My perception, for what its worth, is that Sistani is saving his political capital.

He was always in a dicey situation. If he becomes too close to the Americans, then he loses his credibility through that association.

Basically, in Iraq, anyone associated with the Americans might as well have open running genital sores and a compulsion to display them to children. America is not well liked, and those who America favours are disliked for that. Those who prosper from America are targets. Those who America raises up as allies are dead men walking. It's as if Hitler was alive and occasionally endorsing certain jewish politicians.

So it was incumbent upon Sistani not to get too close or to be seen as allied with or affiliated with the American occupation.

On the other hand, Sistani could not oppose the American occupation too strongly.

In the worst possible case, they'd simply bomb him, or take him out and shoot him, or ship him to Abu Ghraib, stick lightsticks up his ass, electrodes to his genitals, lit cigarettes in his ear and waterboard him to their hearts content. All of these treatments were given to highly ranked Sunni generals and tribal leaders, so its foolish to say that Sistani or anyone else was immune.

Another worst possible case would be a futile and bloody confrontation with American power which would see thousands or tens of thousands of ill prepared, unorganized, badly trained followers dead. Its one thing to turn out 100,000 for a demonstration. Its another to turn that 100,000 into an arym.

Finally and worse, a direct confrontation would crush Sistani's political power entirely.

So, from Sistan's point of view, he needed to be in a sweet spot of not being associated with the occupation, but not being openly at war with it. From that position, he could garner the support of the majority of Iraqi's who disliked America but were unwilling to risk open revolt.

Give the guy credit, he managed to find and hold that sweet spot for quite some time. His interventions twice pulled the Americans off the Mahdi army and saved Sadr's but. He also managed to maintain a lot of peace and civility among Shiites for an extended period. And he repeatedly trumped Bremer with his insistence on elections, despite relentless American opposition.

Essentially, he was able to moderate the Americans actions against the radicals with threat of crowds, and neutralize the radicals actions against Americans by pushing or forcing non-violent options. In each case, he used his control of the center to use one side against another.

But a balancing like that is hard to sustain. In a way, his own success was his undoing.

By finally getting elections, and getting an elected Iraqi government, Sistani was trapped supporting that government. That government itself was a pawn of the United States. Thus, Sistani inevitably found himself being associated, through the elected government, with the American occupation.

At the same time, Sadr's success and survival (because of Sistani), and the continuing escalation of the Sunni insurgency meant that there was a lot more room on the 'resistance' side for movement. Radicalism became more acceptable and popular.

The result was that Sistani found himself moved out of his 'sweet spot'. Increasingly indirectly associated with the occupation, and perceived as increasingly out of touch with the broadening radicalizing political spectrum, his influence diminished with both.

The twin failures came: He demanded that the elected government impose a timetable on the Americans... and that didn't happen. Which meant that he had lost the ability, or reached the limits of his ability, to pressure the Americans, he'd lost the perception of his control over masses. At the same time, his calls to cease violence against Sunnis went unheeded, meaning that he was now too associated with Americans and too out of touch to matter.

In that situation, Sistani had two options. He could quickly pontificate himself into irrelevance, futilely burning away his remaining political capital.

Or he could retreat from the field, preserving both dignity and mystique, and wait for the wheel to turn and conditions to favour him once again.

The election of an American puppet government had cost him legitimacy. The best that he could do was to remove his legitimacy from, and remove the legitimacy from, the American puppet government by turning away from it.

With respect to the radicalized elements, they had proven that they were unwilling to listen to him. The worst thing that he could do would be to keep talking to them, and reinforcing his impotence.

Now, he can play the sleeping giant. Detached from the horrors of both sides, he is responsible for neither. He is untainted. He becomes a symbol of honour, of integrity and of hope. He's the king in Avalon, who may some day return to save the nation... Barbarossa sleeping in his cave... the 12th Imam waiting, the messiah in the distance.

Preserving his credibility and his legitmacy is important. The Americans can't be beaten, but neither can they triumph. Sooner or later, they'll have to leave. The various radicalising factions will war with each other, and will discredit themselves and each other with most of the population. At some point, they will need someone who is of them, but not tainted, someone who is above and outside, to bring them together and make peace to unite the country.

Or at least, this is the role that he sees for himself. Let's hope that he's right.

In a sense, its also a role that Sadr is trying for, but on a more populist level.

One final thing.

Sistani has absolutely less than zero interest in saving America in Iraq. He's not inclined to give a rats ass about American soldiers lives, when the death rate is 200 Iraqi lives for every dead American. He's not sympathetic to any ambition that America has. He doesn't like how you've conducted yourselves, doesn't like the occupation, isn't impressed by the reconstruction, how you've played games with the population, or anything that you plan to do.

If it were up to Sistani, every American in Iraq today would be dead or outside of the country in a year.

Given that he's withdrawn, my advice is to let sleeping giants lie. Wake him up too early, and that might be a bad thing.

For instance, were America to unilaterally declare a partition of Iraq, or to declare Kurdistan independent... then I think Sistani would likely declare a fatwa and a jihad against America.

This isn't the bullshit fatwas that Osama Bin Laden issues. Sistani is the real deal, and his declarations are genuine theological and social instruments, taken very seriously by other clerics and by the worshippers. The population is radicalized enough that a Fatwa like this would basically let everything loose.

How's that? Does it help to answer the question?