A Tehran Spring
There is, right now, a desperate search for options on dealing with the Iranian nuclear crisis. All of the Security Council permanent members admit that they do not wish to see Iran become an atomic state, nor do they wish to see the situation spiral out of control. However, the willingness to do something about the problem varies widely, even within NATO allies.
Let us first admit that Iran isn't going to make the list of the West's favorite regime any time soon. They are repressive at home, they export terrorism, have geopolitical and cultural ambitions which include a sphere of influence that extends from Beirut to the Kashmir. Iran's vision of itself is as the natural regional dominant power, and as the center of Shia Islam, intellectually and economically, as well as politically. Not to put too fine a point on it, diplomacy is most important when dealing with regimes with conflicting goals and aspirations, and marginal means of pursuing them. It is preventing the hostile state from becoming inimical that the test of diplomacy lies.
But let us also admit that much of the American pain regarding Iran is self-inflicted. Repeatedly American administrations have failed to recognize the Iranian self-vision of their role in the Middle East and the world, and repeatedly we have intervened for short term reasons rather than in our long term interests. From the Anglo-Iranian crisis forward, the United States has often seen Iran as an annoyance to be downgraded rather than as a state with which we must come to terms.
It was former Ambassador Gallucci who pointed out most directly the two important realities of counter-proliferation diplomacy. The first is that there are three options: bomb, bribe or offer a bone. The second is that there is a spectrum of commitment on the part of would be atomic states: there are those whose nuclear program the United States can buy, and those that it can only rent. On one end of the spectrum is North Korea, which has atomic sabre rattling as its basic industry – the regime has no other options for foreign currency. Hence, one can rent, not even lease, the North Korean program. On the other end of the spectrum are nations such as Argentina and Brazil, whose commitment to obtaining atomic weapons is very weak, and hence their programs can be more or less bought, and were. This spectrum creates a third reality, the ability to do something other than temporizing talking is directly related to economic and military options available. A program that is vulnerable, centralized and early is most easily dealt with militarily, an America with a strong dollar is most capable of using economic carrots and sticks.
From these two perspectives, the United States has a very weak hand with respect to Iran. First, the Bush executive policies have been almost calculated to improve the position of Iran. It might even be said that long term, the two most important winners of the Iraqi-American War have been the Likud Party in Israel, and the governing Shia theocracy of Iran. First because Iraq creates both full strategic commitment for the US military, and a power vacuum on the border of Iran into which their influence can expand. Second because US monetary and fiscal policy have been directly responsible for pushing oil up from historic lows, to real highs. Finally, by expending American credibility on questionable assertions about Iraq's atomic program, the United States is not in a position, nor does it have the allies, to make strong assertions about Iran's objectives.
These policies also extend to the positions of the two permanent security council members who are hurdles to any real action on Iran: Russia and the People's Republic of China. Since the US is economically dependent on China to hold down inflation, and the world is now dependent on Russia's gas and oil reserves, it is far more difficult to cajole them into accepting the American position. Compare this to the 1990's when Russia was a basket case needing IMF bailouts, and China was still in a fragile stage of becoming an export driven economy. American diplomacy often rests on the dollar, and the dollar is not very almighty at this time.
By dropping both military and economic sticks, and by reducing the clout that the US carries with the rest of the world, Bush has disarmed America diplomatically. This has magnified the challenges, and diminished the tools to create a solution with. This means that any solution to the Iran problem must be looked at, not in isolation, but as part of a broader change of policy regime. American policy is in a gopher groove – multiply and magnifying problems.
Aggravating the policy failures of the current executive is the personnel. Rice is completely reactive, and Rumsfeld has shown consistently poor judgment in resource allocation. Bush's rhetoric, playing to his domestic base, has poured gasoline on the fire.
The first step to a solution to the Iran crisis is to realize that there is no crisis that requires immediate solution. There are ways of improving American negotiating position, but they take time. The first step then must be one of gaining time, to remove temporary advantages that have accrued to Iran's regime based on previous policy choices. The price of oil is not fixed by a deity, but by US economic policy. American involvement in Iraq is currently optimal for Iran: Tehran is not seen as being responsible for the situation on the ground, but they are free to exploit it for their own political gain. Israeli policy in Lebanon is, likewise, a case where Iran is free to reap the benefits, while not being seen as accountable for the dislocation and chaos.
This means that the United States should move towards a stance of negotiations without preconditions, because the Iranian government cannot refuse to negotiate without shifting the perception of where the problem is. This stance changes nothing effectively, negotiations are not worth much to Iran, since they have an acceptable alternative to negotiating, that is, continuing to advance their atomic program. Negotiation without precondition buys time.
However, the second wave is to realize that buying time is only useful if time is on your side. This means that the United States must change its economic policy regime, and begin a concerted attempt to lower the world price of oil. Fortunately, even China is willing to sign on board to this objective, and the Europeans and the major NGOs such as the WTO and IMF have been practically begging for it. Ever dollar a barrel in reduction in oil prices long term is $4,000,000 a day of less free cash flow for the Iranian regime.
Doing this means propping up the Japanese economy, to give the Bank of Japan room to raise rates, and thus reduce the "carry trade" money available for speculating on oil. It is the cheap Yen flowing from Japan that finance speculation, which is adding between $10 and $20 dollars a barrel to the price of oil. The United States can then work in concert with China to jointly cool the two economies to prevent inflation pressures from continuing. This alone would deprive Tehran of its most powerful weapon, not atomic uncertainty, but the certainty of thin world supply overhead.
Presently we are seeing a short term speculative blow off of the price of oil, which has dropped from nearly $80 per barrel to around $65 today. This is a temporary situation, unless there is concerted action from Europe, Japan, China and the United States. However, such temporary down drafts, if exploited, can be used to break the back of inflationary pressures.
Thus trade, recognition and giving Iran formal responsibilities from which they cannot easily escape are the best way to contain their atomic ambitions. The key pieces being getting inspections, reducing Iran's proxy leverage, and a dramatic decrease in the global price of oil, making pursuing an atomic program more expensive. At no time should the United States take military action off the table, since this threat increases the Iranian expense of development and misdirection.
The second step requires a hard, and conscious, choice on Iraq. One road in Iraq is to accept that the United States is at war, and to begin seriously tying to win it. This would require tax increases, the reinstitution of conscription, not merely of young enlisted prospects, but of older individuals with high skill levels such as pilot, military policing and technical skills. This, combined with war taxes and war rationing would allow the United States to begin deploying a substantial force to Iraq, and stabilize the situation. However, the ruling Republican coalition will not accept this, since it would require rolling back the only policy that they have been truly committed to domestically – reducing taxes on the very wealthy.
The only other branch then is to draw the Iranians into Iraq on terms which would sink a great deal of their efforts. Right now Iran can fund three proxy wars against the United States and American interests: in Iraq, in Afghanistan and in Lebanon. There are, to paraphrase an observation made about Vietnam and the Russians, no dead Iranians lying around in these conflicts. This option, of an almost total withdrawal from Iraq, in the short run, would allow the Iranians to flood into Iraq. It would, simultaneously, require their involvement. Iran's own vision of itself as a hegemonic power, and their abhorrence of destabilization on their own borders, would make the opening irresistible. The United States would then be in the uncomfortable, but winnable, position of funding those opposed to Iranian hegemony in Iran, including, ironically, the Sunni rebellion and the de facto state of Kurdistan.
At the same time the United States must move to win the winnable war: in Afghanistan. Here the Taliban have no where near the support or readiness to hold territory, and a concerted military effort could end their ability to threaten the stability of whatever political arrangements are created there. Finally the United States must make sure that the UN force in Lebanon "works" and creates a wide buffer zone. By rapidly settling the proxy conflicts, the United States can dramatically reduce Iran's leverage to upset the economy of force peripheral to the main drive to make sure that Iran does not become an atomic power.
The third phase, however, is the most crucial. Even given two years of downward pressure on oil, and an Iran that is trying to bite off more than it can chew in Iraq, the realization must be that Iran has established itself as a regional power, and as a regional power, has an interest in stability, not instability, in the region. This recognition is valuable to Tehran, and the negotiations before this point have one crucial objective – to elicit from the Iranian regime their list of desires.
The trade that must ultimately be made is for a series of arrangements that makes Iran a responsible power in the region, rather than its current position of enjoying the revenue stream of the global economy, without having any responsibility for maintaining said global economy or regional stability. These trade offs should be offered in embryo from the beginning of negotiations, in return for slowing work on critical steps in their nuclear program, inspections under the auspices of the IAEA, which has shown the capability of monitoring even in hostile political environments, and continued negotiations.
On the road to this the United States can take a few simple steps. The first is canning World War Three rhetoric entirely. Terms such as "islamofascist", "axis of evil" and the like are counter-productive to the plan of dealing with Tehran. This is not to say that the United States should remove Iran from the list of states that sponsor terrorism, or take steps that would substansively increase American risks. Tehran is still involved in proxy wars against the United States and its interests. However, the very same cultural and political pride which is currently providing a stumbling block, can become the lever required to get, and keep, the Iranians at the table while economic options are allowed to develop.
At the same time the United States needs to find a way to introduce into negotiations, and then renounce, aggressive doctrines of invasion, such as the "1% doctrine". This doctrine is one of the major drivers of the Iranian perceived need for atomic weapons, In addition to the reality that they lie within easy reach of Israel, Pakistan, India and Russia – all declared atomic powers with conflicting interests. Reducing the public perception in Iran of the need for atomic weapons will mean that the regime will gain less from pursuing it. More over, the long term objective is to make it clear to Iranians that the United States will do business with moderate regimes, and without prejudice or hostility. The less the United States acts like it is 1979, the more pressure we will be able to get Russian, Europe and China to accept on the Iranian regime. The United States is currently losing a PR war with a state that sponsors terrorism, represses human rights and is led by a loose canon populist. This must change.
Presently the United States is in a weak position with regard to Iran's atomic program. This weakness includes full strategic commitment, economic exposure, diplomatic failure and rhetorical excess. Almost all of these problems are self-inflicted wounds, and can only be healed by a concerted effort to reduce the root causes of them. To do so requires time, and buying time requires talking. Only at the end of the amelioration cycle will the United States have sufficient military, political, economic and diplomatic leverage to create conditions where Iran will have to, verifiably, renounce atomic weapons. The present executive is unlikely to listen to such scenarios, simply because the political pain for policy gain has never been something they have been willing to do. Politics used to stop at the water's edge, but this is no longer the case.
The immediate goal is to engage in negotiations without preconditions – which might well include offering "Strategic Arms" talks, and integration of Iran into an arms control negotiation regime. Iran wants to be on the inside of the world body of nations, and making readmission contingent on peaceful pursuit of technology is the best lever the United States has at the present time. By reducing US commitment to what are peripheral security conflicts, and by ending the current dollar glut, the US will be in a far stronger position with respect to Iran within 3 years, before Iran will have the ability to produce atomic weapons under all but the most "crash program" conditions. The United States can reserve, implicitly, the right to intervene should obvious signs of a crash program materialize, without jeopardizing a change in diplomatic direction. This change must center on ending the hysterical and excessive rhetoric of World War III, since this rhetoric is neither productive to policy, nor in any manner accurate to the facts on the ground.
This is far from a policy of appeasement. The United States, and the American public, must realize that Tehran is a dangerous regime, one that over time must be replaced. However replacing it is best accomplished by playing to the growing desire in Iran for a normal way of life and a normalized polity. This will not happen as long as we create the external threats that politicians such as Ahmadinejad thrive upon. The United States does not need to silence realistic criticism of Iran, as the BBC did to Churchill, nor does it need to take the stance that Iran is a potential ally, as Baldwin, Chamberlain and their foreign policy experts did. Instead, it is a realistic appraisal that, like Stalin in 1939, Iran isn't going any place any time soon, and some form of modus vivendi must be found while we allow permanent social, political and economic advantages of open societies to win out over the short term efficiencies, but long term deficiencies of closed societies.
In summary, we can bomb, bribe or begin saying "nice doggie", until we are able to find a bone and a rock. Since military options are not viable, and economic options will take time to develop, the open road is for a charm offensive, which would include one of the favorite ploys of the current executive: the surprise visit. Creating a "Tehran Spring", a thaw in relations with Iran, should be the first objective of US foreign policy to Iran, even as the United States seeks to alter the basis on which the global powers seek the Iran atomic program. The atomic program is a long term threat to stability, however dealing with it is not best accomplished by creating even more present short term threats to security.
My feeling is that the issue is nuclear weapons proliferation, no matter who's doin' it.
This is an international issue, best dealt with by an international agreement, action, and inspection to which we give our full support even as we no longer exempt ourselves from a general ban. Nor should we plead special circumstances for allies like Pakistan, Israel and India.
Meanwhile, the "average American" has to understand that most Iranians' primary issue is not tossing off headscarves or yearning for an Americanized culture. Instead, what they want is economic stability and recognition as a "great nation among great nations." The rest -- political relaxation, greater liberties, shared cultures -- will follow. But first there must be our respect for an ancient culture and that more important than "winning" is having dependable allies in the region.
During the past thirty years or so we have demonstrated amply that American militarism and strong-arming just don't work. That lethal combination makes whatever administration using end up with the loss of support of a majority of Americans and of the international community.
September 14, 2006 6:27 PM | Reply | Permalink
Beside everything else, diplomacy should be creative.
For example, we may conclude that we have to live with Iran as being practically invulnerable militarily, but we draw a line at nuclear arms issue.
Clearly, Iran has much more to gain from access to conventional modern rocket weapons than from nukes. First of all, you really cannot use nukes, while good land-to-see-rockets --- in the Persian Gulf no less --- are of considerable strategic and tactical value. So, a deal: clean bill of health on nuclear program, or access to missile technology. No other sanctions whatsoever.
The chances are that China and Russia could actually live with it, and join a conditional technology embargo, although a thorny issue remains how to attest that Iran has no enrichment program. One bad thing is that we misused the ability to claim that Iraq was "not complying" when it did, so we cannot be trusted with a decisive vote, neither can UK, but again, some creative compromise can be found.
Now, if we are satisfied only with Iran that can be attacked with impunity when we wish it, than we have a different ballgame, one that we cannot win, I am afraid.
To summarise, with properly limited goals and with some creativity we can get half of a pie. Otherwise we can be forced to loose step by step our positions.
By the way, a sharp decrease in oil prices seems to indicate that wise people are heavily betting on USA doing nothing about Iran's program.
September 14, 2006 7:00 PM | Reply | Permalink
Tehran already has ample access to missile technology. The horse is well out of the barn on that one.
Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com
September 14, 2006 7:02 PM | Reply | Permalink
Stirling,
The strategy you suggest strikes me as far too complicated. The United States is not very good at geopolitical subtlety and chess-playing over long periods of time; it never has been. The US is not a corporate board room. The game you are recommending appears to require a series of well-executed feints and deceptions executed in stages over several years, and a degree of patience for which the US is not noted. One reason the United States is not good at stealthy long-term strategies is that there is too much public discussion of those strategies in our war colleges, our think tanks, our universities and our media. You are engaging in such a discussion right now. And right now there is probably some Iranian intelligence agent browsing the web, and compiling reports on proposed clever American ploys like “introduce into negotiations, and then renounce, aggressive doctrines of invasion, such as the "1% doctrine", or “draw the Iranians into Iraq on terms which would sink a great deal of their efforts.” None of these ploys will take the Iranians by surprise, and thus they will not fall for these sucker plays.
Another reason that US governments are bad at strategic games of long-term deception is that they lack the freedom of movement and indulgence from the country’s political system that is required to conduct a stealth policy over several years, while publicly proclaiming another one. Our actual foreign policy always runs very close to the policy preferences that are publicly articulated by the key constituencies backing the White House. The US always telegraphs its long-term play from miles away, so there is not much point in trying to keep it secret.
Woodrow Wilson argued that democracy was good for world peace because democratic governments were too open, and lacked the long-term capacity for secret councils, closeted Machiavellian scheming and conspiratorial arrangements that characterize despotic governments – in which there are many fewer players in the game. The foreign policy stance that works best for the United States is to say: “here are our preferences and here are our red lines; we will do X and Y in exchange for cooperation with our preferences; cross the red lines and you will pay such-and-such a price; don’t cross them and we leave you alone”, and then stick to the policy articulated in our public pronouncements. This approach is simple, direct, honest, public and democratically sustainable.
On the more concrete matter of Iran, I think you are overstating the long-term threat posed and the degree and difficulty of the containment required; and I believe you are underestimating the potential for negotiations to reach an acceptable conclusion in the near term, rather than being only the longer term stalling or time-gaining tactic you seem to envision. My own interpretation is that Iran is quite sincerely eager to negotiate with the United States. It is true that they are good at playing the brinkmanship bravado game as well as the US, and they now have an entertaining front man who projects a lot of confidence. But the US military threat against Iran is still very credible, despite the fact that we are bogged down in Iraq. The US can still do what is best at – drop lots of explosive firepower from planes and blow important things up. And since Iran’s government does not consist in a single person or a handful of people, unlike the situation in Iraq, it cannot all hide in a system of bunkers and tunnels. Many government officials would surely be killed in a sudden attack, and they know it. And their nuclear power program, which is evidently a source of great national pride, could be set back many years.
I would also argue that Iranian regime does not have to be replaced eventually, as you argue. Iran is still a young, post-revolutionary regime in an evolutionary process of self-definition and institution-building. The quasi-democratic and constitutional goverment contains a number of separate power centers: the Presidency, the Majlis, the Expediency Council, the military and the Leaders. By working with and empowering the more democratic and moderate components of the Iranian government, we and other nations can help guide its evolution in a constructive direction. Building up the moderate and practical elements of the government means increasing the size of the constituencies around them, by demonstrating that these elements can deliver benefits to their people while the more ideologically doctrinaire and aggressive elements cannot.
One thing I think we can take advantage of is thet Ahmadinejad is a man who craves attention. He has lots of views, which he enjoys expressing to whomever is will listen. That is something that can work to our advantage
September 14, 2006 8:55 PM | Reply | Permalink
Several weeks ago in the discussion boards I argued that perhaps it was time for the U.S. to reduce its footprint in the Middle East and afford Iran the opportunity to enjoy its sovereignty.
By doing this, we will essentially be holding Iran to its word that it is, at heart, a peace loving nation. Ahmadinejad has stated many times that his nation is not seeking to construct nuclear weapons; only the ability to create nuclear energy for civilian purposes.
Let's let them.
Ahmadinejad has said he does not fund terrorist organizations.
Let's give them the opportunity to prove it. In essence, we put the burden of responsibility on Tehran for once.
Like I said in my post, two outcomes are possible by the U.S. diminishing its footprint in the region.
1)Iran stays true to its word and is a responsible, peace loving nation. In this case, the world will enjoy a great deal of peace (at least the between the West and the Middle East)
2)Iran takes advantage of its freedoms and creates a nuclear weapons program and/or continues to fund and sponsor terror organizations.
If this is the case, the U.S. and its allies then have the military initiative AND moral highground to check Tehran's motives. Consider it akin to allowing a sexual predator to be released from prison equipped with a tracking bracelet. He gets one last crack at the straight and narrow, but if he deviates, nobody will be fooled.
Bush change his course, but the next president ought to consider it. Negotiating and offering incentive packages and/or threatening sanctions is utterly worthless with Iran simply because it is alread too powerful.
September 14, 2006 10:16 PM | Reply | Permalink
I had discussions on the topic with hberkowitz who sounds like an expert. It is not clear how much 1st class missiles does Iran have. Stuff that can blow a naval vessel out of the water even with the best countermeasures on. Blowing out facilities on the opposite side of the Persian Gulf p_r_e_c_i_s_e_l_y. Blowing F-15s down from the sky.
With capabilities like that Iran would be in a position to stop the traffic in Persian Gulf completely, demolish our facilities in Qatar and Kuwait. This would be painful for Iran, kind of economic MAD, but it could hurt us more than some crappy nukes that barely manage to explode (which could be a fair description of Pakistani nukes, India had a tad better test results).
Given its excellant strategic position, Iran seem to need nukes for one purpose alone: annoying USA and thus scoring political points at home.
That said, we really do not have such profound bones of contention with Iran. That they will be a dominant partner of independent Iraq is a given to me, not even worth much struggle. In Afghanistan, they are actually more interested in stability that we are. Opium and heroin from Afghanistan are a serious domestic problem for Iran, while Busheviks seem almost indifferent. Possible proxies in Afghanistan are Shia tribes from central Hindukush that were badly abused by Taliban and some Persian (Dari, Tadjik) speaking warlords, all rather supportive of Karzai. Influence in Lebanon? To a degree, unavoidable. The structure of Lebanon is such that this influence is limited, except when we whack people who were supposed to be our allies.
The last issue is the specter of the Second Salah-ed-Din, a Shia axis spanning from Khorasan to Litani. Which would not be a problem if Israel got an aggreement with Palestinians.
The bottom line seems to be this: Israel won the second Intifada and she can do pretty much what she wishes, but, apparently, not forever. If we wish otherwise, we get into all sorts of problems. Our foreign policy will remain lame as long as it is based on rank and transparent hypocrisy. Hailing Lebanese for their independence from Syria and watching with total indifference how they get bombed was an example that we are a steadfast ally to one country only.
Because we do not Israel to have any limits on her behavior, we must support rather insane policies that are supposed to eliminate any possible future treat to Israel, like Iran. So we want to have the option of bombing Teheran flat, which is not there because of Hezbollah, so the Hezbollah have to be eliminated, which seems to be impossible barring bunker-to-bunker infantry combat, so to get around it we support bombing Beirut neighborhoods flat which somehow makes us less than popular (ingrates! we said so many nice things about them!).
Anyway, it seems that Iran has a lot of rockets, but few of high quality, so there are some levers. But we do not have any kind of monopoly and the knowledge of military electronics etc. will eventually reach anyone willing to pay for it, so we cannot stake our long term strategy on our opponents being relatively weaponless forever.
September 14, 2006 11:27 PM | Reply | Permalink
The idea that any nation could have a right to depose the government of another nation is a dangerous thought that are better to weed out from serious discussions. Aspirations of regime changes do not promote international stability. Leave that game to the neo-conservative dilettantes! In fact, it chases Iran away from any constructive solutions with the West (including the U.S.) and puts her in the knee of either China or Russia or both.
Similarly, the idea that Iran shouldn't be entitled to similar rights and duties with regard to nuclear technology is as much of a long-term disservice to our common interests of trade, transparency and cooperation.
Ambiguous demands like Do not support anything we deem as a terrorist organization! are no good idea. They know, and we know, how close such a demand is to becoming an excuse for our attack on them.
From 1953 and on, we have given a quite bad impression of ourselves. The first requirement for a successful diplomacy is to realize that the Iranians have legitimate resentments which likely will take time and efforts (from both sides) to get over.
Trade, cooperation and display of respect will speed up the economic and political development among common Iranians and be the most likely path to a democratic development.
And a democratic development in Iran is our goal, isn't it?
It can not be Iran's subordination to an American Empire, can it?
September 15, 2006 7:04 AM | Reply | Permalink
"Let us first admit that Iran isn't going to make the list of the West's favorite regime any time soon. They are repressive at home, they export terrorism, have geopolitical and cultural ambitions which include a sphere of influence that extends from Beirut to the Kashmir. Iran's vision of itself is as the natural regional dominant power, and as the center of Shia Islam, intellectually and economically, as well as politically."
Iran exports terrorism. To where? Do I have to keep popping in the same links over and over again.
Iran wants to be a regional power. As opposed to whom? Am I supposed to automatically pick Israel's side in a war? Why? Am I supposed to pick the US? Why pick any country? The occupation has been going on for 40 years. Israel has alredy broken the ceasefire over one hundred times. Israel has the bomb. Pakistan has the bomb. Iran is run by reactionary priests who rule over an increasingly young and educated and impatient populace. Pakistan is a military dictatorship living in fear of peasant rebellion and a clique of religious lunatics.
You offer the choice of the the lesser of two bogymen. BOO!
stupid.
September 15, 2006 7:41 AM | Reply | Permalink
Seth,
I think we are seeing the continuation of five-year pattern. Republican leaders pump lies and distortions into the national information pipeline, and recommend bold and aggressive measures to deal with the alleged threats. Democrats then take the "responsible path" by swallowing 90% of the lies and distortions, rejecting or cavilling on others, and recommeding a more moderate approach to defeating the illusory bogey men.
September 15, 2006 9:55 AM | Reply | Permalink
I would like to expand on the "regime change".
From purely pragmatic, rather than moral, perspective it seems pointless to expend money, and/or blood and/or moral capital to forster governments that dislike us. Regime change may entail installing a friendly dictator or rigging or straightening the system to favor some friendly political movements.
The formative experience of our "conservative diletantes" were civil wars in Central America where elites were "pro-American". Middle East does not have big number of Ivy-League aducated people who have condominiums in Miami or Los Angeles. Nobody really likes us there and unless we change that interventions make no sense whatsover. Changing our conduct to gain some modicum of popularity would be a precondition. One should also recognize that expending "moral capital" works exactly in the opposite direction. When we loose our morality, we have nothing to show for it.
Hence idealistic foreign policy that exchews the hypocrisy of "exporting democracy" will be more effective and cheaper. And if we on top of that have fewer stains on the national honor, that is just a bonus. Or vice versa (fewer stains on honor and effective and less expensive policy as a bonus).
September 15, 2006 12:18 PM | Reply | Permalink
And as another result the whole of the American nation gets alienated from other concerned parties (Israel excluded).
In case anyone has forgotten: Iran is the near-abroad for both Russia, India and the EU and a neighbor of Turkey.
September 15, 2006 3:21 PM | Reply | Permalink
Problems with this analysis:
First, the 'export of terrorism' committed by Iran is supporting the Hezbollah against Israeli incursions and Hamas against Israeli ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. Compar that to the US' support, financing, training and arming of nun-raping death sqauds in Latin America, not to mention the 300000 dead babies resulting from US sanctions on Iraq during Clinton's reign, then ask who is the real "terrorism supporter" -- BTW that should also be clear by taking ONE LOOK at what Israel did in Lebanese civilians, and guess who was "supporting" them...
Second, you are simply proceeding on the implied assumption that Iran is working towards a nuclear weapon. There's no evidence of that. In fact, Iran HAS allowed IAEA inspections - more than it was ever required - and has been bending backwards to show peaceful intent (including voluntarily suspending enrichment) but the US keeps insisting that the entire field of nuclear technology should be a mystery to a proud & ancient nation with a population larger than France. That's just not workable, sorry.
And Argentina and Brazi's nuclear program have hardly been "bought" by the US - in fact they're still quite active. Brazil has recently developed enrichment technology and refused full IAEA inspections, and Argentina (and S. Africa) have announced plans to start enrichment themselves. In fact, Brazil has a graphite reactor - a plutonium "breeder" known as the Atlantic Project - and the primary investor in BRazil's nuclear program is its Navy.
And Iran is hardly an expansionist state. Iran's military budget is $4 billion - that's compared to the Saudi military budget of $26 billion (2001) Iran hasn't waged a war againts anyone in over 200 years. Iran doesn't need to resort to aggression because it HAS been the NATURAL hegemon of the region. Simply by existing, it influences the entire region due to its position, its size, etc. Don't forget, both Afghanistan and Iraq were once part of Iran, and long long before the US was "discovered", the Sultans from the Mughals of India to the Ottomans in Turkey were all speaking Persian. Heck today, the population of all the southern Arab littoral states of the Persian Gulf barely matches the population of just Tehran.
September 15, 2006 8:24 PM | Reply | Permalink
So it is OK to kill civilians as long as they are Jews. Got it. Protocols of the Elders of Zion, back wall, on the right.
Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com
September 15, 2006 10:47 PM | Reply | Permalink
Well yes you are.
Iranian agents executed a truck bombing in 1996 in Saudi Arabia. Last I checked, there were no Israelis there.
Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com
September 15, 2006 10:49 PM | Reply | Permalink
Sarcasm ill becomes you, nor does playing the victim.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
September 15, 2006 10:50 PM | Reply | Permalink
This is nonsense.
First: producing atomic weapons is not a right of states under the treaties that Iran and the United States have signed.
Second: support for groups which target civilians is against American interests. Iran continues to do so.
Third: Supporting terrorism isn't a legitimate interest. The US has, in fact, been on the receiving end of precisely that judgement. In the above posts I see numerous people arguing various forms of "supporting terrorism is a legitimate state right." It is not. It is not when Iran does it, it is not when Israel does it, it is not when the United States does it. That's international law, and it is also basic common sense.
Fourth: Pursuit of atomic weapons, while not a right under treaty is an interest of Iran, particularly because they are part of a region of the world with a number of declared and undeclared powers - Israel, Russia, India, Pakistan, NATO - in short range of Tehran. It is imperative to remove the interest in pursuing such weapons, in order to make treaty obligations meaningful.
Iran is a dangerous and repressive regime, neither Bush's tough guy talk, or the kind of white washing of atrocities which I am seeing on this thread are productive in dealing with Iran. The facts on the ground are that Iran is now a regional power, in no small part a gift from the United States over the last 6 years, and must be dealt with as a regional power. However, this does not mean that the US should forget that Iran has in the past, and will in the future, use assymetrical means to pursue its interests, including terrorism and proliferation.
If the United States wants to see an Iran which is both more liberal - in the rights sense - and more responsible, then the United States must change its course dramatically. This involves changes to our economic and foreign policy. Most specifically ending of our prolifigate spending and self-imposed isolation from other Western powers on a variety of issues.
Failure to deal with Iran out of enlightened self-interest, as opposed to crass self-interest, will have penalties. Equally in error is the crypto-anti-semitism on display here, and an abnegation of self-interest. I don't believe there is any political reality where this course will be taken, which is why I don't bother to argue against it in the piece. It is self-marginalizing, and almost self-refuting.
However it does dramatically improve the hand of the right wing, since it provides a caricature of opposition to current policy. For this Karl Rove thanks you, because it makes his job enormously easier.
Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com
September 15, 2006 11:05 PM | Reply | Permalink
There you go with delusions of adequeacy again.
Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com
September 15, 2006 11:08 PM | Reply | Permalink
Getting "it's ok to kill civilians only if they are Jews" is a bit of a stretch. Want to attempt to justify where you got that logic? Is it that no action of Israel may be criticized?
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Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
September 15, 2006 11:11 PM | Reply | Permalink
There are more pro-American people in the Middle East than you think. However, American policy for some time seems to consist of systematically marginalizing them in pursuit of illusory advantage.
There is a large population in the Middle East that aspires to stable, more open, government and economics. However, this aspiration will not be channelled into forms that are useful to the US as long as the US continually acts as if the region were a colonial protectorate at best, and "The Axis of Evil" at worst. American dialog is laced with anti-Arab and anti-Islamic images and tropes, which, not surprisingly people in the Middle East pick up on.
There is also the consistent failure of the United States to back economic development in the region, instead prefering to deal with regimes which recycle profits as dollars, or are willing to follow US military adventures.
The US mishandling of Israel is icing on the cake, a visible sore which gives a name to the other ills of US policy.
Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com
September 15, 2006 11:13 PM | Reply | Permalink
Let me be fair. This is an excellent and concise post.
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Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
September 15, 2006 11:14 PM | Reply | Permalink
If I am to be an absolute realist, I will state that matters are going to continue to get worse until 2009 at the earlies, and quite possibly 2013 - anyone who expects a McCain presidency to significantly improve on Bush's handling of Iran is not looking at his record seriously, nor are any of the other likely Republican Presidential contenders going to be any improvement.
However, part of opposing current policy is laying out workable alternatives. A diplomatic offensive, combined with developing military and economic options which allows the United States to negotiate from a credible position is such a workable alternative.
Do I think it will happen? In part, simply because the United States has no military options, and its economic options are almost useless. Sanctions against Iran will do more damage to the US than to Iran.
But also realistically, if the general consensus is that Iran is a long term, not short term problem, all this really requires Bush to do is stop shouting and start talking, and engage in fiscal house cleaning. The first he can do, and the second a different Congress can force him to do.
While there are some niceties of proliferation doctrine that would make it so that we would like to act now, the reality is that this is not possible. Instead the United States is going to have to learn to live with Iran as a pre-nuclear state, and will have to in future manage the relationship so that Iran consistently decides that while it could get atomic weapons, it is better off not doing so right now.
This is going to be the state of affairs with more and more of our relationships - as the technology for atomic weapons becomes within reach of smaller and smaller powers. The age where the declared nuclear states could set a hard fire break between having fissiles and not having fissiles has come to an end. Reality dictates that the US begin developing strategies which, in an international context, can deal with this new state of proliferation.
Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com
September 15, 2006 11:20 PM | Reply | Permalink
Realistically any international agreement will have to be driven by the United States, and occur with our cooperation. American military and economic policy are two of the major drivers of political instability which generates the possiblity and interest in proliferation.
What is worse is that in pursuit of Iraq, the US has ignored what active proliferators are doing.
Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com
September 15, 2006 11:23 PM | Reply | Permalink
That is precisely what the commenter argued, that Tehran's support for terrorism was acceptable because it was targetted at Israeal.
Either you can't read, or you can't tell the truth. In either case it is impossible to have a civilized conversation with you. I've had trolls banned before, and you are bumping up against the line where your presence is purely disputatious and unproductive.
Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com
September 15, 2006 11:46 PM | Reply | Permalink
"Ahmadinejad has said he does not fund terrorist organizations."
The facts don't support this assertion. Iran has not been a good faith negotiator in the past, and this is part of the reason why negotiations in the short run, without credible carrots and sticks, are not going to produce reliable results.
However, the United States has also been a bad faith actor, and continues to be so. Negotiations which take place as long as the United States continues, as official policy, to act in bad faith are unlikely to produce reliable results.
Thus the two variables we do control are changing our lack of options, and present bad faith policy on the part of the United States. Since both of these will take time, it is essential that the United States begin buying time, and not wasting it.
Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com
September 15, 2006 11:52 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'll stand on my record of having the great majority of my posts being substantive rather Other than an offhand comment that may have been made at some odd time in the past, I don't remember ever having a conversation with you. How are you determining that it is impossible to have a civilized conversation after approximately two exchanges, plus a case where, within the same rough time interval, I complimented you on a post?
If this is your conception of trollism, by all means have Josh evaluate it. I am willing to assume that there may be mistaken identity involved here, but I will admit I am fairly intolerant about people pulling rubbish like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion into a context where they were never mentioned.
Again, I offer that you may have me confused with someone else. If you won't accept that, or attempt to have a conversation, then please do attempt to have me banned. Of course, in neopagan tradition, we do believe that actions reflect threefold on the actor. It's a nice balancing approach to life.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
September 15, 2006 11:56 PM | Reply | Permalink
(. Impressive. .)
September 16, 2006 12:14 AM | Reply | Permalink
> And Iran is hardly an expansionist state. Iran's military budget is $4 billion - that's compared to the Saudi military budget of $26 billion (2001) Iran hasn't waged a war againts anyone in over 200 years.
The only words which describe this point are "bull shit". The size of military budget is not an indicator of expansionism. The United States in the late 19th century had a small military budget compared with European colonial powers, and yet was expansionist by both doctrine and effect.
As far as "hasn't gone to war in 200 years" this is inaccurate on its face, the Qajar dynasty fought a series of wars and actions in order to restore Persia to control over regions that had been lost previous to their ascension, including one in the 1850's over Herat. It should be noted that they were more encroached upon than encroaching - the "Grand Game" between Russia and the United Kingdom was to divide Persia into spheres of influence, but it is the Qajars that when to war against Russia in the early 19th century.
In 1969 Iran voided a peace treaty with Iraq, and demanded renogotiation, with the threat of force, in November of 1971, it forceably took control of three small Arab islans at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.
However this is history, what is relevant is the history of the current Islamic Republic and its geo-political objectives. During the Islamic revolution Iran's government backed the storming of the US Embassy. This is an act of war under relevant international law.
Iran has not sought expansion of its sphere of influence by invasion, but by funding proxy groups to wage Islamic Jihad, it has backed the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hamas and Hezbollah in the Levant, and groups scattered through Europe, the Middle East and Africa. It has from time to time engaged in operations run by its own intelligence agency.
Fundamental to this policy is the history of Persia and Iran from 1800 forward, which had three basic patterns: the first was the repeated failure of Persia or Iran to engage in effective military offense, the second is the repeated occupation of all or part of Iran by foriegn powers, and the third is the repeated internal revolutions which have often been backed by foreign powers.
Iran's policy then has been to avoid direct military confrontation - if any further reminder was needed the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88 showed exactly how punishing warfare is - and to pursue internal arrangements which repressed possible dissent and entre by foreign powers into Iran's polity. The extension of this was to back teh Taliban in Afghanistan. Backing politically repressive movements in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine qualifies as exporting revolution. And the Islamic Revolution in Iraq wins few points for being an open and pluralistic society. These are the facts, and any solution to the current nuclear problem, or longer term diplomatic situation vis a vis Iraq must face them squarely.
In short, virtually every thing you have said is either directly factually in error, or so misleading as to be useless. It isn't possible to discuss matters with someone who is as arrogant, willfully dishonest, and frankly repulsively anti-semetic as yourself.
Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com
September 16, 2006 12:30 AM | Reply | Permalink
The original commenter defended killing civilians because it was directed at Isreal. This is anti-semetism pure and simple.
It was also a comment filled with factual inaccuracies and specious arguments.
And no, you've never had a conversation with me, because your previous posts have all been hit and run slurs similar to the ones above.
Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com
September 16, 2006 12:35 AM | Reply | Permalink
Nobody's perfect and I'm trying to view Mr. Newberry's reflexive defensiveness as endearingly idiosyncratic. It is on its face not reflective responsiveness, as he will describe all as "well-known trolls" or some such, even when we are admirers in our comments. One strike and you're out.
Nonetheless, I am grateful for his deep looks into economics and society.
September 16, 2006 7:41 AM | Reply | Permalink
Don't let Stirling's short fuse distract you from his outstanding posts on Iran and its Persian history.
Stirling, don't let the ******** get to you.
September 16, 2006 8:54 AM | Reply | Permalink
Funny - I write about Israeli ethnic cleansing of Palestinians and you read "killing Jews" - LOL!!!
Here, lets settle the issue of who espouses killing civilians, according to a ISRAELI historian:
http://www.counterpunch.org/shavit01162004.htmlSeptember 16, 2006 9:42 AM | Reply | Permalink
The French government blew up a ship in an Australian harbor.
The Israeli government comments act of terror every day. Asassinations are common in Gaza and the West Bank.
The US mined Bluefields harbor in Nicaragua, under Reagan. Should I go on? There's a long list. One act of government terror? Gimme something more than that; I'm a man of the world, I'm jaded.
To "Export Terrorism" is to engage in an ongoing program.
I'll say again. Iran is a non-issue for the world at large. It is an 'issue' for Israel and the US- due to paranoia and little else.
By the way, has that idiot Ratzinger apologized yet?
September 16, 2006 10:06 AM | Reply | Permalink
Even assuming that Iran had a role in Khobar, compare that the US shoot down of the Iranian civilian airliner over the Persian Gulf, not to mention the US providing chemical weapons to Saddam to be used against his own people and Iranians - 60,000 Iranian killed by chemical weapons, with the knowing support and connivance of the US. So who is the terrorist?
And of course thus far other than simply repeating this conclusory statements, no actual evidenece has been provided to support the claim that Iran bombed US military posts in Saudi Arabia. Here, read this:
http://www.iranian.com/Opinion/2001/May/Khobar/index.html
September 16, 2006 10:10 AM | Reply | Permalink
How many Israeli civilians had Hezbollah killed between 2000 and the recent Israeli assault? The numbers range from 6 to 0.
September 16, 2006 10:12 AM | Reply | Permalink
Linking a 4th time. A fifth?
"Indeed, a 2002 Congressional Research Service report noted, in its analysis of Hezbollah, that “no major terrorist attacks have been attributed to it since 1994.”
September 16, 2006 10:16 AM | Reply | Permalink
Your claim that Iran backed the Taliban? is so laughably ridiculous and contra-factual, not to mention characterizing Iran's support of the Palestinians and Lebanese in fighting off Israeli aggression as "support for repression" - who is repressing the Palestinians, Iran or the Israelis? LOL!!!
And your comparison of military budgets to the 19th century US is flawed since the US expansion is simply not comparable to any alleged expansion of Iran against her neighbors, almost all of whom have larger military budgets than Iran.
The fact is that Iran has no claim to any territory outside of her existing borders - unlike Israel - and has not engaged in any wars of aggression against anyone in 200 years which was intended to acquire territory that belonged to others (acquiring territory wrongfully taken isn't aggression.) The examples you cite are also flawed - for example your claim that Iran "forceably" took the three islands in the Persian Gulf overlooks the fact that the Shah got control over those islands pursuant to a treaty with the British when they evacuated the islands, and incidentally the Shah GAVE UP Bahrain at that time. So much for your claims of expansionism.
As for the US embassy invasion constituting a violation of international law - I suggest you consider the violations of international law when the US re-installed the Shah into power first.
September 16, 2006 10:18 AM | Reply | Permalink
Of course you "got it" - because you made it up! LOL! How pathetic can you get to resort to this?
September 16, 2006 10:20 AM | Reply | Permalink
Helena Cobban quotes Haaretz:
You haven't read a single thing I've linked to. You go off like MJ Rosenberg and J Marshall when your claims to moral superiority are called for what they are: bluster wrapped in fear and self-interest. Zionists don't like to think of themselves as bad people. No. You're a nice guy.
September 16, 2006 10:32 AM | Reply | Permalink
This is a matter of context.
My context was: why is it so much more difficult to obtain a friendly government through an overt or covert intervention in Central America than in Middle East. One reason is that elites in Central America are pro-American, so it was sufficient to tilt the balance of power toward these elites.
In ME, Lebanon is nearest to "free political game", has many connections to USA etc. and even there at best you can find political factions ready to make a temporary aliance of convenience. That was before the last exhibition of our friendship.
I meant "pro-American" as "ready to collaborate in case when USA sponsors a regime change". You will find rather few of those. So we are in a situation when intervention is probably futile, and if we manage to change that, it will be probably unnecessary, so hardly ever it is a good option.
You meant "pro-American" as "open to Western ideas".
September 16, 2006 8:12 PM | Reply | Permalink
Just a comment: is it just my impression that Hezbollah, that unlike Hamas could be viewed as Iranian proxy, has a distinct preference for military targets? The exceptions tend to be retaliations for attacks on civilians by the opponents. It seems that the military wing of hezbollah is indeed military rather than terrorist.
OTOH, counting defence budgets is indeed not a good measure. SA has incredibly bloated military budget. Even so, Taliban was not recognized by Iran but by Saudis, if I recall. Sunni extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan are quite hostile to Shia and I suspect that the feeling is mutual.
By the way: Iraq was a part of Iran? I mean, after VII-th century?
Now, a genuine point. Iran is hostile and veers toward dictatorship, but their policies are indeed not expantionist, totalitarian etc., additionally, they seem to follow a certain code of conduct that shows that they can be reasoned with.
A common theme of the nuclear controversy and the most recent break-up of hostilities with Israel. Both Hezbollah and Iran went to considerable lengths to have a sound legal case, at least from their own point of view, but at the very least a convincing case to most non-Westerers.
Iran, as we know, did not sign any treaty forbidding it from uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes. We basically say that who cares, they cannot be trusted. Perhaps not, but a legal case it is not. I also perceive that the whole point of Iranian policy is to provoke a confrontation in a situation in which they are arguably the rightful side and we are the lawless side. Why they would want to do it, and why the legalities would matter to them? I think that domestic politics and approval of the population, including educated potentially pro-Western people. They are the once who would appreciate the legal case and who would reject "we cannot be trusted" position. And they are the very people who represent our hope for more democratic and pro-Western Iran.
Similarly, Hezbollah was careful to start from purely military attack, and one that follow a discovery of what was claimed to be Israeli network of assasins in Lebanon. They clearly want to have a good legal case, at least from the point of view of the public opinion among the non-Shia (and Shia, of course), Lebanese.
The very fact that such fine points may be important for the public opinion indicate a legal-oriented or even legalistic mentality that is actually quite characteristic of Islam in general and Shia version in particular.
This legalism has a dark side. If a well argued fatwa concludes that Israel has no right to exist, a compromise may be hard to achieve. Yet, it is also clear that the situation in nowhere as dire as that. But our blithe disregard for legal niceties, and I include Israel here, is really rubbing them in the worst possible way.
I must stress that we may view our action as perfectly legal and yet they may appear as total lawless bullshit. For example, we used our sway over banking system to basically forbid any money transfers to Hamas, and we had some American laws to support those actions, which nevertheless were probably looking in ME like lawless bending of the rules.
September 16, 2006 9:01 PM | Reply | Permalink
However, part of opposing current policy is laying out workable alternatives. A diplomatic offensive, combined with developing military and economic options which allows the United States to negotiate from a credible position is such a workable alternative.
My view is that the US is actually in a very solid bargaining position right now, but that its position becomes weaker as time passes, and that further diplomatic steps other than real bilateral negotiations with Iran are unlikely to improve its position.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, Iran really does have a long term nuclear weapons program underway. (I hasten to add that there is no firm evidence that this is true. The program may very well be a domestic nuclear energy program, as Iran claims. There are excellent reasons for Iran to want such an energy program, and also to be careful about allowing overly intrusive inspections of the program.) A program to build a nuclear arsenal is a risky venture. Its success can be thwarted by many factors along the way: military attack, economic reversals, engineering failures, accidents, domestic instability, etc. The current value of the program to Iran is a function of the value it sees in possessing these weapons, discounted by the probability of success in achieving the aim of the program. However, every day the program moves forward and inches toward its goal, the probability of eventual success increases incrementally, and the program's value to Iran appreciates. The more valuable the program to Iran, the more that must be offered in exchange to get Iran to end it.
So I say make the trade now, while the nuclear weapons program - if its exists - is still largely an Iranian pipedream of doubtful outcome. As the the program progresses, it gradually moves in steps from pipedream to near certainty, the US accordingly will accordingly have to rely on either tastier carrots or heavier sticks to end it.
September 16, 2006 9:57 PM | Reply | Permalink
Ah, a Trifecta! You converted my statement about Israelis killing Palestinians into "justifying killing civilians" and then "justifying killing jews" and now you're resort to waving around the old "Antisemitism" cudgel - the standard method of silencing the TRUTH about Israel and the US's support for Israeli state terrorism.
LOL - like this sort of sophomoric spin can't be spotted a mile away.
Take a look at Lebanon and then come back here to whine about "killing civilians."
September 16, 2006 10:00 PM | Reply | Permalink
I suppose that was a content rating. Or was my comment just too brief?
September 16, 2006 10:06 PM | Reply | Permalink
I've had trolls banned before, and you are bumping up against the line where your presence is purely disputatious and unproductive.
Well, speaking for myself, I'll save you the trouble. This is my last comment on one of your posts Mr. Newberry. I refuse to patronize another peevish brat-blogger with a delicate, pampered ego and a kit bag of cowardly slanders.
So ban away, though boy of tears. And after everyone has been banned out to the corn field, scurry back home to mommy. I'm sure she will be happy to post all of your your muddled, sophomoric rambles on the refrigerator, where only doting, indulgent eyes will view them.
September 16, 2006 11:36 PM | Reply | Permalink
If I may, let me expand on some aspects of missile technology that might help clarify Iranian capability. One of the key issues is that for certain types of missile attacks, the missile alone is inadequate.
Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of guided missiles: autonomous and man-in-the-loop. Let me begin with autonomous anti-shipping missiles, which have several tradeoffs.
There have been several attempts to solve the problem, with varying degrees of success. The US, for example, retired the Tomahawk anti-ship missile, because at its long range, the target may well have moved enough that the missile terminal guidance radar can't find it.
Both the US and fUSSR have varying approaches, some mentioned only briefly in the unclassified literature, to give midcourse guidance to the missiles. Current US practice, in the absence of carriers with full-capability radar planes, is to put up a radar-equipped helicopter, which moves around outside the missile defense range of the target, and may drop below the radar horizon and pop up occasionally.
It appears that the US and fUSSR, especially the latter, have methods to send midcourse guidance from a lurking submarine closer to the target. For the submarine not to become a target, it has to use passive sensors, with their limitations. The fUSSR also used long-range Bear radar recon planes, the crews of which generally expected to be shot down, from their high altitude position, very soon after target acquisition.
One very creative fUSSR approach was used with its big Granit missiles, one of which could do a mission kill on a carrier. They would launch several simultaneously, and all but one would fly at very low level. One of the group would pop up and use radar. If it was shot down, another robot would replace it. Eventually, they would get close enough for individual target acquisition, at which time they would pop up to dive, at Mach 3 or better, into the targets.
There's a lot more that could be said, but the reality is having ship-attackng missiles alone isn't enough against a sophisticated enemy. The midcourse guidance problem is the really tough one, and picking the target out of waves, especially at low altitude, is another.
The Iranians have clones, probably improved, of Chinese C-700 and C-800 antiship missiles. The C-800, especially, needs tracking radar, and, against an alerted force, can be engaged with antiradar missiles, possibly cutting off guidance to the antiship missile.
It's one thing to attack Israeli Saar class corvettes, operating alone or in pairs. It's another thing to attack ships that have or are protected by the Aegis battle management system, which integrates radar from various sources, long-range and point-defense missiles, and countermeasures. The problem, without midcourse guidance, when you get close enough to see the carrier protected by Aegis ships, the Aegis ships can see you, as can the fighters.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
September 17, 2006 9:30 AM | Reply | Permalink