Steve Walt versus the Princeton Project
Steve Walt has written a tough neo-realist critique of the Princeton Project report, Forging a World of Liberty under Law. His basic thesis is that the report is a liberal internationalist statement that shares “many of the same beliefs” as neo-conservatism – “hubris” in the “energetic use” of American power, urging the United States to intervene in the affairs of others around the world, promoting democracy through force, and generally trying to run the world. “If the neoconservatives are essentially liberals on steroids, then liberal internationalists are just kinder, gentler neocons.”
He offers an alternative grand strategy which he calls “off shore balancing” which he contrasts with the Princeton Project’s vision in this way: “Instead of trying to solve the world’s problems, the United States should play ‘hard to get,’ and force other states to pay a high price to gain our support.” We can come back to Steve’s grand strategy – which does sound more like Fortress America than he is willing to admit – in a moment. But let’s start with his critique of us.
First, it is worth noting what Steve does not dispute. One of the leading arguments of the Princeton Project report is that America should not make Islamo-Fascism the defining feature of American national security – which is the neo-conservative want. Steve does not seem to disagree with this central message. We also argue that the problem of terrorist networks is not best conceived as a war at all. It is a threat that is best approached their intelligence, law enforcement, and special operations. The sources of terrorism are rooted in the West as well as the Middle East, and this requires tackling grievances and addressing the social bases of hatred and violence. Steve appears to agree with this too. We also call for American leadership in support of an open world economy and call for collective action to address global problems of public health and the environment. Steve apparently doesn’t dispute these challenges or needs for American leadership.
Steve also doesn’t dispute our argument about the postwar era – that the United States acted in its enlightened self-interest by creating institutions, forging alliances, opening the world economy, and using it power to build a foundation for democratic and capitalist states to thrive. Indeed, at the end of his post, Steve says: “it is in the U.S. interest to preserve its current position of primacy for as long as it can, and it should remain engaged with allies and friends around the world.” He also says: “It would also be desirable if more countries become democratic, largely because they are less likely to abuse their own populations if they do.” Precisely. The American position of “primacy” that Steve wants to hold onto is precisely a global position built on an ambitious vision of the “energetic exercise of American power” after World War II – something that Steve wants to curtail today for some reason.
What would Steve’s position be if he were writing his critique in the 1940s: “Come home America. If you get involved in the world it will only make trouble for us and others, and – after all – international institutions don’t do much, and while democracy is great, let’s don’t risk mistakes by seeking to promote it.” This would not have been a Dean Acheson moment. If Steve wants to attack the fundamental premises of the PPNS report, he needs to be prepared to take issue with the grand sweep of American foreign policy over the last half century – or make an argument that the world or America has changed fundamentally so that the “energetic use of American power” is now dangerous.
The only quibble Anne-Marie and I would have with Steve’s views – so far – is his emphasis on preserving “primacy.” On this basic point, it is Steve – and not us – who throws his lot in with the neo-conservatives. In the PPNS report, we argue that primacy should not be America’s goal, rather it should be preserving a preponderance of power among the liberal democracies. On primacy, Steve agrees with Paul Wolfowitz, not us! But on the other goals, Steve wants to hold on to the world that the United States created after World War II, precisely a world that was brought to life because the United States had ambitious goals, conceived of its interests in enlightened ways, tied its power to rules and institutions, and so forth. Sorry Steve, you are free riding on liberal internationalism!
Second, where Steve makes comparisons between liberal internationalism and neo-conservatism, he is off base. Let’s use Steve Walt’s editing technique. Here is Steve’s big paragraph: “The report reminds us of the extent to which liberal internationalists and neoconservatives have been defacto enablers of many of Bush’s mistakes. Why? Because liberal internationalists and neoconservatives share many of the same core beliefs. Both groups think American power is almost always a force for good” [Steve: Is your argument that American power tends to be a force for no-good? Our view is that American interests are best secured through working with other states to build a mutually agreeable liberal international order. American power certainly has been and can be a force for good in the world. American power and leadership is associated with the building of the most successful international order in history – measured in terms of physical security and wealth creation. If America is not a force for good in this fundamental sense, what are you saying? The point of the PPNS report is to learn lessons from America’s great successes and failures so as to instruct the current exercise of American power. Anne-Marie and I certainly part company with neo-cons on the ways and means in which American power should be exercised.], “and both believe that most states (and especially most democracies) should welcome the energetic use of American power." [Steve: Please refer to my comment above. The way in which American power is exercised matters greatly to whether other states embrace or reject American leadership. “Energetic use of American power” is a vague term – it could mean reforming the UN or invading a country. It matters which it is. Unlike neo-conservatives, we do believe that a legitimate international order is vital to American national security and we offer ideas about how to get back to such an order.]
Steve continues: “Both see authoritarian governments and human rights violators as great evils, and think that the United States should use its power to get rid of the former and punish the latter.” [Steve: Whoops, you missed one of our major arguments in the report: we reject democracy promotion through the barrel of a gun. We argue that it is a mistake to equate democracy with elections. The United States should use its power and leadership to keep the global system stable and open – encouraging ordered liberty around the world that is moved forward by slow processes of engagement. This is not a neo-con vision at all. As Robert Wright has observed, liberal internationalists tend to have confidence that economic and social integration around the world will move countries closer to liberal democracy. But it is a slow process that America cannot control and direct through coercive use of power. This is a different “theory” of democracy – or vision of “liberty under law” – than anything offered by neo-conservatives.] “Both groups dislike weapons of mass destruction (and especially nuclear weapons), except in the hands of the United States and its friends.” [Steve. Whoops again. We do embrace the NPT, as you note. We do not think the solution to proliferation is regime change as the neo-conservatives do. This is a fundamental difference that is deeply rooted in the PPNS report. We do propose revision of Article IV to restrict enrichment and processing facilities while guaranteeing access to the fuel cycle. We also reaffirm the NPT’s Article VI – which mandates that nuclear states make good faith efforts to reduce their stocks of nuclear weapons. Overall, we are asking for a return to arms control and cooperative security which directly is at odds with neo-conservative thinking.]
Steve continues: “Given these points of agreement, it is hardly surprising that many liberal internationalists endorsed the neocons’ adventure in Iraq.” [Steve: You make two mistakes here. First, realists also supported the war. Indeed, we have learned that Henry Kissinger – an icon of American realism – was an active supporter of the war. Other realists, such as Fareed Zakaria, also supported the war, at least at first. But I do not draw the conclusion that because realists like Henry Kissinger and Fareed Zakaria supported the war in Iraq that realism itself is somehow flawed and dangerous. Nor can you draw such conclusions about liberal internatioalism from the fact that some liberal internationalists supported the war. Second, Bush did not invade Iraq because he embraced liberal internationalism. The administration did use – and continues to use – Wilsonian rhetoric to provide an ex post facto rationale for the war once all the other rationales dried up. But this does not make liberalism internationalism an enabler. Bush has hidden behind some noble liberal ideas. It is true that those noble liberal ideas can be used to make mischief and lead the U.S. on imperialist crusades. This has indeed happened in American history. No one is denying that good ideas can be misused. But the Iraq episode was not even of this sort! The original Iraq invasion, as I recall, was actually justified on good-old-fashion realist security grounds! Again, some liberal internationalists did support the war (either as it was actually launched or under some other hypothetical conditions, such as with a full UN mandate). But what should we conclude from this information? Wouldn’t it be a mistake to overreact to the Iraq debacle by adopting a principle that forbids the use of force under any circumstances for humanitarian ends? If this is your position, you should state it clearly and defend it. If it is not your position, than you are in the same boat we are: struggling to determine the circumstances and conditions under which the use of force (By whom? In what fashion?) is a legitimate tool of the international community.]
Steve ends his critique by noting that the report proposes to do lots of things – reform institutions, create a Concert of Democracies, lead in tackling various sorts of problems. He says that no administration could do all of them. After all, governments need to set priorities. We definitely agree. The first step in setting priorities and fashioning a strategy is to grasp the security environment in which America will operate in the 21st century. In our view, it is an environment where the United States will encounter a lot of diffuse but interconnected threats. If Steve wants to offer a deep and searching critique of the report, he would need to engage this basic contention. He doesn’t really do so. What he says is that when the U.S. engages in “energetic” actions on the global stage, it gets into trouble. So, he says, the United States should stay home and play “hard to get.” This sounds like a recipe for trouble. Again, if the U.S. had followed Steve’s advice in the 1940s, we would live in a very different world today – and it probably would not be a very secure world for Americans or others. So in Steve’s approach, American forfeits any attempt to shape the global environment in which it operates.
The other problem with Steve’s vision of “off shore balancing” is that it is a strategy without much real principled guidance. The United States should not get involved abroad unless it needs to. It should engage in off shore balancing, but it should also try to preserve US primacy and keep its “alliances and friends” around the world. This sounds like intellectual mush to me.
I think what distinguishes the PPNS report from both Steve Walt realism and neo-conservative militaristic unilateralism is that we offer a vision of a working international order. Neo-cons offer a strategy to run the world – and this approach is experiencing a massive strategic failure before our eyes. But “off shore balancing” realists commit the opposite mistake. They forfeit America’s opportunity to help shape the foundations of the emerging international system. And when off shore balancers feel compelled to get involved and intervene abroad, they are bereft of any vision or theory to guide the way. They are defensive and reactive – and they have a puny and underdeveloped theory about how the world works.
The irony of Steve’s critique of the Princeton Project is that he reads into the report a liberal American “hubris” to rule the world. This is deeply wrong – and, quite frankly, I don’t think he really believes it. The Princeton Project is proposing to reform and restructure the governance mechanisms of the global system. It argues that global institutions are broken. It argues that rising and middle-tier states – such as China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa – should become fuller partners in running the system, and that advanced states such as Germany and Japan should also set forward. Steve says that the PPNS report is “prescribing a National Security where the United States continues to be responsible for all global problems and has to do most of the heavy lifting. . . “ But this simply does not reflect the spirit or the letter of the report. It is precisely the opposite. We are arguing for the United States to lead in the rebuilding of the institutions of governance so as to ensure that the burdens of sustaining an open and secure global system will be more widely shared.














John Ikenberry essentially advocates another 1940's moment, but his account of the 1940's misses one essential component: the Soviet Union. According to Ikenberry's self-serving portrayal of the 1940's, the United States was simply motivated in the late 1940's by a virtuous desire to create a stable international order. In fact, the American desire for NATO, European integration, and opening of the global economy were all motivated by a desire to create a bulwark against Soviet-inspired communism. Where is today's Soviet Union? "Islamo-fascism" is certainly a threat, but it is a different type of threat than a superpower in the form of the Soviet Union.
Ikenberry's account is also remarkably oblivious to the realities of American power and the threat that power poses to others. The US can say nice things and try to act in nice ways, but one of the key realist points (a la Steve Walt) is that states instinctively fear other states' power in international relations. Even the best efforts of the United States to reconstitute the international system are likely to be greeted with trepidation by others.
In short, off-shore balancing may be "intellectual mush," but is that better or worse than the dangerous naivete of liberal internationalism?
October 11, 2006 6:26 AM | Reply | Permalink
Henry Kissinger : “the war on terror is not the ultimate test of U.S. foreign policy, which is, above all, to protect the extraordinary opportunity that has come about to recast the international system.”
Engaging the world as a liberal Leviathan in order to recast the international system, to remake the world around new constitutional rules governing the use of force and making states accountable to the international society, is a must.
US should not solve all the world’s problems by itself….but it should use this extraordinary window of opportunity provided by the unipolar moment for creating a multilateral “infrastructure of capacity and cooperation” (Ikenberry) capable of projecting a networked response in order to enforce the rules and norms of a constitutional international system.
US should use the unipolar opportunity to prepare the world for the post-unipolar era by designing a constitutional order and security arrangements that should gradually develop concerted power-projection capabilities for crisis response.
US should use the unipolar assets shaping a constitutional design for a post-unipolar moment era, an era far beyond the old classic geopolitical rivalries defined by a 21 st century Concert (Haass) and by a liberal Leviathan (Ikenberry): an enforcement community with networked power–projection capabilities for crisis response; this era should be fundamentally defined as a post-westphalian world with an hyperinstitutionalised order structure reflecting a doctrine of international community responsibility (built around the new emerging norms such as conditional sovereignty, responsibility to protect, responsibility to prevent). A constitutional order should be developed as an widely integrative framework offering status-quo incentives to the potential revisionist players.
October 11, 2006 8:03 AM | Reply | Permalink
I find it très amusant that Ikenberry, Slaughter, and Kleinfeld dominate this site, and yet, almost none of us plebe commenters agree with a word they say.
October 11, 2006 10:53 AM | Reply | Permalink
It is, indeed, amusing.
I think that's because our motivations are different. The Princeton Project is a think tank piece that has one objective: making Slaughter the next Rice (or, rather, Albright) with the help of a retinue of followers who obviously would have nothing to lose from that development.
So every line in that tome has been written with, in mind, a phalanx of hostile congressmen/women questioning Slaughter's patriotism. That's called a "centrist" position, which is codeword for "regardless of which party controls congress, I can get confirmed."
The result is the usual America-uber-Alles platitudes wrapped in thick layers of liberal drivel.
October 11, 2006 9:15 PM | Reply | Permalink
Oh you poor proletariat!
October 12, 2006 10:38 PM | Reply | Permalink
Is there any other kind?
October 13, 2006 12:02 PM | Reply | Permalink
There never was a "unipolar era," you dope. Grow up.
October 14, 2006 8:28 PM | Reply | Permalink