China, Africa, Asia: New Directions?
The leadership of the PRC has designated 2006 as the ‘Year of Africa”, and they seem to be putting their policies where their rhetoric is. A more sophisticated global strategy seems to be emerging alongside the older blunt one. The Chinese are bringing to bear new tools, applied to new purposes. These changes have implications beyond Africa for U.S.-China global competition, especially in light of a new Carnegie report.
China’s efforts to slake its galloping thirst for oil and hunger for minerals have riled up considerable concern in the US political and policy communities. Congressional committees have gnashed their teeth over the possible impacts of China’s resource dash on U.S. economic and political security, and several think tanks like the CFR and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace have devoted serious attention to it. One such contribution is an insightful Policy Brief prepared by Carnegie’s Joshua Kurlantzick entitled “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power”. The author gives a broad definition of ‘soft power’ to include commercial leverage, gambits in international organizations, as well as the traditional elements of soft-sell diplomacy, educational exchanges and culture. He points to some trends in Asia that mirror what we are beginning to see in Africa. So far, China’s policy approach to Africa has been heavy-handed. It needs raw materials to fuel it hi-octane economy and the top people in Beijing have made it pretty clear they are willing to do whatever is required to get them. Paying money even to unsavory regimes that have oil, gas or bauxite, sweetening the pot with a few ancillary oil-related expenditures while continuing a couple of long-standing programs in health or education is the way it generally does its international business. This blunt petro-policy in Africa was framed and justified in a PRC white paper released in January, although the document contained enough flexibility to permit other activities as well. Which leads us to the more recent trends. It appears that while non-interference remains firmly in place, the targets and the modalities of its relationships with African countries may be expanding if Nigeria is an example. Nigeria is an important country for China as it is for all others in the world oil market. The country is Africa's top oil exporter, a major provider to the U.S. market and a growing source of Asian energy. Its population of 130 million makes it a major target for Chinese and American products, and it plays a continent-wide strategic role second to none. Therefore, what any big country does in Nigeria can be seen as a potential bellwether for its priorities and policies more broadly in Africa and toward oil exporters in other regions. During his April visit to Nigeria President Hu Jintao announced a number of new initiatives that go beyond the usual petro-politics we have seen in the past. The standard PRC packages involve oil and mineral related projects. Earlier, for example, Nigeria granted the China National Overseas Oil Company (CNOOC) a $2.7 billion deal to buy a 45 share in Nigerian oil fields. China will also take over the operation of a large refinery in the northern city of Kaduna. More recently are commitments to help with electricity generation. However, on the Hu trip came commitments that extended more into strategic cooperation and coordination. The Chinese president pledged to work with the Nigerians to forge closer relations to “co-ordinate our positions for our mutual benefit” especially pursuing ‘win-win situations’. The notion of ‘win-win’ is a cornerstone of China’s recent foreign policy appeals, especially to developing countries to counter the more unilateralist approach of the U.S. The joint communiqué issued in the Nigerian capital committed the two countries to “work in the spirit of their existing strategic partnership to step up cooperation in international affairs, uphold the rights and interests of developing countries…and foster a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity.” Even more pointed were the remarks of the chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the Nigerian House of Representatives, who said: “We have a relationship with the West that is essentially colonial. Even after independence, this relationship did not substantially change. [But] these things are bound to change….[b]ecause we have an alternative in China and…the West stands to lose out and that means there will be competition now for products from the African continent.” Lest there be any doubt, President Obasanjo announced at the banquet hosted for Hu: "From our assessment this is the century of China to lead the world…And when you are leading the world we want to be very close behind you." Beyond stepping up their mutual strategic commitments, on the commercial front a large Chinese business delegation also visited Nigeria scouting for investment and sales opportunities. Sounds more and more like France, the UK or the US. The sectoral spread of commitments is also widening beyond oil. There is a contract between the Water Resources Ministry and the Beijing G&M Construction Co., Ltd. to construct water wells in 9 Nigeria states. (Nigeriafirst). The Chinese also provided a grant to rehabilitate and construct railway facilities for the Nigerian Railway Corporation, to the tune of about $3 billion over 5 years. There is also foreign aid for anti-malarial campaigns, and for the Chinese to help in the country’s IT sector. And the Chinese announced that they will launch a Nigerian satellite into space sometime in 2007. These trends are hardly unique to Africa, as Kurlantzick shows. In Asia too we find more visits by top leaders (twice as many trips to Thailand and Cambodia as taken by American leaders); we see the Chinese leadership pushing the term ‘win-win’ in speeches and regional agreements; re-commitments not to interfere in other nations’ internal affairs; and, especially critically, statements by national leaders touting China as a reliable ally and a model for development. Some elements of the ‘Chinese model’ should raise few concerns among observers, like their explosive economic growth. In some respects the Chinese challenges to the U.S. are the same commercial and diplomatic challenges we face from France, Germany or South Korea. In regional and global strategic matters, and in their-less-than democratic political model, there remains cause for close attention and some criticism. That also holds for their toleration of petro-despots in Angola and Sudan. We need to see whether these Africa-Asia patterns continue to converge, and then consider what the U.S. administration, as well as non-governmental organizations, can do about them. On this last point, I’ll have more to say at the hearings organized by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in early August. (SEE my earlier congressional testimony on China and Africa)
If you look at the futures market you will see that a lot of traders expect to see various materials will continue to rise in price. This is predicated on China, India, Brazil and others buying materials like never before. Presumably a rise in prices will lead to a reduction in use over time.
What is expected from China? A mercantilist approach? Do you think China can corral the materials they need and block others from them? If they do that who will buy their finished good?
Daniel A. Greenbaum
July 10, 2006 2:09 PM | Reply | Permalink
This would be the same Council on Foreign Relations which planned the attack on Iraq, according to Greg Palast?
"After two mad years of hunting, I discovered the real plan for Iraq’s oil, the one that keeps our troops in Fallujah. Some 323 pages long and deeply confidential, it was drafted at the James A. Baker III Institute in Houston, Texas, under the strict guidance of Big Oil’s minions. It was the culmination of a series of planning groups that began in December 2000 with key players from the Baker Institute and Council on Foreign Relations (including one Ken Lay of Enron). This was followed by a State Department invasion-planning session in Walnut Creek, California, in February 2001, only weeks after Bush and Cheney took office. Its concepts received official blessing after a March 2001 gathering of oil chiefs (and Lay) with Dick Cheney where the group reviewed with the Vice-President the map of Iraq’s oil fields."
In other words, let's start planning now for the war on China, because China is going to screw up OPEC, or US oil company profits, or what?
The problem I have with all this "pundit-speak" is how the unspoken - and sometimes spoken - assumption is that, just because China wants resources and the US wants resources, that this is all a "zero-sum" game and therefore we inevitably have to ratchet up the military options and go to war. All the "what is the US going to do about China" talks inevitably ends up being about the military. Exactly how does anyone expect "diplomacy" to resolve a zero-sum game? If, in fact, that is what it is - and of course, it doesn't have to be if you concentrate on developing technology.
If it is a zero-sum game, you primates have a serious problem because both China and the US have nuclear weapons.
This isn't the US taking out Saddam just to secure OPEC.
July 10, 2006 2:40 PM | Reply | Permalink
Many scholars have said that the 21st Century will see the African continent join the rest of the civilized world. The United States will join the game when there are enough chips on the table. It is unlikely that the Bush administration has given much thought to the future of Africa, or even possible American aims there.
China's recent affair with Nigeria is, in a way, unprecedented. As Nigeria's president himself said, the West still deals with Africa inside the Colonialism paradigm. If China and Nigeria are able to truly develop a "win-win" scenario, you can rest assured that the United States will be there, along with England, France, Germany, and Russia. Not to mention Japan and South Korea who will look to serve their own aims by countering any Chinese dominance.
But Africa is a bit of a wildcard when considering 90% of the continent has remained virtually unchanged for centuries; and we're talking humans, animals, and geography alike. Does China truly have a sustainable plan in Africa or are they merely taking a stab in the dark because they have nothing else to lose?
Chinese diplomats in Washington have been so vociferous at downplaying their nation's economic and military rise that it becomes obvious that they are not interested in directly confronting or competing with the United States for natural resources. Indeed, I seem to recall last year a leading representative at the Chinese Embassy in the U.S. travelling around the country to places like Des Moines, Iowa and giving speeches on how China does not want to infringe on American might.
Their dominante trade leverage and fixed currency are allowing them to make a dent in the U.S. armor without doing much else. The U.S. will watch closely at what happens between Nigeria and China. For once Washington seems to be content to let someone else take the initiative on something...
July 10, 2006 7:48 PM | Reply | Permalink
I continue to be amazed at the focus on China in Africa. Now, I'm not suggesting that the Chinese aren't playing a significant role, but there's tunnel vision.
In Sudan, for example, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating company has roughly equal participation from China, Malaysia and India. The French ELF oil company has independent operations, and the French play a major role in Chad, the western border of Darfur.
Italian and German firms have major roles in Sudanese infrastructure. One German firm, I believe, is taking an extremely positive role, more effective than the simplistic sanctions being pushed to "solve Darfur".
With Darfur being in the media spotlight, the West seems unaware that there had been a on-and-off civil war between Arab north Sudan and African south Sudan, since 1955. There was abundant ethnic cleansing there, in the oil areas of south-central Sudan. The militias used against African groups including the Dinka and Nuer were Baqqara Arabs, the same group that constitutes the janjaweed in Darfur.
Last year, a Power-Sharing Agreement seems to have brought the north-south war to a close, with a referendum on whether to split Sudan into north and south countries scheduled in six years. There is now a coalition government in Khartoum, although the North still has an edge in power.
As I mentioned, the proven oil operations are in central Sudan, generally south of the proposed north-south border, centered on Bentiu. While the fields are in the south, the north retains leverage because the export pipeline runs north to a refinery near Khartoum. While the refinery products are mostly used domestically, Sudan being essentially self-sufficient with respect to oil, the hoped-for export and foreign exchange runs northeast from the refinery to the oil terminal at Port Sudan.
A German company is financing its own speculation on railroads in the south, connecting to Kenya and Uganda. If they can connect to the Kenyan oil pipeline head, the south can export via the oil terminal at Mombasa. In other words, they won't need the north any more. Another branch of the railroad should connect to the World Food Programme's warehouses in Uganda. WFP is the UN operating agency for Darfur.
Now, what bothers the north more -- blocking imports on things not all that critical to it, or losing its oil resources to a new southern nation? Economic warfare isn't always the bludgeon of sanctions, but sometimes a rapier.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
July 10, 2006 8:11 PM | Reply | Permalink
Is there any content to the talk of "win-win"? I know only what I have just read here, but it sounds like so many content-free programs I saw while living in Japan in the 80s and 90s.
July 11, 2006 2:09 AM | Reply | Permalink