdrawal) because it is not politically viable. He therefore avoids drawing what should be an obvious conclusion--that nothing will work.
The United States does not have the power (no one does) to solve this situation. Once you've drawn that conclusion, withdrawal becomes the least bad option.
December 29, 2006 8:19 AM | Reply | Permalink
This reminds me of the FBI's "Virtual Casefile" debacle.
Way back when Rummy's "transformation" of the military began, the emphasis was on the use of integrated information to be used as ammunition. I remember some "spirited" discussions with young conservatives in my office as they beat the war drum (for others to dance to) with their claim that this would be a computerized war and they need not join up because their boots would never be needed on the ground. They assumed command and control of the information was all that would be necessary to win. Hail Technology!
Which brings me back to the FBI.
After several years, $100+ million dollars, and a broken "Virtual Casefile" system to show for it, the newly appointed CIO had to make the decision to say exactly what reader Michael Murray has said: "Times Up".
In retrospective debacles like the IRS's $4 billion dollar technology screw-up, or the countless other smaller tech contractor schemes since, the same theme keeps coming up. Different ways of re-arranging electrons will somehow provide the "right" answer to a problem, while we're neck deep in the problem. Most technologists, (when not on the government dole), will tell you that the time for solving problems is before deployment, not while you're running the system.
This soldier's analysis of what is not working simply reinforces my own humble rules for designing any project in information technology- collect the right information, get it to the right people, get it to them at the right time, so they can make the right decision. If those four "right turns" are followed, they always point the way to the decision itself and those responsible for the decision. Had these simple rules been adopted for the use of military force by the US, this logic loop that we are currently in would never have gotten past Shinsecki's "several hundred thousand troops" assessment.
The only way that this particular broken system can be repaired is to take it offline, now, before any more data (blood) is corrupted (spilled). Screw-ups at the speed of carrier pidgeon can be less costly than a datastorm screw-up at the speed of light.
Alphonse ( Al ) Kada
December 29, 2006 9:23 AM | Reply | Permalink
Tactful of him to say that "stay the course" is off the table politically, rather than as a failure, but the analysis of increasing troop strength perhaps makes the case sufficiently well by implication. It would appear that, like Iraq, he's between a rock and a hard place. We can't reduce troop strength, because it's a disaster Bush isn't prepared to accept responsibility for; we can't maintain or increase troop strength, because it only exacerbates the disaster it appears to postpone. That exhausts pretty much the alternatives.
So we adjust the course in some imaginative way, short of calling for the Second Coming to sort things out. Intelligence is, in effect, once again told the desired outcome, and it must find a way to support it. So if that produces some contorted logic, one has to feel for his efforts.
The idea seems to be that two key sides in the civil war cannot be put down by the United States, controlled by the Iraqi government, or made friendlier to us by Iraq's neighbors (the last an interesting criticism of the ISG one doesn't speak about much). The solution: embrace them. The trouble is threefold, I think. First, they don't necessarily want the U.S. embrace, which deligitimizes them. Second, there remain too many other parties. Third, embracing them may merely embrace their contribution to further violence.
The other components follow from this forced inability to acknowledge disaster. Since hold and build won't work, we hold fewer points and build elsewhere; but the fewer points leave many Iraqis insecure or further headed for exile, and the infrastructure we then build is a fantasy city apart from their crumbling lives. Nor is such new infrastructure any more secure from damage as a casualty of war than the old.
I'd love to agree with DanK that getting us out will bring peace. I'd love to agree with others in other posts that political activism will force Bush's hand and get us out. I guess I'm just a pessimist. All I can hope is that the candidates will speak up, marking this as Bush's war; that a new president will remove us quickly; that we can make small contributions by offering Iraq and our allies alike aid and even military support at some future time in the decreasingly likely event that a central government or a slaughtered minority demands it, as in Bosnia; and that the majority of Americans don't go bonkers when the wingnuts scream at us ever after for letting things fall apart.
John
http://www.haberarts.com/
December 29, 2006 9:27 AM | Reply | Permalink
In a perfect world #4 might work. The problem is there is too much water (and too many bodies) under the proverbial bridge for it to work. Everything would have to go exactly like expected for it to work. And that is unrealistic due to too many assumptions being made about the large amount of variables in the equation.
If they started implementing policy based on the soldier's recommendations 2 years ago there would have been a chance. Too many parties have a vested interest in seeing the violence continue and the political system to fail now for anything to work under our stewardship.
So seeing that #2 is off the El Presidente's table it is gonna be 2 more years of sectarian bloodletting and many more dead, maimed and wounded US forces.
I sincerely wish your friend the best of luck Larry...
December 29, 2006 9:47 AM | Reply | Permalink
My guess is a big part of the problem is the ministries don't really provide much in the way of governmental services. It's not all their fault, with the violence it's impossible to function. Couple that with the really bad examples of Saddam's Stalinist state and the CPA's laissez-faire kleptocracy it seems they operate more as mob outfits with welfare slush funds to hand out to their tribal constituencies. In a nation with 60% unemployment that's important. It's also why divvying up the ministries was such a big deal when forming the government. I'd also guess a big chunk of that money that goes to "security" is actually paid to protection rackets.
Our military presence isn't going to help fix this. We need to get out and take it away as an excuse to keep fighting. Remove our troops to Kurdistan and Kuwait. There may be a final spasm of violence once we leave but my guess is Iraqis will make peace with each other much faster without us there.
December 29, 2006 9:49 AM | Reply | Permalink
The first actual thought about how to deal with where we are I've seen in over a year. I think the idea of integrating company sized Iraqi units into US battalions has real potential. Everybody screams "Speed up the training!", but this is the first idea I've heard that might actually do that.
I also agree whole-heartedly with his observation that employment is of paramount importance. We must offer the Iraqis a light at the end of the tunnel, some hint that normalcy can be restored.
Some in this thread have criticized his ideas as being too Baghdad-centric, but I have long thought that control of Baghdad, and the support of its citizens, is the key to Iraq, just as London was the key to the English throne during the Wars of the Roses.
Lastly, let me say that I am thrilled to see anything in this debate between "All is well." and "All is lost." I vehemently opposed this war at it's outset, but having begun it I believe we have no choice but to see to it some sort of functional governmnt emerges. Otherwise we will have mirrored the British disaster there in the 1930's just as stupidly as we did the French experience in Indochina three decades ago.
December 29, 2006 10:14 AM | Reply | Permalink
Creative ideas. Looking at historical parallels, AFAIK, KATUSA (South Korean) had little or no opportunity to move up in the ranks. Some SK advisors to Americans did -- perhaps a parallel there.
In Vietnam, the Marine CAP had a different mission of developing village forces around an American cadre. This was somewhat different than Special Forces commanded A teams. Perhaps a reverse advisory model -- Iraqi advisors to US commanders?
Wingate and the British Special Night Squads again don't fit as there was no goal of integration. I wonder about the French and Belgian SAS units in WWII?
These are all analogies and only a point of reference.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
December 29, 2006 11:16 AM | Reply | Permalink
I appreciate the sincerity and analytical effort of the post. Thx to the author, Mr. Johnson and TPM for making it available. Its tone reminds me of memos I used to write to my bosses at a former job in a similar effort to try and help solve a systemic problem within the organization. The tension in this thought piece between frustration, pessimism and "we can do it" optimism is palpable.
My take is that the document represents a fairly open and shut case for immediate withdrawal; in that even the author seems to seriously doubt whether his/her superiors are listening, will listen or will seriously consider a plate of suggestions such as he has presented. Systemic problems like those he describes are almost impossible to fix without starting from scratch -- which cannot happen. In that sense, this reads and functions more like an autopsy -- what the patient died from -- rather than a prescription for what ails the patient.
December 29, 2006 11:22 AM | Reply | Permalink
Sadly even that won't work. It takes quite awhile for a dictator to acquire the power, defeat and/or exterminate his enemies to earn a nasty enough reputation to maintain his reign. There isn't a power infrastructure to graft Saddam or anyone else to anymore.
December 29, 2006 11:26 AM | Reply | Permalink
I suspect this is the truest thing ever written on a blog in the history of mankind.
December 29, 2006 3:21 PM | Reply | Permalink
Iraq = Sudan, now.
Stupidest thought for the day: Why isn't the US and the international community trying to interdict the weapons at the border? At the current rate of shoot 'em up, all the weapons in the country must be used up every couple weeks. Someone is shipping in more munitions than were used in WWII. Sure the IEDs are homemade, but even they need chemicals. Since the US is the world's #1 weapons supplier, I would hate to think that somehow we are arming our enemy.
December 29, 2006 8:30 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'm a little confused about the reference to Sudan. Literally thousands of tons of munitions dumps were not secured at the time of the invasion of Iraq. IEDs are usually made from combinations of regular military munitions or military explosives, not completely home-made.
A large IED might combine three 155mm howitzer shells. The US M107 shell of this sort weighs about 40 kilograms. They come loaded in pallets of 8. The 18 howitzers of a battalion will carry a basic load of a number of salvoes, some multiple of 8*18 (104), so having 1000+ issued to a battalion isn't unreasonable. Given large depots, I'm not sure I see the logic to the assumption that the insurgents are running out of explosives.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
December 29, 2006 11:00 PM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen
Point well taken, comment edited
J. McCutchen
1. Sadr only as big a deal as we make him? C'mon. He's a big deal to Bush new best buddy al-Hakim. If Juan Cole's assessment is to be believed, Sadr is the reason that SCIRI doesn't want to hold provincial elections per the constitution.
2. We have no carrots to offer Iran because the gardner won't go into the garden (apologies to Peter Sellers RIP)
3. Any effort of the US to play one side or the other is folly. Look at this map. Militias and militia controlled local police provide at least a modicum of security and some social services but are becoming increasingly fractured themselves and fighting each other in local power contests. The temptation to meddle in internal Iraqi politics is dangerous as our three year track record of failure bears out.
4. The "oil problem" - Can't get it out of the north I hear. Can out of the south. WHy? Because the cash flow suits the smugglers and the militias.
5. There is no Iraqi government to strengthen. There is no state, precious little left we could rightly call a nation. 5. Cal Perry CNN reporting that an Iraqi friend of his has been drafted into the local "neighborhood watch" (aka militia") spends several hours every night after work with an AK47 guarding his neighborhood.
December 30, 2006 2:40 AM | Reply | Permalink
The US has shipped over 300,000-500,000 weapons to Iraq, without keeping track of over 95%, the NYT recently reported many on sale throughout the country, link USA Today
The Defense Department registered the serial numbers of only about 10,000 of the 370,251 weapons it provided — less than 3%.
And as HC correctly states about the supply of explosives, Bush left the barn door open in that department too, link CNN 2004
Tons of Iraq explosives missing...
Some 380 tons of explosives powerful enough to detonate nuclear warheads are missing from a former Iraqi military facility that was supposed to be under American control, the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog agency says.
Of course, the Republicans claimed the missing 380 tons of C4 high explosives were not their fault, was just a lie, was actually Saddam's doing, and was just 'politics' (the story came out in Oct. 2004 from the UN). The couple thousand dead troops since says otherwise.
A US embed reporter toured the C4 storage site in Iraq with US troops and taped the barrels of explosives on April 18, 2003, proving the lie to the Bush claim that "it wasn't their fault" the hundreds of tons of high explosives were being stolen as they taped. link
December 30, 2006 8:52 AM | Reply | Permalink
A large IED might combine three 155mm howitzer shells. The US M107 shell of this sort weighs about 40 kilograms.
That would be a big one alright. If I am not mistaken, a grenade contains less than four ounces of explosive. A grenade can spoil your day.
December 30, 2006 8:55 AM | Reply | Permalink
Let's not wander into drama:
Extremely powerful explosives are often the last thing you want in the implosion system of a nuclear weapon. Much of the design complexity of a weapon is not in the nuclear system proper, but in the explosive system that forms the compressive wave that takes the nuclear material to supercriticality. Indeed, the explosive lenses often are a very carefully layered mix of high and low explosives.
C4 and related general-purpose explosives, of course, are used, especially in the more extensively improvised systems such as roadside platter charges. Still, artillery shells are common as antivehicular mines.
It isn't a Republican or Democratic thing to say that you need enough occupying troops to secure all enemy munitions. In this case, of course, it was a Republican fantasy that there were enough, or somehow security forces were not needed.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
December 30, 2006 9:00 AM | Reply | Permalink
When you are not winning, sometimes it's better to change the definition of the fight
Trying to prevent sectarian displeasure at the situation is probably a lost cause
People don't like the occupation, factions don't like living near each other, citizens are not impressed with the govt there and no one is happy with what Iraq as a country has become.
The US needs to accept this reality and pursue achievable goals, change the story.
There are certain targets that are large enough you can address them, with raw military force.
But a lot of the day to day details the US does not have the presence to contain.
The large targets are
- preventing large concentrations of terror groups
- preventing large-scale set engagements between militias
- preventing incursions by militias into neighboring countries
- preventing WMD development centers
- preventing outright Iranian control of Iraq
- controlling key border areas, ports, airports and air traffic in general
- preventing mass killing zones
- preventing starvation
- preventing unilateral seizure of oil operations and funds by rogue parties
Those should be long-term US commitments, maybe a few others, and all can be done with reasonable level of US forces deployed in and around Iraq
The rest of Iraq's problems can only be resolved through a political deal in Iraq that truly satisfies all parties, and the nation-building that will come from people who feel they have an investment in their own unique future
If arranged correctly, a political resolution can empower leaders within each region of Iraq to deal with lawlessness and terror in their own area, and make that a condition of getting funding and continued support
The US must force that resolution to come about, and bring regional players in to sign off on it and be involved in supporting it
December 30, 2006 9:58 AM | Reply | Permalink
I don't follow the reference to Sudan. Could you clarify?
Sudan, in the various areas of conflict not limited to Darfur, is a light infantry war, with very little heavy ordnance. On a practical basis, there's very little capability to transport heavy weapons.
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Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
December 30, 2006 10:03 AM | Reply | Permalink
[duplicate deleted]
December 30, 2006 10:04 AM | Reply | Permalink
It wasn't drama, that was a statement from the UN official Melissa Fleming, spokeswoman for the International Atomic Energy Agency, as reported by CNN in 2004. The IAEA probably knows more about the triggering of nuclear weapons than you do HC, and that is why the site was monitored and under UN seal before the US invasion. Your inner curmudgeon is coming through again.
December 30, 2006 11:28 AM | Reply | Permalink
Inner curmudgeon? You don't know what I know about nuclear weapons, or how accurate a UN news release may be. Care to discuss the formation of the compression wave in a spherical implosion system, or is linear implosion more interesting?
FYI, the Little Boy device used on Hiroshima used ordinary artillery propellant explosive in the gun system, not anything unduly powerful.
Incidentally, I did know at least one of the inspectors and they did an excellent job, but the public reporting was quite vague.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
December 30, 2006 11:37 AM | Reply | Permalink
In my year of posting on this site, I have fond that Howard is a double Ph.D. and internationally recognized (if little known) expert on every topic under the sun.
December 30, 2006 5:26 PM | Reply | Permalink
You underestimate the number of Piled Higher and Deeper certifications. Please enlighten us, then, from your understanding of how the gun-type Hiroshima weapon or the first-generation spherical implosion Nagasaki worked used different explosives to form the compression wave.
It's easy to criticize from ignorance.
For extra credit, we can go into the role of levitated pits, tampers, and reflectors in slightly more advanced spherical implosion. I suggest Sublette as a place to start studying; Glasstone doesn't give internal details.
We can, of course, get into who is known for what. I can point to my publications regarding critical infrastructure, as well as related work for the Y2K Information Center, Critical Infrastructure Group, and National Communications System. Can you?
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Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
December 30, 2006 6:06 PM | Reply | Permalink
Oh, I expect you might know something somewhere. But, I have seen you dig in with the presumption of god on way too many things to believe you know it all. You have strayed into my field and made some sharply foolish comments.
December 30, 2006 7:16 PM | Reply | Permalink
And your field is?
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Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
December 30, 2006 7:17 PM | Reply | Permalink
I will sleep as soundly as our much esteemed President tonight knowing HC has been and may still be devoting his personally vouched for substantial talents to protecting our critical infrastructure.
However, the original point was that the C4 explosives at Al Qaqaa were under UN seal due to their possible use for nukes. (link)Those who stole the explosives are not likely planning any gun-type Hiroshima's, they are just using the C4 and artillery ordnance the old fashion way-big fiery bangs that blow things up.
December 30, 2006 9:51 PM | Reply | Permalink
Actually, I was thinking Somalia, an ungoverned and ungovernable region. It is an opinion, not a statement of fact.
However, the Sudan/Darfur analogy has also been on my mind.
As the instability increases, the region collapses.
December 31, 2006 8:04 AM | Reply | Permalink
I would agree about Somalia; I have yet to hear any proposals that seem to have much chance of success.
As you may have seen in other posts, I believe that selective economic development in Sudan (not in the part dominated by the Arab-Islamist bloc) is the only long-term solution for Darfur -- but also being of help to the rest of Sudan, as well as Chad, Uganda and Kenya.
There are some remarkably creative entepreneurs in southern Sudan who have gone beyond satellite-based internet cafes, and, partially by recycling old cellular equipment, created business centers/business development/education areas that don't try to cover more than a 20-30 mile radius at first, and expand by self-funding.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
December 31, 2006 9:57 AM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen
Larry...your correspondent's effort while commendable is fundamentally flawed.
The following cross post to AAbroad for the fundamental flaw in your friend's piece...which is, in the main, a good example of an analyst fixing fact to the policy
"The facts are being fixed to the policy"???
Say it ain't so Dr Bruce!
All symptoms that in the Bush administration internal process, policy is fixed not made. After all, he is the Decider!
Time for a reality check...
December 31, 2006 1:30 PM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen
It's worse than I thought (Call Me Cassandra)
I think we should dissolve all Iraqi Army, National Police above the Company level and start over.
At the end of the day, all Iraqification proposals must answer one question:
Or put another way, what can American trainers (foreign infidels) say that will motivate them to kill their neighbors?
December 31, 2006 1:44 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'm not trying to be a smarthead, but I must admit that I wasn't able to read this email.
I tried, but unfortunately I understand very little.
January 6, 2007 5:44 PM | Reply | Permalink
The idea of "hand-picking" staff above Battalion (Bn) level is a bit optimistic, the degree of optimism depending on the capabilities expected of that battalion. I won't try to summarize the complexities in the US military, but a typical combat battalion commander is a lieutenant colonel with 15-20 years of experience after college graduation.
Yes, there are exceptional individuals that can take on this sort of responsibility, and indeed excel. Depending on having an adequate supply is, in my opinion, overly optimistic. Remember that anyone working that closely with US mentors is realistically going to need to be fluent in English; there's no time for interpreting in combat command.
I will turn around Jexter's statement:
and put it as "how can trainers (without the emotional flourish) help Iraqi soldiers feel responsible for the security of their community, and kill those who threaten it?" That's still difficult. In fact, I do not believe that the US can train such a force in the time available; I believe that Iraq will go through a period of even more intense strife before either devolving to an authoritarian state, or, more likely, a federation with greater levels of regional freedom.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
January 6, 2007 6:03 PM | Reply | Permalink