Powering Up India Not Worth Destabilizing The Region
Yesterday, the House approved, and I opposed, a bill to allow the President to enter into a nuclear cooperation agreement with India, the world’s largest democracy and an important strategic ally of the United States. The India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act (HR 5682) left too many uncertainties for me to support it. For one, it creates the possibility of escalating the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. The precarious relations between these neighboring nations mean that small changes in either of their nuclear arsenals could have a destabilizing effect in the region.
Under the bill, the United States would agree to transfer nuclear material and technology to India in exchange for India’s promise to separate its civilian and military nuclear programs. H.R. 5682 also allows the U.S. to transfer nuclear material to India without first ensuring that India stop its domestic production. This was one of the major flaws. It would have allowed India to use U.S. provided uranium for its civilian programs, while also using domestically produced uranium for the development of nuclear weapons. Under this scenario, some commentators estimated that India could add an additional 50 nuclear weapons to their nuclear arsenal every year.
Pakistan has already hinted that it might increase the production of nuclear weapons if this agreement was approved and, as I said in the debate, we must do everything possible to stop this train while it’s still in the station.
With its burgeoning population, India needs clean and affordable power. But in the end, we need an agreement which avoids further destabilizing the region.
August 7 will be the annual Hiroshima Day rememberance sponsored by SANE and other anti-nuclear groups. The record of their successes in getting nuclear weapons banned, reduced or restricted has not been good.
Over the past decades nuclear weapons have spread to even more countries than ever before. The total number of US and Russian warheads may have declined slightly, but the number is still many times greater than the amount needed to cripple the planet. So the reductions are, at best, cosmetic.
If we have been pursuing a policy of nuclear non-proliferation and elimination of existing weapons for 50 years and the results have been just the opposite then it's time to try something else. The latest deals with India and Pakistan are just another example of failure.
How about some real new ideas? The first step is to figure out who benefits from the status quo and what kinds of carrots and/or sticks can be applied to change their cost-benefit equation. For example, we have many government labs and production facilities devoted to the nuclear weapons industry. Eliminating this program would displace these highly-sklled workers. Their local politicians are not interested in seeing this happen. So, if change is going to come their needs to be a transition plan offered and implemented before the existing organizations will be open to new missions.
OK, Rep. Harmon, we know what you are against. What are you for?
--- Policies not Politics
Daily Landscape
July 27, 2006 10:32 AM | Reply | Permalink
The tenets of Mutually Assured Destruction will prevail in the Indian/Palestinian conflict. After all, these nations border one another.
Democrats continually criticize the Bush administration for ignoring our allies. Now that he has done something pragmatic with India, the world's largest Democratic nation, the left still is not satisfied.
It is beginning to look like the DEMS will never be happy with anything Bush does. They have the right to feel this way but should come right out and say it instead of hiding behind fabricated "principles."
Indeed, they are employing mere parlor tricks at this point.
July 27, 2006 10:49 AM | Reply | Permalink
I've commented on this before on TPMCafe, in a discussion of deterrence theory. Allow me to reiterate the critical, perhaps controversial point: nuclear weapons do not change the balance of power. India, in terms of political organization, wealth, military might and population dwarfs Pakistan. If Pakistan were a real threat to India (i.e., it had achieved parity in the above areas) then the probability of war would be very high. And should war break out, what would deter either power from unleashing their nuclear arsenals on one another? In total war, no one holds back from brutality.
No one should worry about Pakistan fighting India because Pakistan would lose that war and everyone knows it. You don't fight wars you can't possibly win. But you do make that ultimate gamble if you think you can win. Pakistan's threat is itself. Recently I read somewhere (I can't remember where) that Pakistan was an assassin's bullet away from being a nuclear-armed terrorist state. Pakistan's political inflexibility (a military dictatorship that pervades all institutions in its society) makes it dangerous.
In the future we might see parity between India and China, in which the threat of war could be very real. The caveat, however, is whether one of these states is dissatisfied with its position in the world. If both China and India are satisfied in the future, then what cause would they have to go to war, even if they were in parity? Pakistan and India may be dissatisfied now, but the sharp contrast in their levels of power makes them highly unlikely to go to war. Regardless of the presence of nuclear weapons.
July 27, 2006 11:15 AM | Reply | Permalink
I think it makes strategic sense for the US to be engaging with India for the simple fact that it provides us with some important capital for future debates. This is important because India's nuclear program has not historically included many areas vulnerable to US pressure.
India developed their bomb on their own, with very little foreign support. As you point out, they also have their own uranium resources, meaning they could continue to develop weapons without any American intervention. In the current status quo, the US therefore had very little leverage to alter our ally's weapons policy. This agreement is important because it ties their weapons policy to an energy policy dependent on the US. It gives us a potent tool to prevent any potential dissemination of the Indian stockpile, just as China has leverage in N. Korea due to its control of the fuel supply.
India has been an extraordinarily good ally for the United States. It has not used its enormous size and compartively strong military to threaten its neighbors -- even after enduring serious potential casus belli's like the Mumbai train bombings and a direct attack on Parliament in 2001. Unlike Pakistan, it has not been linked to any proliferation, and it does not have any ideological or ethnic reason to hand out its nuclear material. It has also worked well with China, despite the long history of rivalry between the two nations. Finally, it has repeatedly proven that, despite its poverty, it is responsible enough to handle a stable democratic government. If anything, we should be doing everything possible to encourage responsible states like India to remain that way.
July 27, 2006 12:02 PM | Reply | Permalink
The problem is that political leaders don't always make rational decisions when taking a country to war. Either they mis-estimate the relative strengths of both sides or they allow emotions to rule and turn a minor event into an excuse to fight.
A quick look at the biggest military disasters of the 20th Century will show how common misjudgement has been. Off hand I can't think of a single example where the country that started a conflict was happy with the outcome.
--- Policies not Politics
Daily Landscape
July 27, 2006 12:32 PM | Reply | Permalink
Well... given India's surprisingly measured response to multiple terrorist attacks that almost certainly came from groups based in Pakistan, I think it's unlikely that they'll be jumping into their tanks anytime soon. Pakistan is another matter. Musharraf has to know he'd lose another conventional war with India, and India's shown no Israeli or US-style tendency to wade into high-attrition battles (and with a billion people, Pakistan would need a hell of a lot of attrition). On top of that, Musharraf has been doing what he can to keep talks open with India, so he doesn't seem TOO inclined to fight (although his military backers are a different story).
But some of the jihadi-inspired fundies that want to take Musharraf out aren't quite that level-headed. We've seen that inviting civilian casualties has become a favorite tactic of groups like Hezbollah and Hamas in the Middle East, and al-Qaeda has taken up suicide bombing with a vengence. So a madrassa-fueled Pakistani government very well might take the crazy risk a nuclear confrontation would involve.
The problem is that all of that has nearly nothing to do with the Indian nuclear deal. If it looks like the fundies are going to take over in Pakistan, India will start pumping out nukes no matter what the US says, simply for self-defense.
July 27, 2006 1:05 PM | Reply | Permalink
Proliferation of nuclear capabilities in South Asia must proceed with prudence. Growing populations in India creates a need for more power and increasing uranium production, however, expanding the proliferation of nuclear weapons, by the U.S., is not a healthy idea. This would create a stronger build up by Pakistan. India has the knowledge to increase its own nuclear weapons. India is able to defend itself from Pakistan and any major build up from the U.S. would create unwanted attention from China.
July 27, 2006 2:52 PM | Reply | Permalink
ChicagoDem
Great points. You point out that India has not only been a great ally to the United States but it has also been a harbinger of peace and stability in its own troublesome region even with its internal success at developing nuclear technology.
Dissent to Bush's plan seems to be more political in nature than anything substantive in content.
July 27, 2006 3:16 PM | Reply | Permalink
With its burgeoning population, India needs clean and affordable power. But in the end, we need an agreement which avoids further destabilizing the region.
Agreed. With that (transparency & equilibrium), in mind, we would oppose, postpone, modify said agreement per the following: IAEA safeguards (for 14 declared civilian facilities) must be finalized or in place concomitant to ratification; safeguards should be expanded to cover and include all fissile material produced (22 total facilities) before the agreement; consideration or inclusion of caps on future fissile material; unnegotiable proviso for immediate termination subsequent to further nuclear tests; unanimous pre consent and approval by NSG to "full civilian nuclear commerce with India"; prohibitive restriction on cooperative nuclear transfers should the agreement be terminated; accurate, timely, more predictive collection & analysis of Pakistan's response (status, possible acceleration of HEU, plutonium processing; pace of cooperation or assistance from China, DPRK, others) since the agreement was announced -- i.e, many of the same, sound objections raised in the initial CRS report.
July 27, 2006 3:38 PM | Reply | Permalink
Gettysburg and I come at our responses from opposite ends of the spectrum, but I too have no time for these neo-hawk policies that try to triangulate the Democrats to the right of Bush.
What is this a new WMD fearmongering tactic framed for the With All Our Might competition the neo-Dems are going to wage with the Republicans to see who can out hawk the other party?
I wish the Dems would be as tough with India on jobs! Not a chance of that.
July 27, 2006 4:27 PM | Reply | Permalink
Representative Jane Harmon.
I certainly am not an expert on this matter, but have spent time trying to inform myself. While traveling in India in the 1980's, I had the luck to enjoy a long train ride with a guy doing Nuclear Medical Research in New Delhi -- twas an informative conversation, and parts of it became questions to read about and research once I came home.
India's Nuclear Industry is indeed homegrown, and dates from shortly after 1947 Independence. It incorporates something of a hodge-podge of imported technology, French, Canadian, Soviet Era stuff, and German (both E & W). One huge problem is the lack of any serious plan for disposal of waste. (In the 80's they were putting medical waste into what they call waste ground -- poisoning the groundwater among other things.) Any "deal" with India ought to rationally include environmental considerations.
In the last few days the press has carried stories about Bush keeping the fact Pakistan was building Plutonium production facilities secret from Congress. When are you guys in congress going to tell Bush that it is necessary to have the full deck of cards in order to make reasoned decisions?
Now -- Energy needs. Anyone who has traveled in S. Asia knows all about this shortage. (How many times do you have to get stuck in a Calcutta Hotel Elevator when they "load shift" to know about this?) Ironically, both India and Pakistan have a huge resource for power that is not being exploited, and that's wind power. All the foothills of the Himalayas are supurb locations for wind-farms, and in the case of India, there are also great off-shore locations. Manufactures of wind turbines include the US, but also Germany and Denmark make more efficient ones. While such a strategy might not support heavy industrial use -- it clearly supports domestic electrification -- and in India every conversion to domestic electricity eliminates wood burning, Cow Pattie burning, and can replace coal burning generation. What's needed is partnerships that transfer technology so as to enable India to build a wind turbine industry, and thus add to its net production of electricity for essentially domestic consumption -- and as a way of curtailing environmentally damaging generation.
Stark Example: 1 cup of Basmati rice cooks in 17 minutes in a 600 watt Microwave in a clay pot.
1 cup of Basmati rice cooked over wood requires two large sticks -- or perhaps 2 cow patties. Now -- think millions of conversions to wind generated electricity. Korea makes microwaves that sell for perhaps 35 dollars. India can probably make them cheaper.
July 27, 2006 9:39 PM | Reply | Permalink
Morte says:
I think this statement is true in the main, but the truth of the statement measured against the historic record isn't very encouraging. Chris Hedges' book, War is a Force That Gives us Meaning, suggests, among other things, that the decision to go to war is never completely or even mainly a rational decision. The review to which I've linked is interesting on several levels, one of which the source from which it comes. (I'll leave that as a teaser to get some of you to go take a look at it.)
But the primary point I'd like to make with regard to the quote above is this. If we take "You don't fight wars you can't possibly win" as the major premise, and "Wars have been fought nearly continuously since Herodotus started writing histories" as the minor premise, one is stuck with two conclusions. Someone always thinks its "side" can win, and Someone is always wrong. Note that the statement in the quote says "don't fight" not "don't start", and I think that is a perfect way to frame the discussion. I'm in a pessimistic frame of mind this morning. In Hedges' description of the conflict between Eros and Thanatos, Thanatos seems ahead on points.
Mike
July 28, 2006 10:12 AM | Reply | Permalink
I have read Hedges' book (albeit 2.5 years ago) and what struck me about it is not so much how states get into wars, but how participants act once they're involved. Two comments have been made to my post that point out my reliance upon the model of the rational actor. While I take the point I would like to emphasize that I am arguing less for the rational actor than I am arguing against the "madman" theory.
Take North Korea. Is Kim Jong-il a madman? A good deal of the foreign policy establishment, popular and academic, seems to think so. Thus the Korean Peninsula is always on the verge of "crisis" because a madman has his finger on the button. I disagree with this interpretation of the DPRK regime. Personal eccentricity aside, I see little evidence of Kim Jong-il being a madman (that is, certifiable insanity). Rather I see a regime with very few policy options other than forcing the world to take notice of it (by launching impotent rockets into the Sea of Japan, for instance). It's not as though the DPRK could suddenly democratize, demilitarize and reintegrate with its more prosperous and free brethren to the south. Deescalating the Korean Penninsula will require a gradual process spearheaded by regional powers, China in particular.
I've strayed off course. My point is that rational actors are the historical norm in international relations. The mistake is to confuse what is rational with what is moral, which makes it difficult to reconcile (particularly for neoconservatives) how monstrous tyrants can be perfectly rational while committing genocide, for instance. Kim Jong-il is no more likely to launch live nukes at a target than India or Pakistan would because that would effectively end his regime. Preservation of the regime is what leaders want, and initiating a war that will certainly lead to the end of the regime is illogical, and is not altered by the presence of nuclear weapons. To assert otherwise is to endorse the madman theory.
God knows this is not an airtight assessment of all the world's leaders (including and especially our own), but I think it is a useful way of thinking about how and why wars begin. Parity is what matters, which is why Western Civilization has been at war with itself (i.e., Herodotus) for going on three millenia. Balance-of-power theory arose out of conditions where states (such as they were in the Middle Ages) were roughly equal in power. In the modern age wars begin when a rising power challenges the status quo. If they are dissatisified, they will fight to become the dominant power. If they are satisfied, the transition will be peaceful. Again, this is straight out of the power transition theory of international relations, for which I recommend Organski, 1958; Organski and Kugler, 1981; and Tammen, et al., 2000.
July 28, 2006 12:30 PM | Reply | Permalink
Morte says:
I have no disagreement with this. What I'm trying to do is make a distinction between rational actors and rational actions. I propose that the most rational of actors is not immune from actions which, in retrospect, seem clearly irrational. Historians, of course, have the advantage of 20/20 hindsight, but that doesn't invalidate the insight which that hindsight gives; that despite evidence of the Duchy of Grand Fenwick in The Mouse that Roared, countries don't go into war thinking they'll lose, but countries lose. Why they lose seems self-evident in retrospect, but not in prospect.
The war about which I know the most, almost despite myself is the American Civil War. All the members of the political elite on both sides were rational actors, I guess. Looking backward, it is hard to see the northern victory as anything but inevitable. The intangible resource, "will," of course is what the South relied upon. A rational miscalculation, perhaps, but a miscalculation nonetheless.
This is why I don't find rational actor theory very comforting, though I agree with you that the madman theory of war explains very little. Thanks for your post, by the way. I enjoyed. it.
Mike
July 28, 2006 5:31 PM | Reply | Permalink
Raimondo and the rest at antiwar dot com, would be amused to know you've lumped them into the big generalised 'left'
-*- Inter Press Service, "Indo-US Nuclear Deal Sows Resentment, Rivalry", AntiWar dot com, July 29, 2006
It seems that you generally desire to distill motives down into a linear synthesis, to fit all ideas into a distorted BiPolar visualisation of politics. If only the Democrats have criticsed Bush for avoiding real alliances with the largest Democracy in the world, hasn't the GOP exposed more of their own situationalist hypocrisy with the acquiescence of silence?
The fact is that you operate on false asumptions regarding contemporary American political views. I am someone who welcomes the US dialog with India, and think it happened much later than it should have. The flurry of diplomacy that occurred between the Bush admin and Pakistan immediately after 911 is reprehensible, and proves Bush's morality is compromised. Pakistan is not an ally in the GWOT, they are a major contributing factor to Global terrorism. At the same time, India should not be rewarded with American nuclear tech, unless they abide by the same rules every other country must. This is an unequal application, more evidence of Bush relativism. So what is this, 'left' or 'right'?
The tragic/comedy of GW and his GWOT bud, the Pakistani dictator, Pervez Musharraf, is is more wafting mendacity sent as a smoke signal to a candid world. This hypocritical support of an egregiously non-democratic dictator is adding a great deal of fuel to the flame of anti-Americanism in S. Asia. There are far too many former ReaganWonks, suffering from an inability to accept responsibility for their past acts, holding significant positions within the Bush Admin. They feel a sense of loyalty to Musharraf for his role as head of ISI when they were funding the education of the mujahadin during the Reagan Admin; back when the reagancomics performed their own pirouettes of situationalism upon the world stage choreographed to the insane tune of 'the enemy of my enemy' rationlisations.
Meanwhile the US media has largely ignored the Institute for Science and International Security's (ISIS) report that
Bush still was able to ram through his sale of F-16s to Pakistan, and Deep in the Heart of Texas: the eyes are bright; the teeth smilling white, about their own ex-gov's ability to do the moral relativist jig; especially down at Lockheed Plant in Texas.
Ashish Kumar Sen, "Bush knew of Pak N-reactor plan", The Tribune of India, July 25, 2006
The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said he was aware of the demands but did not see the reported construction of a nuclear reactor affecting the arms deal that also features F-16 fighter jets.
Anwar Iqbal, "Reactor not to affect arms deals: US official", Dawn (Pakistan), July 25, 2006
July 29, 2006 11:01 AM | Reply | Permalink
This is the peril of superficial and ignorant perspectives. While I respect Gettysberg and others a great deal, I must point out that this comment is absolutely uninformed.
As far as being a 'great ally' of America, actually, India has traditionally been a leader of the non-aligned nations. That is, historically, India refused to embrace the American orbit and avoided alliances or entanglements with America. CENTO (Central East Asian Treaty Organization) part of the 'encircling ring of alliances against the USSR that included NATO and SEATO featured Pakistan but not India.
Nor has India been an economic ally of the United States. Rather, its protectionist and anti-globalization policies have largely taken it out of the American commercial empire. Indeed, in alliance with Brazil and China, India continues to oppose the trade policies of the West and of the United States.
India has been a 'great ally' to the United States in the sense that it hasn't actually had serious conflicts with the United States. That's about it. It certainly is not submissive to American interests, nor does it facilitate those interests.
The whole point of India's foreign and economic policy is that it has refused to ally itself with the United States. Had it been a smaller and weaker state, this decision would have been costly. As it was, it was big enough to make it stick.
The portrait of India as a 'great ally' is of relatively recent vintage and it has more to do with geopolitical considerations than historical practice.
The 'geopolitical consideration', of course, is China. The United States leadership is shit-scared of China and desperately looking for counterweights. Unfortunately, American credibility in places like Taiwan, South Korea and Japan are at historic low ebbs. Australia is too small to make a difference. The Phillipines and Indonesia are likely unreliable. Vietnam is hardly friendly.
This leaves India as the only large country in the region that the United States can use as a catspaw to check or balance the hypothetical Chinese peril.
Thus, the strategy unfolding is to push India into an arms race and a dramatic military and nuclear expansion in order to place the Chinese in a non-advantageous position. China faces, not just America, but America and India.
To this end, it becomes a bidding war. Chinese/India rapprochement or negotiations are anathema. If you want to stop this, you can't just raise the stakes a little. You have to trump the Chinese in a colossal way. You have to put soooo much swag on the table that India can't walk away.
So far, it seems to be working. However, the danger is that this will destabilize the situation in unpredictable ways. Do we really want or need an India/China arms race? Hostile relations between these two large powers, and external entanglements?
Moreover, within the immediate region, an India/China arms race is destabilizing for many local countries. Pakistan is first of course, since it maintains its own relatively low intensity arms race (Including a nuclear arms race) with India.
Indeed, Pakistan/India is probably the worlds best shot at a nuclear war. The countries have fought three full scale wars already. India interfered in Pakistan's civil war to dismember it and support the creation of Bangladesh. The Kashmir issue has never been resolved and so the two countries fight a perrenial guerilla war in which Pakistan is the source of Muslim terrorism in India. It's seriously messy, and at least twice in the last decade or so, we've just missed out on another Pakistan/India war.
So.... Polarize India/China, and what happens to the existing India/Pakistan polarity. Does China balance the equation by allying with Pakistan? And if so, what does that do to regional stability? Right now, what we are looking at is a potential low scale Pakistani/India nuclear war. What we may be looking at in the future is a possible Pakistani/India/China nuclear war with a major risk of escalation to the United States. Ouch!!!
And it gets worse. Bangladesh is hardly the most stable state in the world with huge problems, and a restive status as Indian client state. Sri Lanka is in a full scale civil war. Afghanistan is a joke. Nepal is unstable. The only thing holding Myanmar together is a brutal military repression... and its not really working.
So much for India being the harbinger of stability for the region. India's role in these various conflicts has often been as harmful as helpful. India itself fought a border war with China in the 1960's. So... let's have no illusions.
Now, the only thing that has maintained any kind of stability overall in the region is that none of the great powers, either the USSR, US or China has had particular interests in it. Basically, India has been the sleeping giant, and everyone was wise enough not to piss in its swimming pool.
All of this may come to an end, because an India/US alliance against China, means that China may respond by backing anti-Indian sides in any or all of these surrounding states - Nepal, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh. India responds. Things get bloody within the states and things get tense out there in the great game in which they are pawns.
That's the long term. The immediate issue is that the US is trying to maintain and arm both India and Pakistan. Pakistan is the most fragile state to ever have nuclear weapons, and it teeters on the verge of collapsing like a house of cards.
So, Pervez Mushareff has tied his fortunes to America. America bitchslaps him in pursuit of a strategic alliance with his worst enemy. What happens to Pervez and his government? What happens to Pakistan? Who or what replaces Pervez?
One thing for sure, forget about Osama, cause you're not touching him after that. In fact, he might wind up running Pakistan. Al Quaeda has its best shot at obtaining nuclear weapons. The Great War on Terror is permanently screwed, and there's a great big unpredictable wild card on the table. None of this is a good thing.
In particular, screwing up Pakistan not only screws things with India, but the repercussions affect Iran, Afghanistan and central Asia.
Now, it might be that we should trust in the foreign policy acumen of the Bush administration.
However, I am looking at the list of foreign policy debacles in the last few years, including alienating Europe, invading Iraq, staging needless confrontations with Iran, bungling North Korea, flatulating on Cuba, failed coups in Venezuala, dropping the ball on the WTO and the formation of a third world bloc, failing to appreciate the threat Al Quaeda posed until after 9/11, alienating and provoking Russia, etc. etc.
It's not impressive. Not by a long shot. A careful examination of Bush's foreign policy history suggests several disturbing things: 1) A pronounced ideological bent, with a tendency to conflate elaborate fantasies based on that ideology, a tendency to dismiss contrary evidence, and an absolute refusal to be flexible. 2) A sense of floundering or ad hoc improvisation, together with a lack of clear understanding of long range consequences... In part, this may relate to the ideological blindering. 3) A pretty much constant series of fuck ups at every level and on every front.
Now, it might be a political decisin to embrace Bush's foreign policy initiatives without examining them. Or examining them on a profoundly superficial level.
But it strikes me that the issues here are so potentially dangerous and unpredictably volatile, and Bush's record is so poor, that any reasonable person would evince considerable skepticism. Hell, the absence of a track record, or a considerably more accomplished track record would still earn a lot of skepticism on this frame of issues.
Frankly, "Trust in Bush" don't cut it. It's not political to be skeptical of foreign policy by retards.
July 29, 2006 5:18 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'll agree that the 'madman' theory should be consigned to the dustbin and that we should proceed on the basis that state actors are fundamentally rational.
That being said, do not assume that rationality presupposes perfect information, perfect options, or perfect judgement.
If the United States had had perfect judgement as to the aftermath or outcome of its invasion of Iraq, it might not have gone in. If Israel had had perfect information as to Hezbollah's actual potential and capabilities, it might not have chosen its war. If Saddam Hussein had any good option to avoid an American invasion he would have taken it.
State actors may be rational, but foreign policy considerations and actions are often driven by domestic politics. The United States is the perfect example of this. Domestic considerations may well impell foreign policy conduct which is unwise or even suicidal.
So, Morte, while I appreciate your arguments, I am not as sanguine about it as you are. I keep remembering that two countries so dramatically mismatched have still managed to have three wars already.
July 29, 2006 5:26 PM | Reply | Permalink
I would mischievously argue that India has managed to retain its status as a democratic nation by avoiding getting jiggy with the United States. Historically, the US has not advanced Democracy in third world states... quite the opposite.
And frankly, its not that the 'DEMS' will never be happy with anything Bush does. The 'DEMS' (or at least the Congressional and party leadership) have consistently supported Bush's foreign policy, no matter how goofy and mismanaged.
I'm not a 'DEMS', I'm not even an American. I'm just a disinterested by stander with clear eyes. Bush has been a 'moron in a hurry' on just about every level, and after watching him screw up constantly for five years you'll forgive my well justified skepticism.
The only parlor trick is that your retard in Chief has followers at all.
July 29, 2006 5:31 PM | Reply | Permalink
Nixon Intervened on Pakistan's behalf during the Indian/Pakistani War of 1971.
July 30, 2006 6:37 AM | Reply | Permalink
India/China are in a race already. India's nuclear weapon program began after the Chinese nuclear tests in the 60s, and a brief period when India inquired whether it could live under the US nuclear umbrella. Moreover, all those reactors for producing plutonium, heavy water plant, etc. in Pakistan came from China in the first place. China is a major armaments' supplier to Pakistan. The flights carrying nuclear technology of AQ Khan from Pakistan to North Korea almost certainly had to overfly China, and happened with Chinese connivance.
Some past history is here:
http://cns.miis.edu/research/india/china/mpakpos.htm
http://www.nci.org/t/t51498.htm
Re; the nuclear deal:
Ultimately, India will either develop the necessary technology on its own, or will obtain it, say, from the US. In the former case, the US has no say in what India will do with it.
July 30, 2006 11:59 AM | Reply | Permalink
Since Valdron writes about ignorant perspectives, I'd like to point out that his statement about Bangladesh as an Indian client state is the height of ignorance.
For some perspective, follow the links from here on a simple matter of Asian highways.
July 30, 2006 12:05 PM | Reply | Permalink
It's very simple. E.g., India will agree to a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty but China won't. That is, China won't unless disarmament is also on the plate. The US, Russia, Great Britain and France, of course, don't want that.
There is a similar deadlock with regard to the non-proliferation treaty. Universal disarmament has to be on the table.
You want world peace, there cannot be nuclear haves and have-nots - every country in the world must abide by the same rules.
July 30, 2006 12:13 PM | Reply | Permalink