The Iran-Afghanistan Connection: America Needs to Cut Some Deals
When I recently met Mohammed Khatami, Iran's former President, one of the first things he said was no one more than Iran applauded the fall of Saddam Hussein and the routing of the Taliban in Afghanistan. He ticked through a long list of strategic priorities and concerns that he suggested were overwhelmingly similar to the U.S. position. Leaving Iran's nuclear ambitions aside for the time being, Khatami is right.
What Mitt Romney and many who are recklessly demonizing Khatami have totally wrong is that there has been significant collaboration between Iran and the U.S. for years -- including in Bosnia and Kosovo, but most recently in Afghanistan. In fact, before President Bush's famous "axis of evil" speech, most in the administration were appreciative of Iran's assistance inside Afghanistan, with which Iran has had a close working relationship with the Afghan military. The United States could not have successfully pacified Afghanistan without Iranian help behind the scenes.
Today, Afghanistan is coming undone as the Taliban are back big time. My colleague Peter Bergen has a very important and disturbing piece on this, "The Taliban: Regrouped and Rearmed" in today's Washington Post.
While Bergen reports that the U.S. Commander in Afghanistan, Lt. General Karl Eikenberry, remains optimistic, to me it looks like the trends are very bad. The line that "at the end of every road, the Taliban starts" is an indictment of the failure to rebuild infrastructure and offer people outside Kabul the benefits of a better, modern life.
Eikenberry is an impressive scholar-soldier whom I first met years ago when he was handling China issues in the Office of International Security Affairs in the Pentagon. He should read Bergen's article today, because the general tone of the piece and his depictions of the enemy sound very much like an increasingly encircled elite just before things went bad in China in 1947 and then again some decades later in Saigon.
But it seems to me that Iran and the United States need to find some activities on the periphery of their direct concerns with each other to re-establish any kind of trust, of which there is absolutely none right now. One of these confidence building arenas could be Afghanistan.
We need to keep Afghanistan from capsizing, and it's not in Iran's strategic interests for the Taliban to return. Perhaps we need to informally seek the assistance of Iran in getting the Afghan problem under control and use that as a precursor for other things.
-- Steve Clemons is Senior Fellow and Director of the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation and publishes the popular political blog, The Washington Note.
I take a lesson from both Afghanistan and Iraq of the risks of impatience.
Many feel we brought down the Soviet Union. I'm not sure of how much credit we can take, although the CIA credits the mujihadeen and the Armageddon crowd credits Star Wars. To whatever extent we hastened its demise, the results are not completely wonderful. The sudden collapse led to wholesale theft of state assets, and the growth of a mafia that undercuts proper government and rule of law.
Similar issues appear in our two interventions. Instead of organically grown civic society in Iraq we have to transplant it. Same in Aghanistan, where the cosiderably-less-than-wonderful Taliban were at least providing security and stopped opium production.
The population of Iran is not stupid and will eventually grow more democratic if we let it. Presenting it with an external threat is guaranteed to produce a defensive, suspicious posture. I note the irony of the "Party of Personal Responsibility" not being willing to let other countries find their own way.
September 10, 2006 11:24 AM | Reply | Permalink
I was struck by this comment in Bergen's piece:
"Despite their numerous casualties, the Taliban are much more willing than Iraqi insurgents to engage in pitched battles, Sturek said. "These guys will mix it up," he said, "and they use a lot more direct fire." In the five months he had been in Afghanistan, he noted, none of the Taliban fighters his men had fought had ever surrendered."
There is much in common here with the comments made by the IDF soldiers who fought Hezbollah. The fact that the Taliban is as much a part of the local fabric as is Hezbollah in Lebanon is another commonality. Bergen's further explanations of Pakistan's role in facilitating/supporting the Taliban are similiar to the accusations about Iran's relationship to Hezbollah. A point surely not missed by the Iranians.
Why would Iran be inclined to "help" the US again? Syria was also of great assistance shortly after 9/11 and what did that get them?
As far as what serves Iran's purpose in Afghanistan, I wouldn't bet that they consider the resurgence of the Taliban as as much of a threat to them as a bonus. A destabilized Afghanistan keeps their most threatening enemy off balance and is no doubt preferable to an Afghanistan as a stable US client state.
Unless there is a widespread scourge of policymakers embedded within this administration, there is no reason for Iran to "trust" us.
September 10, 2006 11:54 AM | Reply | Permalink
Actually, we don't have to "leave aside" Iran's nuclear aspirations since the US and Iran have seen eye-to-eye on that too, which is why the US encouraged and supported the development of nuclear energy in Iran in the first place - and thus far, a civilian nuclear energy progam is all that the IAEA has found in Iran.
The economic basis of Iran's nuclear program did not change when the Shah fell, and if anything nuclear energy makes more economic sense today. Iran now consumes 40% of its oil and gas domestically while its major oil fields have become further depleted.
But I suppose the Israelis won't permit the US to pursue its own broader interests in the Mideast and certainly not with respect to Iran either.
September 10, 2006 11:57 AM | Reply | Permalink
Afghanistan hasn't been 'stable' since it was torn off of Iran by the British. A stable Afghanistan would by nature be more of an Iranian-influenced than a US cleint state. Just the location of Iran alone ensures that, aside from the deep historical/cultural/linguistic/economic connections.
September 10, 2006 12:01 PM | Reply | Permalink
The one chance of real "stability" for Afghanistan was blown up on 9/9/01.
September 10, 2006 12:16 PM | Reply | Permalink
The assassination was a terrible blow, removing someone I saw as another Ataturk. Can someone comparable yet emerge?
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
September 10, 2006 12:48 PM | Reply | Permalink
I would suspect that Arabs, as individuals tend to be more skilled with edged weapons. Knife skill is fairly universal, and sword less so. Arabs tend to have no concept of unarmed combat; I have talked to soldiers, with a good martial arts background, talk about the utter shock many Arabs have when a barehanded opponent disarms them -- even a punch can leave them puzzled. Still, bringing a knife to a gunfight is generally a poor idea.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
September 10, 2006 12:54 PM | Reply | Permalink
Yeah those arabs are inherently better with "edged weapons"
And them Blacks make for better atheletes...
And of course women are too emotional for technical work...
September 10, 2006 1:43 PM | Reply | Permalink
Massoud was such a unique character; a product of his time and place. If someone comparable emerges, he will have to come from the ranks of the fighters to have any credibility.
That assasination still bothers me 5 years on. I'm not quite convinced of the official story line......
September 10, 2006 1:59 PM | Reply | Permalink
"Not necessarily a surprise, because Afghans do not share the traditions and actions of Arabs"
I don't recall that similiar statements about the Taliban's willlingness to "mix it up" were made about the initial engagements with the Taliban after we invaded Afghanistan. One bitter IDF soldier also said something to the effect of "why didn't the Arabs run away from a fight as we were told they would"?
To me it indicates that whether by design or coincidence, the Taliban are becoming more like Hezbollah. (Hezbollah supposedly used Che as model according to one study I read.) If they are importing techniques from Lebanon and Iraq, this could be real trouble.
September 10, 2006 2:13 PM | Reply | Permalink
You seem to be confusing training and skills within a culture, to which I did refer, to genetic predispositions, which I did not. Let me take an example that doesn't deal with what might be considered developing nations or groups.
In WWII, the US military could reasonably assume that the average soldier could drive a car, and, with a little training, a truck or tank. With superb British troops, driving was a sufficiently rare skill that in WWII, the Royal Army Service Corps (RASC) would recruit new soldiers and teach them to drive.
Oh, as far as women and emotion...in WWII, the Navy did have to teach my mother to drive an heavy truck, as she was from New York City where few people drove. She went on, however, to become a Chief Aviation Metalsmith, in charge of the airframe maintenance school at Pensacola Naval Air Station. She later switched into medical work in the Army, but that is another tale.
Knives and swords are not only tools and weapons in Arab society, but works of art. The best blades of the Middle Ages (outside Japan) were of Damascus steel. The swordsmiths of what is now Syria developed a steelmaking technique that was as functional as it was beautiful.
The scimitar is a fairly traditional Arab weapon, with some, like Japanese katanas, having names and being passed, in honor, from generation to generation. In Arab societies, duels and honor killings are traditional with the khanjar or similar dagger. Some consider themselves undressed if they do not wear a dagger at the belt of their djellabah.
I didn't say Arabs are inherently better with edged weapons for genetic reasons. I did say that they had more training with them than in unarmed combat. I also said that gunsmithing and marksmanship are highly respected in the hills of Afghanistan and surrounding areas.
Try not to go PC when specific cultural learning is being discussed, eh?
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
September 10, 2006 4:24 PM | Reply | Permalink
His spirit lives on. As I understand, it's difficult to say, simply, "free expression" in Dari or Pashtun. Massoud, coming out of a culture from which no one would expect such behavior, actively wanted a free press and radio.
Even today, an editor can simply refer to Massoud and get a would-be censor to leave. If that editor can produce a picture of himself or herself with Massoud, it has the effect on a censor that a mirrored crucifix, soaked in garlic broth made from holy water, has on a vampire...or so I am told about vampires.
That wasn't just a PC use of "himself or herself". After Kabul was freed from the Taliban, the first voice announcing it on Radio Kabul was a very brave journalist who happened to be a woman.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
September 10, 2006 4:29 PM | Reply | Permalink
I dunno. The thing is, Iran gets to be the prime beneficiary in a very 'not good' way of Afghanistan's position as the worlds leading Heroin based Narco-state.
The massive influx of very cheap heroin into Iran from Afghanistan poses equally massive social problems for its neighbors, particularly Iran. Pakistan is a basket case anyway. Some of the former Soviet Republics are becoming narco-states themselves, and India is so huge that the heroin problem is somewhat blunted.
On the other hand, Iran has a major social problem on its hands, and I've read estimates suggesting that Iran may have as many as two to four million addicts. Four million heroin addicts in a population of less than 80 million, and with a third world (albeit, prosperous third world) GNP, is a nightmare.
So, the notion that Afghanistan is going full bore as a hot and heavy heroin state is fairly bad news as far as the Iranians are concerned.
The Iranians may even be paranoid enough to believel that the US is deliberately encouraging Afghanistan's heroin production as a form of 'cool war.' Essentially, attacking or subverting the functioning of Iranian society.
Beyond that, a perpetually destabilized Iran may be hell on ice for the Shiite population of Iran, and it may lead to banditry, organized crime, and border incursions.
So, in a general sense, I think the Iranians would prefer to see a stable, secure, heroin free Afghanistan.
On the other hand, if the alternative to that is the US using the place as a launching point for air raids into Iran, or as a base for invasion or attack... they might well decide that destabilizing is the best of very bad options.
And for the record, Iran was never fond of the Taliban. Among other things, the Taliban carried out massacres of Shiites, and at one point murdered a whole bunch of captured Iranian diplomats. The Iranians and the Taliban were bitter enemies, and at points, the Iranians actually considered intervening militarily against the Taliban.
September 10, 2006 7:19 PM | Reply | Permalink
I dunno. I suspect that the Taliban's shifting fortunes and tactics have more to do with local politics.
The Taliban essentially melted away because 1) They were likely overawed by the myth of the US forces; 2) They had no coherent answer for air superiority; 3) Their troops were bought out from under them; and 4) They'd worn out their welcome with many clans and tribes.
Of these, probably item 3 was the most important. Afghan politics are famous for double crosses and fluid loyalties. Warlords can fight under as many as dozen different banners, their struggles are endless tales of betrayals, flight, and return. When the Americans came, a lot of the Taliban's forces simply turned their turbans around and joined the warlords.
September 10, 2006 7:27 PM | Reply | Permalink
The Iranians have been dealing with the narco bizness since it came into being in Afghanistan and the vast majority of product was routed through the stans and the Caucasus and on to Russia and Europe. Is that the case now? I don't know.
The Taliban seized control of the trade when they first came to power. They controlled the warehouses/storage facilities for the minimally processed/packaged goods. The $42million grant from the Bushies was in honor of their efforts to corral the drug trade.
I doubt the Iranians consider the Taliban as an existential threat to their existance.
The emphasis on rebuilding/ building the infrastructure by well-meaning Westerners ignores the fact that many Afghanis haven't been accustomed to such niceties on any significent scale in the past and it probably isn't all that critical to the population in most remote provinces.
So far, only the road from Kabul to Herat is receiving much attention. It is a start and the fact that it's route parallels that of the anticipated TAP natural gas pipeline to Pakistan and beyond is only a happy coincidence.
Those who are making decisions about how to make friends with the locals need to hold their narrow noses and study how groups like Hezbollah establish influence.
September 10, 2006 8:43 PM | Reply | Permalink
"Melted away" is apt.
Whatever their reasons for retreat, the Taliban's melting back in has been focused and appears to be far more solidified than their first go-round.
They are familiar, we are and always will be strangers in their lands.
But, trade is trade.
September 10, 2006 9:19 PM | Reply | Permalink
I suspect the usual reasons are in play. The Americans aren't paying enough. Or some faction or other thinks they should be paid more. Or the Americans have worn out their welcome. Or the warlords have worn out their welcome.
September 10, 2006 9:26 PM | Reply | Permalink
With two to four million heroin addicts, you bet they've been dealing with it. Or trying to deal with it. Much as America started dealing heavily with heroin as a result of its Vietnam misadventure.
You aren't suggesting that the Iranian government has been directing or running the drug trade, are you?
Because if you are, I'd certainly like to see your sourcing for this. I'm hardly an expert, but my impression was that Iran was a consumer destination, rather than a key distributor. Certainly they've got more money to spend than the destitute former soviet Republics.
I'm also not too sure how involved the Taliban were with respect to the heroin trade. At some point, the arbitrarily decided it was anti-islamic and suppressed it. I don't know how involved they were in it prior to that, my impression was that they were hardly a worldly bunch.
True, the Taliban hardly represent an existential threat to Iran.
Wouldn't be so sure about that. Afghanistan has been slowly but steadily burning its way through centuries of accumulated low level infrastructure. Irrigation systems, agricultural canals, traditional roads, the infrastructure legacies of the Russians... It's slowly getting chewed up. There's still an appalling amount of Russian mines left behind. And there's evidence of new American mines and fairly frequent aerial bombing campaigns.
Large areas of Afghanistan are in drought, millions are internal or externalized refugees. The middle classes and infrastructure classes are largely departed. Large parts of the country are at risk of starvation, only international NGO's stand in the way. Medical care? NGO's again.
Look it up. The average life span is about 40 years. Not a good place to live.
September 10, 2006 9:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
Massoud's legendary status only seems to grow with time. A fitting legacy for the Afghanistan he gave his life for:
"His native tongue was Persian, but he was also fluent in French, Pashto, and Urdu. Furthermore, he had a good working knowledge of the Arabic language.
Massoud: “For me, North, South, Persian, Pashto is absolutely meaningless. In our home, we can talk in every language.“
(From the following link to an admiring but thorough bio of Ahmad Shah Massoud)
http://www.afgha.com/?q=en/node/974
September 10, 2006 9:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
Again a great loss, for his country, and possibly the world. Not long ago, someone perhaps of the same caliber, John Garang, the leader of the South Sudanese rebels but now in the coalition, died in a helicopter crash in bad weather. To my surprise, his wife, Rebecca, is showing some of the same stature.
When I move to more permanent quarters, I want to decorate one wall with portraits of people who made a real difference, regarless of country. I don't think Lincoln and TR and George Marshall would mind sharing a wall with Massoud, Ataturk, Magsaysay and Churchill.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
September 10, 2006 9:57 PM | Reply | Permalink
Minor comments:
once I read that Iran offered several hundred million dollars for crop substitution program in Afghanistan -- the offer was refused.
I doubt that it is hard to say "free expression" in Dari; Iranians have no trouble with the concept (they have trouble with censorship, but they had a "hundred flowers" period), and Dari is basically a dialect of Farsi and a Dari speaker surely can use a Persian expression.
What is totally appalling is that after all these years there is no Afghan government army that could deal with Taliban. This is a political screw-up of the first order. Foreigners cannot win that thing. I read that a Canadian officer thinks that the next 6 months will be critical, and it is important to disable Taliban within that time frame. If NATO sends more troops to the southern Afghanistan, Taliban may keep a lower profile for a while, while taking some potshots. Taliban clearly is familiar with the concept of biding time.
September 11, 2006 12:13 AM | Reply | Permalink
I'd say that's pretty much a given from the start. Remember that the US basically won that war by handing out cheques to warlords and taliban supporters. The warlords were hard to control even from the start, you'll recall that they went into Kabul against the wishes of the U.S. The reality is that Afghanistan is a highly factionalized area, loyalty is largely feudal rather than state based, and even there its pretty flexible.
The notion that you could just build a 'state army' in that kind of social environment is laughable. At best, you'd just have one armed faction competing with other armed factions.
The only way it would have worked was if you launched a campaign against warlords and wiped them all out relentlessly. Then crossed your fingers and hoped that you could build institutions before the next crop materialized. With luck, you might have something that could have suppressed new warlords.
The trouble was that the warlords were US allies.
There were other ways of dealing. The US could have negotiated a governing coalition of warlords. Fractious, squabbling, potentially unstable, but it would have recognized where the real power in the country lay. Something viable might have been created.
Or backing one warlord and screwing the rest over. That would be a 'made in Afghanistan' solution.
What the US ultimately did was indulge a meaningless Democratic exercise to put a hand picked puppet on the throne.
And how well is that working out:
I wouldn't take the whole 6 month thing seriously. That's just a Friedman. It's just long enough that you there isn't any immediacy, but far enough off that it doesn't seem hopeless.
The truth is that after almost five years, there's no answer and no hopeful outcome in site.
The Taliban may be beaten, but it won't be in 6 months. Might be in two years, or five years, or ten. They probably won't be beaten by NATO, but rather by exhaustion, old age, by warlords or by up and comers and radicals within their ranks.
Afghan politics.
September 11, 2006 6:18 AM | Reply | Permalink
Arabs as a "culture" (?) don't go around fighting with "edged weapons" any more than your average American goes around having shoot-outs at high noon.
They're human beings for God's sake, not stereotypes.
September 11, 2006 9:35 AM | Reply | Permalink
Well yeah, exactly. High noon? What is this, the 1890's. 21st century Americans don't have 'shoot outs', they 'bust caps' and have 'drive bys.'
September 11, 2006 12:44 PM | Reply | Permalink