Containing Containment
Thinking strategically, as a chess player or a paranoid, the world looks a little scary to American eyes right about now. Time for a new over-arching global strategy, a new containment strategy? Not really.
Through his war of choice, Bush maneuvers us into Iraq where we get bogged down, adding to the morass that is Afghanistan. The North Koreans notice, and ramp up their provocations, tying us up at the UN with constant consultations with our allies and near-allies. We prod Iran, which responds by prompting Hezbollah to attack Israel from the north. Putin puts on a tough face at the G-8 summit, supported by historically high petro prices. Under these circumstances the temptation is to seek a new meta-strategy to incorporate everything under a new unifying frame. There are calls, from left and right, to create a new over-arching framework based on a new One Big Thing: anti-terrorism, for example.
There are so many pieces to this puzzle, it would be comforting to have a unifying picture that would make sense of this chaotic world, and show us what we should do about it.
Normally, I’m pretty open to ‘big think’. I believe one of the biggest problems Democrats face is the absence of a mutually-agreed upon strategic worldview that can get us away from the reactive ‘small-think’ that often passes for strategic doctrine in D.C. There seems not much appetite for creatively linking trade, security, diplomacy or global issues into a common conversation. So, more power to the Center for American Progress or the New American Foundation and those folks trying to knit together the elements of a coherent foreign policy. (Including our blogo-colleagues at the Woodrow Wilson School)
At the same time, the challenges America confronts now are largely the result of our ignorance of local circumstances and their long complicated histories of alliance and animosity. The administration didn’t and doesn’t understand the political dynamics in the Middle East, in Latin America or other regions. Worse than its ignorance is its accompanying willful arrogance; “we don’t need to know anything about these backward places, as long as our cause is just, and our muscles are bigger than their muscles.” Ignorance and arrogance are a terrible and dangerous combination.
If you have not read George Packer’s long New Yorker review of Peter Beinart’s book “The Good Fight: Why Liberals – and Only Liberals – Can Win the War on Terror and Make America Great Again, I urge you to do so. (July 10&17 issue). I don’t know if he is accurate or not in his assessment of the book, because I haven’t yet read it. But his broader point is worth noting: “…conceiving the larger struggle as a global war comparable to the world wars or the Cold War overstates the scope of the problem.” And “Ultimately, the Cold War analogy is unhelpful, because it allows Americans to make a virtue of our ignorance.” He refers to our vast ignorance of other countries and cultures factions maneuvering, aligning and fighting all around the Muslim world, from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to power configurations in Iran to the Islamic takeover in Mogadishu. To frame the world in dichotomous terms is always a temptation to Americans, whether Democrats or Republicans. It is a temptation to be resisted. Instead, think globally, sure. But learn something locally too.
Are you using "containment" in the sense of George Kennan's original Long Telegram or X Article, or as it evolved under the Brothers Dulles? I didn't regard Kennan as treating the sources of Soviet power as completely monolithic, but, as things evolved, great opportunities were missed in returning French power to Indochina/breaking off contact with Ho, or John Foster Dulles ostentatiously ignoring Zhou Enlai?
Again asking for information, as I don't totally agree with him, do you consider Thomas Barnett's distinction between the connected core and the disconnected nations also a mean of containment?
I agree completely that dichotomization is usually a bad idea. Even an emphatic bloc structure, such as Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, is questionable.
Please believe that I do think you have some valid points, and I'm interested in developing actual proposals for dealing with them. As one example, subsidizing "tough" language study (e.g., Arabic, remembering Spanish remains important) in K-12 is something that could pay great benefits for low investment.
At the same time, I don't want to create a trivialized approach. Back in the eighties, I was sent, as were all my co-workers, to a "diversity sensitivity" seminar. The seminar leader informed us that we were insensitive to "Asians". Said leader was rather confused when I asked if there was a standard Asian, or if I was being insensitive to an Ainu, a Mahayana Buddhist, a Rhade Montagnard, or a Jain.
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Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
July 17, 2006 7:25 AM | Reply | Permalink
Perhaps a new foreign policy paradigm is what should be strived for with regard to the Middle East. Your comments about American ignorance and arrogance were perhaps a bit overstated, yet there is undoubtedly some validity to the claims. It makes sense that Europe would be skepticle of any new American policy towards the region; at least as long as Bush is in office. So that's where the United Nations comes in. Wait...what United Nations?
If people think American silence on the Israeli War has been curious, how about the UN's reaction? Absolutely nothing. Koffi Annan looks even more tired than does G.W.
July 17, 2006 11:54 AM | Reply | Permalink
"We prod Iran, which responds by prompting Hezbollah to attack Israel from the north."
Yeah, right.
"At the same time, the challenges America confronts now are largely the result of our ignorance of local circumstances and their long complicated histories of alliance and animosity."
Wrong.
The challenges the US faces are the result of its intent on power, greed and force.
These things are only AGGRAVATED by the US ignorance of local realities, not caused by them.
More "pundit-speak".
July 17, 2006 10:53 PM | Reply | Permalink
As an aside, why can't we rate the contributors on their articles?
Is it because not too many of them would remain if we did?
July 17, 2006 10:54 PM | Reply | Permalink
Well, for a couple of years I have consistently offered my own version of the "big strategic idea". It can be stated fairly concisely, in terms of the chief threat and the chief challenge:
The greatest threat to the United States, and most of the world's population, continues to be the threat of armed conflict between large, populous, militarily powerful states - many of which possess nuclear weapons. These states are increasingly drawn into competition over dwindling supplies of key resources, and over economic control of those resources. The competition is exacerbated by population growth, racing demand and popular expectations, and a deteriorating global environment.
The greatest challenge is to develop cooperative systems and approaches for addressing these global problems, and addressing and managing the underlying sources of the competition in a careful, thoughtful and prudent manner, all while maintaining a balance of power that serves to inhibit the temptation to rely on force.
One reason it is important, I believe, to focus on the right big idea, is that the public attitude "zeitgeist" only has room for one big idea at a time. These are several problems that are mentioned as the "big threat" by some Democratic thinkers, which are in my view lesser, or subsidiary problems. They take our attention off the top concern:
1. The big problem is not terrorism.
Contemporary terrorism is a by-product of great power competition. It's proximate historical cause is the resentment, defensive posture and strife caused by the aggressive intervention of outside powers in the Middle East over the past century, and the geopolitical maneuverings related to those interventions. This involvement is likely to be a continuing factor for the forseeable future, and the competition is actually likely to get worse. Governments in the region might come and go, and alliances shift, but the underlying causes of the involvement of outside powers will remain.
So whatever governments exist in the region, we can expect them to be political footballs of other governments outside the region, and we can therefore expect the general trend toward revolt, unrest insurgency and terrorism to continue so long as great powers are unable to extricate themselves from the necessity of strategic competition in the region.
I continue to be mytified by the undue emphasis placed on terrorism. Surely it must have occurred to many observers of the present political conflict between Iran and the US, and the emerging global alignments that are taking shape around that conflict, that a coflict that begins over Iran could conceivably draw the United States and Russia, for example, into a military confrontation. And such a conflict carries the threat of harms to the United States i>far, far worse than anything that could be caused by a terrorist with a dirty bomb, or even a single loose nuke.
Contemporary resistance to the traditional focus on great power competition is sometimes based on a sort of globo-enthusiasm. People like Peter Beinart tend to believe we are in some new globalized age, where all the great powers are so stable, interconnected and interdependent that military conflict among them is almost unthinkable, and at least unlikely. I believe this is a deluded and ahistorical view of the world. The level of globalization today is not qualitatively different from the interdependence of the European powers in the 19th century - and we know where they eventually headed. Indeed, globalization even raises the competitive stakes, and could in some cases be a spur to conflict. Consider Russia's attempt to dominate the global natural gas market. This effort appears to be a goal of national policy. But all states compete for control of key markets, and throw their military weight around to help in the effort.
2. The big problem is not the "democracy deficit".
Replacing bad government by good government can certainly help to alleviate problems. But America is a democracy, and is nevertheless in the midst of a deeply nationalistic, suspicious, beligerant and self-regarding episode in its history. I haven't exactly noticed the democratic United States being pro-active on global approaches and solutions, or foregoing geostrategic competition with potential rivals. What makes people believe that erasing the democracy deficit will somehow eliminate the fundamental sources of the competition among states?
Our relationship with China is a crucial concern. Armed conflict with China is clearly imaginable, not because China is "evil" but because China's massive population has an ever increasing demand for oil and other material resources, and because it is part of the Chinese government's job to secure those resources for its people; and because our own smaller, but equally resource-hungry population places the same demands on our own government. This is a recipe for total disaster - but making China a democracy wouldn't fix the problem.
3. Failed states are not the big problem.
Conflict developing in and around failed states is certainly one of the potential triggers for expanded conflict, but only because there is something for them to trigger: existing conflicts of needs and interests among great powers.
July 17, 2006 11:03 PM | Reply | Permalink
May I assume that your threat model of nuclear conflict does not center around direct nuclear attack on the United States, but on major regional nuclear conflict, probably with India and Pakistan heading the list, followed by the Middle East, followed by East Asia? I rank these based on a composite of the range of delivery systems, the populations involved, and the instability of nuclear powers -- including those that might purchase or steal warheads?
There are, of course, immense populations involved with India and Pakistan, not just the population of the subcontinent, but the possibility of spread to Muslim countries and to China. Americans tend not to think of India when discussing "democracy gaps", yet, messy as it is, it is the world's largest reasonably functioning democracy.
North Korea does not represent a serious threat to the continental US, and China is a minimal one. Russia remains the only real threat to the US in those terms, and has the most to lose and least to gain of any major nuclear power. While the threat can be overstated due to the realities that nuclear weapons have finite shelf life without factory overhaul, the fUSSR is the most likely source of a finished nuclear weapon reaching the hands of non-national actors.
I don't think anyone really understands the dynamics of a situation in which Japan repeals Article 9, renunciation of war, from its constitution, and steps up its quite substantial military capacity. Japan's demonstrated space launch capability, as well as its advanced electronics industry, puts it far closer to major ICBM capacity than North Korea, and indeed Japan could leapfrog China.
There remain bitter memories of Japan and WWII, and bitter distrust of Japan. One of the great dangers is North Korea lighting a match, South Korea suffering badly, but a lasting conflict between China and Japan, potentially impacting Japan's role as an economic superpower. South Korea would eventually win a war on the peninsula, but with horrible initial casualties even if the war stays non-nuclear, and the "tripwire" Second US Infantry Division could bring the US into a war of indeterminate boundaries, including eastern Russia.
I am far more concerned about the preceding situation than war between the PRC and Taiwan. While there is saber-rattling, there does seem to be a certain sense that both want to work out eventual reunification in a peaceful way.
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Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
July 17, 2006 11:57 PM | Reply | Permalink
The 'containment' notion was meant in the larger sense of how it was actually implemented by successive administrations. 'Containment' came to mean that the broad strategy tended to trump local conditions, as the strategy became an 'idee fixe'. At its core, this strategy reinforced a dichotomous way of thinking that is certainly no longer appropriate for our more complex and multifaceted world, if it was ever appropriate.
To fix this really requires taking affirmative steps at all levels to produce Americans better educated and equipped to be more culturally competent for foreign affairs. This includes new incentives for language training, for teaching history of strategically important regions, etc., for all Americans. Then we need especially robust training for the people who go into international affairs, i.e. via better education via Foreign Service Institute, the service academies, JFK and Woodrow Wilson School. Sounds simple, but it ain't. But the stakes are high.
July 18, 2006 9:20 AM | Reply | Permalink
Thank you for the clear answer.
Unfortunately, we fixate on simple solutions like testing for "No Child Left Behind". There are disciplines, foreign languages, music, and mathematics among them, where the best learning takes place early in life. Sometimes we may not be egalitarian, and we need to be sure the children capable of becoming bi- or more-lingual get the appropriate education, as an investment in international replacements.
I have Scandinavian friends that are honestly surprised when I am impressed by their ability to communicate in 5 to 10 languages. They start getting impressed at around 15. Mind you, their definitions of "language" and "fluency" are sometimes different than ours. I have a friend, a Swedish citizen who lives in Dallas with her American husband, who called me one day, delighted. She announced she had long been able to think in English, but now found she could think in Texan. She launched into a demonstration, not with just the accent but with references and examples I'd never have dreamed of her using.
As a minor personal note, languages can surprise one at a much later stage in life. I was terrible in my high school and college language courses in Latin and German. While I have long been interested in Japanese history and culture, I made the standard assumption that Japanese is a terribly difficult language, and memorized a few phrases from books. When I spent a couple of weeks there on a business trip, however, I found myself picking up more and more, and, to my surprise, starting to speak appropriately if simply to people I met, sufficient to get double-takes. Reincarnation? Who knows?
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Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
July 18, 2006 9:34 AM | Reply | Permalink
Howard-
Good points all, but a concern.
The challenge is less the substantive content of a national program to enhance American competencies in foreign affairs...most experts wd agree on the top 5 things to do...language, history, skills, etc. etc.
I believe the biggest challenge at this point is to frame the issue in ways that attract the attention of more people than you and me and the other handful of experts who currently care. How to articulate it so that more traditional national security types, plus school boards and elected local officials and congressional committees start paying attention to what is becoming a matter of life and death. Or in nat sec-speak, that these competencies have become 'mission critical'. This is a challenge that is partly intellectual and rhetorical, and partly political.
Transhuman misses an important point. It's not ignorance alone that produces stupid and dangerous policies. It's ignorance married to arrogance that is the source of our current problems.
EJW
July 19, 2006 7:02 AM | Reply | Permalink
Sadly, it's worse. Alleged experts and national officials (some overlap), for example, frequently either don't know what a map is, or don't read them.
I read, with some shock, some comments from Wes Clark about putting an intervention force into Darfur. Unfortunately, what he described required roads and substantial airport capability. Unless one has been made in the last couple of months, there are no paved roads in Darfur, and the airport at El Fasher has no way to refuel aircraft. Lots of intervention proposals get made, not just in Darfur, with unsustainable logistics.
People also fixate on the "main enemy". I hear lots of concern about China in Sudan, but very few people know that Malaysia and India are equal partners in the main oil consortium, the French have their own oil area but also have a major humanitarian role on the Chad-Darfur border, and private German companies are doing railroad building that might totally change the power balance as a result of economics.
There are many discussions of Darfur, but most of them seem either to consider it in total isolation from the rest of Sudan, or forget that a major civil war in Sudan just ended and changed the dynamics of pressuring the Sudanese goverment.
We've screwed up in many parts of the world. In many areas of Africa, no outside powers have been involved significantly for many years. I tend to wind up talking to a fair number of Africans, usually health care workers, and the newly met ones will often look at me in total shock. They make comments like "Most Americans couldn't find our country on a map, and you know something about our internal politics and needs?" Of course the traditional hot spots are important to know about, but let's not screw up the few where opinions haven't hardened. Even the most impoverished, such as Sierra Leone, where I have the most personal ties, have lots of resouces and hard-working people: they've only just begun to experience peace after decades of banditry and civil war.
I think there is hope in this area. Not very publicized, but apparently quite effective, the military CENTCOM is doing things besides Iraq and Afghanistan. There is a "Task Force Horn of Africa", mostly in Djibouti where war is not imminent, and it seems to be building quite a reservoir of good will. Remember, Special Forces are trained not just in killing, but healing and building. Djibouti is one of those countries with a valuable geographic location; it is a natural meeting point, for example, for major communications cables.
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Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
July 19, 2006 8:25 AM | Reply | Permalink
Sometimes, I feel that America right now is too focused on basing its foreign policy around terrorism and security, when problems such as poverty and hunger are much more acute for billions of people. Maybe the US should invest more in programs that work to achieve things like the UN Millennium Development Goals in future years.
July 19, 2006 9:16 AM | Reply | Permalink