dean Slaughter,

For some time now, I have been convinced that the UN needs a standing military capability. The UN force I envision should be made up of soldiers who enlist specifically and exclusively in that force – not members of the armed forces of member states who are merely on loan to the UN, and can be pulled from any operation whenever their home countries decide to do so. Allowing one’s nationals to enlist in the UN force would be a condition of UN membership

One problem with the current arrangement is that the Security Council is not a body made up military or security professionals. It is not even an executive body. It is a group of ambassadors. Obviously these ambassadors receive instructions from the chief executives and foreign ministries of their home countries, but the Security Council is a very poor structure for planning military operations, especially on the fly under the pressure of a crisis. What comes out of such deliberations is not the framework for a well-organized military operation, but rather a cobbled-together, loosely coherent diplomatic compromise full of best wishes and good intentions.

If the UN had a standing military capability, the UN force could be charged with ongoing contingency planning and training for all manner of military operations is every conceivable theatre of operations. It would eventually possess a chain of command built up of professionals with years of experience working within the UN system, and performing the specific types of operations assigned to it. When a crisis like the Lebanon crisis comes up, instead of having 15 ambassadors hashing out the framework of some compromise military operation, and trying to play amateur soldier, those ambassadors could issue a directive to the UN military command to come back to them within 72 hours (for example) with several different proposed operations. Since it would be the job of this command to constantly contingency plan for these operations, they should be able to satisfy the directive fairly expeditiously, pull something off the shelf, adapt it to the requirements of the current situation and produce something much more well-thought out, with the logistical, material and personnel needs specified in detail and in advance. This sort of preparedness would be part of their job. The role of the Security Council then would be to approve the plans, not create them, and to focus its attentions on diplomatic and political side of the crisis. And the very fact that such a force existed, with the capabilities and planning needed to mount a serious and well-organized operation in short order, would in itself provide a strong deterrent to bad actors.

Since the UN would be using their own professional soldiers, who would already be well-trained and stationed in bases around the world, the selection of soldiers for the operation would be based on rational criteria of mission requirements and unit capabilities, and not on seat of the pants, vague, and hard to enforce commitments of volunteers from member nations, each of whose soldiers are trained for different kinds of missions and have other primary loyalties.

Implementing this sort of system would certainly require other sorts of UN reforms to create the necessary command and control structure, and institute appropriate checks and balances. But if the world is serious about internationalized collective security, it has to move beyond the posse stage.

An amusing side effect of this would be that nation "A" might find its military contingent fighting against itself!

Historically, it's been unwise to send troops with likely mixed allegiances into an area of temptation. One of the most obvious problematic areas is exactly what you describe. The stories of brother against brother in the American Civil War are not fantasy.
At the next level, until a military has bonded internally so it has its own tradition ad identity, there is a security risk that they will tip off local militias, etc., when they are scheduled into an area -- and may desert, or refuse to move, or, without active mutiny, doing everything they can to interfere with operations.
Now, if such a force existed for some time, under consistent leadership, it might have the cohesion to represent the UN. The cases of the Gurkhas in the British Army, the French Foreign Legion, and, in the past, troops from colonies are generally treated as regular military units under the appropriate chain of command.
Realistically, it's questionable if standby authority would produce a force capable of any serious combat. Before mixed national units, with different languages, different military doctrines, different physical conditioning, etc., can work as a whole, they need substantial training. Standby forces are not going to be interchangeable. Finnish ski troops are probably the best in the world, but their acclimation and equipment doesn't really qualify them for a mission in Darfur. Senegalese troops, when they were French colonials, were outstanding in many actions, but I wouldn't try to put troops conditioned for hot lowlands onto observer duty in the mountains of disputed areas between India and Pakistan.

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Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

What would you see as the minimum size of such a force? As well as absolute size, there is a question of where they would be based, and what strategic mobility they would need.

For example, for the US to commit a Marine Expeditionary Unit, about the smallest you can reasonably expect to be capable of some independent operations, you're talking of a landing force and supporting troops of 1500-2000 people. Their transport and support from the sea will take 3-4 purpose-built amphibious ships, adding another thousand-plus sailors. Typically, those amphibious ships will have an escort of 2-3 frigates or destroyers, the size largely depending on the degree of air, naval surface, and submarine threat, plus the need for gunfire support.

For each MEU deployed, usually for 6 months, there are two more, one drilling for the next mission, with the other with more people on leave for personal reasons or schools, equipment in overhaul, etc.

The British have comparable units of Royal Marines that carried out a fairly successful operation that might be a reasonable measure of capability: from waters off Sierra Leone, they brought in troops that neutralized the nastiest local militia, capturing Foday Sankoh, its leader, and providing security until a West African regional peace enforcement unit (ECOMOG) took over. The British then withdrew to the sea, but close enough to be a deterrent, and left once ECOMOG was operational.

Serious question: how would you handle the natural inclinations of diplomats not to escalate, in a situation such as Rwanda? The on-the-ground UN commander, Romeo Dallaire, begged UN headquarters to let him take control of some weapons dumps and radio stations before the outbreak of hostilities. Had he been authorized to do that, at the very least, the fighting would have been less bloody, and the small UN force more effective -- possibly holding enough ground that larger forces could come in. As it was, only a major country could have made a forced entry, with large units, once the fighting started.

Incidentally, while he may be physically and emotionally unable to do it, Dallaire would be my first choice for UN military commander, or even Secretary General. I've never met him, but I have friends that work directly with him, and find him the personification of humanitarian goals with military discipline.
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Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

Shhh!  We aren't supposed to ever mention that some of us did know what was likely to happen when we invaded Iraq.  That just isn't the storyline that we now follow. 

Hoppy in Sacramento

The UN is only as good as the leadership coming from the "great" powers. Maybe we should make Security Council membership contingent on ponying up real assets: money, military power, peace keepers, humanitarian aid, i.e., tangible commitment to lead and keep the peace.

I missed your post when I was writing mine...we are again on the same track.

One more comment. You make the point of the mandate gap. Is this anything new? We have our right wingers insisting on improved education and accountability...with no further infusion of funds. Isn't there an education mandate gap? I think George Bush is going to improve the environment with no investing of funds...an environment gap? Or invade and occupy Iraq with inadequate equipment , insufficient troops, and no post invasion plans (to say nothing of the criminal lies to justify the disaster on the Tigris)...a military gap? Underfunding first responders and port and air security...a security gap? The nation's health mortgaged to Big Pharma...the health gap? Widespread torture, renditions, spying on UN members, warrantless spying on Americans...the freedom gap? Rebuild the hurricane devastated Gulf coast by funneling money to corporate cronies...the Katrina gap?

You detect a gap? Really?

It is a truism never to underestimate the power of human stupidity, especially when the Bush 43 administration is involved. That being said, Iraq is one of the worst places in the Middle East to establish bases. There is only one route to the sea, which is trivial for Iran to close.

I would agree that permanent bases are being established in Kuwait and Qatar. As far as Iraq, I'm reasonably familiar with the largest base, LSA ANACONDA, formerly Balad Air Base, when I consulted on some MWR communications installations -- turned out that a con man was involved and hasn't been arrested, but thats another story. There remains a substantial amount of trailers used as offices and housing. I saw solid construction in things that variously had to resist the weather, or were targets and built to take direct hits with plausible weapons.

Again not underestimating stupidity, I see it as one of the worst places to put permanent bases. Chomsky has trumpeted his theory, but I don't think he's ever defined what makes a base permanent, versus what is reasonably rugged construction for a difficult weather environment. Balad certainly does not, for example, have electrical power generation of a sort that lends itself to a permanent base.

Some smaller bases have been turned over to the Iraqis, and, if there's going to be construction there, you might as well make it enduring. Still, I'm aware of things such as only one company being allowed to install satellite dishes, because it's the one firm who has demonstrated the ability to secure them in the high winds. There were too many cases of small dishes tearing loose and becoming lethal Frisbees.

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Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

"Part of the problem is that the UN is not organized to fight wars, but only to prevent wars. Given that, the idea that they need a standing army is troublesome to me." I think that's right. Perhaps we just have to give up on the idea of the UN as a peacekeeping force. Even if we were happier embracing the idea than is Hoppy here, I doubt it'd happen.  Clinton turned over Somalia to the UN, which wasn't a plausible solution, and we didn't have other options lined up. He worked with Nato in the Balkans. And here we are again now.

The UN can certainly deligitimize military action, and we can demand that members take that seriously. Bush could have taken it seriously when they paid no attention to Powell's war cry. But effective military alliances themselves may have to have other roots. That still also leaves the UN with plenty of other roles in the international community, including diplomacy, economic policy, climate policy, and so on. And, as others have pointed out, our attending to some of those options rather than solely to military might not not hurt either.

John

http://www.haberarts.com/

I agree with Dan K that the UN needs a standing military force. As to the question of how large it must be posed by hcberkowitz, it must be large enough to defeat any other standing military or likely military coalition. So in other words, it should be huge. It should control the sea lanes and maintain global air superiority. Units should be based in all member countries and should be mobile enough to move anywhere if the order comes through. Personnel should be diverse and frequently rotated to minimize local loyalties and establishment of local powerbases. Military command structure should be professional and heirarchical with ultimate responsibility being ceded to the civilian leadership at the UN.

Personnel should not be attachments from other militaries. They should be recruited directly from the populace of all member countries. Their training should include a two-year language immersion program where troops learn to speak English and write Chinese, enabling them to communicate with at least half the people in the world and each other. Equipment should be purchased directly from manufacturers and should be designed with occupation and mandate enforcement as primary functions.
As for the question of "...how would you handle the natural inclinations of diplomats not to escalate, in a situation such as Rwanda?" The military commander would obey the orders of those diplomats and not excede the authority given them be said same. If the civilian authority gives a standing order that when hostilities are imminent known sites of ordinance are to be seized, then that can be done. But it is important that UN military leaders do not seize national assets without orders from above. Seizing assets of rebels and pirates should be standard fare.

I do think an effective standing military would help narrow the "Mandate Gap" referred to in the original post but even that would require that the UN have the courage to use its military. The fact is, an independant military would represent a surrender of some degree of sovereignty and a great degree of hegemony by the more powerful members (perticularly the United States) of the United Nations. And what I advocate next would be even a greater threat: direct revenue taxation.

These mechanical changes would allow for a UN which could have a degree of independance (and is henceforth unlikely to be allowed) but frankly the entire design of the UN including its method of decision making needs to be completely overhauled in order for the body to evolve past a mere taunting center.

The most deserately needed reform in the UN is the need to develop a mechanism for overriding the veto. One of the problems with this is that developing such a mechanism might very well result in the attempted withdrawal from the UN of one or more veto-wielding members. First the UN has to make sure that it articulates that membership is compulsory and withdrawal is not an option. The other major problem with the development of any veto-override is that it would surely get vetoed, probably five times.

This is not to say that there aren't currently successful UN programs. Certainly the UN has been a useful institution when it comes to health, nourishment, education and disaster aid. But in my opinion, the UN will not live up to its potential for human good until it becomes the authority that all states have to recognize.