« Thank You, Debt Collectors! | Home | 10 comments on the current crisis in the Middle East »

Big Dig Death: Corruption of Privatization

user-pic

The death last week due to faulty construction in the "Big Dig" construction project in Boston should be seen as a canary in the coal mine of the corruption and even murder due to privatization in this country. 

A lot of conservatives might try to blame this on Massachusetts liberals, but the actual management of the project was handed over to the often GOP-allied Bechtel Corp. See this Boston Globe website for a decade plus of stories on privatization problems,  but here are some key stories tracing the problem:

1994: Project poses a test for privatization- "Bechtel Corp...is head of a private partnership that will ultimately receive as much as $2 billion in contracts for managing the $7.7 billion Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel project...The conflict of interest, critics say, is that Bechtel is overseeing a project that it designed itself. Bechtel, as the lead firm in the joint venture responsible for managing the project, is also responsible for completing up to 40 percent of the engineering design work in some sections."

2004: Big Dig found riddled with leaks- "Engineers hired to investigate the cause of September's massive Big Dig tunnel leak have discovered that the project is riddled with hundreds of leaks that are pouring millions of gallons of water into the $14.6 billion tunnel system.  While none of the leaks is as large as the fissure that snarled traffic for miles on Interstate 93 northbound in September, the breaches appear to permeate the subterranean road system, calling into question the quality of construction and managerial oversight provided by Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff on the massive highway project."

But here's my favorite story, which is a story about how the workers on the project knew Bechtel's management was a clusterfuck but were ignored:

2006: Workers doubted ceiling method- "Field tests by construction workers indicated that bolt-and-epoxy fasteners might not support the multi-ton ceiling panels in the Interstate 90 connector tunnel, but the firm that designed the tunnel persuaded Big Dig officials to use the system anyway, law enforcement officials said yesterday...``There were questions raised about whether this design was adequate to carry the weight and hold the weight that it's expected to hold," said Attorney General Thomas F. Reilly , who is leading an investigation into whether criminal charges are warranted in Del Valle's death.'" (Quote fixed)

READ THAT LAST PARAGRAPH.  Bechtel had workers complaining and documents showing that the roof in the tunnels were faulty, yet they covered it up, no doubt because they wanted to save money.   

This is what comes from handing management of public projects to private entities with a conflict-of-interest between protecting the public and maximizing their own profits.  And of course at the federal level, we've seen the frauds perpetuated by Haliburton and company.

Unfortunately, this kind of privatization is accelerating across the country, not just in construction projects but in handling children in foster care, evaluating health care systems and a range of other public services.   But progressives should be focusing on the story of the Big Dig as one more example of why profit-making companies shouldn't be trusted to manage in the public interest.

Update:  Just to emphasize one point, based on some comments.  Some private involvement in providing public services may be useful in tapping expertise in the private sector, but especially if you outsource any oversight, those doing such oversight should have their contracts structured so that they have ZERO financial interest in who else is hired, which means they should not also have the conflict of interest of Bechtel in this case of potentially making profits from cutting corners on work quality. 

Although when the government takes on multi-decade projects like the Big Dig, one might suggest that hiring folks with this kind of management expertise as government officials would make a lot of sense.   As some folks pointed out, claiming government "lacks the expertise" to oversee such projects is part of a self-fulfilling prophecy derived from privatization campaigns, which hollow out expertise in government, thereby making looting by private interests all the easier.


35 Comments

| Leave a comment

But given the hollowing out of the civil service over the past three decades, is there an alternative to private management of governmental programs?

One thing to emphasis is that the hollowing of the civil service was an explicitly Republican plan, and one of the intentions behind it was to allow
private firms who donated to Republican interests to loot the public till.

Demanding design-build on all public projects (especially homeland security projects) is vitally important. Design-build means hiring one firm to make the design specifications, another to do the work. This allows design firms to compete based on how cost-effective a plan they can produce, without having an incentive to pad the bottom line. One example would be security. Ask the police department to plan for security and you end up with huge amounts of police overtime, and all sorts of "cop toys" that they would like to be able to keep on hand. (Bringing this back to Boston, note the security plan for the Democratic convention, which ended up with an offer of all the overtime any policeman in Eastern Mass. wanted, and all sorts of equipment purchases. So you had huge crowds of policemen sitting around, not doing much, and a young woman killed at a Red Sox game, with equipment purchased for the Dem. Convention that the officer involved was not qualified to use.)

Also blame the Republican congress for cutting all federal funding to the Big Dig in the late 90s, after the project had reached beyond the point where construction could be halted. This threw all costs back onto Massachusetts taxpayers, despite a pledge from the Feds to pay half the costs. This is the point where the ignoring of real problems began.

I don't want to contradict you, but management of large government construction projects by private engineering firms has been the norm since George Washington's day (in the United States; I would imagine much the same in the Roman Empire). No government agency can keep the number and types of engineering and project management resources on staff for projects of this magnitude. While there has to be a level of competent client meta-management, the day-to-day PM work and engineering are always going to be contracted.

Now, contracting the PM work to the designer is generally not a good idea ;-(. Unless that combined entity has an ownership incentive, and my guess is that the Big Dig contract was not structured that way.

sPh

=== Also blame the Republican congress for cutting all federal funding to the Big Dig in the late 90s, after the project had reached beyond the point where construction could be halted. This threw all costs back onto Massachusetts taxpayers, despite a pledge from the Feds to pay half the costs. ===

The original estimate for the Big Dig was somewhere in the neighborhood of $5 billion. The final cost around $11 billion. I am sitting in a midwestern city that is choking economically due to the lack of a critical and 30-year-overdue infrastructure project; we can't get any significant amount of federal funding even though the state (though not the directly-affected metro area) voted for W both time. You might make an argument to me that Boston's infrastructure was so critical to the whole nation that it required an investment of $4 billion by the federal taxpayer (me), but why the HECK should I be expected to pay for the $6 BILLION overrun?

sPh

One of the spectator sports in the US has been watching the corruption in public works projects. Chicago and Boston led the way from the late 19th to the late 20th Centuries. They are just trying to keep up with their illustrious predecessors (wink).

Two words: Boss Tweed 

--- Policies not Politics
          Daily Landscape

But do we have the civil service assets, even in the Department of Defense, to perform even minimally "competent client meta-management"?

I work for PENNDOT in highway construction and last winter at a construction staff meeting a discovery was being discussed about COUNTERFEIT bolts that had been used on signage along the interstates. The two sets of bolts were passed around for the engineers to see which ones needed replacing. By comparison, the counterfeits were no where near spec even to the naked eye, and I'm no engineer.

Could it be possible these counterfeits found their way to the tunnel roof also? I had never heard of a counterfeiting problem of specified materials before. But they're out there.

Thanks for the post. I found it very helpful, by teaching me about an aspect of the disaster I hadn't seen reported. It also made a good balance to a GOP governor's using the event for political capital.

Ellen's got why the objections are perhaps misplaced. I realize that government will contract out for tasks. So when Nathan reports on privatization, perhaps it's a misnomer. But she's right that it needn't mean privatizing the functions of government to lay out specs, seek competitive designs and competitive bids, ensure oversight, and manage generally in the public interest.

John

http://www.haberarts.com/

=== Could it be possible these counterfeits found their way to the tunnel roof also? I had never heard of a counterfeiting problem of specified materials before. But they're out there. ===

Counterfeiting of bolts was a big problem in the aerospace industry, and to a lesser extent in the nuclear industry, during the 1980s (a google of "grade 8 counterfeit" might turn up some references). It was solved with tigher auditing and end-to-end traceability, but there is no reason to think the theives didn't just go into another industry.

sPh

Before we swiftly abandon the notion of privatization in infrastructure projects, we should realize that this was a failure of oversight, not a simply a failure of "privatization".

Think about it this way: a bull can pull a load equal to that of say 10 men. Although there is the slim possibility that the bull could break loose and gore a bystander, it is much more efficient to pull a heavy cart by training a driver to harness the bull rather than harnessing 10 human beings to do the pulling.

The mark of good government it to use its resources to maximize the efficiency of tax dollars in a transparent way. Yes, Boston's Big Dig fell short, but that’s no reason to think that tying up 10 men is any better.

I have to agree that this management arrangement is nothing out of the ordinary for projects like this and not part of a new trend sweeping the country. I work in environmental permitting and I can't think of an infrastructure project like this that I've been associated with in the last 25 years where a government agency was in day to day control of construction

"A lot of conservatives might try to blame this on Massachusetts liberals, but the actual management of the project was handed over to the often GOP-allied Bechtel Corp."


Do you read what you link to?:

"Bechtel is the 800-pound gorilla in this thing," says Frederick Salvucci, who was secretary of transportation under Gov. Michael Dukakis and is credited as the visionary of the Big Dig. "Right now the thing is out of the cage. But I think they the Weld administration are working hard to get it back in."

Salvucci, under whose watch Bechtel was selected as the project manager, also insists that Bechtel is the most qualified firm to handle a job like the artery/tunnel project."

So the Dukakis administration is the one who decided to go this way. This is a failure of oversight. Either the State should have had auditors or hired another engineering firm to serve as third-party auditors.

"It was solved with tigher auditing and end-to-end traceability, but there is no reason to think the theives didn't just go into another industry."

I am familiar with the McHaffey Fasteners scandal in the 80s. Those theives didn't go to another industry - they went to jail.

I agree that private engineering management of huge projects like this is nothing out of the ordinary. I also concur with the other commenter who mentioned Bechtel's GOP ties - anyone recall who was President in the early '80s when this deal went down? The turnpike authority made a Faustian bargain, and now they're paying for it.

Also, anyone remember the "Harbor of Shame" from the 1988 presidential campaign? Some academic should do a case study comparing the Big Dig management versus the Boston Harbor Project, another multi-billion dollar public infrastructure project (the latter cleaned up Boston Harbor)that went on during the same time frame. Here's a one-page summary of the BHP from the website of the private firm that served as CM. Note that this close to $4 billion project came in UNDER budget, and IN BOSTON. Amazing, eh? I have some inside knowledge of this project, and in some very important ways it was structured differently from the Big Dig.

http://www.earthtech.com/projects/water/bostonharbor.htm

I think we should take this failing as another sign of why Mitt Romney should not be President. If he can't deal effectively with the quasi-public Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (he's been trying unsuccessfully to get the head of the MTA removed since coming to office), what hope would anyone have for him dealing with the Department of Homeland Security? He's all talk, no action, all sizzle, no steak.

So what is your thesis? THat Big Dig type jobs should be done by public organizations?

How about in Europe? How is it done there? Are they able to get their large public projects done in time and on budget via private entities?

I do agree that large aggrgations of capital need to be better restrained. But your argument is vapid.

Better to understand that power corrupts. Take away power to de-corrupt.

What is wrong is the American culture that allows those at the top to get away with whatever they want.

Punish severely those at the top who act wrongfully. Special penalties and courts and a seperate justice system for the powerful, that is what is needed.


My documentary/book in progress is at http://www.leftwingmediamachine.blogspot.com

I'm close enough to Boston that I listen to the public radio stations there.  I don't know enough about engineering as a profession or process to speak to what went on or what is going on.  But a couple of things do come to mind.

The 1994 Article by Charles M. Sennott is an amazing piece of investigative journalism.  He's a giant. We need more like him now.   Don't let Newman's link go to waste.  Read all 7 pages of the story.  It is very complicated and needs careful reading.  For one thing, it shows what happens when a project begun in one administration gets finished in another.  Yes, Dukakis' team engaged Bechtel, but only for 10% of the work.  It was Dukakis team (and, I gather local engineers) which raised the question of whether engaging Bechtel for more than ten percent was good practice. 

The money quotes in the story come well into it.  My favorite is this:

But Steven Kaiser, a former engineer for the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, who was involved in the original scoping of the artery project, said "Salvucci made a mistake in the beginning, and it has just gotten worse. This relationship of Bechtel overseeing its own design has been rotten since day one. . . . To say it is industry-wide is just pointing out an industry- wide corruption." (p. 3)

Sennott makes it clear that it was Weld not Dukakis who privatized the management of the project.  The comments about the relationship being "rotten since day one" were made in 1994!  It's enough to make one believe in predestination.

The most ironic thing in the story comes later.  Part of the project was originally supposed to be bridge, and not a tunnel at all.  Relating geography above ground to tunnels below ground is not my forte.  But I think the section mentioned is one of the ones which became troublesome last week. 

The Fort Point Channel was marshland until the 19th century when the city carved a channel through it, extending the wharves and warehouses on a bustling waterfront. The skeletons of that era are still buried in the muck, broken wooden piers and a rusted 19th-century railroad bridge.

There, in the murky waters of the channel, the project faces perhaps its most complex engineering challenge: to design an intricate weave of ramps and tunnels through the soft mud and the ancient relics at the bottom. The engineers must also design over an existing MBTA Red Line that runs beneath the channel and under a series of rail lines that snake along its banks. (p. 4)

Why wasn't this section built as a bridge as called for in the original plans?

In 1983, Mike Shea, Salvucci's chief of staff at the time, said that he and the then-transportation secretary met with Gillette, at the behest of US Rep. Joe Moakley, a South Boston Democrat. The Gillette executives told Salvucci and Shea that the canal was vital to the plant's operations.

"They made it clear," said Shea. "If we went ahead with it, they were going to leave the city of Boston." As they left, Shea remembers, Salvucci was "ashen."

"When the city's largest employer tells you they'll leave, it's over. We're dead in the water," Shea recalls Salvucci saying.

But Salvucci eventually came up with a promise to Gillette that the state could build the complex network of ramps taking traffic from the Massachusetts Turnpike Extension to the new Third Harbor Tunnel underground -- without impacting Gillette. (p. 6)

Here's the delicious irony.  Where is Gillette today?  Not in Boston.  In fact, not anywhere.  It was purchased by Proctor and Gamble last year, just a bit more than a decade after its threat to leave caused the Big Dig to be redesigned. 

This kind of corporate blackmail is as scandalous as the privatization of design/build.  I'd love to have Newman do a piece about it. 

Mike

The articles headlined in this morning’s Herald and Globe are a clear indication that the documentation points to the upper levels of Big Dig engineering and management, sufficiently enough that Attorney General Reilly chose not to even hint at the particulars today as he builds a criminal case in Mrs. DelValle’s death. There’s little doubt in anyone’s mind that Bechtel Parsons, as project managers, are central to that probe. As I believe they should be.

But I have to disagree that this horribly sad loss of life is, ultimately, a consequence of privatization in quite the way Nathan has framed it here; for there is burden enough to go all around, and much of it falls squarely on the shoulders of those public entities which shared management and oversight responsibilities for the Central Artery/Tunnel project with Bechtel Parsons/Brinkeroff. Over the years, the Turnpike Authority, the administrations of Bill Weld, Paul Cellucci and Jane Swift, and the Federal Highway Administrators regionally and in Washington, among others, have acted with no less self-interest, disregard for the public, arrogance, ineptitiude, or downright duplicity, as proven by their performance as oversight authorities and management "partners" with BP/B, and as documented in countless investigations over the history of the Big Dig.

The tragedy of Mrs. Del Valle’s death has triggered an accounting, very much as the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger triggered an accounting: not simply another in an endless string of probes into squandered billions, not another expose of shoddy work, or an assessment of faulty processes and methods; it will be all of those. But finally, too, will come the long- past -due accounting of the collective mindset and attitude among those for whom such misfeasance had grown, by the early to mid-90’s, into the virtually unmanageable daily reality of "overseeing" this 14.5 billion dollar public works project.

The decision by Morton Thiokol managers to overrule the concerns of their own engineers, who well knew of the vulnerability of the O rings and advised against the launch, was made in the context of the political and public relations expediency of that launch proceeding on schedule. By 1994, cost overruns on the Big Dig were gargantuan and growing. As documented in a report by Inspector General Robert Cerasoli, BPB knew that the true cost would approach 14.2 billion dollars, and indicated so to state officials, while said state officials were promising FHWA officials, state taxpayers and bond regulators that the project would not exceed 10 billion, indexed for inflation: From the Boston Globe:

"Big Dig managers in the William F. Weld and Paul Cellucci administrations knew in 1994 that the megaproject's price tag was heading for $14 billion and schemed to hide billions in costs from the public and bond investors, according to a report issued yesterday by state Inspector General Robert Cerasoli.

Managers of the Central Artery-Ted Williams Tunnel project used "a largely semantic series of exclusions, deductions, and accounting assumptions" to cover up $6 billion in cost overruns, according to the report.

And they did it with the assistance or complicity of local Federal Highway Administration officials and the state's private management consultant, Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, the report said."

Late in 1999, Big Dig officials discussed the pros and cons of telling [State Treasurer Shannon] O'Brien the truth. Both for political reasons and to avoid "brutal press scrutiny," according to memorandums outlining various strategies, they "opted not to disclose the overrun." "

[And as for B/PB:]

Consultant Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff has "remained virtually immune from any criticism or blame for this crisis" but actively participated "in the promulgation of misleading reports to the state Legislature."

Despite Bechtel/Parsons' 1994 disclosure to Weld of the project's true cost, the Cerasoli report said, "In fact, documents reviewed by this office illustrate B/PB's efforts to develop and maintain the mechanisms used to obscure Big Dig costs." [End of quote]

So there, documented in Cerasoli’s report, is the virtue of public oversight in all its glory as it played out over the push to avoid the unthinkable horror, not of a motorist’s tragic death, but of "brutal press scrutiny." Yes, these were Republicans, running the MacGovern state, home of Teddy Kennedy, dutifully protecting their public image as keepers of the reins of fiscal sanity from the hands of those irresponsible Democrats in the Legislature.

Does any of this sound familiar?


The only sense in which this case will be the "canary in the coal mine" is the degree to which it will reveal the intensity and the scope of the effort that will be undertaken to discredit the Attorney General’s criminal probe. It bears watching, and one has to hope that ‘brutal press scrutiny" hasn’t become the oxymoron in Massachusetts that it has in Washington. That Reilly is a Democrat running for Governor of the state whose current governor is a Republican presumably running for the presidency in 2008, almost assures that the truth, the accounting of responsibility and the pursuit of justice for Milena Del Valle’s death will become as troubled and opaque as the 20 year long project that was its cause. I’m grateful that Nathan has brought this to the front page here, because its an opportunity to ask that readers and posters here work to keep that from happening.

And I've not learned how to close the blockquote where the quote actually ends, so I apologize for any confusion here from my words being lumped in with the excerpts from the GLobe.

Hmm....I noted that the 2006 "favorite story" included quotes from two stories, one appearing 7/18/06 and the other back in 2004...the part after the ellipse ("The engineers also said they have discovered documents showing that Bechtel managers were aware that the wall breached this fall was deficient from the moment it was built in the late 1990s, yet did not order it replaced and did not inform state officials of the situation.") was referring *not* to the current situation with the bolts, but to the leaks discovered in 2004.

This would appear to undercut the next sentence:
"READ THAT LAST PARAGRAPH. Bechtel had workers complaining and documents showing that the roof in the tunnels were faulty, yet they covered it up, no doubt because they wanted to save money."

Could you please explain? I trust this was an honest error. I am not at all a Bechtel apologist (see prior post), but this isn't right.

You're right-- quotes from two different articles got mixed (as did the URL link).  Now fixed.

Lot's of conservatives- and here, I mean among the Republican voters in Massachusetts, not the successive Republican politicians who have occupied the corner office on Beacon Hill since 1991- do seem to presumptively hold up the Big Dig as a manifestation of free-spending liberalism and corruption perpetrated by Democrats and labor unions.

If shoddy workmanship is shown to be among the causes here, it will certainly reinforce that perception. It has never really mattered that the overwhelmingly Democratic (and conservative) state legislature has had little to do with the delays, cost overruns and leaks which have plagued this project, other than being the body which formally passed the bills taxing Massachusetts citizens to cover costs the federal government refused to pay when the extent of inept management and false accounting became known.

The issue of pinning the blame on liberals extends from that conservative perception, and as I note in my post further down the thread, I believe there will be a concerted effort to focus public perception on any criminal liability among workers, unions and subcontractors by all those interests, public and private, whose mangement authority is now in the cross-hairs of Reilly's criminal investigation.

Two final comments about Dukakis' role here, and the failure of oversight: Dukakis initially opposed the whole idea of the Big Dig.
Salvucci is supposed to have convinced him otherwise. And no, there was nothing inherently wrong with the state hiring Bechtel to oversee the mangement of the project. As others have pointed out, and Massachusetts' experience has shown, no public entity has the resources or the expertise to do something as complex as this.

The role of public entities in this case was oversight, and there were layers upon layers of ostensible oversight by Authority boards, peer-review panels, paid consultants, Inspectors General, FHWA officials, city inspectors, and more. That oversight was inadequate, ignored, or deliberately corrupted by the sheer magnitude of the money involved, the complexity of the scheme, and the overwhelming political liability the Big Dig had grown to represent for those who bore responsibilty.

It has taken a woman's death for us to reconsider the real cost of such inadequacy, disregard, and outright criminalty.

Seems it was the bolts:

Governor: Big Trouble With Big Dig Bolts

Whether or not they were counterfeited will be something for the Massachuesetts DOT Materials Testing Lab to discern. I suggest they look into this with other states (like PENNDOT). Like I said, this was a sign company that had them in PA.

And with the fed dollars sunk into this, the USDOT will be mighty interested to see what they paid for.

Steve Bailey, a business columnist for the Boston Globe, has a column today comparing the management of the Big Dig versus management of the Boston Harbor Project, another multi-billion public infrastructure project that went on at the same time. The latter, however, came in pretty much on time and definitely under budget.

A">http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2006/07/19/a_tale_of_2_projects/">A Tale of Two Projects

Note that both had private construction managers. The difference was the public management team. Also, the Boston Harbor construction management firm was not the project designer.

Your Words Here

<blockquote>Your Quote Here</blockquote>

Your Words Here

Interesting that the Globe's own page of Big Dig problems shows NO articles between Sennott's excellent pieces in 1994 and the results of a one-year investigation in 2003. Those of us living here at the time recall that the issue of ballooning costs blew up publicly in 2000 - and the Globe was caught apparently unaware. Between 1994 and 2000, the Globe was one of the biggest cheerleaders for the project, treating us to one puff piece after another about how excellently the whole thing was working out. (Anyone remember that article about which donuts Big Dig construction workers preferred - Dunkin' or Krispy Kreme?) It's nice that they published a big investigative piece in 2003, but that was well after the horses were out of the barn.

I'm not blaming Charlie Sennott, who went on to bigger and better things at the paper and wasn't covering the Big Dig in the mid-late '90s. But the Globe bears some responsibility in not following through.

There are already published reports that the clevis hangers used in the suspension framework were "not properly galvanized."
That may point to other instances of substitution that might have played a role in the extensive failure of the support system. Unfortunately, those published reports don't state that neither the clevis hangers nor the way they were galvanized are suspected as causing the failure in this case.

The fundamnetal issue is the use of epoxy adhesive anchors -steel bolts bonded with 2-part epoxy into pre-drilled holes in the overhead concrete-
to support a steel framework carrying cast concrete ceiling panels that wiegh 3 tons each. Visual inspection and pull tests have demonstrated that none of anchors in the connector tunnel are adequate to support the sustained load they have carried. This was indeed a systemic failure, and the documentation so far seems to support the likelihood that there were concerns early on about the design.

That design grew indirectly out of the way the adjacent Ted Williams harbor Tunnel was fabricated, by casting steel reinforced concrete tubes in a casting basin, towing them out to the harbor, and sinking them.

The tunnel ceiling would be fabricated once the tubes were in place. The ceiling would create a ventilation plenum at the top of the tunnel to exhaust fumes, and in the case of a fire, smoke, by way of high powered fans at both ends of the tunnel. Rather than fabricate into the shell of the tunnel a mechanical system from which to hang the ceiling, it was determined that epoxy-adhesive bolts could be used to secure a hanging plenum of ceramic panels. That proved to be more difficult than anticipated: workers found it difficult to drill holes because of the density of the reinforcing mesh in the tunnel concrete.
High percentages of installed bolts failed pull tests; shorter bolts were found to have been substituted in places( and were eventually replaced), and testing standards were ultimately modified to allow the work to go ahead.
All of this was highlighted in a report by IG Cerasoli in 1998. It makes hair-raising reading; and it precedes the construction of a comparable system in the I 90 "connector tunnel" where the collapse occured.

The connector tunnel required heavier ceiling panels to resist vibration caused by wind entering the open ends of the tunnel.
Instead of 800 lb ceramic panels employed in the TWT, the connector tunnel would hang 3-ton cast concrete panels from adhesive, rather than mechanical, anchors. This has been represented by Bechtel since the collapse as "standard industry practice." But the Boston Herald notes that no one has yet pointed to a single comparable example of adhesive anchors supporting these levels of sustained load from overhead. In fact, in California (home to Bechtel), such overhead use of adhesive anchors is prohibited by law.

That such prohibitions should have been known to Bechtel, as well as FHWA engineers, becomes, in light of the documents cited by the AG revealing concerns about the safety of the anchoring system for the connector tunnel, central to the investigation of Melina Del Valle's death.

Gannett Fleming, who designed the adhesive anchor system, has had no comment.

Great. Thanks so much.

Although when the government takes on multi-decade projects like the Big Dig, one might suggest that hiring folks with this kind of management expertise as government officials would make a lot of sense. As some folks pointed out, claiming government "lacks the expertise" to oversee such projects is part of a self-fulfilling prophecy derived from privatization campaigns, which hollow out expertise in government, thereby making looting by private interests all the easier.

When big projects such as this come to a district, consultants come onboard to handle the extra workload. Govt doesn't want to hire any more civil service workers than they have to retain for the duration of their service years (till retirement) to handle the projected amount of spending on projects in those areas.

Actually Nathan, many (if not most) of the oversight firms hire retired DOT workers. I know one of these administrative services consultant that was even started by a retiree.

Double dipping at it's finest? Or common sense employment for those who wish to stay working?

One alternative might be to make Civil Service Reform a campaign issue, with the Big Dig an example of what happens when private profit suborns the public good.

Restore the Civil Service! Yea! Civil Service.

Remind people, too, of how much of the common good results from government produced and supervised projects. My town has a sidewalk system constructed in the thirties by the WPA. They're in remarkably good shape, amazing good shape, considering that they've suffered every kind of weather New England can throw at them. They're in better shape than sidewalks built later.

The only forces which seem to be able to do them in are Mother Nature's Tree roots as the tree lawn trees have matured, and vandals who conduct midnight raids on the brass medallions, which are evidently highly collectible now.


Mike

I don't get it. My father is an engineer and he had to sware an oath to uphold the public trust. I mean he wares that iron ring on his pinky to remind himself that when engineers aren't honest people die.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iron_ring

It has been such a complex and confusing problem for so many years that it takes a scorecard to sort out the criminals here. Someone (but who?) needs to go back and start from the beginnings of the project and go forward as efficiently and throroughly as possible so evidence is not destroyed. I think we can expect some "missing" records on this deal. We all knew it was unsafe on some level, but this? If there is any justice, heads should roll!
My question would be "Where, if any, is the integrity and pride that people used to have in their work?" This whole tragedy was avoidable long ago, IMHO.

My question would be "Where, if any, is the integrity and pride that people used to have in their work?"

You mean like back in 1981?  Or 1976?

Not sure what you mean, but there was a time, not that long ago that people would work up to par just to cover their asses. Apparently, this is what has woken me up to the fact that few, if any, can be trusted. Just my .02 cents.

UPDATE:

For any who may still be interested in this thread, there's an important story in this morning's(7/23) Globe which provides some more background to the issue reported earlier this week re: concerns about the
design of the ceiling system in the connector tunnel. I'll briefly note a couple of key quotes:

In the end, crews installed a connector ceiling that was 2 1/2 times heavier per square foot than in the neighboring Ted Williams Tunnel, yet was held up by bolts that were not as thick, according to Bardow. The ceiling still met safety standards -- on paper at least -- but it is becoming clear that a chain of decisions dating back to at least 1993 set the stage for the fatal ceiling collapse. From the changes in tunnel ceiling design to the fact that the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority didn't schedule a three-year inspection of th