After a meeting with Israel's Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, D'Alema agreed to send a robust number of Italian troops to join the international force in Southern Lebanon.

Can you please specify, quantitatively, what you mean by robust?

From the Haaretz article:

Italy's decision to contribute 3,000 soldiers to a beefed-up UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), thereby making it the largest western contributor to the force.

Thanks for the link. Unfortunately, I am a typical American and only fluent in one language.

Yes, I agree about the French misgivings. I am not as sure about this being 'worthy'.

Some have suggested that the mission is "peace enforcement", but that implies the ability to compel a violator to stop fighting, by all force necessary. Given the two sides, and their inconclusive but intense fighting, only an inconceivably powerful force could take that role.

This is what worries me about much of the current debate as well - it shows a shocking lack of realism.

For one thing, I don't see how the international force could possibly conduct peace enforcement operations in a way that would be perceived as fair by the international community, and at the same time politically acceptable to the major parties backing the effort.

Israel has planes, which from time to time violate Lebanon's border. Does anyone seriously expect the international force to shoot down an Israeli plane? Suppose it doesn't shoot down these planes, but shoots at Hizbollah soldiers who shoot at the planes. Or suppose it attacks Hizbollah missile sites targeting israel, while Israeli planes are free to drop bombs on Lebanese targets. What will the international response be? Or suppose the force actually does shoot down a plane? Can you imagine the outcry in the US, which would surely hustle a resolution bringing an immediate end to the international peacekeeping force through the Security Council.

Suppose Israel and Hizbollah really get into it again, with full-scale hostilities. Does anyone think that this international force could actually bring an end to those hostilities through its own application of force? Wouldn't we now just have a war of three sides on our hands rather than two? And how long can the international force maintain its operational integrity, given that its soldiers are all on loan from the armed forces of various countries, and can be withdrawn the moment those countries decide to opt out. I can see why France and others are mighty worried about this effort. They could be walking into a deadly, no-win trap, both militarily and politically.

It also occurs to me that many of the people on the "left" most aggressively pushing for an expansive mandate for the international force were closet Bush/Rice supporters all along. Rice resisted calls for a cease-fire that she said would only return the situation to the status quo. She ran resistance for Israel so that it could finish the job, and only moved on a cease fire when it was clear Israel wouldn't or couldn't finish the job.

Now it turns out that all sorts of supposedly liberal commentators are expecting a European force to go into Lebanon and simply pick up the ball for Israel and finish the job Israel started - in effect to fight a war to disarm Hizbollah, something not even the rather capable Israeli military could do. This is a clear recipe to re-ignite the violence and spread chaos. I really wonder if these advocates are even putting their proposals forward in good faith, or are really just devout pro-Israel warriors in peacekeeper's clothing, itching to restore Israel's pride and reputation by winning their war for them.

(and was there a better way to move things on than by putting forward the Italians as potential military commanders?)

Yeppers. A country which is relentlessly grinding its own army int red chowder in pursuit of undefined strategic ojbectives in the midst of disaster at every level sure do have lots of grounds to laugh at the Italians. ;)

I would agree though that the French reluctance had a lot to do with negotiating terms of force, and the realities of the situation on the ground.

Frankly, as long as Israel carries out offensive military operations under the false rubric of 'defense', there is a real possibility of the ceasefire breaking down and UN forces being caught in a war.

The notion of disarming Hezbollah seems unrealistic and foolish, given Israel's continuing aggressive moves on and in Lebanon. Certainly Israel could not manage to enforce it, and given that military failure, I don't think anyone sensible would ask the UN forces to do it. Nor is there any sentiment whatsoever in Lebanon for it.

And frankly, its worth noting that all the UN deaths so far have been at the hands of Israel. So it may well be that the key for the blue helmets is that they get to return fire against Israel when Israel attacks them or civilians in their neighborhood.

It's a given, we're not exactly in a position to wisecrack about any else's military leadership...

Btw - whilst on the topic of cheap national stereotyping - my favorite is the rumor that when things got ugly in Yugoslavia, the Germans first volunteered to send in its army. The rest of the NATO members quietly reminded the Chancellor (Kohl I think) that the last time unrest in the Balkans triggered a German invasion, things got a little out of hand.

It occurs to me that many of the people who cast suspicions on the people casting suspicions, on the suspicions of certain liberal commentators, may suspiciously occur to be Karl Rove and George W. Bush in Ann Coulter drag.

And in other news, the Peoples Front for the liberation of Judea still sucks. As does the Judean Popular Liberation Front, and the Popular Liberation Front for the Judean Peoples Liberation (boo hiss!!!)

Sincerely, the Judean Peoples Popular Liberation Front.

Hey, we both know that the Popular Judean Peoples Front, Liberation division, is just an RNC scam. If we can't come together on a simple thing like that, then eventually the Liberation Front of Judean Peoples are going to get us all.

For a variety of reasons, including some stereotypes, both the rules of engagement and the authority (and wisdom) of the field commander are utterly essential here. As has been pointed out, to what extent is the force authorized to shoot at either Hezbollah or Israeli forces? Do they deploy with enough antiaircraft to make the justifiably proud Israeli Air Force use due regard in overflights? NATO air defenses, even in the field, are a bit different than Syrian or Iraqi.

Going back to WWII and moving forward, the actual troops of Germany, Italy, and France were often excellent, but failed by their command at various levels. In Germany's case in WWII, it was at the grand strategic level of Hitler. France failed down to the operational and some of the tactical level both in WWII and Indochina, but there were battalion and brigade forces that fought superbly; the French force in the Korean war was feared. Italians seem to have lost the ability for high command back with the Romans, but, in WWII, the lower the echelon, the better the performance, especially in the navy and paramilitary forces. Italian paramilitary carabinieri are very highly regarded today, and their high command seems to have become very good at dealing with asymmetric threats.

I don't know the latest on Turkish contributions to the forces, but, again, they have some excellent troops -- and, if anyone suggests that the western allies always are superior to Turks in higher-level thinking, say "Gallipoli and Ataturk" several times, until the urge passes.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

My guess is that the French - ... - are trying to work up a plan to integrate Hezbollah militants into the Lebanese army.

Integration has always looked like a viable option to me, and have said so somewhere in the Cafe.  Of course everyone would know that if it happened Hezbollah would always keep an elite group under their command and outside the army.

There's no chance it would happen overnight, and the extent to which it would be successful would depend ultimately on whether Hezbollah severed its links with Iran and Syria, and fully integrated within the Lebanese body politic.

So yeah, it's a long shot, but we're short of good options at the moment. However, the big mistake would be to view Hezbollah as a monolithic organization; starting a process that would test supporters' priorities, test Hezbollah's leaders' unity, I think that's what we have to set in motion. The alternative is to submit to the Neocon view that Israel cannot co-exist alongside Arab states, and it would be a sad day if it had to come to that.

Eddie-george,

The alternative is to submit to the Neocon view that Israel cannot co-exist alongside Arab states, and it would be a sad day if it had to come to that.

Unfortunately, that doesn't seem a particular point of view that was ever limited to neocon ideology (such as it is).

I see Nasrallah as a smart strategist and this integration looks like a smart strategy from his point of view, regardless of what we in the US or others think. Smart because it takes away the state within a state issue and smart because it extends Hezbollah's role in the governing of Lebanon.

There you go. Now you're thinking like an old style Lebanese.

When UN peace-keeping forces get to southern Lebanon, if they ever do, "embedded" with them should be reporters from every major news source in the world. At the moment Hezbollah's image in much of the world is probably at its zenith, a position it would be in their best interest to keep, while Israel's is probably at its nadir, a position it would be in their best interest to get out of. The possibiiity that any and every move made by the Israelis or Hezbollah would be immediately reported world-wide might keep the lid on things, afford a cooling off period which is what is needed right now. Disarming Hezbollah etc. can wait - given enough time and a modicum of equilibrium it and other flash points might become moot.

In this specific case, what this boils down to is - has the IDF lost its edge?

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

Nothing to it.  I used to drink Old Style beer in a Lebanese restaurant in Albany Park.

Maybe the UN is stuck in its old mould, and the mission objective is to continue keeping tabs on the Blue Line and record transgressions, now more agressively.

We're left hanging in the air as far as information is concerned. I just realized that the captured GIs haven't been returned to the Israelis - and it's hard for me to understand how Israel could cease firing without that condition, since it was lauded as the original causa belli for the 34 day war.

Left hanging is the question whether or not the war was pre-planned, the soldiers' capture being a timely precipitating cause. The answer, if it is even possible at this point, would speak to the enigma which exists between offense and defense.

Were the Israeli soldiers captured in Lebanon? That too hangs in space. There's a pretty provocative piece in this week's al Ahram on this: The importance of place.

Of interest to me in this article is that the Israelis obliterated the alleged site of the capture - which otherwise didn't appear to be a strategic target in the stated effort to put Hezbollah to its knees. So no investigation could determine where these soldiers were captured. Again, the meaning of place is within the defense/offence question.

I therefore think that the Blue Helmet's presence in the border area is constructive, with or without a combat function. It will make clandestine trangressions of the Blue Line less likely by either party. At the very least that will nullify the excuses to go to war significantly.

Neoboho

Obviously they are not putting their proposals forward in good faith, since it is patently absurd to imagine a European force would go into Lebanon to fight Hezbollah for Israel.

Equally obviously the result of the war has been to demonstrate to Israeli public opinion that Israel has no strategic options other than to accept Hezbollahs terms for peace.

Why persist in the illusion that the actual intention was different from the result? Simply because they say so when you know that they are liars not speaking in good faith?

Why not actually read and respond to Jo-Ann's post and the explanation of what is happening given in the Haaretz article she links to?

If you disagree with that analysis surely you should respond to it rather than just ignoring it and simply taking the fact that it was a post about Lebanon as an opportunity to continue exactly the same confusions about what is going on from previous threads as though Italy had not spilt the beans about what is actually going on.

Nice try, but the proper grammar is:

"Stay wear your to, eh, till I comes wear your at!"

Thanks for the tip, Howard.  But I'm more a falafil, hummos and babaganouj guy, if you get my drift.  Meanwhile, the thought of baklava is making me drool....

Rosh Chodesh Elul sameach, Yidlach!

Their babaghanouj is better than their hummos, although I'll challenge with my own recipe. Recipe? Let's be realistic; I adjust to taste.

As opposed to traditional peacekeeping, I rather like the idea of feasts between the factions in disputed areas. This has been prominent in some lasting reconciliations between formerly fighting African groups, such as the Nuer and Dinka.

Actually, while there indeed are reams of recipes for baklava and similar substances, I have come to the conclusion that every cook south of the Sahara has a different recipe for Joloff Rice.
--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

Re: The Israeli government has learnt that listening to Bushco gets you in trouble

I rather doubt that Israelis did any listening to Bush at all. Their recent Lebanese adventure is completely of a piece with their nation's strategic behavior since its inception (that's not really a criticism, just an observation). The Israelis are masters of their house and they take no orders from Washintgon or anyone else.

In common usage, yes. In a broader context, asymmetry has been a fact of military life since some samurai's last thought was "an unarmed peasant cannot possibly hurt..."

Asymmetry is not heavy versus guerilla. Over the years, there has always been a tradeoff among mobility, protection, killing power, and, increasingly, information. Crecy and Agincourt were battles between "conventional" forces of the time, yet the English yeomanry destroyed the French knights.

In air combat, most fighter pilots who are shot down never see their opponent. Is ambush, in air, land, or sea asymmetry? Was a U-boat manned by the Imperial German Navy asymmetrical against the proud British cruisers HMS Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy, as they blew up and sank from an unseen opponent?

There are a few cases when the asymmetry oscillated wildly, none more than the Battle of Hampton Roads. A strange angular beast, CSS Virginia (ex-USS Merrimac), almost invulnerable, destroyed USS Cumberland, badly damaged USS Congress, and left the Union blockading squadron in disarray. The very next day, an even stranger vessel, the "cheesebox on a raft", USS Monitor challenged, a leap of a generation in a day. While it was an inconclusive action, it started as wildly asymmetrical, and became either symmetrical or the symmetry began to swing the other way.

Sometimes asymmetrical warfare has unrecognized potential. Twice in WWI, there was an option to break open the stalemate, with the first large-scale (German) use of chemical warfare, and the first large-scale (British) use of tanks. Both blasted holes in the lines, but there was no one ready to exploit and pursue.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

Hmmmm.... My own perception is that Britain has tied its star so closely to the United States that their star is falling right along with it.

Blair banked on playing the 'good cop', moderating America's extremism and providing an accessible channel for communications and negotiations that America would not engage directly.

That hasn't happened at all. Instead, Blair has simply given cover to the American extremism. He's pulled along, justifying or endorsing Bush's most offensive policies, making excuses, or being shamed to silence.

By all accounts, Blair worked very hard and thought he had a quid pro quo - his support on Iraq, and in return, Bush would seek progress in Palestine. Well, that went nowhere.

Meanwhile the role that Blair envisioned as a sort of channel for progress simply has not occurred. The United States has not allowed Britain any other role than obedient sidekick.

The most telling recent example of this was 'open mike' night, where Blair suggested that he go to the middle east, and Bush shut him down, saying that it was Condoleeza Rice's gig. Geez. That's not the way one talks to an independent head of state, rather, its how you talk to an employee, or a subject.

The point is that the United States refuses to talk to Hezbollah, or to Iran, or to Syria, or to Hamas. No channel of communication exists. And because this is America's decision, Blair can't talk to them either, because that would be disloyal. Any British diplomatic initiative is stymied.

So where does this leave Britain in the middle east? They're the 'me too' power, either willing handmaids to Bush's outrages, or weeping and ineffectual impotentates.

Meanwhile, British military and economic clout is just about used up, or that's the perception. A perception borne out by the hasty closure of a British base in southern Iraq and the news that Britain is scaling back its commitment.

Britain's influence in the region is probably at its lowest ebb ever. Tony Blair is either a puppet, a joke or a failure.

I would agree that the EU as a whole is in a good position to step in. France, in particular, has substantial credibility simply for avoiding entanglement with the United States.

(And another humiliation for Blair when Chirac negotiated the ceasefire instead of Britain)

I'd be quite interested, Tgossard, in your elaborating on your reference to China and Russia's influence, direct or indirect in the region. I have a few thoughts in that direction, but they are far from concrete.

I'm interested in hearing yours. Though I don't have fleshed out thoughts yet, Russia has weapons tech to sell and badly needs the (any) income. It has its own troubles with fundamentalists and would benefit from cooling down in the ME. Basically it wants a piece of whatever action there may be short of war.

China has deals in the making with Tehran for long range pipelines for water, to cite a really big one. It has its own worries about terrorists (who doesn't) and I think I've read it's eager, and actively engaged in forging ties with India.

Blair, I grant you, is pretty hemmed in. But he's still PM and he has a lot to do behind the scenes. Bush&Cie. is coming apart at the seams six ways to Sunday. It's interests, to the extent it can soberly pursue them, are to keep pressure on Iran. They can get better returns if they have some kind of out from their characteristic posture of brinkmanship. If only they can lock Cheney up in an undisclosed location. Seriously. He's a loose cannon, no doubt about it.

There are rumors that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will be inviting Iran to join as a full member.

The turmoil in the Middle East has not stopped China and Russia from expanding their geopolitical and economic interests.

For instance, after Hu left Washington DC and Bush's less than warm welcome earlier this year, he went to Saudi Arabia and closed a $5b+ deal for the Saudi's to build an oil refinery in China.

I would be interested in hearing what you two think of these activities and alliances.

"Well, I think if you say you're going to do something and don't do it, that's trustworthiness." GWB-Aug. 30, 2000

deleted

Okay, here's how I see it.

The Chinese are energy poor, and have a major, major interest in securing long term access to energy. This is the interest that the United States is blocking at all costs.

In the great game, if the United States controls Persian Gulf energy exports, directly or indirectly, then it controls the worldwide price of oil, and it also controls access to significant portions of China's, Europes and India's energy reserves (notwithstanding that most of China's oil might come from Indonesia, and most of Europe's oil might come from the North sea and Mediteranean Africa.

Which means that they would control the economies of these countries, in theory, and ensure permanent American economic and political dominance. This is significant because all three of these players already surpass America's population, Europe's economy already surpasses America's, and India and China will probably match or surpass in the coming decades.

So for the far thinking American imperialists, this is their big game for all the marbles.

Now, the most interesting thing so far, is the almost complete absence of the other three powers from the middle eastern stage. America has an apparently free hand.

With India, the weakest of the three, this is understandable. It's fully occupied with Pakistan and its own concerns.

Europe, meanwhile, is still divided and somewhat ineffective. But what we've seen with Lebanon is that Europe is getting involved. Still... Europe can rely on its longstanding alliance with America, so the idea of perpetual American hegemony is not fearsome. They've done quite well out of it, so far.

But where's China?

Part of the problem for China is that they're unable to project force effectively. They've got no navy worth pissing on. So far as anyone knows, they've got no logistical support capacity that would allow them to field an effective army. Their air force is inadequate. They might have sunburn missiles, and they've got a small nuclear fleet. But they're simply not configured to be a military power in the Gulf.

So, there is no possibility they'd even bother to challenge American military hegemony in the region. And that certainly limits them in terms of challenging America diplomatically. Particularly given the close Diplomatic/Military entanglements that the American presence in the Persian Gulf poses. For better or for worse, the Americans have Iraq occupied, and they've got military/diplomatic relationships with Saudi Arabia, Quatar, Bahrain, the UAE and Kuwait so close and intense that these places might as well be protectorates. So there's not a lot of scope anyway, to even find a toehold.

China has one possible client in the whole area. Iran. But given the state of Iran/U.S. relations, a close overt alliance with China would not stabilize matters. Rather, it would simply intensify the American hostility.

Nor is there much upside for either country. A China/Iran axis is as worthless as a bugs tit, from Iran's point of view, if war breaks out. Simply, China can't get forces in place to help Iran. From Iran's point of view, it knows this, and it knows that an alliance would only bring on a wider war. So, everything to lose, nothing to gain.

As for other countries? Lebanon is a joke. The Chinese see no reason whatsoever for them to get involved. Syria has no oil, no economic interest. So its status is peripheral to them, except only for the possible need to protect their pseudo-client's, Iran's, flank.

Finally, there's the extensive ties to and dependence of the Chinese economy on the American economy. They don't want to kill the goose that lays their golden eggs... at least, not yet.

So, what's China's likely strategy? I see it as twofold. Overt and Covert.

First, they have no hope of gaining influence, direct or indirect in the region. Attempting to counter or compete with the Americans would simply be disastrous. An open alliance with Iran would result in the Americans shutting the rest of the region down for them.

So... best not to get involved. Stick to pursuing access instead of influence.

So go there, smile and nod, change the subject when politics comes up, and try and make as many deals and contacts everywhere. In the long run, it pays off better than getting involved.

And if China does get involved in the future, well, its channels are established.

That's the overt, agenda.

Covertly? Covertly, the United States is literally making war upon China and trying to gain hegemonic control over its future economy. They don't have many options right now, but they do have a few.

These are twofold. 1) Set the stage for securing a land route for oil pipelines to China. 2) Frustrate America's long term objectives.

The Taliban has spent three years proving itself as a viable, long term contender. China may find it in its interest to support the Taliban or other Afghan interestes. It may also vie for influence in the former USSR muslim states.

Success here gives, not only pipelines, but long term geographic access for trade and military transit, which would allow China to project both military and economic force into the Persian Gulf. This would also have the added benefit of bypassing India.

On the other hand, both Europe and Russia are better positioned, so vulnerability is inherent.

Keeping Afghanistan boiling frustrates the US, of course. But the other key is Iran.

I would frankly expect major covert arms sales or technology transfers to Iran. This would strongly be in the Chinese interests.

They have no interest at all in getting involved in a shooting war in the region. But if such a war does break out, it is strongly in their interests for their pseudo-client to be able to survive an American attack, or even put a hurting on.

Now, I would be expecting that Iran is stocked to the gills with Sunburn missiles. And that they've got the best anti-aircraft and jamming technology that the Chinese can come up with. And that they've got plenty of it.

The surprise for me is that there seemed to be no indication of hard confirmation in the US. This is the sort of thing that American intelligence would be very concerned with.

But we're now finding out that American intelligence on Iran is terrible, and that it has dropped precipitously since Plame got outed. We're also beginning to suspect as a result of the Chalabi affair, that whatever Iranian intelligence assets America has may well be identified and turned, and America only knows what the Iranians want them to know.

Scary eh? Well, there's satellite photography, and freighter traffic is tagged and monitored. So, America isn't blind.

But there's a very live question as to what Iran has or doesn't have, and how dangerous that stuff is.

If I was a betting man, I'd estimate with the very little that I know, that odds are 60% that Iran's got nothing that could worry the Americans. 30% that the Iranians have something, and perhap enough of it, to hurt the Americans a bit, but not enough to stop their objectives or slow their conduct. 10% that Iran has something nasty and dangerous waiting that will hurt the Americans badly... like sinking an entire Aircraft carrier battle group, or thereabouts. But even that 10% won't guarantee that the Americans won't be able to carry out their objectives... likely they will be able to. And it makes it very likely that the Americans may escalate, perhaps up to nuclear proportions. And that the Iranians may take countermeasures, including a long term closure of Hormuz, with attendant economic shocks.

Basically, if you want to hope... then hope that the Iranians got nothing. Because the more of a fight it becomes, the more of a fight it could turn into, if you know what I mean.

Still, the possibility that the US could take some damage and suffer a diminution of regional influence, the possibility that the PNAC plan would be frustrated, suggests that the Chinese may find it worthwhile to start slipping missiles and stuff in. The truth is that any course of conduct carries inherent risks and rewards, so for China, its cost/benefit analysis.

Anyway... this is my view of China's position. I'd greatly enjoy hearing what you guys are thinking of China... What have I missed?

Russia next.

So far as I can tell, your view is that the affairs of states are conducted by a clever, far-seeing and skillful ruling class, who very effectively guide events in secrecy behind the scenes, and more often than not achieve the results they want.

Not at all, I'm simply saying it is fairly normal for declaratory policies to differ greatly from actual policies and that this is just as necessary to convince public opinion to accept a more rational and moral course than is acceptable based on their existing prejudices as it is to conceal a more corrupt and venal purpose than would be acceptable to the public.

For now, I'll just take up your quote from Lincoln.

Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with or even before the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding.

In other words the South thought they were fighting a brief war for "States Rights" and the North thought they were fighting a brief war for "maintaining the union" ie the status quo.

Neither side expected a long drawn out second American revolution that would radically smash the social system in the South and accelerate the transformatin of the North with its attendant costs in blood and treasure. If they had expected this they would have avoided war.

Lincoln had a "declaratory policy" of "restoring the union status quo by preventing secession". This implied confining slavery to the South but not abolishing it.

Initially no more radical policy was acceptable in the North.

But did it make sense as an actual policy?

Here's some contemporary analysis:

If the border states, the disputed areas in which the two systems have hitherto contended for domination, are a thorn in the flesh of the South, there can, on the other hand, be no mistake that, in the course of the war up to now, they have constituted the chief weakness of the North. One section of the slaveholders in these districts simulated loyalty to the North at the bidding of the conspirators in the South; another section found that in fact it was in accordance with their real interests and traditional ideas to go with the Union. Both sections have equally crippled the North. Anxiety to keep the “loyal” slaveholders of the border states in good humour, fear of throwing them into the arms of secession, in a word, tender regard for the interests, prejudices and sensibilities of these ambiguous allies, has smitten the Union government with incurable weakness since the beginning of the war, driven it to half measures, forced it to dissemble away the principle of the war and to spare the foe's most vulnerable spot, the root of the evil-slavery itself.

The actual policy had to be abolition of slavery in the South since there was in fact no way to restore the union on the old basis.

But did it make sense to announce the actual policy at a time when a majority in Congress and the Supreme Court and the Army leadership and public opinion generally (except in the abolitionist Northeast) would oppose it?

Instead Lincoln followed the following tactics.

President Lincoln never ventures a step forward before the tide of circumstances and the general call of public opinion forbid further delay. But once “Old Abe” realises that such a turning point has been reached, he surprises friend and foe alike by a sudden operation executed as noiselessly as possible. Thus, in the most unassuming manner, he quite recently carried out a coup that half a year earlier would possibly have cost him his presidential office and only a few months ago would have called forth a storm of debate.

You might be interested in following the links to these and other contemporaneous analysis of the difference between Lincoln's actual and declaratory policies at
Marx on Lincoln.

Neither of the following policies make any sense whatever:

(i) encouraging an international force to act aggressively to disarm Hizbollah, and (ii) ultimately taking the fight to Israel's larger enemies in Iran

It isn't that they are bad policies that will fail but that they simply make absolutely no sense whatever and cannot be taken seriously at all.

You know that but you assume that the people loudly advocating this stuff don't.

Our difference is that you think they are idiots while I think they are liars.

Israel's current problem is how to withdraw from the West Bank given a large minority that still hasn't accepted defeat and is able to mobilize even wider opposition from fear of revenge attacks. "Existential threats" from Iran and Hezbollah are just propaganda. Iran and Hezbollah aren't what's on Israeli policy makers minds at the moment (as distinct from Israeli "opinion leaders" who need to be distracted).

There's some useful details on how Nixon and Kissinger presented their acceptance of defeat in Vietnam privately as opposed to publicly towards the end of
this thread.

Nobody could fault Nixon and Kissinger for lack of being avaricious, vain and passion-driven bunglers. But that doesn't change the fact that the public lies were aimed at concealing an internal acceptance of defeat.

I also owe a reply to stuff from Arnold Evans and I'll try to get back to this and deal with both together as soon as I can.

Meanwhile I would like to pose some questions for you:

1. Is there any way that avaricious, vain and passion-driven bunglers, not much different in intellect or skill from the people they lead, not much different from you and me, who muddle along trying to keep up with events and improvise new plans in an unpredictable world, a world that rarely meets their expectations and constantly frustrates their aims could have imagined that it was feasible to achieve Israel's stated aims in Lebanon using the means adopted? Or would they have to be exceptionally stupid?

2. Likewise could any such bunglers, not completely lacking normal levels of intellect and skill, be of the view that Israel can hold the West Bank indefinately?

3. If you were in the Israeli government and were convinced that Israel has to get out of the West Bank, how would you go about preparing public opinion for this? (Note I'm not asking about how somebody who isn't a Zionist and therefore couldn't be in the Israeli government would go about it but about how a hypothetical Zionist actually in the current government and convinced it was time to withdraw would go about it).