China’s Challenge: The Ideological One
The discussion over the past couple weeks prompted by Reed Hundt’s book has been of China’s economic challenge. An article by Nazneen Barma and Ely Ratner in the Fall 2006 edition of Democracy: A Journal of Ideas provides an excellent discussion of China’s ideological challenge.
Their approach is not threat mongering but rather a realistic assessment of strengths China does have and an urging for the United States to see beyond the “war of ideas” freedom vs. fundamentalism dynamic that the Bush administration and too many others posit. It’s not just the economic world that’s competitive; the “ideas world” of how societies should organize themselves at home and how they should act internationally is as well.
China’s “illiberal” model has two core elements. One is the domestic bargain in which “markets are free but politics are not.” The other is sovereignty strict constructionism stressing the rights not responsibilities of states and the illegitimacy of liberal interventionism. Cell phones at home but not uncensored Internet. None of this genocide prevention abroad, no human rights linkages, none or not much good governance conditionality.
Barma and Ratner are analyzing not advocating. You can see why the illiberal model has its appeal. This isn’t like the Soviets in the Cold War, China is not “forcefully exporting” it. They are modeling it through their own success, as well as enticing with their growing foreign aid and investment sans conditionalities. “The result is that developing countries now have an alternative to the funds that are often tied to inherently painful liberal reforms, as well as an ideological ally to help shield them from Western pressure.”
The U.S.’ problems are not just what our competitors’ appeals are, but more fundamentally how we’ve so damaged our own appeal and whether our core democracy promotion paradigm is right. That’s its own topic as we’ve gotten into earlier and will do so more. The Barma-Ratner article is valuable as part of the overall effort to understand and strategize for this global marketplace of ideas.
Disclosure: Naaz and Ely are Ph.D. students at UC Berkeley, and we’ve been working together through a Berkeley-Duke collaboration. They both have had policy experience before going back to grad school; it shows.















I posted some of my thoughts on North Korea's nuclear test here, but the salient point is the last, so here:
This isn't just a failure for the United States, but also for China, which supplies the North Koreans with fuel oil and other necessities to prevent a flood of North Korean refugees into their northern territories. North Korea used to be considered a Chinese proxy state (like East Germany in Cold War days), but no longer; China's desperate drive to be the regional economic powerhouse depends on trade. If the White House can get China to understand that an unstable Pacific means a lack of commerce and growth, they could turn out to be our strongest ally; but if Bush, Rumsfeld and Cheney push the morality card, and appear to be moving towards a confrontation one way or another, China will almost certainly take sides against its biggest economic rival.
October 9, 2006 5:21 AM | Reply | Permalink
There has been inadequate discussion of China's economic expansion. Projections about future growth are based upon the recent past, this is not accurate.
For example, China is using fresh water 40% higher than the replenishment rate. This is causing the water table to drop precipitately in many areas. China also has plans to build urban housing for 400,000,000 million people over the next decade. This is equivalent to replacing every housing unit in the US over the next seven years. This is unrealistic. China is already the world's largest user of cement and is putting a strain on steel as well.
Labor is not going smoothly either. There are an estimated 30,000 labor protests annually. The abuse of the peasant class by corrupt local officials only serves to make things worse. Several industrialized areas are having trouble recruiting workers and have started raising wages as a result.
All of these economic and social strains will have a profound effect on how the government operates over the next several decades. The prospects are not good. Recent prior history like the Cultural Revolution or the Great Leap Forward were economic disasters and caused millions of deaths.
Even if China manages to navigate its growth without a major collapse there is a good chance that they will turn inward and become less interested in selling to the US. Currently they are lending us the money to buy their stuff, in effect giving it away.
As their middle class expands they will have a big enough internal market that they can scale back exports. Where will Walmart get its junk from then?
--- Policies not Politics
Daily Landscape
October 9, 2006 10:03 AM | Reply | Permalink
The irony of China and the United States is at least for now both need each other. In order for China to keep its economy growing fast enough for the government to keep its side of the bargin the United State economy has to grow fast enough for U.S. consumers to keep buying Chinese goods. For the U.S. governmetn to keep priming the pump by running enormous budget deficitis the Chinese must be willing to buy U.S. Tresuries. An interesting pas de deux.
Daniel A. Greenbaum
October 9, 2006 11:49 AM | Reply | Permalink
China’s “illiberal” model has two core elements. One is the domestic bargain in which “markets are free but politics are not.” The other is sovereignty strict constructionism stressing the rights not responsibilities of states and the illegitimacy of liberal interventionism. Cell phones at home but not uncensored Internet. None of this genocide prevention abroad, no human rights linkages, none or not much good governance conditionality.
It seems like the problem is the current US administration's vision of the role of governence and China's vision are not that divergent. And as long as the neocons are in power we will not provide that "alternative" vision to China's. So like I said to Reed the problem isn't as much China's ideology as it is the failings of US to promote that "alternative" ideology of our own...
October 9, 2006 12:00 PM | Reply | Permalink
And unlike China, the United States is indeed "forcefully exporting" our model, that is the very point of our current "democracy promotion" campaign in Iraq. But, through threats of economic embargo (through the IMF & World Bank) that is also how we've tried to export our model under the umbrella of "globalization" for two decades. What's new, from a non-US perspective, is that we are now willing to use troops to export our concept of democracy. Few Americans are willing to own up to the fact that we were "forcefully exporting" our model throughout the Cold War just as strongly as the Soviets were. We won the Cold War in part because we used different tools and we were better at it than they were.
In his "Can Asians Think" Kishore Mahbubani disputes one of our most cherished notions, that liberal democracy produces prosperity. He argues that our much prized notions of things like a free press and universal franchise are not the cause of prosperity, but the result of prosperity. He argues that democracy is one of the ways that the middle class participates in the distribution of wealth. The example of the "Asian Tigers" supports his thesis. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore built their industrial juggernauts during decades of one party rule where the ruling party was basically little more than a tool of industrial concerns (AKA "national socialism"). The resulting prosperity then lead to pluralistic democracy.
I assume that Jentleson's comment "how we’ve so damaged our own appeal" refers to our current attempt to promote democracy as a "take it or die" proposition at the end of a gun. True enough, if it has to be done at the end of a gun instead of through seduction, it's called rape. But it goes much deeper than that. What do we offer as a model? An economy where more and more of the wealth is concentrated in fewer and fewer families? Latin America already has THAT! They don't want more of it!
I sell my own brand of software over the internet with customers in 56 nations. Good customer support is the best R&D department a small software company can have. I've therefore built numerous close relations with customers that extend beyond just their features wish lists. On our private developer's forum a comment by a customer in China rang true for customers in Latin America and Africa - "Show me a democracy that works. Show me a democracy that promotes national purpose, harmony, and cohesion instead of animosity between it's citizens as they fight over the scraps left by the elites. Show me a democracy that does not avoid civil war by bribing it's electorate with wealth borrowed from it's grandchildren." Guess who got the most votes on the forum. It wasn't the US of A. It was South Africa!?! It is entirely irrelevant that we can argue about the accurracy of that perspective if we cannot, and do not, project a different image - actions speak louder than words.
There's an old truism that a dysfunctional family is the last to know just how dysfunctional it's become because of all the things the family's done to compensate. If we want to seduce the world into being more like Kansas we first need to answer the question, "Who in hell would WANT to be more like Kansas?"
October 9, 2006 12:24 PM | Reply | Permalink
Barma and Ratner are analyzing not advocating.
Bah. Barma and Ratner are engaging in transparent propagandizing on behalf of their favored domestic agenda through the time-honored technique of puffing up the spectre of a foreign enemy. I did a search on their article when it appeared for occurrences of the terms "liberal" and "illiberal", and found something like 83 occurrences. Yet there was was no serious attempt - or even halfhearted attempt - to define either of these terms, and no serious analytical attempt to survey the various interconnected realms of Chinese society and specify just what freedoms the Chinese do and do not enjoy, and in which degrees. Instead one finds only a crude and ill-defined caricature: "economic liberality" vs. "political illiberality". The term "illiberality" just functions as a scare term, and the obsessive verbal marker of some obscure idée fixe.
The Chinese government apparently chooses to promote its own country's security and build cooperative partnerships by offering aid with fewer strings attached. Somehow this practical statesmanship is elevated to a new and dangerous "ideological model". Nor does one find China engaging in any serious effort to replicate its own system of government inside other countries. But this very indifference to spreading its ideology is bizarrely identified as in itself an ideology the Chinese are insidiously spreading. Nor do the Chinese seem to incline toward the exertion of heavy-handed military threats and demands. What many would view as a greater tolerance for diverse styles of political organization, and a greater reluctance to intervene in the affairs of other soverign nations is perversely decried as "illiberality". Interesting, since I always thought that tolerance and a "live and let live" mentality were characteristic of liberalism.
So Barma and Ratner are far from neutral analysts, but are emblematic of the new liberal totalitarianism that thrives in elite policy circles.
October 9, 2006 10:10 PM | Reply | Permalink