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The Fall of the Israeli Empire

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Face with a week of failure, mounting deaths, and international opprobrium for the hundreds of civilian dead left behind by air strikes, Olmert has ordered the expected big push into Lebanon, tripling the Israeli invasion force. The object is to end the rocket attacks that have killed 51 Israeli civilians, and to put down a revolt on the right flank of the Government. Likud, hammered in Sharon's snap elections, has declared that it wants to bring down Olmert.

Haaretz documented the fialures of the Israeli military, particularly the shattering of the "Merkava myth" as a nearly invulnerasble tank. So far it is Hezbollah that has performed above expectations, even their own, in that they did not put their best unit in front. But now, it is crunch time.

While the UN votes for an "immediate cease fire", the war goes on. Israel's talking points are increasingly thin, and there are clear implications that the war will represent a significant blow to Israel's prestige. The big push seems to be an attempt to gain a political victory out of a military loss. Hezbollah has become one and the same with a Lebanese resistence, and is now a power center to be reckoned with. They are, for all intents and purposes, the most powerful armed force in Lebanon's politics.

The wider implications for this push cannot be underestimated. First, Israel is turning itself into a political liability at the very moment when the United States wants to negotiate itself out of Iraq. At the very moment when it needs Islamic support for anti-terrorism, and at the very moment when the domestic political situation in the United States is turning against the kind of goonilateralism that Olmert has undertaken. For a brief moment Olmert had almost all of world Jewish public opinion behind him, that unity is rapidly collapsing, as the left sees him as an incompetent butcher, and the right as not sufficiently competent at butchery.

The United States must also think long and hard about what the results of the first phase of this conflict means. The Rumsfeldian small and light approach has had its tombstone carved along the Litani - the light infantry of Hezbollay might not be able to take the brunt of a full assault - the results will only be known over time -but they are clearly capable of dealing with lesser thrusts that rely overly much on technological superiority, and not enough on volume of fire power.

The fig leaf offensive will not fundamentally alter this balance. Nor will it change the perception of Israeli vulnerability, of a military that has lived on its laurels, and become street brawlers used to fighting rabble.

The prognostication for Israel varies. Some observers, like John Robb, urge Israel to meet infantry with infantry, others see Israel's problem as not going in for the large invasion sooner. The political advice however, boils down to the same reality - Israel must acknowledge a changed state on the ground.

My own view is that Israeli empire - its control over subject people's - has been eroding and is now doomed. Sharon's attempt was to reduce the imperial committment, and thus make it more sustainable. However all he managed to do is turn the imperial zone from one which the Israeli's occupied, into one that they were repeatedly obliged to invade or attack, and not just in Lebanon.

The result is that Israel must either accept that it is about to become a state whose power and core are roughly the same, and deal with subject areas on an equal basis, or face a growing series of strikes at the core of its economic and political existence.

Take, for example, the surprise that the Merkava tank has underperformed.

This should be less of a surprise than it is. The tank is clearly designed for "crew survivability" and transport capacity. It has been modified for urban combat, which, according to "experts" should not have changed its combat characteristics. This again, seems to be nothing short of disinformation. The armor isn't sufficient to stand up to even hand held arms fire, let alone what 120mm anti-tank rounds could do. The tank is also too heavy - nearly as heavy as the M-1 Abrams.

Consider for example one of the reports from the link above:


At around 1:40 P.M., an IDF Merkava tank was struck by an explosive device in the village of Aita al-Shaab in the western sector. The tank's four crew members were killed instantly. The IDF is still investigating the source of the explosion. The kind of damage sustained by the tank (its turret was blown off) appears to indicate that the vehicle was hit by a large explosive device, but a senior Northern Command officer told Haaretz on Wednesday night that it was more likely that the Merkava had been hit by an anti-tank missile.

Turrets blown off, crew killed instantly.

The Lebanon conflict is having the same results that similar actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, namely the ability of a light force to stymie a mechanized military. The methods of Hezbollah are an improvment in every way over the Sunni rebellion in Iraq - they are able to take out tanks, and their crews, with far more regularity than the rebels are. Part of this is terrain, part of this is, clearly, that the Merkava 3 Baz and Merkava 4 are over-rated.

However, the first conclusion that we can draw is that we are watching the fall of the Israeli Empire. An empire is a state which rules over non-citizen populations integrated into its power structure. Israel, while a small empire, is still an empire, with subject territories which dominate its resources, command and control decisions, and military profile.

Some will object to this characterization, on the grounds that Israel has elections and a democracy. But empires have often had democratic cores - including Athens, Rome, The British Empire. The United States has been called an imperial power - even by some who are proud of the nature of the US as empire. New York is, after all, the "Empire State". The defining characteristic of an empire is the division between subjects and citizens, and the exploitation of subjects for the benefit of the citizens. Israel meets this test.

One of the characteristics of this empire, is that it has been able, over the last 40 years, to militarily dominate or deter larger states around it. It was a matter of survival for Israel to have a "near abroad", and to carve out buffer zones to hold key military points. But this relied on the perception that conflict with Israel was political suicide - that to fight with Israel is to lose to Israel.

However, the last invasion run by Israel is now almost 25 years ago. Since then, the imperial capacity has dominated their doctrine, and hardware, and their decisions reflect this. Go to any article on the Merkava tank, and you will read that it was designed for crew survivability. Empire's have a basic reality, a small core of privileged people having to dominate a poorer rapidly growing population. They must either coöpt, or crush, those under their control.

Israel's policies have focused on dealing with the politically unstable Palestinian presence in "their" imperial zone. The Palestinians have repeatedly chosen to align themselves with external elements, and take money to act as the front line against Israel itself. The Israeli governments however, had to continually undercut the Palestinian economic development, in order to promote their own immigration. The combination of a PLO unwillingness to seek autonomy, and Israeli intransigence on providing an economically viable state - that is, the insistence on remaining an empire - have created a perpetual stalemate situation.

This also led to the Israeli military degrading with respect to its core mission of strategic deterrence. The Merkava 4 has not performed as well as even the much maligned Merkava 1. It has not performed as well as the improvements to power to weight ratio would indicate. The front mounted engine has proven to be a mistake in attempting tactical advances and operational occupation of land, as would be expected.

In short the job of fighting "rabble" in Israel's core imperial area, has destroyed its capabilities in dealing with its imperial peripheries. One of the most import of these, since it is a failed state, is the northern border with Lebanon, where states which do not have the will to directly confront Israel supply proxies. Hezbollah is a proxy army for Syria and Iran. The difference is that it is a capable army, and it is facing an Israeli military that has clearly been living on its reputation.

The result is that Olmert, who only two weeks ago was master of the Israeli political universe, and seemed to have grown into Sharon's shoes, is now beset from left and right in the Knesset, and no longer commands a governing majority on certain issues. In short, the governing core of Israel is split over the current action. Sharon cannot dump Labor and govern, and yet it is likely that Labor is the group that wants to restrain the Israeli invasion. Olmert's course is going to be pressured to call new elections with Likud as the senior partner in a new government.

Israel no longer has the will to be an empire.

This leads to the second essential point: the action against Hezbollah has implications for the United States and the West. The United States, in particularly, has chosen to deal with the problem of militant Islamic terrorism as a military proposition. To some extent this was driven by domestic considerations: politics and the access to the power that being at war creates. However, it was also because of the perception that military means were the area where the West had the most lopsided advantages over the enemy. Perceptions are reality, until reality puts an RPG28 between the chassis/turret gap on your tank.

The very approach of militarization of the problem is called into question. Not only has it generally failed, but the failure as been progressive:

Afghanistan was invaded, a civilian government brought on line rapidly, and the situation stabilized, even if the general trend was slowly towards a de facto partition of the state.

Iraq was invaded, but a stable civilian government has proven elusive, and the territory of the state remains out of control in key areas.

In Lebanon, Israel has not only failed to invade, but it did what did not happen in Iraq or Afghanistan - namely, it created the opposition of other states to its actions. Israel the state is at war with Lebanon, the state.

This progression of failure has led to the speculation that Hezbollah is the template for a defensive light infantry force which is designed to make large mechanized militaries bleed. This has happened before. The first generation of fully mechanized military was able to deal with partisans and light infantry, allowing it to crush insurrections, except in unfriendly terrain such as the jungles of Vietnam - until the late 1960's. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan was confirmation that the mass mobilization military was no longer able to cope with guerilla forces. Through out the 1970's and 1980's guerilla movements festered, often backed by the Soviet Union or China.

However this military generation with vulnerable infantry and lack of precision munitions, as well as primitive communications and fire control systems, was increasingly under pressure, because while it could kill more enemies than it lost, it lost high value lives in return for easier to replace attrition fighters. The "revolution in military affairs" changed this equation, putting the mechanized military back in control of the equation. By being able to flood an area with firepower, and having the speed to rapidly reach key political objectives, dictate peace and leave, the new model military circumvented these problems, and with high volume of firepower, electronic intelligence (elint) and mobility, was able to hold such insurgencies at bay.

Al-Qaeda's camps in Afghanistan represented a first attempt to create a guerilla counter-force to the "Air-Land Battle". Their manifest inability to blunt the edge of the sword was clearly noted. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban returned to more traditional guerilla tactics.

The next attempt at a blunting force was seen for a very brief period in the early invasion of Iraq, where the US military invasion, stripped of key numerical and strategic advantages, was often out maneuver or slowed by inferior forces. However, the successes of Saddam's Fedakeen fighters were limited, localized and the result of an invasion force fighting "one hand tied behind its back". It was also not politically stable - with bribes being capable of prying people loose from active opposition.

This third attempt has been wildly more successful. It has taken out main battle tanks, killed their crews, remained in supply, thwarted the taking of political and military objectives, delivered a blow to the Israeli body politic. This is not to say that it has "won" - conflicts, particularly long conflicts such the one over control over the Biqa and southern Lebanon ebb and flow, and it is within the realm of possibility that the Israelis will change course and either engage in a full scale ground invasion, dictate peace and get out. However, their present tactical posture leads only to more losses, both physical and political.

Since major states have relied on the ability to threaten invasion and overthrow, or the ability to inflict punishing losses on minor states, the ability for light infantry again to offer a resistance to invasion alters the balance considerably. When combined with Weapons of Mass Destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, it will make military confrontation far less palatable to Western powers, without the need to pulverize the entire economy to become a North Korea style armed camp. Hezbollah's military participation for its population base is far below the army of Iraq currently.

This is particularly important when considering the increasing tensions with Iran – which now has much of Iraq within its sphere of influence, is developing atomic capabilities, and which desires the ability to exert counter-pressure on the United States. US foreign policy has proceeded under the assumption that a military conflict with Iran might bring about unacceptable economic losses, but that militarily, it would not inflict unacceptable casualties or degradation of equipment and organization. The results from Lebanon show that this assumption is simply not tenable in the light of the facts on the ground.

Instead the reports indicate that Hezbollah is able to maintain unit cohesion in the face of Israeli firepower and deal counter strikes. The model provided could be transported to Iran rather easily, and backed by a military of substantial size and an economy with monetary reserves, it would clearly be able to blunt an invasion of Iran by the United States. Since the Shia of Iraq are under Iran's growing umbrella, the implication is that on the day that the political will exists for the Shia to demand we leave, that they will have a military instrument capable of making staying unacceptable.

The first lesson then from Lebanon is that the second generation mechanized military, which combined mechanization with turbines, communication and materials science to produce a faster, smarter, harder hitting and better protected force, is now reaching a counter force state with respect to small man portable arms, and guerilla forces designed to blunt their movement and other advantages.

The second lesson is that Israel, the state which most directly relies on the military superiority of this instrument over its imperial zone is now faced with the necessity of either changing course, redoubling and retrippling its efforts to produce a force capable of maintaining its current imperial stance, or face a slow erosion of security and eventually exposure to shattering attacks on its economic core.

The third lesson is that this rebalancing is no longer a matter of theory to be discussed by refugees from the military establishment, but a clear tendency which electorates and elites must incorporate into their thinking. The "we will just wipe them out" thinking of the American electorate over the last 6 years, and the shock support for Olmert in Israel are examples of electorate perception not matching military reality.

It is not certain that the current trend will continue, however, for the first time, it is clear that the air land battle faces an enemy with a military imagination. In A Bright and Shining Lie one pilot reported that the shock moment for him was when the VC had learned to lead the choppers with fire, because, of course, a bullet takes time to get into the air, even though it is very fast, it is not infinitely fast. He knew he was facing a real enemy. For me the shock moment is when insurgents started burying mines and IEDs in filled in shell holes. After all, if there is fresh digging, normally a tank driver will avoid it, as a sign of danger. But of course a shell hole is filled in…

The readjustment of electorates to realities takes time. It has taken nearly 3 years for the American public to adjust its expectations in Iraq. While the strategic costs of withdrawal are high, it is becoming less clear that winning is even achievable given the commitments Americans are willing to make. The North Vietnamese used to joke that Americans ran a school for anti-aircraft training over Hanoi. It may well be the case that Iraq is a giant school for the light infantry counter-forces of the future.


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The conclusion in no way follows from the main body of this article.

Yes the Israeli Empire is ending. Security Council Resolution 1701 meets Hezbollah's terms, not Israel's proclaimed goals.

Yes Hezbollah is fighting better than the Israelis.

Of course if the Shia asked the US to leave Iraq it could not stay and would suffer the same military defeat as the Israelis if it tried.

But America is fighting as an ally of parties equivalent to Hezbolllah in Iraq and winning against the murderous thugs who are trying to intimidate the elected government by massacring civilians is quite achievable just as winning against the Israeli massacres of Lebanese civilians was quite achievable.

"winning?" you have a strange definition of success.

...and your writing leaves something to be desired, dent.

Another factor in Hezbollah's success as voiced by Israeli military officials is that "Hezbollah doesn't count their dead".

By contrast, the descriptions of the Israeli media treatment of their losses is intensely personalized and indivuated. While this is a part and parcel of Israeli tradition and admirable, it may be counterproductive in that civilians tasked with final decision making over military objectives/tactics/etc are projecting their own prejudices and emotions upon the enemy and inventing their own realities.

(It's my contention that this type of projection also rules within the civilian corps of the WH, the NSC, the DOD and allied think tanks)

One can see this in action in Israeli psyops leaflet drops taunting (they think) the Lebanese populace with the allegation that Hezbollah is lying to them about how many fighters they have lost.

While the numbers of IDF losses is of great concern to the Israeli public, it's of less concern to a marginalized populace watching their side fight on to the last man.

In article I read serveral years ago about US local law enforcement types discussing what they had learned from their on-site instruction on Israeli counter-terrorism measures, one of the lessons learned has lingered. The Israeli instructor cautioned his students to never, ever, fall into the trap of dismissing or belittling the capacities of their adversaries. He told them to remember the enemy is smart and tough and underestimating them is fatal.

In general, civilians and even military (AF, Navy) without up close and personal experience are ill-equipped to plan and execute campaigns against their cartoon versions of "the enemy". Civilian leaders with visions and vast agendas are the most dangerously inept of all.

Ariel Sharon may have had damn good reasons to maintain the status quo with Hezbollah. They were playing the game by "rules" acknowledged by both sides.

is this really the "fall" of Israel or some putative empire that Israel holds?*
Failing to achieve some objectives whole still being able to withdraw in good order with a fig leaf truce covering up the mess does not amount to a "fall". It isn't even up there with great imperialist disasters like, say, the Turkish defeat at Lepanto or Varus losing the Roman Legions in Germmania (after which defeats both empires went merrily on for centuries). At most Israel is learning the limits of a policy of blunt-edged force.

* Yes I know Israel holds some territories not propoerly itys own. Still, "empire" conjures up images of vast provinces and colonies held in thrall; Israel's puny occupations don't seem to add up to "empire".

is this really the "fall" of Israel or some putative empire that Israel holds?*
Failing to achieve some objectives whole still being able to withdraw in good order with a fig leaf truce covering up the mess does not amount to a "fall". It isn't even up there with great imperialist disasters like, say, the Turkish defeat at Lepanto or Varus losing the Roman Legions in Germmania (after which defeats both empires went merrily on for centuries). At most Israel is learning the limits of a policy of blunt-edged force. If only Israel's foes would learn the same lesson!

* Yes I know Israel holds some territories not propoerly itys own. Still, "empire" conjures up images of vast provinces and colonies held in thrall; Israel's puny occupations don't seem to add up to "empire".

Isreal rules over some 2.5 million to 3.7 million palestinians in occupied territories, that is to say, about half as many people as are citizens.

A nation with more than one third of its population being subject people is an empire. More over, maintaining control is the dominant problem of Israel's politics and the dominant mission of its military.


Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com

The Israelis have killed 20 times as many civilians as Hezbollah, and have attempted to humliate the democratically elected government of Lebanon, including taking Lebanese Army members as POWs.

Piling on the purple prose doesn't change the facts on the ground - Olmert's government attacked southern Lebanon with disproportionate force in hopes of a quick "victory" and now it is engaged in a abad faith offensive under the shadow of a cease fire in order to claim victory after having been beaten in the field.

I'm a supporter of Israel, but this attack on Hezbollah was illconsidered, badly planned, horrendously executed and a diplomatic disaster. Any time you can't beat non-state terrorists in a PR battle, you have big problems.

If the behavior of fanatics is the standard Israel holds itself too, then that is how Israel will be treated.


Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com

First of all Israel has never been an "empire" you twit. Israel is smaller than lake Michigan. Take a look at a map of the Middle East, and see the comparison of land mass between Israel and the arab states. You have to be truly demented and hateful to think that Israel has too much land vis a vis the arabs. Furthermore, the fact that the left would pull for the terrorist hezbollah shows the deep, dark depths of moral depravity to which the left has sunk. What does the left stand for anymore other than its opposition to America and Israel, even to the point of compromising its own supposed values by aligning itself with islamic fascists and nazis.

You're surely right that the Israeli "empire" is eroding and that this has come about because Israel got too used to fighting unarmed Palestinians. You're surely right, too, that Hezbollah has surprised everyone by the strength of its response to the Israeli assault.

What I don't see is that the war crimes Israel is committing in Lebanon have damaged its prestige or made it a political liability. Israel long ago damaged its prestige among that part of the world that doesn't depend on the US media for its information. And a political liability for whom? Not for the White House or for either party in Congress. Not even for the liberal blogosphere, judging by the silence that reigns there.

You say Israel will now have to "deal with subject areas on an equal basis, or face a growing series of strikes." Well, yes, but this could have been predicted decades ago, even as early as 1948.

Israel isn't an empire, but the extension of one, a European colony installed in the Middle East. Those of us in the English-speaking world should know from our own colonial histories that settler colonialism only succeeds where the settlers can eliminate the indigenous population. That was never in the cards for the Israelis. They got off to a great start, thanks to generous supplies of money and arms from their Western patrons. And they still have military superiority over their Palestinian subjects and their Arab neighbors. But they will always be outnumbered, and the Arabs won't always be poor and weak.

I'm very far from being an expert on Hezbollah, but the news of the past few weeks make it seem like a great deal more than a mere proxy army for Iran and Syria. I doubt that mercenaries in the pay of foreign countries would have performed half as well as Hezbollah has. Or that they would have won majority support in a country as fragmented as Lebanon.

At some point, the US and Israel will have to recognize Palestine's right to exist and come to some sort of accommodation with the Arab states. Dealing with Arabs as equals will prevent Israel from "facing a growing series of strikes," but it won't put an end to all strikes. Look at Northern Ireland. They’re just now trying to get over the last spurt of fighting over a land grab that took place 400 years ago. If this turnaround takes place, it will be the Israeli electorate that makes it happen, not the American. They're much better informed.

Israel has more land area under its control than "The Athenian Empire" had.

Once again, abusive trolls try and create fake definitions.

Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com

Not that it's any of my business, Stirling, but having written the pivotal essay, do you really feel its appropriate to get down in the trenches and slug it out.

Your essay should speak for itself, any work of art or performance is, in its own terms, the answer to critics. Nothing is gained from the artist or performer confronting the critic except to exhibit his own thin skin and a lack of faith in the merit of the pivotal work.

Now arguably, your essay is discussion rather than art, which implies different rules. But I would propose that having written the essay which starts the thread and getting top billing puts you in a different category than us lowly types who simply offer our own comments and opinions.

It strikes me, (and frankly, by this time, I've read a fair bit of your stuff, some I've liked, some I've not thought much of, but all of which I can respect) that you should trust your audience.

If you have really hit the mark, then your readers will defend you from trolls. You don't have to do it yourself. And if no one defends or supports your position, then you should wonder if either you've made a persuave point or perhaps an unimportant one.

The thing is, that by holding your tongue and not engaging, you are forced to consider your work in terms of how people are seeing it, rather than in terms of defending it.

Also, while trolls are offensive and abusive, my advice is that its often discourteous to blast a person as a troll. Ultimately, we don't know anything about the commenter. It is much more on point, and more satisfying, to blast away at the opinion or the post, to dissect their idea as worthless and pointless. Feel free to make it hurt.

Finally, its just a little tacky to rate someone for commenting positively or negatively on your post or your essay. Even if the 0 rating is well deserved, which might or might not be the case, the fact that it comes from you leaves the audience with the impression that you may be responding out of pique rather than justice.

Remember that the whole point of writing is to persuade an audience, to win people over to your side. It's fine to get into a debate with someone where neither of you end up backing down from a position... but even in those cases, there is an audience who read and watch the two of you getting into it, and they can be swayed and cajoled into picking sides. When you're in a knock down drag out, always play, not to your vanity or your self satisfaction, but to that third party in the discussion... the watcher.

I hope that you take this as friendly advice and give it some thought.

Some friendly advice, calling someone a liar and thin skinned is a very poor way of persuading them to listen to "friendly advice".

And I will note that attacks like "twit" aren't acceptable by the rules of TPM cafe. If you don't like that, then perhaps you should find a site like Little Green Footballs or the Free Republic.com which have rules of disourse that are more to your liking. No one is forcing you to be here.


Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com

Sigh, talk about not getting the message.

calling someone a liar and thin skinned is a very poor way of persuading them

I went back and reread my post carefully. I don't believe that at any point I called you a liar, and I don't believe that is a reasonable inference you could take from any of it.

In terms of the phrase 'thin skinned' it was used in the context of saying that a writer who engages with his critics in this way often appears thin skinned to his audience. I didn't say 'Stirling Newberry is thin skinned.' I merely said certain forms of conduct will lead to that conclusion.

And yes 'Twit' is an abusive term. But I didn't use it and I don't endorse it. On the other hand, it seems laughably mild, particularly compared to the degree of invective that floats around elsewhere.

Think of it strategically. Name calling is what people do when they don't have much else. More to the point, name calling feels like a cheap shot and leaves that third party, the audience, with a negative impression.

But the real question is not with regard to them, but how *you* respond to it. Okay, you're offended. Fine. Now get over it. Think rationally, remember, you are always playing to an audience.

So, you need to approach things like that, not from the point of view of being offended, an honest emotional reaction which may or may not be productive in winning your debate... but rather, how best to respond *tactically* and *strategically.*

Do you honestly feel that your best approach is telling someone who has *not* called you a twit, who has *not* called you a liar, and who has *at the very best* only *indirectly* suggested you are thin skinned to fuck off to little green footballs?

Stirling, let me propose a test for you. Print off this little exchange that we've had, starting with Mister Whazisname and your response to that, take it to someone you trust and respect enough to not get mad at if he disagrees with you, ask him or her to read it, and then ask him for his or her advice.

A nation with more than one third of its population being subject people is an empire.

At the risk of incurring further antagonism, I really have to ask where you got this from and whether this sort of pronouncement can be truly justified.

For instance, Iraq under Hussein was the Sunni dominating Shia and Kurds, was this an Empire? Should we characterize Guatemala as an Empire for the hispanic domination of the Mayan Indian population? Peru an Empire for domination of the Quechua. What about the majority of African states where dominant tribes, often minorities, rule the apparatus of state and lord it over other tribes... Empires all?

What about the 17th and 18th century 'commercial/mercantile' Empires of France, Britain, Holland and Portugal, in which the prize was not domination of subject peoples, but control of trade and trading routes? Are they Empires or not? How about the "American Empire" of military bases, does it qualify?

I dunno. It strikes me that the term Empire can reasonably and justifiably be applied to Israel, but that the sort of hard inflexible definition which you propose may not be workable.

And you accuse me of troll rating someone for just disagreeing. If I had done that, it would have been dishonest. To falsely rate someone down is a lie, and you know that. And I know you know that.

As for getting someone to look at your comments - you've already flunked that test. Two people have noted that you are providing cover for trolls already when I had them read over your last note.

Everyone knows the act of the faux reasonable person who is just all aghast when someone calls a troll a troll. No one is fooled by your act V. Sorry this isn't 1999 when all this was new.


Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com

Stirling,

I would argue that not much has changed, nor is it likely to in the near future.

As is the case with every issue in the Middle East, the lines in the sand have already been drawn. One side, featuring the likes of Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, already despise the very existance of Israel. It is not important if they now despise it more.

What is important is that those on the other side of the line, namely the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany, will still support Israel simply because they have no other option. Call it the "lesser of two evils" if you want, but Israel's allies are still intact.

As for the "neutral" members in this debate (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Russia, China, etc), their irritation at Israel will cool as the war becomes just another in a long series of violent memories that has plagued the region.

You are correct when noting that the UN peacekeeping force, along with its Lebanese counterparts, will not achieve its desired objective: disarmament of Hezbollah. In fact, such an endeavor will likely never even be attempted. As Bush has been saying from the outset, the great fear is that things will merely return to what they were prior to the start of the conflict.

And that is exactly what will happen.

Israel failed in its low carb War, yet things might have been different if they had launched a full-scale invasion. And don't forget the nuclear option...


As is the case with every issue in the Middle East, the lines in the sand have already been drawn. One side, featuring the likes of Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, already despise the very existance of Israel. It is not important if they now despise it more.

I didn't address the question of the view of the arab street or the elites emotionally with respect to Israel - but instead the pragmatic question of Israel's position on the ground, and the prospects for a continued policy of aggressive warfare by Israel and the United States in the middle east in light of developments over the last month. The conclusion I draw is that we have seen the failure of both the invasion military and the occupation military - the US and Israel respectively - to impose politically favorable solutions through military means.

Instead we have seen an escalating series of failures, in the face of a progressively better armed, better trained and better led form of light infantry which has weapons which are increasingly capable of neutralizing the advantages in range, defense and firepower of the air-land battle military.

The analogy is the coming of the long bow, which unhorsed the charging knight from its position of almost unquestioned military superiority. Personal firepower in the form of infantry is beginning to return to balance against the mechanized power of cavalry - both air and ground.

The full scale invasion option would not have led to a better outcome - the Israeli military occupied southern Lebanon after a swift and decisive invasion for the better part of 18 years. And yet, within a short time after their withdrawal, the area is again a hotbed for anti-Israel activity, and a base for terrorism.

The key is not the ability to take ground, Hezbollah isn't dependent on the ground for its military supply, but, as with the NVA, on the ability to move munitions through the porous network of borders and roads which blankets the middle east. Gun running has been going on for a very long time, and a bigger invasion force would not change that. A larger invasion would simply have created a more target rich environment for the guerillas.

The dominant reasons for continued animosity at Isreal, however, are important to address here. One is the nature of the Arab governments that fund it - it is a distraction from their own failing economies and closed societies. Cheaper than having a real country is to give the arab street an enemy. This combined with a Palestinian leadership that kept buying lottery tickets on armed conflict - both against Israel and against other Arab nations - kept one half of the equation locked in a pattern of hostility.

However the other part is that Israel has consistently followed the script as a heavy - by continually denying the Palestinians an economically viable state. This has not increased Israel's security, on the contrary, it has reduced it, because a bantustan Palestine is a fertile ground for recruiting a proxy army. The same can be said of a balkanized Lebanon.

One of the key actors here is the United States. The US, by flooding the world with dollars has created conditions which are very favorable for regimes such as Iran to use petro-dollars to foment conflict. In fact, there is no down side for Iran. It gets higher oil prices, a more unified political consensus, and a proving ground for military doctrines and weapons without any dead Iranians being produced.

If there is to be greaters stability in the Levant, then the first step is fo the US to abandon the increasingly untenable policy of aggression, and switch instead to a hard dollar policy which relies on fiscal and monetary discipline.

The dollar diplomacy works much better when the dollar really is almighty.


Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com


You say Israel will now have to "deal with subject areas on an equal basis, or face a growing series of strikes." Well, yes, but this could have been predicted decades ago, even as early as 1948.

In 1948 the existence of Israel was in doubt, and remained so until the 1967 war. With the coming of the 1970's there was a change in Israeli thinking, from the counterthrust, to holding territory. The merkava tank is out of this change in thinking. While it is true that the demographics and economic realilties of development made this a strategy with a limited life span, a generation in politics is forever. The architects of the change in direction - including Sharon - have largely passed from the scene. Begin is gone, so too are most of the other politicians of that era except Peres.

There is a large difference then, between saying a policy will run out sometime in the vague future - which means that alternatives must do as well - and saying that the sign post which says "The End - 10 years ahead" has arrived. What the last month has shown is that it is possible to field a light force that can "bloody the nose" of what was once the most highly regarded military in the world.


At some point, the US and Israel will have to recognize Palestine's right to exist and come to some sort of accommodation with the Arab states.

As I am sure you know, the complex question is economic viability. The palestinian leadership needs to be oriented towards this, and "recognition" is meaningless without a working state, and that rests on having an economy. Peace for sand is a losing proposition. While I am critical of Israel's handling of the Levant, let us recognize that economic viability will come with a paradigm shift in the Palestinian body politic. There had been some hopeful signs, but the Sharonian desire for a unilateral peace under the umbrella provided by Iraq, combined with internal political instability among the Palestinians, put an end to that.


Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com


For instance, Iraq under Hussein was the Sunni dominating Shia and Kurds, was this an Empire?

Yes, and it met the fate of empires that are militarily defeated - collapse to a core of the most ardent adherents.


At the risk of incurring further antagonism, I really have to ask where you got this from and whether this sort of pronouncement can be truly justified.

Actually, now that you've come out of the closet, and are not pretending to be an expert on social communcation defending trolls, perhaps we can have a conversation.

The politcal theory of empire rests on the idea of a governing core with its own citizenry, and a series of additional governmental arrangements for non-citizens. This can include economic hegemony as well as military superiority - see Wallerstien The World Capitalist System for the distinction between economic hegemony and imperialization. Many of your questions have long since been dealt with in the literature. Commerical "empires" often do become military empires, particularly when purely commericial means are insufficient to maintain strategic access. A rather simple example is the European use of force to create concessions within China during the 19th century, when local political forces disrupted trade, particularly drug trade, that Europeans were engaged in. A simple case of economic hegemony acquiring imperial characteristics. You might want to look up the difference between colonialism and imperialism, which should clarify some of your confusion.

However, to point out the painfully obvious, Israel isn't a commericial or mercantile empire, but a classic ground empire of a type that goes back to the the bronze age. While elaborating on the various kinds of empire would have been interesting, it would have been irrelevant to the question at hand, which is, simply put "can Israel maintain its empire with present military policy?" and "what are the larger implications for the emergence of light counter-forces to American policy?" Since the recent developments don't touch on America's economic imperial role, it would have been pointless to digress.

For a thorough discussion of traditional empires, you can of course read Hardt and Negri - Empire - which center on the distinction between inside and outside, and then a hierarchy of insides and outsides. Modulo the marxian/post-structuralist paradigm, their description of classical territorial empire is realatively non-controversial. A useful paper to read is Yuen Foong Khong's 1995 paper on imperial responses to power.

The key to an empire is the existence of one or more layers of core which have a wide separation from the peripheral layers, and that the peripheral layers have different governing structures or hierarchies, but still are expected to have their sovereignty determined by the core. Israel has been an empire since the 1967 war, and has had, at varying times, areas and subject people's under its control. Israel's unease with this role is an interesting feature, but not, in itself, a disqualification from the status as an empire.

This predicts - correctly - that the problem of maintaining the rings of power and the differentiated systems of administration become the chief focus of Israeli politics. On one side has been the Likud position that the road to security was to intermingle "settlements" - that is a polite word for colonization - in areas that were occupied, and thus create the impossiblity of an organized hostile palestinian state.


but that the sort of hard inflexible definition which you propose may not be workable.

You almost made it through an entire comment without any cheap dishonesty and debating tricks. Sigh - that's not what I proposed, instead I singled out an obvious marker that Israel is an empire. The logical fallacy you are making is that simply because A implies B doesn't mean that all B are A.

Better luck next time, but a significant improvement on your early comments.


Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com

Stirling

I would agree with you that the U.S. must cease its confrontational policies. You illustrate clearly how such an enterprise works to bolster both states like Iran/Syria but also non-state organizations like Hezbollah and Al Qaeda.

I made the comment on another thread that perhaps a major key to diminishing this Middle Eastern threat is finding a policy that somehow puts the onus of responsibility on places like Iran, or even terror organizations like Al Qaeda.

The Western paradigm of confrontation allows Tehran an others to essentially sit back and play the role of oppressed underdog. It would be a very interesting dynamic if they were actually allowed the freedom to rule completely as a sovereign.

Would they keep their word and only enrich uranium for civilian energy? Would a reduced Western footprint placate the disenfranchised who take solace in Al Qaeda or Hezbollah?

Maybe or maybe not. If they succeed in doing as they say (essentially that they are inherently peace loving people and only wish to rid themselves of evil oppressors and would pose no threat to anyone if granted this chance)so much the better for everyone involved. Peace could prevail.

If they struggle keeping their promises and work to develop nuclear weapons while continuing to support terror organizations, then there is the possibility for the U.S. and its allies to make legitimate claims against them.

Perhaps we should give them the ball and see what they do with it...

Oh god, just listen to yourself. 'I know that you know that I know that you know...'

You've missed my point entirely. You should let *someone else* award a troll rating.

That way, no one can complain that you've got a case of sour grapes, or that you've got any person issue going on.

My point is that to go around awarding troll ratings to people who attack your postings is tacky. It's gauche. It's undignified and icky.

If it is a genuine troll then *they will be troll rated anyway.*

It really strikes me that you are going well out of your way to take offense.

Iran's nuclear ambitions require their own thread.


Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com


Oh god, just listen to yourself.

I'm disappointed, it only took a few replies to get you to degenerate down to exposing yourself as a troll. What happened to all the high flown theories of communcation you were expounding? What happened to the advice to be "tactical"? Occam's Razor suggests that it was nonsense and a principle of convenience on your part. Occam's Razor is almost certainly right about this.

Sad. Really good suits can go weeks without cracking, you didn't even last one evening.

Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com


In article I read serveral years ago about US local law enforcement types discussing what they had learned from their on-site instruction on Israeli counter-terrorism measures, one of the lessons learned has lingered. The Israeli instructor cautioned his students to never, ever, fall into the trap of dismissing or belittling the capacities of their adversaries. He told them to remember the enemy is smart and tough and underestimating them is fatal.

A point I am reminded of every time I hear dismissive rhetoric about Al-Qaeda, for example, calling the suicide bombers of 9/11 cowards. They were criminals, terrorists and fanatics - but one thing they were not was cowardly.

Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com

The US, according to every reputable source I have talked to or read, is not winning in Iraq. Instead there is a failed state status quo setting in, and the US has, by withdrawing to bases, accepted it.

The Republican strategy in Iraq can be described as "run and hide".

Stirling Newberry http://www.bopnews.com

Gettysburg should tell us about 'the nuclear option...". Does he mean that Israel would use nuclear weapons to clean out areas hundreds of meters or a few miles from it's borders? Israel has had many casualties within sight of their border, and are trying to advance 12 miles. The beleagered residents of Kiryat Shimona would probably not be enthused about dealing with the blast effects or radiation produced by 'the nuclear option'. If Israel just wiped out more distant Arab cities, how many cities, and what effect would this have on nuclear proliferation in the region and for Israel's future?

“Israel no longer has the will to be an empire.”

I think both Israel and the US have the same problems.

Usually empires and colonial powers use their control and dominance to benefite their country economically. Both Israel and the US are bleeding money and citizens with a select few receiving economic benefits at the expense of a majority of their citizens.

In the case of Israel the society at home supports the empire and the colonies in the west bank. Those citizens in the west bank are highly subsidized by a majority of the citizens that have lost benefits because of the expenses of maintaining the small minority outside of the borders.

In real sustainable economic terms the empire and/or colonization has had a high economic and social cost.

This is the same for the United States in Iraq. Iraq has had high economic cost with only a few large corporations receiving large economic benefits not from Iraq, but from the society back home. Also the costs have fallen not proportionally or progressively on the citizens, but regressively.

In both Israel and the US those in power maintain the power structure by conjuring enemies and myths.

Israel is having trouble with the distributing of benefits of the State,now based on religion, in an equatible and fair way to a secular majority.

At home, the US administration is losing the ability to keep the economy growing from overseas money and to control growing dissatisfaction with its corruption and policies.

-------------------------------------------------------
Today, are we searching for I deals or Ideals?
-Thinking

Not since my undergrad days have I encountered such spiritual dryness cloaked in "impressive" Neo-Marxist theoretical argumentation. It is such a drag, to make a pun.

Newberry's exploitative employ of language to convert nouns such as "empire" into operative terms, "to empire," then apply them to real life flesh and blood political bodies, e.g. the State of Israel, is classic Marxist strategy. Israel, in Newberry's dialectic, is an empire because of what it does, i.e. intentionally and purposefully "rule over" "non-core" peoples in "arrogated" territories. How very convenient for him.

This puffery ignores that Israel has tried, and tried, and tried (and at times, God knows, nearly succeeded) in affirming the boundaries and sovereignty of a Palestinian state in accord with Palestinian leaders, only to be left holding the bag when the same leaders abandoned the terms of each and every such accord, repaying goodwill with gunfire. Likewise, each time Israel has ceded back territory it had won when it repelled successive invasions by its neighbors, it has been repaid with missiles and suicide bombers.

I don't know, but wonder whether Newberry's disappointment with Israel's military "performance" in the present conflict stems from the fact that he can't excoriate it for re-arrogating lost territory it covets for its "imperial" needs, providing him with further examples to stuff his precious theoretical artifices.

It is little wonder that Newberry specializes in matters military, another preoccupation of Marxists who love to deploy words as weapons.

"Spiritual dryness"? What on Earth does that mean?

Actually, I might as well ask what the whole of the post means. OK, you don't like the language employed, for whatever reason. So let's leave loaded terms like "empire" out of it, if it makes you feel better.

After that, what's your point? If you're arguing that Newberry's misconstrued Israel's strategic dilemma, then make some kind of case.

Good Lord...........Stirling, you really need to back off of this for a second.

Valdron gave you advice in good faith, advice that you should have taken. You're managing to come off as both arrogant and insecure in these last couple of posts. George Costanza is not a role-model.

Let's be serious here. The war in Lebanon does not show Israel as weak, any more than the war in Iraq shows America as weak. Both countries have militaries that can crush most of the conventional armies they will face and destroy the infrastructure of whole countries. What the war in Lebanon and the war in Iraq do show, however, is that this kind of overwhelming conventional force is completely ineffective when fighting guerillas operating within the population.

Israel's PR battle?
It took three days for the US media to report Israeli bombing of a refugee convoy in Lebanon. It was reported all over the world except in North America. Even with this "assistance" from the Western press, Israel is losing the PR battle.

New York Times today reports on the convoy bombing from last Thursday. Thousands of people forced from their homes in villages in S. Lebanon are bombed as they head north. "Probably the clearance wasn't cleared enough" a Lebanese reporter said.

Earlier on Friday, the New York Times also reported Israel's demand for a rush on their order of anti-personnel cluster bombs. The US is delaying because of fears of civilian casualties. (No kidding!)

If the shipment is approved, Israel may be told that it must be especially careful about firing the rockets into populated areas, the senior official said.

That "Spiritual dryness" post looks like an example of 'puffery' to me.

IF the misuse of force can be considered a weakness then Israel is indeed 'weak.'

I have a hard time seeing a geographically contigous political entity with historical claims to 100% of the territory is occupies [note: I am NOT taking a position one way or another on the validity of these claims; just stating that they exist] as meeting any reasonable definition of "empire".

BTW, the personal attacked on the gp poster were completely unnecessary.

sPh

I think the historical claims to territory can be classed as a "foundation myth", most if not all empires have some form of "it is our duty / obligation to be an empire, for all sorts of reasons" logic to absolve them of any responsibility for their choice. Think of "Manifest Destiny" and the opening of the American West. (I too am not taking any position on whether such a myth is in fact correct in Israel's case.)

With respect to the "hard and inflexible rule", I think the poster is referring to the use of "one-third" as in one-third of the people are subjects is the cutoff for an empire. Looked at in this way, does 32% subjects mean not an empire, 34% is an empire? In that case, America has probably never been close to an empire. I doubt Stirling means it this way but the issue could have been avoided by saying "roughly one-third" or "about one-third, depending on circumstances" instead of the actual statement which is no longer on my screen.

That actually was my point. That Stirling had endorsed what appeared to be a fairly arbitrary reference point of 33% subject peoples. It appears that wasn't clear enough because Stirling, in his interesting response, didn't bother to address the point.

The example of America is interesting because it raises some worthwhile points. For instance, has America been close to an Empire?

Arguably, it has been, given the population of black slaves. By Newberry's 33% mark it would seem that the Confederate states of America were probably an empire.

On the other hand, was the United States of that era as a whole an Empire? Considering that as much or more than half of its territory was occupied by a relatively small indigenous population? Or consider Russia and Siberia (or for that matter Australia and its Outback) where centralized urban cores dominate vast low population hinterlands.

My view of Wallerstein and other academics is that they did not endorse punctilious 33% rules, but rather, attempted to identify key social features or structures which characterized certain societies which behaved in certain ways.

Academic study and theory, for the record, is a useful tool to attempt to describe and understand reality, its not so good as a replacement for reality.

AlanC9 is right. Cool it a bit, Stirling, and let your essay stand or fall on its own merits - you're certainly not doing it any favors down here.

Look, all of this is pretty silly, because what Stirling is talking about - academic definitions of empire - is a far different game than what's going on out in the real world. Valdron is right when he says that "Academic study and theory... is a useful tool to attempt to describe and understand reality, its not so good as a replacement for reality." I'd add a caveat - it's a useful tool for academics to attempt to describe and understand reality but please, for the love of Mike, let's try to keep things accessible in our discourse.

Empire means certain things to different people, but mostly what it means is a kind of organization of a relatively massive state that ended with and shortly after WWII and the final days of the Japanese and British Empires. That's just the truth - there are no more empires, because nobody calls themselves an empire anymore.

What we do have is states that exert influence in varying degrees and through various means over other states. Fine. Just don't call it an empire - not because it doesn't fit definitionally, but because what the word means to people is not what you want it to mean for them. Truly. Talk about empire in a modern context and most people are confused, because they're thinking about feathered helmets and guys with ridiculous moustaches.

If you mean to say that Israel subjugates people in and around its geopolitical boundaries - just say it.

also, Stirling - saying stuff like "...at the very moment when the United States wants to negotiate itself out of Iraq" really doesn't help your case. Who in the United States is publicly talking about "wanting to negotiate [ourselves] out of Iraq"? Privately doing so? Anyone? Anyone with any power whatsoever? Is this just a guess, or mind-reading? I don't mean to be snarky, but really, there's absolutely no support anywhere for this assertion. The people of the United States want us the hell out of Iraq, but there's a rather enormous difference between that and what you said.

I'm always taken aback when people call the Hezbollah fighters cowardly. Taking on an army equipped with tanks, helicopters, jet fighters, unmanned drones, and all sorts of high-tech weaponry when all you have is AK-47s and RPGs probably requires a good dose of looniness, but it is definitely NOT cowardly.

In fact a case could be made that attacking poorly armed guerrillas with tanks and helicopters is cowardly. But it's interesting how some people can invert the meaning of words without apparently even realizing it.

"Not that it's any of my business..." Valdron.

That's right, it wasn't any of your business. A letter to the author would have been appropriate. Picking a fight in-thread was not.

I rarely read an article by Sterling that does not expose some new and illuminating way to view a situation. He is probably the most original and insightful thinker on this forum. And more often than not, the best nuggets are not found in his articles, but in his elaborations responding to comments. Few of the article writers here have the balls, the commitment to their point of view, or the depth behind their article to get down in the comments and defend or explain in greater detail. Sterling does. And he was right, he responded to a troll comment by calling it a troll comment. Bravo!

On the other hand, Valdron, your comments across this forum are usually also insightful and valuable, above the level of this meager pompus finger-wagging you've indulged in. Your talents are above this sort of thing. Take a deep breath, and carry on pal.

"We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality." Nobody calls themselves an empire?

What people call or don't call themselves is irrelevant anyway. A rose is a rose by any other name, as they say -- an empire is a country that fits all characteristics of an empire.

I am not making any assertions as to which countries do or don't fit those characteristics. Just saying that whether they call themselves empires or not is not the deciding factor.

That was almost puzzling. Actually, as I recall, it was a system to send salvos of rockets with warheads full of cluster bombs.

Is it possible that Pentagon, of all places, views IDF as reckless in attacking civilians?

 has America been close to an Empire?

If you follow Niall Ferguson (sp?) the USA not only is an empire, but also ought to acknowledge it.  You can find his argument in his books.  He also writes a column for the LATimes but I do not follow it.

You may have a decent point about hyperbole, but how does marxualizing your comment bring the point home?

Neoboho

Not the Pentagon, the State Department. After all how does it look, to be negotiating for a cease fire while rushing a shipment of anti-personnel weapons to one of the parties of the cease fire?

Human Rights Watch reports Israel had fired cluster munitions on July 19 at the Lebanese village of Bilda, which the group said had killed one civilian and wounded at least 12 others, including 7 children. HRW has I imagine been pressuring the State Department (who only speak on condition of anonymity.) NYT article

I gather that Chicago dyke's link to Juan Cole was intended as a response to my comment that winning against the murderous thugs massacring Iraqi civilians can be achievable just as winning against the murderous thugs massacring Lebanese civilians was achievable.

I will try to spell it out more clearly.

Stirling's article views things from the perspective of the USA and its ally Israel, engaged in 3 related wars - with some initial success in Afghanistan, increasing failure in Iraq, and and total failure in Lebanon, with a central theme being the growing superiority of guerilla light infantry to the Rumsfeldian Air Land Battle.

I view these as 3 separate wars, with different protagonists, objectives, strategic doctrine and force postures. This is easy for me since I am on the same side as Hezbollah in Lebanon and on the same side as the Iraqi government and its ally the USA in Iraq but merely sympathetic to the warlord regime the US is backing in Afghanistan as being at least somewhat better than the Taliban rather than anything praiseworthy.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah is the largest political party and its armed forces are recognized as the national resistance that defeated the 18 year Israeli occupation. It is not a proxy for Iran or Syria but receives aid from them just as the Vietnamese received aid from the Soviet Union when they were defending their country from the US (with both positive and negative implications).

The Israeli government knew when it went in that it does not have a strategic option of reoccupying south Lebanon or forcing the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah or bringing back the Syrians (whose occupation of Lebanon was supported by both Israel and the US).

One aim was to obscure the fact that the inevitable prisoner exchange and withdrawal from Chebaa farms area was a defeat inflicted by Hezbollah timed for solidarity with the Palestinians holding Israeli prisoners in Gaaza by inflicting collective punishment on Lebanese civilian infrastructure and sending out the message (mainly for domestic consumption) that Israel will strike back hard.

Another aim was to finally resolve the bilateral issues between Israel and Lebanon in a way that would be perceived by Israelis as victorious, with removal of the threat from Hezbollah seen as a victory for Israeli determination to hit back rather than as a result of meeting Hezbollah's demands.

Going for the second aim to the point of mobilizing 30,000 troops and accepting an international force on Israel's border is in my view something the Israeli government would only be doing if it is serious about getting out of the West Bank in the relatively near future and needs to appear "strong" rather than defeated while doing so.

In Iraq the US is not waging a war of aggression against a guerilla army embedded among the people. The terrorists fighting against the Iraqi government do not have an air force like the Israelis and are not aiming their attacks primarily against civilian infrastructure like the Israelis, but directly and openly against the civilian population themselves. The Iraqi armed forces are doing most of the fighting and taking most of the military as well as civilian casualties (although they do not contribute most of the fire power as US forces are far better equipped).

"Run and hide" is not a completely unfair critique of the US contribution with a force posture that is overwhelmingly oriented towards force protection rather than actively engaging the enemy. However since that posture is dictated by the strong opposition to the war from the US foreign policy establishment and especially from Democrats, and consequent need to minimize the (low and declining) rate of US casualties that critique is not one that can be made by people who advocate withdrawal.

At least the US is contributing fire power, training and deterrence of intervention from the neighbours, whereas advocates of withdrawal would leave the freely elected Iraqi government to fend for themselves.

There is certainly an overwhelming consensus that the US is not winning in Iraq. Part of the reason is that things are pretty bad there at the moment. But the overwhelming reason is that most people commenting on it view it as a US imperial war (whether they are for or against it). People who confused "democracy" with pro-US are rather disconcerted at finding the US has very little influence over the Iraqi government which is dominated by Shia Islamist parties somewhat similar to Hezbollah so they ask why the US should be expending blood and treasure on its behalf at all.

I believe it is an "unloseable war" because the murderous terrorists who are slaughtering Iraqi civilians have no program that Iraqis could surrender to. The only question is whether Iraq will be able to remain a democracy while fighting them or whether it will degenerate into a sectarian civil war with the Shia death squads suppressing the Sunnis until all further "resistance" ceases.

Advocates of withdrawal are supporting that outcome. Since it would obviously be extremely damaging to the US there is no chance they could actually implement it and consequently the Democratic party leadership cannot even pay lip service to it for the purpose of placating its base.

I'm not sure that Stirling's second reply to my post was actually intended as a reply to mine or just located there while replying to somebody else. But I'll answer it in detail anyway.

The Israelis have killed 20 times as many civilians as Hezbollah, and have attempted to humliate the democratically elected government of Lebanon, including taking Lebanese Army members as POWs.

True. Doesn't seem to have done the Israelis much good, so I don't see why you think that Iraqi insurgents with an even greater focus on killing civilians and attacking the democratically elected government of Iraq will do any better.

Piling on the purple prose doesn't change the facts on the ground - Olmert's government attacked southern Lebanon with disproportionate force in hopes of a quick "victory" and now it is engaged in a abad faith offensive under the shadow of a cease fire in order to claim victory after having been beaten in the field.

I assume you are referring to Olmert or somebody else's purple prose. I certainly wasn't using any.

You may be right as to the aim of the current offensive. But I was quite certain the result would not be a victory at all from the start and I find it difficult to believe the Israeli government is actually all that less well informed about the outcome of their 18 year occupation of south Lebanon than I am.

Another possible aim of the bad faith offensive under the shadow of a cease fire is to place the IDF in a position where the only exit strategy from south Lebanon is the arrival of the international force which could be linked to a more comprehensive settlement including an international force for Gaza and the West Bank as well.

That is only speculation. But pretty well everyone is now agreed that what's needed is a comprehensive settlement including Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. If you think the US government has problems with its Zionist lobby, spare a thought for Israel's!

The Israeli government leadership has known it has to withdraw from the West Bank for quite a while. A very sizeable minority (including some in the cabinet) does not and are able to mobilize many more who are afraid of ongoing attacks from territory they withdraw from.

These domestic considerations weigh far more heavily in decision making than is recognized in most analysis of what's going on.

I'm a supporter of Israel, but this attack on Hezbollah was illconsidered, badly planned, horrendously executed and a diplomatic disaster. Any time you can't beat non-state terrorists in a PR battle, you have big problems.

I'm not a supporter of Israel. But I am aware that the PR battle the Israeli government is concerned about right now is internal. The US engaged in similar behaviour of totally isolating itself in world public opinion by the Xmas bombing of Hanoi a few weeks before agreeing to withdraw from Vietnam ("with honour").

If the behavior of fanatics is the standard Israel holds itself too, then that is how Israel will be treated

That is the message Israel is sending. They are quite good at PR so I doubt that it is accidental. They wish to be perceived that way, especially by their own fanatics who they will soon have to start evacuating from the West Bank.

jkd,
James Baker, the conservative Republican consiliere has been very busy trying to find a way for the US to exit ASAP. So that would mean that both sides of the political spectrum are looking for a way out of Iraq.

Interestingly enough, the GOP activists and sympathisers you see on TV are very quiet about this because they feel there is still some advantage to be gained by attacking Democrats for wanting out of Iraq.
Hey, I never said they weren't hypocrites.

see attached:
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/080806O.shtml

In short the job of fighting "rabble" in Israel's core imperial area, has destroyed its capabilities in dealing with its imperial peripheries. One of the most important of these, since it is a failed state, is the northern border with Lebanon, where states which do not have the will to directly confront Israel supply proxies. Hezbollah is a proxy army for Syria and Iran. The difference is that it is a capable army, and it is facing an Israeli military that has clearly been living on its reputation.

The way proxies are depicted in this paragraph overlooks a dynamic that has been central to the formation of Islamist groups since WW2. Across Northern Africa, in Syria, in Jordan, and in Iraq, groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood were brutally put down by secular minded nationalist regimes. These are the regimes that Israel has most deeply humiliated with military victories since she has become a state. The story is about an humiliation within an a humiliation.

The emergence of the PLO was not only a matter of those defeated regimes continuing the fight through a proxy but the beginning of a Palestinian national consciousness. The "proxy" in this case, was a continuation of a struggle but also the living symbol of a permanent step back. The tactics of a stateless people are not an aid to the suppression of aspirations that makes the autocratic regimes possible in the region. The loss of Arab military honor is not just a question of how much resentment is stored up against Israel but is central to the question of who has the right to rule.

Arafat’s desire to stand as a peer in the ranks of the Arab League served Israel’s interests as long as the ambivalence of the surrounding regimes kept them in a balancing act where their obvious futility could be justified by arguing for the necessity of their continuance because there was no alternative in the face of the enemy they opposed.

So I contend that the real change in the situation did not come about because of the present stubborn resistance of Hezbollah in the face of a “technologically superior force”, but was the inevitable fallout of the decision made to destroy the infrastructure of the PLA during the Second Intifada.

Sharon destroyed his old enemy but he also dissolved the nationalist idea that had driven the different sides along the paths they have taken to this point. The result: Islamists are the only players left on the field.

With this change of circumstance and opportunity, it is hard to know who is a proxy for whom.

I didn't "Marxualize" my comment. I made a pointed observation about the methodology Newberry uses, that practically speaking is Marxist (deliriously so!). How did Newberry choose his point of view, and why? It wasn't at all necessary, except perhaps to enhance his credentials as a military hardware expert. I'm simply applying McLuhan's idea: the medium is the message. Newberry's argument, however specialized it may appear to be, is bloodless, therefore spiritually "dry." I was struck what a non-sequitur his assertion, "I am a supporter of Israel." With supporters like him, who needs Hezbollah to propagandize Israel's means and motives?

Valdron gave you advice in good faith, advice that you should have taken. You're managing to come off as both arrogant and insecure in these last couple of posts. George Costanza is not a role-model.

Yes, SN, has demonstrated a pompous insecurity in these few posts with V that are consistent with and affirm his inability to engage in cogent dialogue without resorting to Limbaughish behavior. Life is a fight to Mr. Newberry, one that he seldom wins, but nevertheless he believes that as long as he goes down fighting he is winning. His  abrasive posting behavior is quite boorish. He also abuses ratings and should have lost his TU status long ago.

But could you show me in some concrete way how anything that Newberry has written is essentially "Marxist" or even "Neo-Marxist" (whatever that is)?  I'm not saying you're incorrect - just that I can't see it.  My impression is that you're using the term "Marxist" as a generalized perjorative - like "branding" (to use the old term) the left side of academia in the culture-war as "a bunch of Marxists" - even though much of the thought content coming from that camp is critical of actual Marxism.  

Neoboho

I like it when the original posters respond to comments. I think it makes the whole process much more informative. Now, Stirling is a little "touchy" ...and REALLY full of himself, but at least he reads the posts, and says what he thinks about them.

Jan Knaus

"Spiritual dryness"? What on Earth does that mean? 

It's what happens after "spirital gooiness" gets old.   It's how you feel when you've heard people like Rick Santorum or Ken Mehlman talk about republican family values for the 8 millionth time.

Jan Knaus

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