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Summit? What Summit?

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You're forgiven if you had failed to notice this, but the original reason for Bush's trip abroad this week was to meet up with the 25 other NATO leaders of the Alliance for a biannual summit meeting in Riga, Latvia. As James Goldgeier and I argue in a piece that appears in a number of European newspapers this morning, the reason for this summit occurring largely unnoticed are that key leaders assembling in Riga are political lame-ducks, NATO is confronting growing difficulties in stabilizing Afghanistan, and the allies have failed to adapt to the new realities of a globalized world. (On this last point, see our earlier piece here.)

Read more below the fold.

Can the leaders of history’s most successful military alliance meet without anyone really noticing? You wouldn’t have thought so given the record of past NATO summit meetings. In 1991, the NATO leaders met in Rome to adopt a new Strategic Concept to guide their Alliance in the post-Cold War world. In 1997, they came to Madrid and invited three former Warsaw Pact countries to join an organization originally created to defend its members against a Soviet-led attack from these very countries. Two years later, NATO’s leaders met in Washington to celebrate the Alliance’s 50th anniversary and to underscore its continued relevance at a time when it was engaged in its biggest military operation ever in Kosovo.

This week, NATO leaders are meeting once more. Most of them, though, seem to be determined to get in and out of Riga, Latvia, without leaving much a trace, let alone a legacy. Many of the key leaders attending have lost the confidence of their own publics, making it harder to pursue an ambitious agenda. A Labour Party resuscitated by Tony Blair nearly a decade ago has turned on the prime minister, forcing him to step down next summer. Jacques Chirac is a lame duck, and much of France has turned its attention to the battle between its next generation of sparkling, ambitious leaders who are battling to succeed him. And George W. Bush has been dealt the biggest political shellacking of his career by an American electorate clearly fed up with his administration’s incompetence in Iraq, New Orleans, and elsewhere. Angela Merkel must be wondering if there is anyone to work with.

Political paralysis at home affects what NATO can do abroad. As its leaders meet, they confront the specter of failure in the Alliance’s biggest and most important military operation in Afghanistan. NATO set itself a tall order — to stabilize a country wrecked by more than a quarter of a century of civil war and a standard of living that ranks tenth from the bottom among all countries in the world. Afghanistan’s economy depends heavily on opium production, its politics remain paralyzed by the deep divisions, and its security is increasingly challenged by the resurgence of Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces.

NATO took on this mission, knowing that it would be difficult and require extraordinary effort. Unfortunately, it hasn’t provided the means necessary to succeed. Some countries have failed to provide even the troops and capabilities promised, while others have placed such severe restrictions on what their forces can do and where they can be deployed that their presence is practically useless. Yet, even with a full complement of troops and without national “caveats” on what these forces can do, the operation will likely fail without a much greater effort by the Alliance members. Unfortunately, with the United States mired in Iraq and European militaries stretched thin, the Alliance may have bitten off more than it can chew.

There is a temptation in some circles to believe that NATO should think smaller — and once again focus its efforts on the core mission of securing Europe. Indeed, aside from Afghanistan, the main topics of conversation in Riga will likely concern issues close to home — the effort to stabilize the Balkans, reaching out to key neighbors like Ukraine and Georgia, and sorting out the relationship between NATO and the European Union.

These are important issues — but they don’t go to the core of what ails the Alliance. Far too many of its members still think of NATO as primarily a regional — and European — defense organization. But the threats all of the Alliance members face today are global, not regional. Whether it is terrorism or weapons proliferation or failing states, the main challenges confronting Europe and the United States stem from beyond the north Atlantic region. That, after all, is why NATO is in Afghanistan.

So rather than thinking smaller and more regionally, NATO must think bigger and more globally. It must develop a strategy that meets these global challenges head on. NATO needs to develop and procure military capabilities that will enable it to project military power over great distances and at rapid speed. And it must enhance its collective capacity to operate globally by endorsing President Bush’s proposal to create a global partnership with other democratic countries, like Japan, Australia, and South Korea. Indeed, these non-European democracies should down the road be invited to join the Alliance as full members.

The Riga summit provides NATO leaders with an opportunity to set a new course — one that makes success in Afghanistan a first step towards making the Alliance an increasingly relevant actor on the world stage. Realizing this transformation will take time — and likely will require a new set of leaders — but the effort must begin with a new mindset, one that deals with the world as it is, rather than as it once was or as some would still wish it to be.


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Does Riga really provide "NATO leaders with an opportunity to set a new course"? The reluctance to provide support in Afghanistan--where Article V has been invoked, where the national security link is clearest, and where troops are engaged on the ground--suggests a pretty deep aversion to this expansive vision of NATO. If the opposition based in popular sentiment (as it appears to be in some countries) then the opportunities for bold steps at Riga, or anytime soon, seem slim.
Carl Robichaud, www.AfghanistanWatch.org

"Can the leaders of history’s most successful military alliance meet without anyone really noticing?"

We in Germany certainly notice. We are aware that the NATO is at crossroads.

Our newspapers have written a lot about the upcoming summit as well as about the mouthful Merkel is going to get from Canada, Britain, UK about South Afghanistan.

"create a global partnership with other democratic countries, like Japan, Australia, and South Korea. Indeed, these non-European democracies should down the road be invited to join the Alliance as full members."

Partnership sounds good. Perhaps Japan and South Korea could help in Afghanistan.

If they would join the alliance, we would need to defend them: We would need to put aside military resources for potential operations re North Korea, China, Indonesia etc. Though, we don't have the resources to spare.

Europe is busy with the Balkans, Afghanistan, Middle East and Africa; and you never know what will happen in Russia... I think this makes us Europeans skeptical about globalizing NATO. We don't have the resources to get involved in North Asia and South-East Asia.

And why should we?

There are plenty of security risks in and around Europe: Migration, Failing States in Africa, Terrorism, arms smuggling, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine conflict, Kosovo, Bosnia, Belarus, etc.
So far we are not dealing with them very well.

Given our limited resources, we should focus on the security threats closer to home rather than spreading them to the Far East.
Japan, South Korea and Australia are not helping with the threats against Europe anyway. (Okay, they have troops in Iraq, but they will soon pull out and leave a mess behind that endangers Europe more than them.)


My blog: Atlantic Review - A press digest on transatlantic affairs edited by three German Fulbright Alumni

@ Robichaud:
"The reluctance to provide support in Afghanistan"

There has been a reluctance to accept support in Afghanistan.
NATO invoked article V, but the Bush administration preferred to go into Afghanistan without NATO.

Only later, when they planned the war against Iraq and lost interest in Afghanistan, did they give NATO a limited role for Kabul.

Only last year, when developments in Afghanistan deteriorated a lot (primarily due to the lack of interest in Washington), did the Bush administration seek more NATO involvement.
By that time it was too late. If NATO had been involved in all regions of Afghanistan right after 9/11, then things would be better. And if they would not be, then you could blame the Europeans.
That is my impression. Do you read it differently?

Incidentally, I have blogged about the Afghanistan intervention on the cheap and about about the issue, whether Germany should send troops to Southern Afghanistan.


Afghanistan and Iraq have both a population of some 30 million people. While the US has some 150,000 troops in Iraq, you only have some 25,000 troops in Afghanistan.

While I agree that you are right to criticize
European reluctance to provide more support in Afghanistan, it should also be noted that the US has not provide adequate resources either. How can you expect us to send more troops to Afghanistan, while you send so few troops to Afghanistan compared to Iraq?

Dan Hamilton has just emailed his op-ed with similar points:
"NATO summit I: In area, or in trouble"

Quote: "If NATO is visible in expeditionary missions but invisible when it comes to protecting our societies, support for the alliance will wane. Its role will be marginalized and our security diminished. NATO's new mantra must be "in area or in trouble." Unfortunately, the topic is not even on the Riga agenda."

Any thoughts?

My blog: Atlantic Review - A press digest on transatlantic affairs edited by three German Fulbright Alumni

With the Cold War long over, any expansive vision of NATO must be linked to a new global security threat. The Global War on Terrorism may fit the bill but that threat is much more problematic to organize conceptually and structurally, especially with lame ducks quacking and without new members beyond Europe.

.  .  .  we don't have the resources to spare  .  .  .  Given our limited resources   .  .  .  .

And what's the current gross domestic product of the European Union? 

Joerg:

Good points, though I do read it a bit differently.

I agree that the US provided far few troops in Afghanistan to secure the country. America's early strategy was both flawed and under-supported, and for that it deserves a large margin of responsibility. But Europe's failure, over several years now, to provide the troops it says are necessary--or to allow the troops that are there to do their job, free of restrictive caveats--puts it firmly on the hook.

At this point, the number of troops is not the most important dimension--more critical is how those troops are employed and what level (and type) of reconstruction assistance is provided. Nevertheless, even a modest increase in troop levels (e.g. on the order of the 2,000 rapid reaction forces that Gen James Jones called for in Sept) could make a big difference, and isn't a lot to ask from NATO.

-Carl, www.AfghanistanWatch.org

I suspect any policy recommendation coming out of the Bush Foreign Policy Shop will be viewed in many NATO countries as water from an already poisoned well. The Bush Unilateralists have driven so many decisions, how could any offering be viewed as otherwise.

It strikes me that at least in the US this opens up the possibility for bipartisian leadership (Perhaps Biden plus Chuck Hagel and whoever they draw in) to attempt the creation of some sort of bipartisian revival -- a proto power center on NATO, and ultimately more broadly on Foreign Policy -- that begins to travel and consult, particularly with newly emerging political leaders in NATO countries, and perhaps beyond.

There needs to be a clear rejection of Bush style unilateralism in many of its technical details and patterns, and I suspect it is only when that is firmly quashed will more thoughtful American leadership again be accepted.

According to Wikipedia: The European Union has a GDP of 12.4 trillian USD (2005) using Purchasing power parity (PPP) equivalence.
The US GDP (PPP) for 2006 is estimated at USD 13.0 trillion.

I guess, you are saying that we should spend a higher percentage of our GDP on defense.

GDP per capita, however, is much smaller in the EU!
US: $43,555
EU: $29,338.

Thus, we are not as rich as the United States is.

Besides, fighting poverty, unemployment, taking care of the elderly, the homeless, public health insurance etc is for Europeans more important than playing an influential role in North and South East Asia.

Besides, EU enlargement has been part of our security policy. Germany is paying a lot for the EU. This money should be considered defense spending as well.

Likewise, Europe spends more money on development aid around the world. Especially, Germans like to see their country and the EU as a civilian power rather than a military power.

That's why we are not going to shift significantly more resources to the defense budget.

I think there have been polls showing that Americans do not prefer such a large defense spending either.

And even if we would do so, it would take years until this investment materializes into more military resources.

The Riga summit provides NATO leaders with an opportunity to set a new course — one that makes success in Afghanistan a first step towards making the Alliance an increasingly relevant actor on the world stage.

Totalling your car in an accident gives you the opportunity to upgrade to that Ferrari you always wanted.

So rather than thinking smaller and more regionally, NATO must think bigger and more globally. It must develop a strategy that meets these global challenges head on. NATO needs to develop and procure military capabilities that will enable it to project military power over great distances and at rapid speed. And it must enhance its collective capacity to operate globally by endorsing President Bush’s proposal to create a global partnership with other democratic countries, like Japan, Australia, and South Korea. Indeed, these non-European democracies should down the road be invited to join the Alliance as full members.

It doesn't appear to me that there is a great deal of enthusiasm for an expanded NATO mission built around more ambitious global commitments, and a larger membership. Exactly how "relevant" do you want NATO to be? And for what purposes should NATO be willing to "project force"?

Expanding NATO membership will not necessarily make its current members safer. Every new member means an additional security commitment for the other members. In other words its a way of jutting ones chin out further into the world and exposing it to more fists. It's not at all clear to me that the added security that comes from acquiring new force projection platforms around the world justifies the incresed risk that comes from an expanded perimeter.

It is also hard to imagine NATO maintaining its coherence and integrity if it is scattered all over the world, and is degraded into a political-diplomatic tool for loose coalition-building, or an all-purpose police force and fire brigade. The more involved and extensive the security commitments become, the less believable they are.

I also worry that an expanded NATO will be seen incresingly as a global bloc whose unstated mission is the containment of China and Russia. In other words, this envisioned bigger NATO doesn't look like a post-Cold War organization at all, but rather a revised and extended This is the wrong way to go at this juncture in world history. We should be working right now to improving overall relations with China and Russia and developing joint projects with them for security cooperation in the most globally vital areas.

NATO is and should remain a defensive alliance. I think it's time to lay to rest the 90's style global NATO-ization dream, which tends to see NATO less as a true military alliance and more as a diplomatic carrot, and the political-military muscle behind a program Western-oriented globalization from the Atlantic out.

I wouldn't be surprised if NATO's next big project is covering Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian occupied territories.

That cannot be organized either publicly at the moment or with US leadership.

Contrary to the U.S. the Europeans do not live on an island isolated from other aggressors. They have to prioritize the more immediate threats, and the more serious long-term threats.

But, the most important point is not there being "no money in the purse" for military spendings, but that the peoples see migration currents and climat change as at least as serious threats, and armies and NATO don't seem to be the right tool to address them.

As usual, I think Dan nails the issue pretty well.

One additional point is that NATO's non-American members seem to be made scapegoats for a Afghanistan mission that they had no influence over until Washington tired of the mess (well, one may wonder if they still have any real influence). It doesn't really contribute to the Alliance's popularity to be used as a tool for domestic American politics.

Although discussions regarding withdrawal from NATO doesn't occur anywhere I know, the enthusiasm for the alliance has diminished substantially.

A key component for this is that the electorates in the member countries see very different threats, and at least in countries I know the best have very low confidence in NATO's ability to take on "new" issues, such as terrorism that has plauged us at least since the 1960s or proliferation of atomic weapons.

At the same time, many countries continue to see Russia as the most important military threat, although at the moment it's more of a ticking-bomb threat than an immediate danger of invasion.

I guess historians one day will be able to conclude that the minor members of NATO, including France, Spain and Germany, were too polite to tell their aspiring leader America that the alliance had fulfilled its role and ought to be given a decent burial.

But it's obvious that the populations of the member countries are not inclined to spend more lifes or more money on what's increasingly felt to be little else than America's Imperial Project.

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