Making the Poor Count
The Louisiana Recovery Authority’s (LRA) most recent population estimates for Katrina-affected parishes (i.e., counties) are in dispute as parish officials jockey for government rebuilding funds. The LRA puts New Orleans’s population at 200,000, about forty percent of its pre-storm make-up. Mayor Ray Nagin disagrees, and it's feasible that a large invisible population exists in an urban world so tenuous as in parts of his city. A recent survey on the quality of life of New Orleanians indicates that one-third of interviewees are considering moving in the coming two years.
Researchers Report:
“To keep them from moving, interviewees said local governments need to make people feel safe, slice through red tape, fix levees, prevent flooding, repair streets, and provide more jobs and affordable housing...”
Respondents had relatively stable lives, as evidenced by their having land lines, impossible for those living in FEMA trailers. Yet, these population estimates and survey data demonstrate how the post-Katrina plight of very poor or marginalized New Orleanians has measurable implications for all New Orleanians. Furthermore, it is instructive for our national efforts to disperse the urban poor around metropolitan regions, which do little to combat the roots of poverty, but instead leaves them isolated in neighborhoods that would just as soon evict them too.
The prolonged displacement of so many New Orleanians is self-perpetuating, as their absence from the city justifies to the LRA withholding the monies necessary to help bring them home. In turn, East Baton Rouge and Jefferson Parish - adopted home to many former New Orleanians, and neighbor to Orleans Parish, respectively - compete for most populous district in the state and the funds that accompany such a distinction.
The 200 survey interviewees likely represent the 65% of current New Orleans households that are in the same home they occupied prior to the storm (accordingly, the city’s owner-occupancy rate has shifted from 46% to 62% since Katrina). Yet, they speak of the universal concerns of jobs and affordable housing in a city experiencing rental rates that are three times higher than they were prior to the storm. They also highlight the widespread concerns about infrastructure, crime and the role of government in securing the city’s safe and sustainable future. Nonetheless, the displacement of so many poor residents that many believe is essential to cleaning up the city is a phenomenon likely to deny New Orleans the full resources to rebuild.
Conversion of public housing to mixed-use properties as proposed in New Orleans (and nationwide) has the (arguably desired) effect of erasing the most vulnerable poor from urban communities. Yet, the local debate over post-storm population estimates demonstrates that far from disappearing, the displaced merely re-appear elsewhere, often with an increased need for public services. Some scholars argue that our policies towards the poor and marginalized in the US reflect a “politics of disposability.” Rather, the population shuffle in Louisiana illustrates that whether we warehouse or deconcentrate the poor, their headcount remains materially relevant to healthy and prosperous futures for all Americans.
Formally denying services and assistance to the poor only increases the eventual burden on the system, as we see with the estimated 99,000 families living in FEMA trailers 15 months after the storm. This is three times the number living in them last Thanksgiving season, at an estimated taxpayer cost of $70,000 to $140,000 per trailer. In New Orleans, renovating and re-opening structurally sound public housing as temporary worker housing would be a much more efficient and equitable use of federal dollars, and give the displaced a means to come home. Nationwide, the number of people living in poverty continues to rise, despite technically robust economic growth. Post-Katrina New Orleans stands out amidst this rising economic vulnerability as a stark lesson for progressives, who seek to enfranchise working families and take back representation and leadership from the right. As I’ve written at Foresight, New Orleans is a model for a (re)new(ed) social movement around racial and economic equity in the U.S. Progressives should rightly harness this energy and ensure that the marginalized poor are included in their equity agenda.












What is the expected interaction between housing plans and new plans to change the water flow patterns?
December 1, 2006 6:51 AM | Reply | Permalink
I don't know the exact details about how neighborhood planning (the level at which housing decisions are being made) and the plans for diverting MR GO (MS River Gulf Outlet) intersect. This is a great question, in part because it demonstrates the varied levels at which planning is taking place re: rebuilding NOLA and the surrounding parishes. The state has just released a draft plan re: coastal protection, and diverting the water flow is part of a larger regional effort to upgrade levees and restore wetlands. It appears they'd upgrade the levee system around MR GO in Orleans Parish to category 5, which is a key issue for New Orleanians. At a regional level, the bigger conflict is going to be over the state's decision to not upgrade levee protection for Lower Placquesmine Parish - New Orleans is not the only area where notions of "footprints" are in dispute.
The Orleans Levee Board is being folded into a regional authority, effective 1/1/07, and I don't know how realistically the city will coordinate its redevelopment plans (to be finalized theoretically around the same time) with these overall enviromental plans. City-Regional and City-State relationships have never been strong. Yet, the idea is that the infrastructure planning underway in the city is taking all of these larger regional issues into account, esp. since upgraded levee protection is concern #1 re: infrastucture and is a critical part of the state's overall plan for the area.
Neighborhood planning where housing strategies occur will be folded into the city-wide infrastructure plan, and I know from my planning colleagues working at the neighborhood level that they're trying to be realistic in working with residents about levee protection, availability of city services, and these city-wide decisions that will impact how/when/if neighborhoods return (I also know from these folks that it's still pretty unclear what the city-wide plans look like). In the interim, Nagin and local government have largely enabled individual, house-by-house decision-making for the last 15 months, and they're using this market-oriented activity to decide where they will place rebuilding funds, esp. given that the federal funds available will come up short in terms of what's actually needed.
I think at a certain scale housing development will be subordinate to levee and waterway decisions, as the groups with the ability to undertake large-scale development (e.g., the AFL-CIO) will likely build progressively in areas that show the strongest signs of recovery. Meanwhile, individual homes with the means to rebuild will continue to do so around the city. Nonetheless, as I mentioned in the post above, the quality of life for these individual houses - and these households' future in the city - will largely depend on how well the infrastructure of levees and waterways and utilities is built back up around them.
December 1, 2006 12:26 PM | Reply | Permalink