A Great Power Concert
Dan K. takes me to task for failing to discuss all possible forms of international cooperation in my earlier post making the case for a Concert of Democracies. Fair enough. I didn’t. Dan K favors the creation of a Concert of the Sane and Capable. I must confess that I have no idea what that means. (To offer my own paraphrase of Chris Hedges’s book, Glib Titles Give Us No Meaning.) But let’s talk about one form of international cooperation that is getting a lot of play these days: A Concert of Great Powers.
The Concert of Great Powers idea is a venerable one in international affairs. The gist of the argument is that the world would be more peaceful and stable if the great powers agreed on the rules of the road. The best recent piece arguing for creating a great power concert is Richard Haass’s, The Opportunity, which is must reading for anyone who is serious about discussing international affairs.
So should the United States work to forge agreement with other great powers where it can? Of course, it should. There are plenty of issues where we would all be better off if Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and other great powers agreed on what to do. And this fact isn’t lost on anyone. Washington has attempted to one degree or another to forge agreement on the rules of the road for decades—SALT was an effort to hammer out the rules of the road for nuclear policy—and especially since the end of the Cold War. The Clinton administration sought to enlist China and Russia as strategic partners. Bush derided those partnerships in the 2000 campaign. Nonetheless, since September 11 he has solicited—even during the spitting match in the months prior to the invasion of Iraq—an astonishing degree of great power cooperation on the anti-terrorism front.
Unfortunately, a Concert of Great Powers is likely to deliver far less than its proponents hope. If you think it is hard to get democracies to cooperate, try getting countries that have no ideological affinity (and hence have good reason to be suspicious of each other) to work together. Another problem is that most countries aren’t eligible and never will be eligible for inclusion in the Concert of Great Powers (something by the way that is not true of a Concert of Democracies). If history shows us anything, it is that the weak resent and resist rules imposed by the strong, and the powerful often find their plans foiled as a result. (Think Vietnam or Iraq—or look at the current state of play in international trade talks.) A third problem is that a great power concerts seek to preserve the status quo. But the world is a dynamic place, and attempts to preserve it in amber inevitably fail.
Most relevant for our immediate topic, though, is this simple point: The argument for a Concert of Great Powers is not axiomatically a case against a Concert of Democracies and vice versa. Contrary to the assumption running through many of the responses to what Ivo and I have written, we do not face the choice of either working through the UN, or working with Great Powers, or working with fellow democracies. We can in fact do more than one thing at a time.
Indeed, we should try to multi-task. An international arena with overlapping political networks—what political scientists like to call cross-cutting cleavages—is likely to be more durable and less brittle precisely because it blurs sharp divisions and creates opportunities to build new coalitions.
So no, I do not buy the argument that creating a Concert of Democracies will recreate the Cold War, as Dan K argues. Of course, Beijing and Moscow like to play on these fears. But both capitals are quite adept at mixing competition with cooperation as their interests warrant, and they expect the same from us. As we think about forms of international cooperation we shouldn’t let a sensible impulse not to provoke cause us to lose sight of what should be the overarching purpose of our foreign policy: To fashion an international system conducive to liberal democratic values. A Concert of Democracies is a vehicle for doing just that.














Comments (4)
James,
Street gangs and Police might be the two most powerful groups in the inner cities, but I don't want the Police to align with the gangs. I want the police to fight the gangs on behalf of the weak. If the police can't do it themselves, they should align with other police.
Maybe I am just a simple idealist, but it bothers me that America has to get in bed with countries that do things we find morally repugnant on a regular basis. I realize America isn't a Utopia, and that China isn't Nazi Germany, but I'd like to live in a country that tried to push China in the right direction.
The problem with realism, to me, is that it gives you nothing to believe in.
December 13, 2006 3:49 PM | Reply | Permalink
GHaines: Getting China's cooperation on reducing emissions, something which is essential for global survival, is worth toleration of their autocracy, i.e., reaching a modus vivendi.
I see where you're coming from re: idealism, but as Deval Patrick frequently said in his campaign for governor here in the Bay State, the perfect can be the enemy of the good: that is, just because we can't reach perfection through politics does not mean that we shouldn't try for the good. It's an issue of priorities, and also what one Jefferson scholar has labeled "practical idealism" -- doing the best we can within the constraints of reality. It seems like this perspective is often missing from discussion here at America Abroad. Instead -- and I can't cite any specific examples, it's just an observation of larger themes in many of the comments -- we tend to hear a lot of both airy idealism and relentless excoriation of the admittedly flawed United States. No one would deny the U.S. has enormous problems, both today and in its past; but if all that awareness of and concentration on these very real problems does is paralyse us into inactivity and an instinctive stance of sardonic criticism, then it really just becomes a form of moral preening. I think Lindsay et al. should be lauded for at least making some proposals about what a new and more progressive world order could look like.
I'm interested to hear what others think.
December 13, 2006 6:01 PM | Reply | Permalink
James,
Obviously I don’t expect you to discuss all forms of international cooperation. And I know you were just exaggerating for effect. My point was to get some sense from you as to what you judge to be the major problems facing the globe today. My assumption is that whether some major new international initiative or alliance is wise or unwise depends on exactly what the problems are, and what are the likely consequences of that initiative given our actual historic circumstances. So I just wanted to understand how you view the current global scene, taken in the large.
Here, for example, is one popular 90’s-era neoliberal vision: it is a vision that emphasizes a rapidly globalizing world in which the developed powers have more or less solved the problem of war and violent conflict among themselves, have knitted themselves together in a self-sustaining network of economic interdependence, and have entered an end-of –history phase of enduring liberal business as usual. War among developed states is highly unlikely, on this view of things, because states are rational actors and war is simply not in their interest given the high levels of interdependence. The remaining security threats, according to this picture of neoliberalism triumphant, are mainly posed by a rump of rogue states, failed states and non-state actors that must be brought into the civilized fold to ensure the final victory of global democratic capitalism. Beyond that, the main challenge is the spread of political virtue.
I tend to be highly skeptical of this optimistic picture, and believe it is an ahistorical fantasy projected through the distorted prism of only the most recent of historical events. I continue to believe that competition among large, heavily armed states remains the greatest threat to US and global safety and security, despite our current obsession with sideshows like the war on terror. The globalized situation today is not at all unlike the highly interdependent economic scene of the Belle Epoque, and many of the same optimistic themes were voiced in those times. Yet those unfortunate, fated Europeans were just a few years away from the most devastating of wars.
My own vision of the contemporary a world is one in which a deteriorating environment, expanding populations and dwindling energy resources are likely to push large states into more and more direct forms of competition, and ultimately violent competition – unless bold and decisive steps are taken to head this off. At the same time, a multipolar dispersion of hard power, the widespread availability of small arms, growing global resentment over rising inequality and the rise of fiery populist leaders whose voice is magnified and given global reach by developing media, threatens us with outbreaks of revolutionary violence on a global scale.
I also have a somewhat more pessimistic view of human nature. Human beings are not fully rational actors, but are wayward semi-rational creatures. They count many among their number many who are avaricious, irritable, paranoid thrill-seekers or romantic crusaders. Some are simply cruel sadists and psychopaths in suits. Truth be told, many human beings actively seek violence because they enjoy it, and are bored by peace. So to maintain peace, you need to work hard at it, all the time.
I don’t have a lot of faith that the free market and private enterprise will solve the problems of resource competition on their own, and in fact I see them as part of the problem. I have proposed several times in the past what I called an “Energy Transition Treaty”, something I won’t describe again. The fundamental point is that I believe some sort of global compact and regulatory institutions are needed to manage the resource crunch and prevent warm competition from growing into a hot resource war. Given the diverse nature of the world’s largest producers and consumers of energy products, this is also not an issue that can be addressed in the context of a Concert of Democracies. And again, I tend to view a Concert of Democracies as potentially damaging to this effort, since at the very time we would be negotiating a via vivendi with China in the energy sphere, the concert would likely be at work in the world advancing the factional interests of its democratic members.
I also see a world in which the current trends are in the direction of further nuclear proliferation, and believe that unless these trends are reversed, the coming century will likely see major nuclear exchanges between nuclear-armed states, exchanges that will lead to the deaths of scores of millions of people. Again this is an issue which requires extremely broad-based cooperation among democracies, non-democracies and quasi-democracies, among Muslims, Christians, Hindus and Jews. It is going to be a very hard job, and will require much compromise. I don’t see that a Concert of Democracies will be particularly helpful here. And my fear again is that it will actually hurt the situation by exacerbating ideological divisions.
You are skeptical that the formation of a Concert of Democracies would spark a new Cold War. But I believe a revived Cold War of sorts is already under way, with the US/Europe engaged with Russia in strategic competition for clients and strategic influence across a belt of states in Russia’s near abroad, with control of vital resources in the balance. There are large private fortunes, and the people those fortunes control, involved in this game as well. The same sort of competition will become increasingly evident between the US and China in Africa.
I have already lived through one miserable Cold War, and don’t want another one. I don’t want my son, and eventually my grandchildren to have to live in the terrifying shadow of fearsome states, armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons, at perpetual loggerheads. But I hear calls from many corners – including liberal corners - for stepped-up strategic competition with China and/or Russia, a comptetition which will surely lead to a global struggle similar in kind to the Cold War struggle. And while my modified Hedges title might not describe your own sentiments, I believe there is a certain amount of Cold War nostalgia afoot – as evidenced in Peter Beinart’s The Good Fight, which paints the Cold War in very heroic terms.
December 13, 2006 6:18 PM | Reply | Permalink
This is the crux of the issue. The world is moving from 6.5 billion people today to 9 billion people by mid-century. We have already reached a state where we are consuming resources at an unsustainable rate. Large parts of the world are already running out of water. Just yesterday there was a report about Africa and we all have read about 40% of China's water supply already being contaminated.
Water is just one the issues, we also know about fossil fuel issues, but other materials like Tantalum and Helium are in short supply.
All the pundits (neo-con and neo-liberals) and 99% of the economists promote "smart" growth or "sustainable" development as a solution. What they really mean is that they are unwilling to face the possibility that the industrialized world will have to scale back its standard of living. So every other idea is put forth instead: new coalitions of the greedy to force the less powerful states to continue to provide raw materials at favorable terms, myths about rising tides lifting all boats, and policies which confuse growth among the poorest with superfluous growth among those with more wealth than they know what to do with. When pieces of canvas with some paint on them sell at Sotheby's for a price which would pay for AIDS medicine for an entire country for several years then we know that the fundamentals of western society are out of step with the priorities of the rest of the world.
--- Policies not Politics
Daily Landscape
December 14, 2006 7:50 AM | Reply | Permalink