Picking a fight with Al Sadr might not be a good idea from an American perspective, but it's hard to argue the man and his forces don't deserve a rude awakening.

Al Sadr is as intolerant toward the Sunni's as any of the other Shia leaders.

If Al Sadr is destroyed, that might just even the playing field for the resumption of the civil war which would occur after the U.S. drawdown.

That seems to be the goal from Bush, right?

In a weird way, Moqtada reminds me of Fidel Castro and also of Hugo Chavez. Right now, all three of them stink and need to be dealt with. But, all three of them, when they were rising to power, mights have been turned to the US side. I'm not defending any of them by saying this, but it does strike me that all three of them, whatever they are now, represent missed opportunities. All three of them are now problems that didn't need to be prob;ems.

thosethingswesay.blogspot.com

Do you think the coming fight against Al Sadr is solely intended to draw an Iranian audience? A sort of Bull Run where the elite figures in Tehran can watch from the hillsides?

Clearly such a strike is intended to bolster the Sunni's. But at the expense of who?

Some times diplomacy is the only option. Not talking with Iran, North Korea, Syria, or other hostile entities does not help this troubled world. We should show some strength of character in our relations with other countries not just the "its our ball" attitude of this administration. What Tommy Franks said about we being one attack away from seeing our Constitution being shred to pieces is more disturbing than our failed efforts in Iraq. We should always keep in mind that the history of the region is one of flux. We shouldn't have believed that we could change that.

What U.S. military "mission" in Iraq? Didn't you get that "sovereignty" memo from (some years now) before? You sound just like Deputy Dubya Bush assuming that he still occupies an American colony and so we can "impose our will on them," as one of his first viceroys, L. Paul Bremer III indelicatly put it (before he lost track of NINE BILLION DOLLARS).

The U.S. military has no "mission" in Iraq except to get the hell out of that place before their blind, blundering incompetence gets themselves and the Iraqis hurt even worse. Frankly, our post-Vietnam experiment trying to substitute a mercenary foreign legion for a national army has failed just like the French one did.

As with the American War on Vietnam, the American War on Iraq has no purpose but its own perpetuation. Once again: "We are the unwilling led by the unqualified to do the unnecessary for the ungrateful" and "We're there because we're there because we're there because we're there." Lunatic Leviathan time again, fellow Crimestoppers. Pure bureaucratic ass-covering and careerism run amok. No rhyme or reason. Just bloodshed, destruction, and wanton waste any time and everywhere you look. Welcome back to IraqNam Redux Deja Vu All Over Again One More Time -- only faster because of substituting the Worst and the Dullest for the Best and the Brightest.

No one has yet invented a sounding line long enough to plumb the depths of our current stupidity; and I feel utterly confident that our history textbooks not long from now will emulate those of the Japanese who simply cannot bear the shame of remembering what their country did not too long ago and so simply say of the [last lost] war: "We somehow became unpopular. Then some bad things happened. But the future looks so much better now." Come to think of it, I believe our own textbooks already took that embarrased ostrich approach after the [last lost] debacle in Southeast Asia: the one that should have taught us not to do it all over again only worse and quicker.

Oh, there is a mission. Contrary to what the powers that be would like the sheeple to believe it's not about removing or preventing the threat of WMDs, or about bringing democracy to the Middle East and it's not about fighting terrorists.

It's about oil, about the US "goal of creating a client regime that was supposed to be the key to establishing the US as the dominant power in the Middle East" and about removing the obstacles to that end.

Getting out, despite what the American people want, will not be easy as long as the neocons hold positions of power.

J. McCutchen

"For now the focus is on Iraq, but do not imagine for a second that the neo-cons and their patrons in the Bush Administration have given up their quest to take down Iran. The dream is alive. Iran is the longterm obsession."

For more information, see Steve Clemons's report on the WH effort to silence Flynt Levrett

I honestly think that they are just flailing. All options are disastrous. Leaving would cause a conflagration that would ultimately end in an anti-US Shiite state. They're trying to something, anything that would prevent that conflagration, and will let them keep their bases.

At his point, though, any option other than leaving makes the conflagration that will come when the US is forced out still worse. Any attempt to pick sides will make things worse. Continuing to arm and train both sides will make the civil war bloodier. Retreating to the FOBs would have the same effect as leaving, except that when the actual retreat comes, it will be more effectively opposed. I don't say this lightly--the situation is truly FUBAR.

But not leaving, even though it makes things worse in the long haul, holds the hope that they'll find that pony.

I'm in the middle of State of Denial. The degree to which these people engage in pure fantasy and wishful thinking is mind-boggling.

Look for the Reichstag to burn after that one.

I agree completely.

Some argue that there are reasons other than oil. Those reasons are only excuses. I believe that the answer “oil” is like a certain mathematical oddity. Multiply any number by nine and then add up the numbers in the result. If the result is greater than nine, add them again. The answer always reduces to nine. Always.

We have nothing, as a nation, to gain In Iraq except strategic control of oil and without the profit from oil the countries of the Middle East could not resist us.

In our correct judgment of the War in Iraq as both wrong and futile we should not forget how damned important oil is. We should attack the problem where we can overcome it, which is at home.

We should strive to overcome our dependence on foreign oil with “the moral equivalence of war”. A smart man said that years ago and our country should have understood its prescience and truth. A couple trillion dollars invested towards that end instead of in war would have been a good start.

Complete post from Missing Links

"On Tuesday of last week, car-bombers killed 70 laborers who were waiting for the chance for day-work, in Tarayan Square, in a Shiite part of Baghdad. As an expression of their outrage over this, a Sunni group including religious authorities issued a statement, described as a fatwa, in which they proscribed killing of Muslims and killing of Shiites in particular. The authorities included people connected with the Islamic Party, with the Muslim Scholars Association, and with something called the League of Islamic Unity, and apparently they were Basra-based. I don't think there was any widespread notice of this at the time, but this morning Al-Hayat says Moqtada al-Sadr sent a delegation to Basra for the purpose of thanking the officials for their statement.

Apparently referring to the same statement, Al-Hayat explains that group of Basra Sunnis, composed not only of religious authorities but of tribal leaders as well, issued a statement in which they denounced "the terrorism to which the Iraqi people are being subjected", and expressed support for the unity or Iraq geographically and with respect to its people. Signatories of this statement included named people representing the Association of Muslim Scholars, the Sunni Waqf (religious endowments agency), the Islamic Party, and a number of others from the Sunni community of Basra.

A spopkesman for the Sunni group warned of the spread of killings in Basra, but said Basra is different from other Iraqi cities, and what has happened in Baghdad won't be transferred here.

A report on this same exchange between the Sadr delegation and the Sunni group was carried by Aswat al-Iraq yesterday, and it said: The (above-mentioned) spokesman for the Sunni group added that there was a meeting between the Sadr representatives and the Sunni group, at which "a spirit of understanding and cooperation prevailed". He said they agreed on the need to support Iraqi unity, and to denounce terrorist operations and "anything that detracts from the unity and the fabric of Iraqi society".

I would like to underline his mention of "the fabric of Iraqi society", because it is the same phrase Al-Dhari used in his rebuttal of the Islamist at the Istanbul conference, when he warned him against turning the meeting into an anti-Shiite event. Shiites, he reminded the Islamist, are "part of the fabric of Iraqi society". (Quoted in this prior post, the last block-quote section at the bottom).

I think it is a good rule of thumb: If there is any reference to "the fabric of Iraqi society", readers of English-language newspapers and readers of the big blogs won't see it reported. I don't know why. We use "fabric" in exactly the same way. What could the reason be?"
[emphasis: s.e.]
---

Americans love to talk to each other about outsiders.

Number 1, Bush and his cronies want to hold out long enough to blame our defeat (which has already happened, we just haven't admitted it) on the Democrats and the liberals.

Number 2, Bush and his cronies want the war to go on as long as possible, get as big as possible and get as bloody as posssible because the Bush family and its cronies make money on war profiteering.

Glad to see you back, Howard. 

Neoboho

Packer article and Drum comment.

Anyone named Houk, from American U? While still in junior high school I played a SORO party--Houk's son, David, was our bass player. I remember SORO as a partying bunch, not the expected dull academics.

Kilcullen also points out that the Malay and other insurgencies, including Vietnam, offer limited lessons. It is precisely the individual character of an insurgency that needs attention, not its similarity to another.

Don't remember a Houk when I was at American U. Some of the research staff -- CRESS was just a name change from SORO -- would complain that the guy in Chile went off on tangents that no one wanted, especially, of course, after he got caught.

Now, I am trying to remember names. Michael Conley, maybe? James Eliot Cross? I think he was at CRESS; he was one of the guest lecturers for "Dynamics of Revolution", which, as opposed to the "Seminar in Unconventional Warfare", tried to look at the conditions in which insurgency would start. There was overlap, of course -- I do remember one calm lecture, in Roper Hall, about the pros and cons of carrying off your dead after an expropriation from a bank. The consensus seemed to be that it was best to leave dead bodies of your enemies, in a manner suggestive they were members of an underground.

I'm a very eclectic cook, without excessive modesty. There are things to learn from every cuisine, just as there are things to learn from every insurgency. I often wonder how much current insurgents have learned from the literature and even formal training, and how much is reinvented. There's not much ideological commonality between militant jihadists and Greek Cypriots or Russian anarchists, but there are tactical similarities.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

I don't think the mission statement was that coherent.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

That part about no professional military assessment says it all. The wry joke "military intelligence is an oxymoron" is one piece of disinformation that has worked entirely too well.
You do realize you have inadvertently given the brush-cutting Crawford Cowboy (a.k.a. World Sheriff, The Decider, AWOL ) his best media moniker yet : " Calamity George "

In some countries, it is (or has been) the Army's duty.

If the Army isn't trained for occupation duties, then someone else must be.

Good to see you roaming the tables of the Cafe Howard. I had an APB I was going to post to see if anyone had heard from you. Glad to see you're in good health and have returned.

As to you're response to Tom, I can't get this picture out of my noggin that I'm watching this long running FUBAR like Chief Bromden, i.e.; One flew east, One flew west, One flew over the cuckoo's nest.

But as I've said over and over when it comes to this Chump-in-Chief, it's bound to get worse before it gets worse.,,

~OGD~

The military seemed to be asked to depose Saddem and quickly get out of the ways as the naturally freedom loving Iraqis took over. It may even explain Rumsfeld's very peculiar blase attitude toward the looting and his comparison to the post-American Revolution period.

Daniel A. Greenbaum

Precisely -- although I would distinguish not the Army per se, but combat versus occupation forces. In Europe after WWII, the Constabulary was an Army force, but quite separate from the combat forces that broke the Nazis and the combat forces deployed against the USSR.

In large conflicts, especially with the technology used by first-line combat forces, combat and occupation/nation-building are separate functions. This is not to say that an occupation force has no combat capability, but it will be limited to local situations, with regular combat forces brought in as needed.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

Not quite FUBAR. In the military lexicon of WWII:

I am the very model of a modern Major-General,
I've information vegetable, animal, and mineral,
I know the kings of England, and I quote the fights historical
From Marathon to Waterloo, in order categorical;
I'm very well acquainted, too, with matters mathematical,
I understand equations, both the simple and quadratical,
About binomial theorem I'm teeming with a lot o' news,
With many cheerful facts about the square of the hypotenuse.

I'm very good at integral and differential calculus;
I know the scientific names of beings animalculous:
In short, in matters vegetable, animal, and mineral,
I am the very model of a modern Major-General.

I know our mythic history, King Arthur's and Sir Caradoc's;
I answer hard acrostics, I've a pretty taste for paradox,
I quote in elegiacs all the crimes of Heliogabalus,
In conics I can floor peculiarities parabolous;
I can tell undoubted Raphaels from Gerard Dows and Zoffanies,
I know the croaking chorus from The Frogs of Aristophanes!
Then I can hum a fugue of which I've heard the music's din afore,
And whistle all the airs from that infernal nonsense Pinafore.

Then I can write a washing bill in Babylonic cuneiform,
And tell you ev'ry detail of Caractacus' uniform:
In short, in matters vegetable, animal, and mineral,
I am the very model of a modern Major-General.

In fact, when I know what is meant by "mamelon" and "ravelin",
When I can tell at sight a Mauser rifle from a javelin,
When such affairs as sorties and surprises I'm more wary at,
And when I know precisely what is meant by "commissariat",
When I have learnt what progress has been made in modern gunnery,
When I know more of tactics than a novice in a nunnery—
In short, when I've a smattering of elemental strategy—
You'll say a better Major-General has never sat a-gee.

For my military knowledge, though I'm plucky and adventury,
Has only been brought down to the beginning of the century;
But still, in matters vegetable, animal, and mineral,
I am the very model of a modern Major-General.

I find it disturbing that I do know the difference between a Mauser and a ravelin.
--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

J. McCutchen

I am SO Effing GOOD

I'll reply to myself! ;=P

BAGHDAD (AFP) - Iraq faces "complete disintegration into failed state chaos" a respected think-tank has warned, urging the United States to adopt a radical change of strategy to end the crisis. The stark analysis from the International Crisis Group came as a Pentagon report confirmed that violence in Iraq has hit record levels and two weeks after a bipartisan US panel branded the situation "grave and deteriorating."

The ICG's new report endorsed the Iraq Study Group's criticisms of White House strategy, but warned the recommendations of former secretary of state James Baker's panel would not be enough to stem the bloodshed.

The End Is Here

Exactly. Even more today than in WWII, there are enough skills to be mastered by a combat soldier as not to leave time, other than for exceptional people, to have expertise in the food industry. Even beyond skills are what I'll loosely call reflexes -- the appropriate response to a threat in a true combat situation is different from the response to a threat in occupation policing. Within the Army, COL HR McMaster, who is more generally known for commanding a lopsided armor victory at the Battle of 73 Easting, is equally known for holding fire against some Republican Guard troops and using an interpreter and loudspeaker to convince them to surrender. While leaflet campaigns and the like are valuable strategic psychological warfare in a combat area, the first response of most combat troopers is to destroy the threat. They don't have the Occupation mindset, which is more like police, in building friends -- with combat troops as backup.

In the Total Force concept, most support functions such as Civil Affairs [Note 1] were moved to the Army Reserve, with the idea that calling up reserves was a significant political step. A side benefit, however, was that many support skills have civilian counterparts: a welder or well-digger does comparable things in and out of uniform.

Some reservists have been called up individually, not in their specialties but to give additional convoy escort and related roles.



[Note 1] There is a very limited active Army civil affairs organization.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

Every criticism of our country’s lack of planning for, and execution of, the occupation of Iraq seems valid.

Never the less, the use of the history of our occupation and rebuilding programs in Germany after WW II as an example of how we could have been successful in Iraq is a mistake. Until it is successfully done we cannot even assume that it is POSSIBLE for a western nation to invade a Middle Eastern country and install a form of government that is alien to its culture and friendly [and subservient] to the invading nation.

The German army and the German people accepted defeat and occupation. The Iraqi people haven’t. I am reasonably sure that the Lt. who ran the food service program as well as any other members of his out fit never were fired on and never suffered any casualties from German dissidents who did not accept the occupation and who were willing to die if necessary to drive US forces from their country. Armed resistance to our occupation was extremely limited. Within a few months American soldiers were dating German girls.

If that Lt. had been shot by a person in civilian clothes who then disappeared among a civilian population which protected him and encouraged his actions and our forces had responded by kicking in doors looking for the shooter, which they would have done, and in the process of looking for the right door to kick in other Americans had been shot, I think it is clear that the history of our occupation of Germany would have been different. The constabulary force would have used their guns and if, as is most likely, it became necessary, the combat troops, who had already come to have zero patience with being shot at, would be brought back to “maintain security”.
The Germans were tough but when “major combat operations” were over there was enough common cultural background that we could deal with them and become friends with them and then allies.

Don’t expect a Christmas truce this year or any near future year where our troops and the enemies who are trying to kill them lay down their weapons for a night of friendly celebration of a common holiday.

It's gotta be tough to work the streets if you never leave your house.

Never the less, the use of the history of our occupation and rebuilding programs in Germany after WW II as an example of how we could have been successful in Iraq is a mistake.

I disagree.

The reason I posted what I did was to emphasize Howard's point of the need for two separate entities of combat and occupation, as was the successful method in the aftermath of WWII.

Also, I did it to emphasize the speed at which they succeeded. As I noted, the occupation and repair forces were right behind the combat forces - beginning the reconstruction of infrastructure immediately, indeed for the express purpose of avoiding partisan violence - something that was not, but should have been, done in Iraq. I put the exclamation point next to October, 1945 above because the Lt.'s group is arguing for its necessity a mere 5 months after the German surrender in May - a situation any reconstruction contractor could have been in in August of 2003, that is if they weren't padding their wallets.

Any argument that says that the Germans bowed to the occupation simply because they were beaten militarily is ludicrous - truly, it is this mindset that has those assholes in this Administration scratching their heads wondering why Iraq is failing. The Germans accepted an occupation because it immediately turned the water back on, put food on their tables, heat in their homes, and provided security. [Visions of John Paul Vann are dancing through my head]

That said, an analysis of the US's failure to recognize the Iraqi's desire for similar things where it did recognize the German desire well before the invasion of Germany is another story, and well worthy of a deeper look.

Yes,we disagree.

I will try to defend my position by expanding on it, but if you wrongly compare my mindset to “those assholes in this administration” it will be hard to keep it polite.

By the time the Germans surrendered in May 1945 they had already been suffering greatly for a few years from the direct affects of the war. They knew who started the war, which leaders had been criminally wrong, and they knew who won. They were ready for the war to be over. They cooperated in getting the lights turned back on and afterwards they did not blow up the generators. They did not attack the occupiers.

That is not the situation in Iraq for reasons that go far beyond the reconstruction of their power grid. It seems a little ridiculous to have to enumerate any of these differences to support the point. Assuming you have noticed that this administration deliberately lied to get public support to invade a country that had not attacked us and was no threat to us, you might agree that the psychology/attitude of this country is different than that of Germany at the end of WW II.

You emphasize the need for two separate entities for combat and occupation. I agree that the right entity is needed where occupation can be successful, I just disagree that the success in Germany means therefore that an entity can be formed that would be successful in any and all circumstance of occupation . Iraq is a place where we, the USA, could not do it. A dedicated group of insurgents willing to commit suicide if necessary to further their ends and who had a great deal of internal support and at least some external support has shown what it can do. It can leverage it’s power through gorilla tactics and cause a reaction that increases its numbers and support while eroding any support the occupiers have. A better run occupation would have been slower to devolve into chaos but would just as surely done so.

Why am I so convinced? Any serious person who has paid any attention must know that it is one result of combat that most soldiers lose their human inhibitions against killing and go with their human urges to kill. It’s necessary and in a just war is justifiable, but some even embrace the urge. Some may differ, but I believe most of even the best get at least somewhat indiscriminate in their reactions. They can identify those who are positively on their team and everyone else is suspect. Even when not ruled by emotions that range from fear through anger to rage or some combination, they would much rather pull the trigger too quick than too late.

Many seem to think that soldiers could be TRAINED to react in a productive way which is, they think, to act more like cops. The constabulary force. There seems to be a assumption that cops would react better to being shot and would not react in a way that would be instrumentalin creating more resentment to add to the resentment which started out already at a level that made many want to kill us . They would actually be able to help lower tensions.

This belief in the efficacy of cops has been said many times at TPMC by many and I heard it expressed this morning on “ON the Point” on NPR. People seem to accept this as a given. Isn’t it obvious that right here in the USA that American cops dealing with an American population often go over the line to the point of enraging entire communities of Americans. Cops right here in America acting to keep American streets safe get itchy trigger fingers and kill innocent people or others who could have and should have been arrested. Cops beat prisoners in our jails and in our prisons. [ To whom it may apply, please spare the obvious retort. I’m not intending to brand all cops, I am saying that these things happen.] Cops often kill cop killers who they could have arrested. American cops operating on Iraqi streets would soon be defensive and would become brutal in an attempt to stop the insurgents from killing the Americans that the insurgents in Iraq surely would kill.

One more thing. Check the numbers of troops that the experts say would be required to form this separate occupying force, or come up with your own prediction/guess. Think of all the generic and specialized training that would be required including teaching the language. Think of the expense and time it would require. Try to imagine the pentagon, on The Decider in Chief’s orders, starting to create this force. Even if such a force could work it would never be created for political and economic reasons even if the right people could be induced to volunteer for the training and service.

It is a moot point. Since that force was not available, was not possible to create, and will never again become a reality unless we are, as a nation, totally mobilized and committed to a war and this force comes about during that time of mobilized commitment, it is not an option and there is no point in talking about it as an option that would lead, even possibly, to success.

You may be assuming disagreement when none exists. Merely because the Decider is not the brightest bulb in the chandelier does not negate some points that should be understood for more rational military activities.

I just disagree that the success in Germany means therefore that an entity can be formed that would be successful in any and all circumstance of occupation

Check the numbers of troops that the experts say would be required to form this separate occupying force, or come up with your own prediction/guess.

Think of all the generic and specialized training that would be required including teaching the language.

Think of the expense and time it would require. Try to imagine the pentagon, on The Decider in Chief’s orders, starting to create this force.

Even if such a force could work it would never be created for political and economic reasons even if the right people could be induced to volunteer for the training and service.

It is a moot point. Since that force was not available, was not possible to create, and will never again become a reality unless we are, as a nation, totally mobilized and committed to a war and this force comes about during that time of mobilized commitment, it is not an option and there is no point in talking about it as an option that would lead, even possibly, to success.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

No, I don't think I ever argued expressly for it. I argued that if the ill-advised decision to invade Iraq was taken, both US and third-nation occupation forces were the only possible means of avoiding complete chaos.

The idea of invading an Arab nation and imposing democracy generally requires pharmacological assistance to take seriously, unless one is a PNAC ideologue or a voter in a soundbiteocracy.

I mention the WWII examples more to show the bankruptcy of Bush Administration thinking, which, in the best style of a five year old putting his hands over his ears, avoided any contradictory opinion. History does not always predict outcomes, but ignoring it is dangerous.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

Holy crap, Howard, you left me in the dust. I started this post at 6! I guess I shouldn't have stopped for dinner.

J. McCutchen

No I hope I didn't suggest that any Sadr strike was intended for an "Iranian" audience. I rather think it a last gasp very desperate and dangerous officials in our National Command Authority.

I think it is a recipie for disaster for many reasons, not the least of which is that while we are "bolstering the Sunnis", we are still attacking them through out al-Anbar, Baghdad, Salahdin, and Diyala provinces.

Perfect illustration of the idiocy of trying to divide and conquer, an imperialist strategy in a post-imperial world, not to mention in the middle of a @&#@(@# civil war.

Get us out...get us as far away as possible...

I think we agree more than disagree except on the idea that the occupation could have been handled successfully.

I will continue to think that the reasons I gave are at least a significant part of why the Germans accepted the occupation until I hear convincing arguments to the contrary. JMOlofsson offers some interesting points but they don't change my ultimate conclusion. The fact that isn’t disputed is that the Germans DID accept the occupation. The Iraqis have not. The question is why didn't they.

I will also continue to believe that, for the reasons I already stated, that those same policies that worked in Germany would not have worked in Iraq even if begun immediately at the beginning of the occupation.

I can only think that you did not read my response carefully
.
You ask me to imagine a scenario in which the occupation could have been screwed up so badly that Germans would have revolted and you give as an example the way we have acted in Iraq. I certainly agree that the same treatment of Germany would have likely caused violent uprising. I simply do not accept that because we acted correctly in Germany and it worked and because we acted stupidly in Iraq and it hasn’t worked that we can then conclude that there was a correct way to act in Iraq that would have worked. The situations have too many differences to compare in that way.

In this discussion that is really the only point I am trying to make clear. It is my opinion and belief that it was impossible from the beginning to successfully occupy Iraq when it was decided by the Decider to invade it.

As to my mindset relative to that of the administration, it may well be that the administration thought since other European countries had accepted occupation after they, by which I mean both the people and their army, were defeated that the defeat of Saddam and his army following the illegal and discrdited invasion of their country would lead to the capitulation of the Iraqi people. I am not surprised that the Iraqi people rejected our occupation and continue to fight and I believe that some of them, and then more of them, and then a lot of them, would have fought us regardless of our policies during occupation. Our stupid handling only expedited the growth of the insurgency. It would have happened anyway. Our current administration could have been so ignorant that they did indeed think that the success of our European occupation showed that an occupation of Iraq would just naturally work out and they’d worry about how later.

I also think most of the administration and most of the neocons are chicken hawks and I am not surprised if a chickenhawk thinks that a people would just naturally capitulate once the army was defeated. The chicken hawks cannot imagine that people with a choice would actually take a personal risk. It is not as if the chicken hawk’s decisions might cost them their own lives. They have probably never even been punched in the nose in a schoolyard scuffle. If their sending out the troops doesn’t work and they are completely discredited they can always accept a choice government appointment or position at the AEI or a teaching assignment at a university where they will continue to be treated with respect and even admiration by some. They are perfectly willing, no, make that eager, to play the great game so long as they believe they cannot personally lose

I expect that I am at least as angry as you at the fact that our children will pay the price for the arrogance and stupidity of the people who got us into this mess.

Time isn't running periously short. It ran out on this idea (invading Iraq) before it even began.

Tom

The "most basic level" is not germane (sorry). Disregarding trivial things like digestion, if Iraqis are the equals of anybody, why did they need special help, our intervention?

At levels that matter, Iraqis are of course different than Germans, with one sector feeling an immense stretch of history behind them (Assyrians). Another important difference was that Germany was a self-formed nation, with essentially full coherence, culturally and politically. What worked in one part of Germany would work everywhere. A final difference is that the cause of the "effect", defeat, was clear, and it was the whole country's responsibility. The "cause" of Iraq's invasion by the US was George Bush.

Otherwise, I tend to agree that an occupation could have been both humane and helpful. The root of the problem is, of course, the lack of legitimacy for the intervention. The same thinking that would have produced an effective occupation would, if pursued honestly, argued against the intervention in the first place. Thus an effective occupation was impossible before it began.

"Can revolution and civil war be avoided in neighboring countries?" This is the Big Narrative drivingall thyis waiting for The Big January Pronouncement? The Big Reason we can't leave etc.

Perhaps revolution and civil war are exactly what the region requires.

J. McCutchen

Hitler always listened to his generals....

After Criticizing Surge, Gen. Abizaid to Retire

Tom Wright and I just had a pretty good hash-out of where we're coming from in this respect. I think we're all coming at the same conclusion but from differing angles. Take a look above and tell me what you think. Cool discussion. I'm also interested in how thin the thread is gonna get...

We're wandering through a thicket of definitions when we basically agree.

Absolutely.

However, definitions are incredibly important. (it depends on what your definition of "is" is). Impossible means no chance whatsoever. Highly unlikely means there is a chance, however slim. It is through the public's assumption of definition that enables politicians to do that voodoo that they do so well.

It is Bush's insistence on the interchangeability of belief and knowledge that alarms me the most.

The blind ambition and bullheadedness of Bush guaranteed there would be no reasoned discussion of the messy details.

But, I think you're right. The discussion about an ideal occupation cannot realistically have an ideal occupation as its goal. It's more like a physics experiment conducted in a vacuum. In reality, it is truly impossible. However, success will be measured by how close one can get to ideal, which is, of course, affected by the dexterity with which real-world variables are dealt in relation to the ideal. But all this requires a common, solid, and singular definition of the ideal in the first place.

My theory is that Bush's ideal had more to do with war-profiteering and revenge than it did to relieve the people of a brutal government, which is one, why he is failing, and two, why he won't tell us what his definition of the ideal, the "job," or "victory," is.

Preemptive shot--don't go there; it drops to single-syllable eventually.

Yeah, I'm slow too, hence my useless "holy crap, Howard" post below, which now looks strange floating by itself.

As for me, I'm new to the game altogether, and just recently grew the stones to start conversing with the superior minds here at TPMC - one of the only places I've found with a high percentage of intelligent debate.

Happy Holidays to you and yours.

See you on another thread.

But already at the lootings it was clear that the leadership of the invasion didn't care about its success.

That is a difference if compared with Germany [1945].

The grinds of justice may be slow.
It's strange, and a rather bad omen, that the American debate at the moment seems focused on detail issues, such as relatively marginal adjustments of troop size.

I had, for a time after the Congress elections, hoped that focus would shift to restoring the American Constitution, Rule of Law, and congress' oversight function. It's rather amazing, after all, that America that is held to be a democracy have pursued a war and occupation for many years already, and no national leader or newpaper seems to find it crucial to investigate and inform the electorate about the ultimate goals of this exercise.

/Tuomas

You have company in your disappointment, but it's early yet. Many legislators will have to find a way to save personal face for their previous support of war policies.

Watch for the hearings. They will be the means of raising the deeper issues, such as the false pretenses for war.

German culture fits into a Western system; Iraqi culture, if there really is a distinctive one, does not. Even if every occupier spoke fluent Arabic, there would be more cultural differences than between Americans and Germans -- and make no mistake, there are, even in modern business, cultural differences between US and German customs.

I am not quite as agreeing when it comes to differences between Protestants-Catholics vis-a-vis Shiites-Sunnites, but on the other hand, that is not particularly important to pin point either.

However, then we come to the fun part, the nit-picking:
(I'm sure you can handle it!)

The construction of 1871 was in no way a nation.

A German nation existed long before 1871.

"Creation of nation" may be better used for the unification of Italy or the seccession of Finland from Sweden. [Both occurred in the 19th century.]

Neither was it a unitary state that was created in 1871. But, as you hint at, maybe it's best described as a unified empire under Prussian leadership.

A German empire had existed before also, particularly in the view that counted the Empire under Prussian leadership as the Second Reich, and the Holy Roman Empire (of the German nation) as the first; a view that was popular with, among others, the Nazis.

There is no doubt that a national awareness existed in Germany (of 1945) that can't be said to have any counterpart in Iraq (of 2003), but differences between Slavs and Germans can be seen as comparable to the differences between Kurds and Arabs, and the differences between Catholics and Protestants can be seen as analogous with the differences between Shiites and Sunnis.

And of Germany was in the 1940s made a large chunk for the Poles, a large chunk for the Protestant Prussians (East Germany) and a somewhat uneasy union between Protestant and Catholic parts of Germany between which no reasonable borders could be drawn.

A similar outcome for Iraq would be a large chunk for the Kurds, a large chunk for the Shiites, and then a rest-Iraq that has a too intermixed structure between Sunnis and Shiites where no reasonable borders can be drawn.

As it looks right now, if that happened, it would be almost a miracle. The more likely outcome right now seems to be much worse. A couple of million Germans died after the war while they were transferred from old German territories that were to become Poland or Russia or Lithuania. And that was during an orderly evacuation and no civil war or anything.

How many Iraqis will die when trying to escape from ethnic cleansing, torture, civil war, and maybe the next invasion of a foreign army?

/Tuomas

Actually, I can't find anything important to disagree with you about.

...possibly with ONE exception. You may be understood as if the U.S. do not have an interest in adressing the many different nations' worries about Kurdistan. I think the U.S. really has, and the only way I can think of for the U.S. to live up to this interest would be to foster the best thinkable relationship with the Kurds of ex-Iraqi Kurdistan, including military bases and including lots of infrastructure financing that in the end would make the Kurds somewhat dependent which, I hope, would make the Syrians, the Turks and the Iranians less worried since they would hope that the American influence would, somehow, guarantee that that ex-Iraqi Kurdistan didn't try to instigate too much trouble on the other side of its border.

The independence of ex-Iraqi Kurdistan was the most slam-dunk foreseeable outcome of the invasion (given the legacy of the no-fly zone). The Kurdistan-issue was at the heart of the pre-invasion deliberations. If not in Washington, at least manywhere else.

/Tuomas

Howard,

Absolutely agreed. With respect to culture, history, and language.

I'll learn not to ask such an ambiguous question in the future.

I was actually trying to draw out a conversation about fundamental differences with respect to the human need for Food, Water, Shelter, and Security. There isn't a difference between Germans and Iraqis in this respect.

As such, American occupiers actually gave a damn about the humanity, these basic needs and lack thereof, of the Germans (which is absolutely related to similar culture, language and skin color), and as such they busted their butts to have a successful occupation, which they did. Whereas with the Iraqis, American occupiers don't, apparently, give a damn about their humanity, don't care that they lack these basic human necessities, don't care to learn the language, culture, and history, and thus we have a FUBAR occupation. Had they learned the language, culture, and history, we likely wouldn't have a war in Iraq at all.

I believe a genuine interest to help people [one of the BS reasons for starting this war] at the most basic levels absolutely requires education about said people's language, culture, and history. The conversation above seemed to be heading in the direction that the Iraqis, or people in the Middle East in general, are inherently incapable of accepting help at all. Hence the question.

IIRC the numbers, the US Embassy in Baghdad has a staff of 1000. Of those, 30 have at least some conversational Arabic, and 6 are at the Foreign Service Institute fluency level 4 (full professional fluency) and level 5 (equivalent to a well-educated native). The Army may actually be a bit better.

It's obvious to me that the planners (and a majority of the executioners) of this debacle couldn't possibly stand in front of any random Iraqi and see an [or at the very least a potential] equal. This, unfortunately, is reflected in the fact that 97% of the US Embassy staff in Baghdad has something less than "some conversational Arabic." IMO it's part of the Administration's bad parent policy of "do as I say not as I do," which tells me they think anyone who's not them is a sheep. They also apply to their constituents. You can't say they're not consistent in that respect.

...one of his many comments being that the most effective full-time interrogator he knows always is in perfect uniform, begins interviews with ceremonial servings of green coffee and mint tea, and can utterly disorient a prisoner by offering bread and salt, fully aware of its symbolism.

That's heartening, as weird as it sounds. But I wish the interrogator was the rule rather than the exception. BTW, what's the significance of bread and salt?

Godspeed General Schoomacher