The Princeton Project Strikes Back, Part I

John and I can certainly thank our commenters for vigorous discussion, even if they didn’t seem to find much to like. Let me address some of the comments we have gotten in three separate posts. First is the debate over whether we actually offer a strategy or not. Second is the core debate between ever-shifting versions of isolationism versus internationalism – this time around framed as “give up on promoting values of any kind and simply stick to balance of power politics” versus “pay attention to the actual life conditions of individuals within states around the world and recognize the ways in which their governments treat them can threaten us.” As usual, there are caricatures aplenty floating around in all the comments on this issue, but if we can't have an honest debate here and move on then we can’t get anywhere. Finally, I will address those critiques that charge us with and unrealistic expectations, either in terms of domestic politics (Peter Trubowitz), or international politics (Steve and Dan).

Steve and Dan both claim that the Princeton Project report does not actually offer a strategy so much as a laundry list of threats. In Dan’s words: “The point of a grand strategy is to prioritize, and FWLL simply refuses to do that. “ With all respect, guys, you just don’t get it. John and I know perfectly well what a strategy must be and do, see the section from the executive summary describing the criteria for a successful national security strategy for the 21st century. But our major point is that any strategy in the 21st century based on prioritizing a few of the major threats we identified – an implosion of the entire Middle East, global terror networks, nuclear proliferation, global pandemics, energy security, or the challenges – the rise of China and India, widening global inequality -- was not doing what a strategy in the 21st century must do.

Alternatively, perhaps ignore the rise of China and India? Is Steve, the neo-realist and offshore balancer of power, telling us that we should not make the greatest geopolitical shift of power in two centuries a priority? Energy security? Without energy, the U.S. has no power. Global pandemics? At one of the last Princeton Project meetings in Washington two leading traditional national security experts, one of whom has just published the book Hard Power, were busy debating whether global warming or avian flu posed the greatest threat to the American way of life. One little viral mutation, and all of us will by lying awake at night trying desperately to figure out how to protect our children.

Our point is that old think – prioritize a few threats and focus on those – just won’t do. This is not exactly a radical thought, except perhaps to traditional national security thinkers. Fortune magazine recently wrote a piece about how Bill Ford stepped down with the admission that Ford’s business model just didn’t work any more. Fortune observed, “Ford’s lament is the signature cry of our age. Across sectors—retailing, brokerage, software, publishing, computers—business models that produced profits for decades have shut down. In most cases managers aren’t sure what the new model will be, but they’re absolutely certain it won’t have a multidecade lifespan.” In a world in which information flows so fast and so fully and dramatic change can happen overnight, placing a few big bets is the fastest way to go out of business altogether. That is why we argued for turning to an interest-based strategy, one that identified the resources, the people, and the infrastructure that we will need to address any of these threats quickly and effectively, and to set about building it based on a calculus of maximum impact and multiple use. That may not look like the kind of strategy that folks like Steve and Dan recognize, but welcome to the 21st century.

What Steve wants as a strategy is something that looks like: containment, engagement, hegemony, or off-shore balancing. That is what he defines as “grand strategy.” As I pointed out in my first post, we went looking for that kind of a strategy and concluded that it simply could no longer do the job. But if he needs a one-word label, we would define ours grand strategy as order-building – both within and among nations – building an order that is legitimate and that allows and empowers actors within states and states themselves to harness their collective capacity to meet whatever threat dominates the agenda. To create that kind of an order requires both protecting liberty and upholding the rule of law, backed by force if necessary. Steve and Dan may not like that strategy, but it is a strategy.

Steve, however, hears “liberty under law” as nothing more than a “euphemism” for democracy promotion, and he and Dan and Peter all equate democracy promotion with the promotion or even imposition of American values on the rest of the world. Those are exactly the kinds of equations we sought to challenge and undo, but that is for my next post.


Comments (51)

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Prof. Slaughter:

You supported the war in Iraq. That war caused 650,000 unnecessary deaths.

Do you see why there might be a little problem when you talk about a strategy for protecting liberty and upholding the rule of law... backed by force if necessary?

I hate to rub it in but in Iraq you supported force without the rule of law. And over half a million people have died because of that illegal use of force.

Is that particular fact so completely irrelevant to the discussion at hand that it doesn't merit being addressed?

Isn't the fact that the rest of the world will have utter contempt for our values for a long time bound to affect our capacity to play a constructive role?

Iraq was the major event of this generation. You got it wrong. Now you tell us how to get "national security right." Do you see the problem?

My point on "democracy promotion" was that it really is unnecessary in the overall strategy. I might be missing something here. Order building is not synonymous with democracy promotion. All the various peoples of the world have their own unique historical backgrounds, including we ourselves. I see stability by order under law not necessarily requiring democracy promotion but accepting a kind of international pluralism, which should not be something alien to our democratic sensibilities. Of course even pluralism has its limits and some regimes are beyond toleration.

Why not seek a grand modus vivendi? Why do you insist that it has to be our form of government? That's what puzzles me.

We have a perfect example of what a losing proposition spreading democracy is in our meddling in the Middle East.

So you say, " we are not looking for mere democratic process but implementation of certain kinds of LAWS that insure basic liberties to its citizens." This you see as transforming outmoded ways of life to the good life we enjoy. The Kantian program of Perpetual Peace as someone mentioned.

I think that this project is overly ambitious and not capable of being implemented by force if need be. But besides that, even if it were implementable I'm not sure that a homogeneous world modeled after ours is really all that appealing from the perspective of evolutionary anthropology (to coin a word).

unstructured individualism just does not seem to me to be the last word on the Human Project. But I might be wrong. What puzzles me is how you seem to be so sure that you are right about this most consequential part of your programme

To call upon Americans to “pay attention to the actual life conditions of individuals within states around the world and recognize the ways in which their governments treat them can threaten us” is to advance an unsupported assertion as an underpinning of (excuse for?) a grand global strategy -- Wilson at his meddlesome worst.

Most of the listed "terrors" can and will be met by important and interested nations working within international administrative organizations; and yes, their procedures require greater transparency and democratization than they exhibit today. But they don't require a grand strategy to operate effectively.

And I think that, as a matter of common decency, few would argue against offering a nation's authoritarian elite carrots in consideration of their lifting their foot from their subjects' necks. And a stick, too, but not a stick whose effect will be the destabilization of that nation's society.

 

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kent roberts,i would think that a more commonsense approach to governing in all facets of the government would be a better approach then any ideaology.thats what gets this country into trouble,ideaologies,concern for our country internally should be a priority,above anything else the american people should come first,then our attention should focus on the most pressing external problems.still commonsense,practical and pragmatic should be the order of the day.example:you hear a lot of mouthing about our energy problems,but nothing is being done.we should have taken care of this problem 40 years ago and taking care of this problem removes us from involvement in such wordly problems.there is a fortune that could be made in the alternative enery area that could benefit all americans and the country,but no,mouthing is all we get.

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I didn't realize this. If Prof. Slaughter would like credibility at this site she needs to explain why she was so imperceptive as to support Bush's con job, explain that she realizes exactly what was wrong in the neo-cons thought process, and explain how the new national security approach will avoid the simplistic views of reality as exhibited by the Bush crowd.

Then she can be a serious player in this discussion.

Tom

There was something empty about that strike back.  It lingered over the rhetorical device of the Ford analogy.  Ford is in trouble, so old thinking generally must go. That justifies anything and nothing about any and no field. Indeed, speaking of old thinking, it seems to be targetting a style of old thinking in a foreign-policy establishment, much of which to us is going to be meaningless. (Notice that she doesn't take notice of commenters anyhow, only formal posts. We don't count.) 

The rest seemed to argue, if I follow, that since health and environmental issues are important, foreign policy must change. I've been an environmentalist forever, but I have trouble seeing how it bears here. I'm certainly aware that energy independence can alter one's policy options, but then I wasn't really planning to invade Iraq for its oil anyhow. I'm aware that funding for science rather than a military buildup may be a good idea, that multinational agreements such as the Kyoto accord are important to pursue, and that these and the WHO may create a greater basis for cooperation among nations. But most liberals accepted all that long ago, too, and it doesn't take the threat of disease to make it so. 

I keep having trouble finding much at all in this grand strategy, and maybe it's my poor reading skills, but I haven't replied because I don't know what to reply to. I can see it's not the same as isolationism, as Kissinger's or Kagan's realism, or a Neocon takeover of the world, but those mostly suggest to me that grand strategies are silly anyhow. I can see that it supports multinational accords, democracy, and human rights, but any variant of liberalism always has. I suspect we're just watching academics trying to join the kids in the same sandbox as the Beltway so they can get more candy. 

John 

http://www.haberarts.com/

I think democracy is the outcome of a long process of ever growing liberties, each of which sustains the other liberties and so on.
In the mean time we have modus vivendi and even we might discover or learn love something we haven't even heard of before.

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grand strategies are silly anyhow

I secretly (or sometimes not so secretly) held this opinion since I figured out what the heck they actually studied in the field of International Relations. I try to keep my mouth shut about it, though, cause it's sort of disrespectful to imply that someone has spent their life doing a late 19th/20th century Brit thing in a completely changed world.

Being a proud relativist, I'm not much for the idea of grand truths of any kind, but if you absolutely have to have some kind of grand strategy, I must admit that I see something in the fact that the Star Trek Prime Directive sounds not only dandy, but remarkably similar in thought to George Washington's farewell address to an infant nation that became one of the most successful in the world by following it most of the time until the 20th century. It's not isolationism, it's more like "live long and prosper" while traveling everywhere and chatting with and learning about other kinds of folks. :-) Even the Bible has a version in "be fruitful and prosper."

Why doesn't a country like Switzerland need a "grand strategy"?

Just the idea of a grand strategy in theory is to my mind very conservative, presuming that there are some core truths to base things on, and an aversion to the idea that the only constant is change. It is certainly contrary to things like business management theory where the idea is to remain nimble and creative and be able to react to things that happen in new and different ways. It sort of presumes humans can predict the future.

the logic of ever-growing liberties leads us right back to man in a state of nature, where s/he has total liberty to love, cooperate, share, but also to plunder, kill and rape. Total Liberty is total disater.

As to the vision of Man as transcending evolutionary forces that constantly threatens all life with extinction, I might share that view to some extent. Still scarcity of resources does not bode well for this utopian vision in the short and medium range either.

At one of the last Princeton Project meetings in Washington two leading traditional national security experts, one of whom has just published the book Hard Power, were busy debating whether global warming or avian flu posed the greatest threat to the American way of life. One little viral mutation, and all of us will by lying awake at night trying desperately to figure out how to protect our children.
I suppose my first reaction would be that while Kyoto certainly drew attention to global warming, and data pro or con, there seems to be a lack of awareness of epidemiology.
If one looks back through well-recorded human history, and the less well-documented Middle Ages, we don't see a huge number of massively fatal pandemics. At this point, we are reasonably certain the Black Plague was an organism with multiple transmission modes, at least one of quickly lethal respiratory transmission, and another of skin lesions. The leading candidate has been Yersinia pestis, the organism we associate with bubonic, pneumonic, and septicemic plague -- all different presentations of the same infection. There is some data suggesting that it might bave been Bacillus anthracis, which, like plague, has different modes: cutaneous, pneumonic, and gastrointestinal. The description of the skin effects are closer to plague than anthrax, but we really don't know.
The 1918-1920 influenza pandemic seems to have been the worst disease outbreak in recorded history. While it was called "Spanish", more recent evidence suggests it developed in the US, especially in densely populated military camps. That population density was important, because extremely "hot" infections tend to burn out all available hosts in a fairly short time. Not long ago, there was a nasty outbreak of Marburg hemorrhagic fever in Angola, but it probably killed under 1000 people before it lost critical mass, and also mutated to a less virulent form. It's not to the evolutionary advantage of a pathogen to kill potential hosts quickly.
Saying "just one little mutation" would turn avian flu into something analogous to 1918 is, from the standpoint of epidemiology, not all that likely. We have a reasonable data base on influenza mutation, and the idea of translation from birds or pigs to humans, typically from western China, is not new. For that matter, there are two strains of avian flu, H5N1 and H5N2, which will have sub-variants. The "Spanish Lady" was H1N1, and the exact viral sequence and mutation is known.
I read daily infectious disease reports, and there is superb international cooperation in tracking H5N1 and H5N2. Public health officials are not hesitant to quarantine, although H5N1 simply hasn't shown itself to be extremely contagious from birds to humans, and there's only questionable evidence of human-to-human spread. If there are pockets that can be quarantined, we do have drugs with some useful effect.
In other words, let's continue the tracking and preparedness, but not looking for panic given a mutation that would be quite different than the way influenza viruses appear to mutate.

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Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

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My God, for once I agree with artappraiser! I have always wondered why people think there should be any goal for foreign policy higher than "Avoid catastrophe." I mean, even meeting that standard would be a considerable improvement.

I was already tired enough of wishes that the Democrats had more big ideas, meaning a grand strategy somehow uniting domestic issues from race and the environment to taxes. Well, we do have nice, big ideas, but it's precisely the strategy spin on them that makes the wish so silly. I suspect the grand strategy thing in foreign affairs comes from the holdover of military metaphors and thus, one stage removed, the militarization of foreign policy. No wonder it's basically seeking an alternative to Realists and Neocons, and no wonder what it actually says is so hard to pin down.

John

http://www.haberarts.com/

A sweet book about Turkey's transition to modernity is "Birds Without Wings", and it portrays the sad result of the "big idea" that enraptured both Greeks and Turks around the time of WWI. The writer laments the loss of shared community formerly enjoyed by disparate cultures in the small towns of Anatolia.

It might be small ideas that are needed.

Are we trying to merge defense policy and foreign policy?  I hope not.  The military should not be a part of any foreign policy.  The military is for our defense, something that seems to have been totally forgotten over the past 50 years.  No President should have the authority to send the US military into another country just to push forward that President's ideas about foreign affairs.  Iraq, of course, and Vietnam are exhibits one in that regard.

Foreign policy should be about maintaining friendly relationships among all of the nations in the world, whether we approve of their governments or not.  And, under no circumstances should business interests dictate foreign policy.

If we believe in capitalism, which I don't, we should not be demanding our government to interfere in business matters, such as oil suppllies, and trade balance issues.  We should, according to capitalism, maintain an adequate supply of oil by paying the best price for it, and we should maintain trade balance by selling at the best price and buying at the lowest price.

Today, our foreign policy is largely a construct by and for big corporations, aimed at maximizing the profits for those corporations.  Changing that should be the first order of business. 

Hoppy in Sacramento

I've been working on my Linux box for the past couple of weeks -- don't ask; I wouldn't know the answer, anyway -- and must have missed the announcement that the "Truman Project" has morphed into the "Princeton Project."

When did that happen? 

I'm hearing a bit of confusion here. Clausewitz defined war as the extension of national policy/politics by military means. Grand strategy is still concerned with the extension of national policy, not limited to military means, but also including diplomacy, information operations, law enforcement, covert and clandestine operations, "national means of technical verification" (i.e., intelligence collection by technical means) and economic warfare.

The problem, it seems, is not of the grand strategy itself -- it is the lack of a coherent and useful policy that the grand strategy provides the means to carry out.
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Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

Core truths are things like: Humans are multicellular organisms, murder is wrong, and 2+2 =4.

Grand Strategies often reduce to Grand Tragedies.

The more complex and non-empirically or analytically verifiable, the less a chance it has to correspond to the (admittedly) elusive REAL. So I would say to artappraiser and all the minions of relativists out there: au contraire. If you want to present evidence for your relativism don't appeal to anything like a "Grand Strategy" or "Cosmic Vision". Show me that 2+ 2 =4 is open to debate, or that perhaps you (as you read this) really might not exist at all. If you can't tackle these simple truths, don't bother proclaiming the triumph of relativism. Don't tell us how smokey it gets when Princeton "experts" in International Relations wax eloquently about Grand Designs, Grand Strategies or whatever else is grand.

There is a utility in sketching these "visions of a future world", if only to assuage the anxieties of the present.
At least it brings to our attention what the world MIGHT be like in the future if we follow their prescriptions. It's like predicting the weather. You would not dismiss it as useless merely because the predication is not guaranteed.
In short--among his/her numerous other noble traits--Man is a predicting animal (which btw you might add to your list of things that are NOT relative truths)

I'm afraid I must disagree on several points. Now, as I have posted elsewhere in this thread, there is a useful definition of grand strategy, as the assortment of means to carry out national policy. It is the policy that is now flawed, not the means of executing policy, with the caveat that inappropriate means may be used for certain objectives.

The proper role of the military is that which civilian policymakers assign to it. Unfortunately, civilian policymakers have been assigning roles that are not even possible, to say nothing of the ethics involved. No significant nation, however, does not balance its diplomatic and military capabilities.

You speak of defense, but I suggest that is a slippery term. The Cold War was very real, and fought with an assortment of strategic deterrents, proxy wars, and alliances. Certainly, a defense cannot be totally passive -- are you suggesting that once attacked, the US should not have taken the war to Tokyo and Berlin?

Economic warfare can be misused, but it is a very real part of national strategy. For example, in WWII, a British Mosquito light bomber flew a round trip to Sweden, where it loaded up with all the ball bearings the British could buy, at whatever price the Swedes would guarantee they would be sold to the Allies rather than the Germans. It was far cheaper to outbid Germany for third-country products than it was to launch the nearly catastrophic bombing raids at the German bearing plants at Schweinfurt. Germany did not have enough bearing manufacturing capability, and keeping them from importing them was critical.

The Germans tried to conquer oil fields rather than import it, so the only means of dealing with their petroleum sector was to attack it. Unfortunately for both sides, the bombing offensive never stayed with one system long enough, until nearly the end of the war when it hit petroleum hard enough to starve the German military. The previous approaches of ball bearings this week, fighter factories the next, a refinery the week after that, and so forth, never delivered a knockout to any target system. It merely prolonged misery on both sides.

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Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

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"Fortune magazine recently wrote a piece about how Bill Ford stepped down with the admission that Ford’s business model just didn’t work any more. Fortune observed, “Ford’s lament is the signature cry of our age. Across sectors—retailing, brokerage, software, publishing, computers—business models that produced profits for decades have shut down. In most cases managers aren’t sure what the new model will be, but they’re absolutely certain it won’t have a multidecade lifespan.”

- I'm not sure what the above means. Toyota makes the same kind of product as Ford, and makes a profit. Of course, if the business model was "people will buy whatever sh** we produce" then the sooner that business model shuts down, the better.

Yes; it was a very silly and rhetorically unproductive analogy.

To me (and I suspect to Vico, as well), your "core truths" seem to be tautologies.

You don't know what tautologies are. A tautology is something like: If it rains then it rains. 2+2=4 is not a tautology in that sense. Tautologies are trivially true statements that are true for linguistic/logical reasons alone. Those in mathematics are extremely useful and not tautologies. There is a reason why Mathematics Departments exist. They are not called Departments of Tautologies. Murder is wrong is certainly not a tautology. To say humans are comprised of cells is also not a tautology. It actually says something substantive about human beings. And to say that Man is a predicting animal is synthetic so not possibly a tautology. I don't want to sound pedantic with you Ellen, but you really don't know what you are talking about.

On Tuesday there were reports that 2 pigs in Indonesia tested positive for H5N1. I do not know if it was the strain which is proving close to universally fatal to humans but if it is we are one big step closer to annihilation.

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The grand strategy of "order building" has the same arrogance as the specific strategy of attempting to build order in foreign societies through military force. Again, no wonder so many liberal internationalists supported the war in Iraq. In all ways, they overestimate their ability and the ability of the United States to impose order on social processes, in particular the nasty, competitive business of international relations.

As an aside, one wonders what the point of all these meetings with all these experts was under the guise of the Princeton Project. Best I can tell, Slaughter and Ikenberry are arguing now precisely what they would have argued prior to spending all this money on fancy dinners and conferences. It's a bit strange to read Slaughter and Ikenberry talking as the "Princeton Project" striking back. Does this report in any way represent the views of the myriad people involved in the Princton Project, many (most?) of whom would disagree with the final report? Slaughter and Ikenberry wrote this report, and it reflects their ideas.

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Professor Slaughter

What are the broader goals that you see as part of a foreign policy? Should there an effort to allow each nation state to determine its own fate and its own policies? What is to be done with groups that demand self determinaton? Should there be a midwifing of a greater globalism?

The Right and the Left are both is hysteric mode urging Americans to be afraid of something whether terrorism or economic globalism and Wal-Mart. Can you really have a non-authoritarian, or even non-totalitarian foreign policy based on people's fears? There seems to be too great a temptation to squelch all dissent and a demand for a lockstep type of thinking. Why shouldn't the goal of an American foreign policy first and foremost be the promotion of a liberal global system and an increasing liberalism within each nation?

Daniel A. Greenbaum

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I think there is a fundamental belief among the People Who Dine at Conferences(tm) that after the Bush/Cheney Administration passes there will be a return to "normalacy", and good-hearted intelligent people from the Clinton and HW Bush camps will be able to politely debate the Serious Issues. They simply cannot acknowledge the amount of damage that the Norquist/Wolfowitz/Cheney/Rove faction has done to both the American political landscape and to America's position in the world; to so acknowledge would also be to acknowledge their own irrelevence.

sPh

I intended freedoms in the sense of freedom of. You have certainly read Sen about it.

Well, why not type it. Sen's concluding remark of the introduction to Development as Freedom:
"Freedoms are not only the primary ends of development, they are also among its principal means........
we also have to understand the remarkable empirical connection that links freedoms of different kind with one another. Political freedoms (in the form of free speech and elections) help promote economic security. Social opportunities ( in the form of education and health facilities) facilitate economic participation. Economic facilities ( in the form of opportunities for participation in trade and production) can help to generate personal abundance as well as public resources for social facilities. Freedoms of different kinds can strengthen one another."

This is the sort of report that worries me, because it comes across as "the sky is falling". The annual patterns of influenza often involve birds to pigs to humans. Typically, world epidemiologists sit down about 9 months before the next flu season (obviously, there are meetings in the northern and southern hemispheres), at which they decide which strains, usually three, need to be in the next vaccine batch. While there are some promising approaches to speeding the process, it takes about 9 months, once the strains are selected, to make and distribute vaccine.

The big concern, of course, is that a new strain pops up that isn't covered by the vaccine. Balancing that, and not having seen the report, isn't there some significance that Indonesian public health people, in a third world country, were efficient enough to suspect and test the pigs? Frankly, I am amazed at how epidemiologists are working this problem, with seemingly every country trying to be proactive?

Sometimes flu crosses directly from birds to humans; sometimes pigs are involved. The questions, in any animal or human, Are how contagious the strain is, and how dangerous is the clinical disease in humans.

Do you have any specific reason to believe that the presence in pigs means both that the strain has mutated to be both more contagious and more virulent, and has a greater probability of affecting humans?

Every year, there are epidemics, but pandemics are much more rare. The worst was 1918-1920, with at least 40 million dead. 1957 and 1968 had 0,5 to 1 million. One can argue "well, it's getting close to time for another", or "Pandemics are rare to begin with, but there are now preventive and treatment measures that weren't available in 1918 or 1957, and only in a limited way in 1968."

If there is crossover to humans, I expect there to be very vigorous quarantine, and quite possibly large-scale administration of drugs that can prevent as well as cure. No guarantees, but we increasingly get better prepared. "We", in this case, means the world.

North Korea had an outbreak among birds, reported it, and had people from neighboring countries and the World Health Organization involved in dealing with it. It turned out to be an H7 strain. Personally, I find it significant when perhaps the most hostile and reclusive government in the world recognizes some things transcend borders.

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Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

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As an aside, one wonders what the point of all these meetings with all these experts was under the guise of the Princeton Project. Best I can tell, Slaughter and Ikenberry are arguing now precisely what they would have argued prior to spending all this money on fancy dinners and conferences.

Perceptive comment irscholar. I have been preparing a more detailed response to the Princeton Project report, and now I can delete a paragraph that dealt with the same question. I am unable to detect any really significant differences between the recommendations in the report and the views Dean Slaughter and Mr. Ikenberry have been blogging here for a long time.

I wonder if all those meetings were really designed to promote challenging, original thinking and develop new ideas; or if they were instead designed just to create a spectacle of elite consensus.

You're right, kosmotropic; your examples of "core truths" are not tautologies; indeed, they're not even trivialities.  They're simply not-examples.

In the world of English speakers and of users of Arabic numerals the sentences "murder is wrong" and "2 x 2 = 4" are simply definitional and have nothing whatever to do with "truth" which implicates a judgment concerning whether a statement appears to describe in a coherent manner such part of the real world to which the statement is directed as has come to the attention of us humans, thus far.

Well the difference between the plagues of the Middle-Ages, the Influenza Pandemic of the early 20th century and now is that the world is much "smaller" now.  Someone infected with a virus can be in Europe or Asia early in the day and in the Americas later the same day.  Which could result in an explosive spread of a disease...that dynamic wasn't part of the earlier outbreaks.

In addition viruses are becoming more resistant to current antibiotics and therefore people who become ill in a pandemic event are probably more likely to die.

I feel with the mobility of the human population pandemics are probably the biggest potential killer out of all the man made and natural threats we face...

Of course, mobility is a problem, and we are learning from it. One of the best examples came from SARS, which had been isolated to several Asian cities, but broke out in Toronto and spread further there. "Patient Zero" was a physician, IIRC, from Hong Kong.

Retrospective analysis of further transmission showed that much of it came from health care workers that did not use proper respiratory protections. While they had respirator masks quite capable of filtering out the virus, they often did not properly fit the mask to their face. It is from experiences like this that techniques are refined. Were I to go back into clinical work with such patients, I'd probably have to shave my beard to get a proper mask seal.

Incidentally, the detection of accidental or deliberate disease transmission is one of the reasons I argue for both universal health care access and electronic medical records are part of national security. Data mining, with appropriate privacy protection, of health records -- when it is convenient and affordable for patients to get health care -- is quite likely the best early warning technique for a new disease outbreak.

To be a bit technical, antiviral drugs and antibiotics tend to be completely different chemical classes. Yes, resistance is a serious concern, just as much in bacteria as with viruses. The rate of new antimicrobial drug (a more general term) is not as fast as it once was, and some things are coming out just in time. Vancomycin, for example, was often reserved for Staphylococcus infection resistant to penicillins. Many hospitals, trying to reserve it, require an infectious disease specialist approve every prescription for it. When reports of vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcs aureus (VRSA) came out, they were considered critical on a worldwide basis, and absolutely strict isolations were used for the patients. In most of those VRSA cases, combinations of antibiotics worked. We now have the streptogramins as backup to vancomycin, but it's a constant war. Indeed, wars have an effect: Acinetobacter baumanii is an essentially new infection found in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is sensitive only to some specialized antibiotics such as imipenem and carbenicillin, which are expensive and often in short supply. We are starting to see imipenem resistance. Large military hospitals such as Walter Reed are setting up separate wards for these patients, to improve isolation.

You are quite correct that there are greater threats. Ironically, the Administration cut funds to the Centers for Disease Control, considered not just a US but a world resource on infectious disease, while spending some tens of billions on national ballistic missile defense. Which is more likely -- a disease outbreak requiring excellent resources, or a North Korean ICBM? We don't have budget for everything.

My question to you would be, however, why there is such fear of avian flu, even if there is an example of crossover into pigs. I don't know if this is a media-created panic or what; the kinds of things described happen every year.
--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

so 'murder is wrong' is true by definition...lol Ellen, Ellen my dear you are precious. How about 'ripe strawberries are sweet'. I mean I can spend an eternity enumerating NON relative truths which if you denied them would make you a candidate for psychiatric examination. Give it up Ellen. It is getting rather silly.

so then the psychopathic killer who thinks murder is great simply does not know the definition of the word 'murder', he is merely lacking in knowledge of the English language....lol

You make some great points Howard. 

To answer your question I think a lot of it is media sensationalism and part of it is the actual threat...but not every influenza outbreak will be a Avian or Spanish type strain.  The tough part is seperating the hype from the real threat.  If the most virulent strains of the flu mutates it poses the risk of a pandemic even if every precaution is taken...nevermind that Smallpox and Polio are making their returns.  You make some good points about the Bubonic Plague was transmitted in more ways then flu.  But mobility mitigates that factor and is now the most distinct and serious problem.  But the threat is not limited to just avian flu.  In nature these organisms constantly mutate as part of their nature.

You mentioned Staph infections.  With the resistence being built up by these microbes even what used to be a very treatable infection like Staph can be life threatening.  The strides that were made in the mid 20th century in mankind developing ways to treat these diseases more effectively wasn't Man "defeating" the diseases...it was more just a temporary setback for the diseases.

And with much of the 3rd World living in squalid and unsanitary conditions I expect to see more virulent strains, other then just Avain Flu, develop.  You make a great point about the Spanish strain of the early 20th century.  It was able to mutate and easily spread because of how we live...I don't think (in a global sense) much has changed in that regard since the Spanish Flu pandemic.

The CDC and WHO have done a solid job keeping on top of Avian Flu and SARS.  But there are many global microbial threats and all it takes is one to slip through.  Hype?  I agree that isn't the answer, I feel devoting more resources to the problem is...  

I don't see this as one of your better efforts, Howard.  You say, "The proper role of the military is that which civilian policymakers assign to it."  That is nonsense.  That is another way of saying civilian policymakers can make no mistakes - they are omnipotent.  Hitler assigned to the German military the role of taking over the world, so by your statement, that was a proper role for the military.  It wasn't, and assigning to the US military the role of invading Iraq was not a proper role.  No aggressive, illegal, irrational role is a proper one for the military.

Then you question, "...are you suggesting that once attacked, the US should not have taken the war to Tokyo and Berlin?"  That is not germane to the discussion. The attacks on Japan and Germany in WWII were defensive responses to the attacks on the US by Japan, and the declaration of war against the US by Germany.  Those are not aggressive attacks, but defensive ones.  An aggressive attack would have been for the US to invade Japan in 1938, as a preemptive move to head off a feared attack by Japan.  That would not have been acceptable, and would not have been a proper role for the US military.

We simply must start from the position that our country does not mount unjustified, illegal attacks on other nations.  Failing to do that puts us in the same moral category as Nazi Germany, a place we must never allow ourselves to be placed. 

Hoppy in Sacramento

The problem with autodidacts, kosmotropic, is that they never quite seem to get to the end of the book.

By definition, "murder" is the wrongful killing of a human being.  QED

You say, "The proper role of the military is that which civilian policymakers assign to it." That is nonsense.
I stand by that statement. I also, however, state that the Republican Party has been wrecking constitutional controls on the things to which the military is assigned. Congress did not take its proper role of oversightm, but simply rubber-stamped for political reasons.
To invite the military to decide what wars to be fought invites military coups. If anything, I find the Congress even more at fault than Bush.
That is another way of saying civilian policymakers can make no mistakes - they are omnipotent.
No, that is saying that a proper civilian authority has checks and balances, not a "unitary executive".
Hitler assigned to the German military the role of taking over the world,
That statement is historically incorrect. I'm not sure if you are bringing up Hitler for dramatic effect, but there was a little something called the Tripartite Pact and the Axis. Hitler's aspirations were principally on the land mass of Eurasia, counting the Eastern and Western Fronts. The Nazi involvement in North Africa was more an issue of bailing out Italy than a primary interest of Hitler's.
None of the Axis powers made serious moves toward subsaharan Africa or Latin America. Yes, there was the Graf Spee incident, but that ship was a commerce raider trying to interfere with shipping to Europe. Yes, there was a good deal of flirtation with right-wing governments in South America.
so by your statement, that was a proper role for the military. It wasn't, and assigning to the US military the role of invading Iraq was not a proper role. No aggressive, illegal, irrational role is a proper one for the military.
As you say, the improper act, by the Executive and Legislative branches, were assigning the military to that task. Unfortunately, irrationality is not defined in international law. Aggressive war was used at Nuremberg and Tokyo as a charge, but the IMT principles were never incorporated into a true treaty; they were committee-of-victors ad hoc indictments. If one does want to make an argument against aggressive war, I suggest one look at the all-but-forgotten Kellogg-Briand accord.
GEN Shinseki, again within the constraints established by the National Security Act of 1947, the War Powers Resolution of 1973, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1968, expressed that the Iraqi operation, as proposed, was not militarily feasible. He and others were ignored.
Who would you have refuse which order? Kellogg-Briand has been effectively abrogated by all parties to it. The UN Charter essentially says that matters of legality can be decided by the Security Council, but a matter has to be brought to it, which was not done. I cannot see any international body with the authority to declare actions illegal -- perhaps there should be, but there are not.
In the absence of binding international law, the authority devolved on US law, and the Authorization for the Use of Military Force was the craven response of the Congress.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

I see how we arrived at this disagreement.  My point was not to view the military as a separate organization run by the government.  My point was that use of the military is not a part of a foreign policy.  Use of the military is a part of a defense policy.  The military itself is, of course, under the control of the President, and has no option but to do as ordered by the President.

It is when we discuss foreign policy and mix in military issues that I get offended.  Any time the military goes to work we have had a failure of our foreign policy.  The perfect foreign policy makes the military largely unnecessary.

Yes, I certainly agree that the Congress refused to do its job when it backed off and approved in advance any use of the military that Bush wanted to try. There is a good reason why the Constitution requres the Congress to declare war, or there is no war, and that is to prevent a President from becoming a King, with the military to enforce his rule.

If I strayed off the subject in my comments, I apologize. 

Hoppy in Sacramento

Hoppy, I know a good many professional military, active and retired. I was honored to be invited onto some private mailing lists, where there are very few civilians, and people speak both frankly, and also of their emotional aspect. In many respects, those that expect to fight are, and not for any kind of cowardice, the last to want to go to war because they know it too well. That being said, if it is necessary, they want to be decisive.

One married military couple I know have spent more time apart than together, rarely being deployed to the same country. They've both had two tours in Iraq, although they are now in Texas. He is trying to decide what is the right thing to do for his next assignment; he's been offered a prestigious job as a drill instructor, but a different unit has asked him to come back to Iraq. One of the things I honor about him is that he's trying to decide where he can best mentor soldiers: in their initial preparation, or on deployment.

She's juggling several things: more civilian education, accepting the Officer Candidate School invitation that's been made several times, or possibly going back to Iraq. Her current assignment is as a military photojournalist, so she often sees much more than she would like. A long letter of hers eloquently addressed the stress she felt when it was her turn to hose the blood out of a medical evacuation helicopter, and being amazed she has not yet lost anyone close to her.

As Robert E. Lee said, "It is well war is so terrible, lest we become too fond of it." Hal Moore's autobiographical title says much: "We were soldiers once, and young." I've known military personnel from private to three-star general, and they don't look forward to war. At the same time, if they must, there's an informal prayer. It's not "God protect me", but "God, don't let me screw up and get my buddies killed."

Turning to the relationship between military and foreign policy, I can go back to Sun Tzu, circa 400 BC, and read how the greatest general wins wars without fighting battles. Deterrence is more than a mere theory. I can cite any number of military theorists who say the same thing, in different contexts, in different times. A Special Forces officer once commented "We do the things that no one should have to do, but sometimes they are necessary." Believe it or not, many Army Special Forces people are happiest when training and nation-building.

Yes, fighting should be the last resort, but a purely defensive force having no deterrent value. Military force has to be part of the armament of a sane national strategy, but used as a last resort. With the issue of Darfur, I see economic means, perhaps out of the box, rather than a fundamentally infeasible military intervention. Unfortunately, no foreign policy can be perfect, if for no other reason that not all governments in the world are perfect.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

Nothing specific. This was significant because it was the first instance of this reported in major western media sources. That might mean bad reporting, or it might be a first discovered case but the potential for an easily (though possibly less virulent!) strain geared to humans has increased.

I suppose my concern is such because I am in the age group (I'm 24) that would be most likely to die of a cytokine storm in the effect of contracting the disease. Well maybe the OX40 IG will be ready by then though I haven't heard anything about it for a year.

As I've stated before I'm also concerned with the kind of power-grab authoritarianism that could result either in a real pandemic or one that was deliberately inflated by compliant media and government sources.

I subscribe to ProMED, which is a mailing list run by the International Society for Infectious Diseases. There are often several mailings per day, which can be pure scientific reports, media reports with substantial annotation by epidemiologists, or unconfirmed news reports. Now, as luck would have it, I had an email problem for the last several days (mutters at "self-learning" firewall now uninstalled), so I just started getting it again after a few days.
The most significant item today is a case of polio in Kenya, which is being investigated -- it came from a Somali refugee. It is of severe concern if it originated in Kenya, as it would be the first wild polio case in Kenya since 1984. This report came from the chief scientist of the Kenyan health ministry, and follows the confirmatory tests from the continental viral lab in South Africa. Intermediate-level tests in Kenya followed by the specific typing in South Africa took about a month, but the report is now fairly definitive that it was a strain known to be in Somalia.

Somalia, some years ago, was the site either of the last or next-to-last smallpox infection (sorry, one was Somalia and one was Bangladesh, but I don't remember which). As you know, smallpox has been eradicated in the wild. Polio is close to eradication; the Western Hemisphere is very close to being declared polio-free.

The reason I give this background is that ProMED usually has one or more reports per day on influenza. As I've mentioned, the international cooperation on this is unprecedented. There has been bird-to-human transmission, but no human-to-human transmission, and the avian transmission involved, at the least, preparing raw fowl and more often being on a farm.

Power-grab authoritarianism isn't going to be helped by sky-is-falling speculation on blogs. If you'd like to see the current reporting, send an email with "subscribe promed" in the body to majordomo@promedmail.org.
--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

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The belief that it is possible at any given time and in any given context to develop a Grand Strategy that is more helpful than not is a presumption, an assumption, perhaps even a kind of ideology. Its validity cannot be judged at the time.

I do think, however, that there is utility in policymakers, or wannabee policymakers, educating themselves about the world, identifying as best they can likely opportunities, needs, and threats, and attempting to formulate and articulate policy, or policy orientations, responsive to those projected needs--and sharing their thoughts on that subject with the interested public.

The projections and plans can be and are sometimes/often wrong, of course. The issue is whether on balance we are better off trying to articulate what we see happening in the world, what we think our guiding principles and values should be, and what we believe we need to do in order to make the wisest use of what power we do have.

The alternative is not to try to assess, not to articulate what is perceived, not to try to formulate some judgments about what needs to be done to give us the best chance of helping to foster a viable future.

In the Princeton report I find, like sphealey, an underestimation of the damage that has been done to the US's position in the world and along with that what seems like a blithe assumption that a return to normalcy pre-Bush is both possible and likely.

I disagree somewhat with sphealey, though, in concluding that makes the efforts of good (and some not particularly good) people who try to pay attention to what is going in the world and think about the implications for the US, and then share their thinking with the interested public, therefore irrelevant. I think it makes doing that job well more difficult, for anyone.

Post World War II a whole lot hinged on getting a reasonably decent analysis of what the true sources of Soviet conduct were. Kennan knew a lot about that subject, as much as anyone probably, and that, along with his talent as a writer, lent him a perhaps unique degree of authority on that subject. (BTW it is hardly the case that, after his initial annointment as a foreign policy guru, Kennan's views were unambiguous in their implications, let alone the subject of unanimous obeisance by foreign policy decisionmakers over the next four decades--but that is another discussion.)

The global situation now is vastly more complicated, it seems to me.

I was unimpressed with some of what I read and thought some of it sounded pretty sensible. (I'll write a fairly detailed response to it soon, having just finished reading it yesterday.)

But I do think there is value in an effort of this sort, if for no other reason than to get people who are, let's face it, likely to hold positions of authority in the next Administration, talking about these issues with one another and giving interested people something on paper to react to.

As a citizen I am struck by the fact that a report of this sort is available to the public--unlike George Kennan's seminal writings at the beginning of the Cold War. So at least there is some opportunity to get some sense of what these foreign policy wonks are thinking, for the interested citizen. Back in Kennan's day none of us would even have known what his thinking was (until his Foreign Affairs article, published anonymously), let alone have had any opportunity as a citizen to respond to it in a public forum.

How much influence citizens have, as individuals or banding together in groups, is obviously very much open to question.

And how much of this various folks, among the long list of participants cited in the report's appendixes, actually believe and agree with, versus how much is for public consumption--well, that's an interesting and important question.

In the ongoing George Kennan wannabe competition Ikenberry and Slaughter have put their oars in the water. My feeling is that, from the humble cafe denizen's point of view, why not respond substantively, given that we here actually have an opportunity to do so, rather than by griping about the standing of those who undertook this effort and the supposedly inherent lack of utility of that effort? I'll offer some of this citizen's thoughts in that vein soon.

Live long and prosper might be good as a kind of golden rule. But by itself it doesn't help us try to figure out what our country actually needs to do in the coming decades in order to realize that as a goal.

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Some broad comments on the report, which I've just finished reading:

*The single largest flaw I see is that it makes no sense to propose a grand strategy--the bringing about of ordered liberty-- whose goals we do not have the means, even multilaterally, to effectuate. In particular, the report vastly over-emphasizes the ability of the US, even working collaboratively with others as we should be, to bring about internal domestic change in other countries in a direction we think we desire.

*I am better able to envision the US and others fostering some greater degree of international institution-building which could lead to more discussion and interchange among nations prior to the making by some nations of some decisions with clear international consequences. That seems sensible enough to me, worth a try, to see what it yields, which may or may not be much. Certainly the nations of the world have many common problems which they cannot address on their own and which will require cross-national collaboration if they are to be addressed successfully. I don't see anything to be lost in this regard.

*There is no effort to address, even in a general way, the tension between the perceived need to collaborate with other nations on security matters vs. the stated goal of promoting ordered liberty in those nations. The Bush Administration's democracy promotion rhetoric looks and is utterly ridiculous in part because of the failure to realize how self destructive it is for the US government's efforts to promote democracy to, on the one hand, set up military bases, say, in one of the "stans", while laying off on the democracy promotion rhetoric with these nations.

*I agree with sphealey in believing the authors assume with too much optimism that a new US Administration is going to be able to pick up roughly where Bill Clinton left off. The re-election of Bush has done immense long-term damage to the trust other nations have in the ability of the US to see and avoid crackpot foreign policy by throwing out incompetent Presidents after a single term.

*The report simply over-estimates US power at this point in time. Realism about what the US is capable of at this time are absent from the tone and substance of the report. To take one example, on page 49, a sentence reads "...Politically, we should offer China greater status and position within the regional and global system." With regard to the regional realities in the Far East, it seems to me that the US is in no position to offer China greater status and position regionally. Rather, at this point, in many respects, it would be China that would have to offer the US greater regional status in the Far East. The report's authors want the US to use its power to create a trans-Pacific institution that would deal the US into discussion of Far East security concerns. I can't help but wonder if China thinks at this point that it neither needs nor wants us in that equation, thank you very much. It's hard to imagine anything that could happen in the Far East that would be a greater concern to the US than North Korea now going nuclear. Yet given the clearly expressed American sense of crisis there, the US's basic policy right now is to hope China deals with it. So from the Chinese point of view, who needs the US?

Yes, they worry a little about Japan, but Japan isn't going to engage in aggression against the Chinese, regardless of whether the US is there to supposedly restrain them or not. The Russians for their part look to me to be charting their own course. As an oil supplier they feel they have a trump card to play with both the US and China lest either of them gets any funny ideas.

We really are in a much weaker position that the tenor of this report reflects. A whole lot has changed to drain the US of relative power and influence, not just as a result of the past 5+ years, but greatly exacerbated by the past 5+ years. Our military is struggling to transition to a set of capabilities reflective of what the country needs in this day and burdens itself and the US economy with much wasteful spending. Our economy is clearly struggling, with the sources of our past advantages--advanced knowledge and technology in particular--things we no longer have any ability to hoard. Our soft power has dissipated dramatically with the loss of worldwide credibility and respect suffered under this Administration in particular, as the highflown rhetoric we continue to use rings hollow when others look at our increasingly dissonant actions. Etc.

All of that will take not only time, but some very different policy directions consistently followed, to begin to recover from. And we will not get back to a position of dominance remotely comparable to what we held in the immediate post WWII and Cold War aftermaths. That just is not in the cards.

*For me, one of the major elephants in the room when it comes to defining ordered liberty is freedom of association, specifically the freedom to form unions. Are we going to include that prominently in what we say about human rights to the Chinese? What if any real leverage do we have? Where does that fit with other issues and interests we have in that relationship? If we are going to push them on the right to unionize to keep wages from being artificially low there, are we going to do the same in our country?

There is recognition of the need for economic opportunity and a decent standard of living, and a growing middle class, if many of these other nations are going to buy into ordered liberty or democracy. But right now large corporations are engaged in an concerted effort to hold down wages in the US and abroad.

What will be the countervailing force to prevent that dynamic from triggering global recession due to depressed aggregate demand, and creating widespread cynicism about what democracy, capitalism, or any other ism that is a philosphy of government or economics really has to offer the ordinary person anyway here or abroad? We may want to sell democracy and "development" (US style). But that doesn't mean others are going to want to buy it. Especially given how it is playing out domestically in the US, with an increasingly struggling middle class.

Weak unions in the US have contributed to the long-term inability of workers to see wage gains consonant with productivity increases, as well as a gradually shredded safety net.

For those who do not think a resuscitated union movement, here and abroad, is part of that solution, what is the alternative? Is it supposed to happen out of the kindess of the hearts of large employers who right now hold most of the best cards?

In China, there is no freedom to form labor unions, with the parallel result that workers there are subject to grossly abusive treatment and may experience similar difficulties in getting wage increases commensurate with enterprise productivity improvements.

There is a line on page 33 that to me is rich: (re US ME policy, "We must aim to empower those in every country whose primary concern is the welfare of the people..."

You mean, like in our own country? We aren't doing that here. The present Administration and Congress do not give a s*** about any other than already well off Americans and well-heeled special interests. What makes the authors think we have a clue as to how to do this in the ME? I agree with those who believe that by far and away the most important single step the US could take to regain influence and respect in the world is clean up our act domestically--on so many levels.

All of these liberal internationalists are going to need to wake up and realize they are going to need to become ardent domestic unionists and safety-net expanders if they are going to make any headway with the US public. What language there is in this report is tepid.

I have a number of specific comments but if I write those up they will have to go into another post given the already excessive length of this one.

A minor point here, of two similar words that are really not interchangeable. The foreign policy of the United States is the set of goals selected by the political leadership, and, indirectly, the electorate.
The foreign strategy of the United States is at the grand strategic level, certainly not limited to military means. One has a grand strategy to carry out a policy. Without a policy vision, strategy flounders.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

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Outstanding comments American Dreamer.

John Ikenberry has described in several places the phenomenon he calls a "security trap". He portrays the US position as an ironic or paradoxical one, in which we have vast power, but in which attempts to exert that power result in resistance, and an ultimate failure to influence people to do what we want.

Somehow he fails to draw the evident conclusion from this that to the extent that the US is unable to exert influence on others, it lacks power - since power is by definition the ability to influence outcomes. To say that the US has certain kinds of power that don't work is as absurd as saying that a person is incredibly wealthy in virtue of his possession of great sums of a certain currency, despite the fact that the currency in question is one that few people will take in exchange for things of value.

Despite the professed liberal internationalist concern with kinds of power other than military power, they still seem dazzled by the conventional trappings of power: big ships and large numbers of tanks and divisions. They can't understand the "paradoxical" situation in which these things don't contribute as much as they once did to a state's power.

The US does still possess great power; and there is certainly no other single state which possesses more power, not by a longshot. But US power relative to the globe is declining. As you say, the Bush administration has exacerbated and accelerated this decline, but it is really a longer term historical process which we have only a limited ability to arrest.

About a year ago, I heard Eric Hobsbawm give a lecture on the "American empire."  He hated that phrase.  He identified three or four key places where American power was clearly less pervasive, less powerful than British power during the nineteenth century.  In Hobsbawm's analysis, any attempt at American empire is doomed to failure because the U.S. doesn't have the strength that would be required -- and because the U.S. doesn't really recognize its own limitations.

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The point was to get in line for positions in a future Democratic administration. Ticket-punching for the political-academic elite.

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That's always the case. Someone is going to get those jobs. I certainly hope the people who should get them, who have the most they are capable of contributing, are tooting their own horns--and I would think all of us would be rooting for them as well, no? The question is whether the individuals in question would have anything to offer.

Slaughter I could see doing a very good job of further stimulating and helping to coordinate, and network, the already-growing networks of government and non-government worker bees in different nations who have been busy networking with one another and trying to solve problems, of necessity and largely off the radar screens of the public. It's an important development, one she feels passionately about, and has investigated and written about. She has an upbeat temperament that would be valuable to have in a person doing that type of work.

There must be a job in the State Department or maybe (preferably) at the NSC, from where she could do this.

From there she would be ideally placed to bring to the attention of the next President key issues, about which worker bees have extensive knowledge and have been working on, which have been off the radar screen of the President but which need to be on it, or which require higher level intervention to take advantage of an emerging opportunity to get policy moving in a positive direction or remove obstacles to that happening.

Ikenberry has contributed importantly on an intellectual level on the place of international institution-building in reducing the chances of countries going to war with one another, and clearly recognizes the necessity of reforming and/or creating international institutions which can bring stakeholders together across national boundaries to address crucial problems none of them can solve by themselves.

While some of the specifics in the Princeton report make good sense, there is too much sloppy, vague, and in some cases simply off-base language in the report to leave me with a clear feeling that he would have practical conceptual contributions to make to the formulation of over-arching government policies in this regard.

Perhaps that is a bit unfair and privately he has a good sense of what he does not know. He may also have expertise on a particular region or a particular issue area that might enable him to contribute to effective policy design on a practical level in those areas of expertise. And he brings a collaborative problem-solving mindset which is valuable, yet sometimes hard to find, among overly turf-conscious government officials.

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I certainly hope the people who should get them, who have the most they are capable of contributing, are tooting their own horns--and I would think all of us would be rooting for them as well, no? The question is whether the individuals in question would have anything to offer.

Actually, that's the question that determines whether or not we should be rooting for them. I want a future Democratic administration to have a modest, realist foreign policy and to force a just settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by putting all necessary pressure on Israel. The likes of Slaughter and Ikenberry aren't going to get us there.

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