How Bad Was It?
Via Hilzoy, a very interesting resource from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, namely a list of Hezbollah attacks along Israel's northern border from May 2000 to June 2006.
I tried to tally it all up, and I came up with 13 soldiers and seven civilians killed, along with 27 soldiers and 7 civilians wounded, plus three IDF soldiers and two Israeli Arabs captured. Obviously, that's an undesirable situation for Israel. What's more, since this is what happened after Israel stopped occupying Lebanese land, it's all very unjustified. Clearly, given the consistent nature of these provocations, Israel had a legal and moral right to seek changes.
At the same time, the list puts some perspective on the practical size of the Hezbollah problem. Twenty dead over six years. Thirty-four wounded. A bad business. But clearly a low-intensity problem all things considered. Hezbollah, whatever it's notional commitment to the destruction of Israel, was not a practical threat to the nation's survival, it was the instigator of low-level border clashes. Throughout the duration of this period, Israel seems to have consistently shot back at attacking Hezbollah operatives (which of course they would) and now and again launced retaliatory strikes when there seemed to be something worth striking.
That, it seems to me, was a wise way to handle the situation. The tit-for-tat retaliations appear to have succeeded in containing the conflict. Not in stopping Hezbollah from attacking, but in dissuading it from escalating. The resulting situation wasn't ideal by any means, but it was pretty good, all things considered. The odds that the current military action -- which has already cost Israel, to say nothing of Lebanon, more lives than six years worth of low-intensity conflict -- will alter the situation dramatically for the better strike me as very low.
Thanks for those statistics: exactly the kind I have been looking for. As I suspected Hezbollah has been a minor threat in terms of actual casualties inficted on Israel. And I think you are exactly right that limited tit-for-tat retaliations on Hezbollah were the right policy both morally and pramatically.
Someone correct me if I am wrong but these numbers about Hezbollah-inflicted casualties in recent years have largely(totally?) gone unreported in the US media, right? One would think that amidst all the hysteria about the dire threat posed by Hezbollah, the MSM would have bothered to dig up and report the basic facts. Isn't that what the MSM is supposed to do better than blogs?
July 29, 2006 11:22 AM | Reply | Permalink
This assumes Israel could count on the same level of intensity in the future. However, with Hezbollah stocking up on more advanced missiles from an Iran reviving its militance, you've got a growing problem going forward, one any nation would be hard pressed to tolerate.
July 29, 2006 12:39 PM | Reply | Permalink
This instigator of low level border clashes seems to have built up a rather impressive stockpile of long range missiles within firing range of Israel. As well as training up an army that many small nations would be envious of. I wonder: Do you suppose they were actually planning on using all that firepower at some point?
It's not irrational to think that Hezbollah was methodically accumulating the capacity to do Israel mortal damage, and that the low level border clashes were no more than a way to keep their hand in while the buildup took place.
It WOULD fit their stated aims, after all.
July 29, 2006 12:54 PM | Reply | Permalink
Do you suppose they were actually planning on using all that firepower at some point?
So we're talking about another preventative war? Jeebus. No wonder the Bush Administration is backing the Israeli government(or pushing them, some say) on this one.
This instigator of low level border clashes seems to have built up a rather impressive stockpile of long range missiles within firing range of Israel.
Not as impressive as two hundred nukes. Why is it so hard for people to concede that no Arab country can militarily defeat Israel, or cause it to cease to exist? That's a good thing, ya know? And then we (and/or really Israel) can start making decisions about policy on that basis.
It's not irrational to think that Hezbollah was methodically accumulating the capacity to do Israel mortal damage
I just want your guesstimate of how long it will take Hezbollah to accumulate the military might to inflict "mortal damage."
July 29, 2006 2:00 PM | Reply | Permalink
SomeCallMeTim is right, Israel should have waited until Hezbollah had entered the country with their pretty darn good army, and/or begun firing their new long range missiles on Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Israel, at which point Israel should have nuked Southern Lebanon.
Not Damascus or Tehran, because that would have been disproportionate. But clearly, as Tim is saying, a few nukes on Southern Lebanon would have been acceptable, but only after long range missiles started falling south of Haifa.
Until then Israel, how about a nice steaming cup of STFU!
---- Just say no to 0 ratings. Especially from petey, the ratings abuser.
July 29, 2006 2:19 PM | Reply | Permalink
"Why is it so hard for people to concede that no Arab country can militarily defeat Israel, or cause it to cease to exist?"
Because it's patently not true.
The possession of nuclear weapons means that no Arab country can hope to destroy Israel, and survive the subsequent nuclear strike.
Hezbollah, you may have noticed, is not a "country"; They may be mostly based out of Lebanon, but that doesn't mean they give a damn about what happens to Lebanon in response to their attack.
And nuclear weapons do not stop missiles from raining over your border. Nor are they particularly useful for taking out invading armies. Especially for a country as small as Israel; If they nuked an army coming over the border from Lebanon, they'd erase themselves from the map in the process.
So it's not at all unrealistic for a force with no concern for a particular geographic area to believe they might strike Israel a mortal blow. Nuclear weapons wouldn't be a factor, save for the possiblity that Hezbollah might somehow get ahold of a few.
When would they be able to land a mortal blow? About half an hour after they equipped those missles with chemical or biological warheads. Want to bet they aren't working on it?
July 29, 2006 3:14 PM | Reply | Permalink
the notion that israel couldn't "tolerate" the continued provocations and munitions buildups of hezbollah doesn't translate into saying that this war, at this time, was a good idea for isreal. didn't people learn anything from the danger of allowing chest-pounding rhetoric about iraq lead us into a fiasco?
it's a shame that the world isn't a black-and-white place, but there you have it: sometimes muddling through really is the best option.
according to ha'aretz, at least, the olmert decision to respond in the way israel responded (essentially, desploying long-standing contingency plans designed for direr circumstances) took place in minutes. marry in haste and repent at leisure, the old saw goes, and israel will have plenty of chance to contemplate it in the years to come.
after all, israel concluded, from its last 20-year occupation of lebanon, that it wasn't a good idea, and certainly israel already has realized that there is zero chance of demolishing hezbollah. as i've been noting pretty much since the third day of this war, hezbollah has already won. the only question left is how bad is the israeli defeat.
is that something that isreal should "tolerate?" a leadership that took a moderately problematic circumstance with a prospect of potentially worse in the future and turned it into a situation in which israel will fail to achieve much of anything, at an extremely high cost?
there's a reason the hippocratic oath tells us to first do no harm. if only olmert had remembered that: even sharon would have.
July 29, 2006 4:20 PM | Reply | Permalink
Hezbollah has a philosophy of war and the means to carry it out. Hezbollah was constantly improving its weapons and instigating small combat. The future was clear, a war against Israel at a time when it seemed beneficial to Hezbollah.
Since war was truly inevitable, as far as humans can tell, it saves lives to have the war before Hezbollah gets Iranian nukes.
If you think war was not inevitable, convince me. I'd like to hear your evidence. Other than "The future is not predictable".
July 30, 2006 6:31 AM | Reply | Permalink
You may be right, if the intensity of the war is such that Hezbollah loses all future capability. Certainly, the populations of Stalingrad and Leningrad were left in utter rubble, using conventional weapons only, and could no longer be a threat or support the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War.
On the other hand, Berlin, in May 1945, was only less damaged than Tokyo since it didn't use paper and light wood as a structural material. Conventional weapons, certainly including street fighting, brought it to a level of destruction comparable to that of Nagasaki. Somehow, of course, the population managed constant defiance of the Bolshevik hordes, through the Berlin Airlift, through the Wall, and...what? no Bolsheviks any more?
So will Hezbollah be so destroyed that their cannot be a remnant that could use a truck-borne suicide nuclear weapon in five years or so? What level of confidence exists in either direction?
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
July 30, 2006 6:38 AM | Reply | Permalink
The idea that a war between Hezbollah and Israel was inevitable is fanciful to say the least. In military terms Hezbollah is a guerilla group and doesn't possess the capacity to successfully initiate a large attack against the Israeli military. What it's good at doing is surviving and frustrating an Israeli attack. If Israel hadn't attacked, it's extremely unlikely that Hezbollah would have launched a major attack on Israel.
Nor is true that the mere accumulation of a rocket arsenal is an indication of Hezbollah plans to initiate a large-scale attack. There are several reasons for Hezbollah to build its arsenal : to deter an Israeli invasion, to build its own prestige, to create a bargaining chip etc. Not to mention the fact that Hezbollah exists in a divided and unstable country with a history of civil war.
July 30, 2006 8:58 AM | Reply | Permalink
This is SUCH a tough issue. On one hand, I agree with commentators who note that the US would hardly be gentle in responding to militants launching attacks from across the borders of either Canada or Mexico.
On the other hand, I'd like to think that we'd carefully avoid punishing innocents for the deeds of a guerrilla army.
Has Israel gone too far? Well, most of the world thinks so and I have to agree.
What I mostly believe, though, is that the US is hurting itself by taking sides in a proxy war in the most volatile region in the world. If we should be doing anything at this point, it's force and enforce a ceasefire.
thosethingswesay.blogspot.com
July 30, 2006 3:05 PM | Reply | Permalink
The comparison with an attack from Mexico is ridiculous.
Unless it just happened that the US had occupied Mexico for the last 20 years, had killed 20,000 of its citizens, and then left without signing a peace treaty with Mexico, offered no reparations, and then constantly engaged in aggressive flyovers ever since.
If people insist on being US-centric to understand the world, they have to get the context right.
IR 101 teaches that's to be avoided at all costs.
July 30, 2006 3:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
Gideon Levy in Haaretz:
---------------------------
Haim Ramon "doesn't understand" why there is still electricity in Baalbek; Eli Yishai proposes turning south Lebanon into a "sandbox"; Yoav Limor, a Channel 1 military correspondent, proposes an exhibition of Hezbollah corpses and the next day to conduct a parade of prisoners in their underwear, "to strengthen the home front's morale."
---------------------------
Pity the fools.
Israel is losing it.
July 30, 2006 3:45 PM | Reply | Permalink
"I tried to tally it all up, and I came up with 13 soldiers and seven civilians killed, along with 27 soldiers and 7 civilians wounded, plus three IDF soldiers and two Israeli Arabs captured. Obviously, that's an undesirable situation for Israel. What's more, since this is what happened after Israel stopped occupying Lebanese land, it's all very unjustified. Clearly, given the consistent nature of these provocations, Israel had a legal and moral right to seek changes.
At the same time, the list puts some perspective on the practical size of the Hezbollah problem. Twenty dead over six years. Thirty-four wounded. A bad business. But clearly a low-intensity problem all things considered."
Matthew, you are reading the table incorrectly.
The table is "Chronological list of events along Israel's northern border in which Israeli civilians and/or soldiers were killed since the IDF pullout of Lebanon in May 2000."
It only lists the events in which Israelis were killed. To try to chart the number of wounded, you would have to look at the much larger lists of all events on the border.
July 30, 2006 8:30 PM | Reply | Permalink
"Do you suppose they were actually planning on using all that firepower at some point?"
Yes, they were planning on using it in retalitation for Israel's bombing Iran's nuclear sites. That is why Iran has been giving Hezbollah all these missles, so that they would retaliate for such an attack on Iran.
The question that must be asked is whether Israel's attempt to take out Hezbullah's missles is in preparation for an Israeli air strike on Iran. That would explain the Bush administration's out an out support of Israel's attack.
There may be more going on here than meets the eye.
July 30, 2006 11:57 PM | Reply | Permalink
Could you define what quantities and types of weapons are in this stockpile? It would be hard to do mortal damage with the things I've heard about. If there's more information, fine.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
July 31, 2006 12:08 AM | Reply | Permalink
Some research into the actual lethality, for a given weight, of chemical weapons may be beneficial. Even nerve agents have basically local effect.
Biological agents are more threatening, but are considerably harder to make work than many believe -- and there is at least a question of who is launching them and what their feelings are if the wind shifts onto them.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
July 31, 2006 12:10 AM | Reply | Permalink
FYI: Don't know how true all of this is, but
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=44899
July 31, 2006 4:06 AM | Reply | Permalink
Perhaps we can also discuss whether the situation has improved in the least bit with respect to Israel's security.
I thought it was just about a year ago that the Lebanese and the international community managed to get Syria to withdraw from Lebanon. Is not the current Israeli action undermining this slowly emerging Lebanese independence? Is not the long term solution to strengthen the Lebanese for them to be able to assert sovereignty over Southern Lebanon and disarm the Hezbollah? Hasn't bombing Beirut made it now an impossible action for the Lebanese to curb Hezbollah? etc., etc.
Anyone?
July 31, 2006 4:21 AM | Reply | Permalink
There may be more going on here than meets the eye.
That's correct imo, Cap'n. But there's a lot going on that does meet the eye which is sort of...welll...ignored in the propaganda interest of bipolar thinking and over-generalization.
Take Syria, for example. There is some strategic sense in Assad covertly supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon. Bashar Assad is playing both ends against the middle though. His government kowtows to Iran and at the same time works for good relations with the Saudis, who distrust Iran immensely. But Assad has a very fragile hold on power in Syria. Look at the demographics - a 74% Sunni population and 14% Alawite (Shiite) population which rules through Assad. Syrian jails are full of Sunni Muslim Brotherhood prisoners (public enemy #1), yet Assad lauds non-Syrian Muslim Brotherhood groups throughtout the region. A sort of have your cake and eat it arrangement that may appease the Sunni majority in Syria, as well as other Sunni states in Western Asia; Turkey 80%, Egypt 90%, Jordan 92%, Saudi Arabia 90%, UAE 81%, Kuwait 60% and Qatar 90%.
Throw in Israel into the equations and you have an emotionally charged issue which tends to transgress the ideological lines that exist in the context of the Sunni/Shiite divisions. Assad, then, achieves some insulation from Syria's internal political conflicts by supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon, and it strengthens his power by a slight degree.
The fears of the Sunni states is the possible formation of what is called the Shiite Crescent which could stretch from Iran to Iraq to Syria and possibly engulfing Lebanon also (although Lebanon has a Christian majority- 39%, next to 24% Sunni and 36% Shiite. It's no wonder that the principle states, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan are vigorously pushing for a cease fire and peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon, and openly condemning Hezbollah for its role in the conflict. These parties see the war, and indeed the Iraq war, as pushing the formation of the Shiite Crescent, and insuring Iranian dominance in a new Middle East whose political landscape has been dramatically rewritten.
What it looks like to me is that Israel is not paying long range attention to these realties, and certainly failing to exploit the existing power divisions among the Middle Eastern states in the interests of Israel's security in the region. When, for example, Syrian Sunnis start rooting for a group of Shiite militiamen in Lebanon, you know something is wrong. At the very least, it will harden anti-Israel attitudes which were otherwise softening, and jack-up Iran's dominance in the region.
I don't want to offer Viet Nam as any sort of analogy to the conflict in the the ME, but there's one thing to consider: The Tonkinese had been adversaries to Chinese influence in SE Asia for a thousand years. Ho Chih Minh was originally the best bet for checking the expansion of the Chinese influence. Just an example of the fact that nations are capable of great policy blunders, especially when they start acting on their own propaganda.
Neoboho
July 31, 2006 11:36 AM | Reply | Permalink
Hezbollah, you may have noticed, is not a "country"; They may be mostly based out of Lebanon, but that doesn't mean they give a damn about what happens to Lebanon in response to their attack.
This rings untrue to me, Brett, but I don't really know. My impression is that Hezbollah see themselves as Lebanese patriots, and their involvement in legitimate Lebanese politics seems to bear this view out. I don't really know how sincere their agreement to disband their militia is, but it seems that concession is always on the table when they do negotiate. I think that their political interests exceed their military interests, at any rate.
Do you have any facts to support the idea that Hezbollah doesn't care what happens in Lebanon. I would be interested if you do.
Neoboho
July 31, 2006 11:49 AM | Reply | Permalink
Sebastian
I find it pretty ambiguous as to whether this list is those killed or those killed or wounded. This is at the head of the page:
"Chronological list of events along Israel's northern border in which Israeli civilians and/or soldiers were killed since the IDF pullout of Lebanon in May 2000."
But, right before the list this description appears:
"The following is a chronological list of events along Israel's northern border in which Israeli civilians or soldiers were killed or wounded since May 2000:"
Reading it, it strikes me that the latter description sounds more plausible, but, i could well be wrong.
joshb
July 31, 2006 1:55 PM | Reply | Permalink
Unless Hezbollah has gotten massively more powerful weapons, some rough quantitation may put its capability in perspective. The figure of 14,000 rockets (not missiles) has been mentioned several times.
Depending if they are the older Katyusha or the newer Grad, these were designed to have 18 48- or 40-tube launchers fire at once, to devastate an area of approximately one square kilometer. Rounding slightly, dividing the available missiles by the size of an optimal salvo gives Hezbollah the capability to devastate 19 to 20 square kilometers. While I recognize there is much unoccupied land in Israel, the World Factbook estimates that Israel has about 20,330 square kilometers of land.
Add to this that the rockets are being fired in much smaller numbers at one time than the Russians had intended. Does this give a bit of perspective?
I make the point that the GRAD and Katyusha rockets are not missiles. Missiles have independent guidance and are intended to hit specific targets, while artillery rockets are intended to blanket areas, killing people in the open, destroying some trucks and other unarmored vehicles, and damaging and sometimes destroying wooden buildings. Missiles, as well as being more accurate, usually have larger warheads.
With the combination of greater accuracy and destructive power, far fewer missiles would be launched than would be artillery rockets. Just because a few rockets are launched at once doesn't give them the properties of guided missiles.
Even tactical guided missiles do not have huge areas of destruction. If they have cluster munition warheads, a greater area is covered but with less explosive power per unit of ground area. AFAIK, Iran does not make particularly accurate, highly mobile long-range missiles such as the US Army ATACMS. This is not a trivial exercise; the US is on the second or third generation of ATACMS since 1991.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
July 31, 2006 2:07 PM | Reply | Permalink
Does the concept of deterrence have any applicability to Israel? As in Israel gets to have F-16s to defend itself from Hizbollah, and Hizbollah gets to have rockets to defend itself from Israel?
July 31, 2006 6:57 PM | Reply | Permalink