... surely there's something less useless they could be building for an equal fee.

I'm not sure. But if there is, rest assured that they're lobbying to build that, too.

For defense contractors, a Republican administration means never having to choose.

I'm genuinely puzzled as to the conservative obsession with missile defense.

Arrghhh!

http://www.freepress.org/departments.php/display/20/2003/374

Let's keep the children of CEOs at Boeing, Lockheed-Martin and GE from starving to death America safe.

.
> Also, did you know that Hawaii keeps
> its prison population in Arizona?

Well, Singapore keeps its air force in Texas (half of it, anyway), so why not?

sPh

In all honesty, shouldn't that be, "can't yet launch a missle that can reach Alaska"?

And the obsession isn't that hard to understand, unless you're already committed to not accepting the most obvious explaination: That missles are a threat to this country, and the the government is supposed to defend us from threats. Hence, missle defense.

Frankly, what requires involved explaination is the idea that we shouldn't have a missle defense.

With respect to Korea, we already do, sitting on Burke destroyers and Ticonderoga VLS cruisers in the Sea of Japan. Japanese Burke-class destroyers are scheduled to get the theater ballistic missile defense SM-3 missile this fall.

SM-3 has capability against boost phase and terminal phase. Japan and Korea are also negotiating for the Army's PAC-3 terminal defense.

TBMD is much more flexible in reducing regional threats worldwide than is the National BMD (NBMD) system in Alaska and California. SM-3 has a far better test record than the very questionable NBMD.

You seem to be falling into a trap of "if a threat exists, the government has to protect against it." Well, an asteroid strike would cause more damage than anything else. We do know some things to do about one. Why aren't we?

Budget. I will name several things that are more immediate a threat to the US than can be dealt with by 10 NBMD interceptors of dubious reliability, but may cost as much.

1. Protecting industrial toxic chemicals in large quantities, at manufacturing, transport, and storage sites. Can we say Bhopal? Texas City? Halifax? Why should terrorists bother smuggling toxic chemicals when they are already traveling through metropolitan areas in multi-ton shipments?


2. Hardening the electrical interconnect grid against major blackouts caused by accident or sabotage. See the analyses of Ohio Valley in 2003, and that it could have been worse.


3. Early detection of covert bioterrorism, which *gasp* might even mean more universal health care, so people get examined more easily.


4. Upgrading emergency first responder command, control, and communications. Implement the very real new lessons learned for responding to environmental disasters such as Katrina.
   

Please explain to me why there isn't significant funding going into these higher-probability threats, examples of which have already happened. Tell me why protection against a limited ICBM threat is more urgent, given that we managed to get through the Cold War with the MAD strategy and no ballistic missile defense, against an enemy much more capable than China or North Korea.

Oh, also tell me how you would protect easier targets for North Korea, such as Guam, Hawaii, Japan, Taiwan and Okinawa.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

Step 1 should be putting one or more space telescopes in Venus' trojans, so that they will be in a better position to spot Earth crossing asteriods than are Earth based and orbiting scopes.

A capability that could also be used to launch Grover Norquist into Venerian trojan, which seems euphemistic. Venereal Trojans, size small, and none of this orbital mechanics stuff?
Default position on generic threats is the government must protect unless it can prove otherwise? I'm looking at the July issue of the American Journal of Public Health. Quite a few real issues there, yet the administration cut funding to the Centers for Disease Control. What constitutes disproof? In particular, if, as you say, you don't know the technical details, how does one establish NBMD is a poor allocation of billions when there are more pressing, but less politically attractive, needs, even in things that are clearly homeland defense? -- Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

While there is no risk today in the US from N. Korean missles, we do face some risk from the Chinese and Russians, so there is a reasonable argument to continue to develop missle defense capability.

First, let's be clear we are talking about National BMD (NBMD). The current system has 10 interceptor missiles. China has 24 DF-5 ICBMs and is working on a new generation. Russia has hundreds. How large a threat do you propose we guard against? General doctrine against high-performance threats is to fire two interceptors against an apparently valid target, then another if tracking doesn't show them to be likely to hit.
There are other strategic issues in NBMD. TBMD, which is vastly more flexible, should be effective against interim Korean threats, as well as plausible Iranian threats, and potentially (depends on geography) against some Indian, Israeli, and Pakistani launches.
But NBMD is not being deployed in a budgetary vacuum. I keep asking its proponents, and getting no answers, why of the finite budget, it is more important to put the money into NBMD rather than into other homeland security threats I identified. While there is much dramatics about A/H5N1 and A/H5N2 bird flu, these still are threats -- and there were budget cuts to the Centers for Disease Control. Which is more likely, a limited ICBM attack or a flu epidemic (if not pandemic)? How many interceptors do we need? Enough to have what probability of kill against a Chinese attack?
Right now, the Chinese have 24 single warheads. Some analysts believe their next generation will have Multiple Independently Targeted (reentry) Vehicles. Depending on the engagement geometry, you may need to engage not the number of missiles, but the number of warheads (and better-quality decoys)

Rocket Performance
There are rather simple reasons for the apparent very poor performance of the missile. This is rocket science, or, more precisely, rocket engineering. It took the US and fUSSR quite a while to solve the engineering problems of minimizing parasitic weight and maximizing throw-weight on ICBMs.
The Taepodong-2, by all reports, is a liquid-fueled missile using a hypergolic, non-cryogenic propulsion system. Hypergolic means the propellants ignite or explode on contact. Apparently, the North Koreans haven't yet mastered the process of making these propellants thixotropic, or a storable gel. They seem to be storable for days, as opposed to the version on the US Titan II.
To give an example of the instability even of something considered fairly well tested, a mechanic dropped a wrench into an operational Titan-II silo. That was enough to create a hole between the tanks, and the missile exploded. A nine-megaton W53 warhead was thrown several hundred yards into a parking lot.
It is no accident that the US and Russia no longer have operational liquid fuel missiles, even with storable thixotropic versions. They are too hard to handle, and have been replaced by solid fuel main propellants. Some spacecraft, and possibly some missiles, do carry small quantities of the hypergolic propellants for use in orbital attitude control.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

Vis-a-vis the latter, I would say it is definitely in the NK military strategy to be prepared to deal with the US Navy battle groups that would be the first responders (after aircraft from Guam and Hawaii and elsewhere) to any Korean war outbreak.

The North has a number of older subs and submersibles. While they are unlikely to be able to deal with our modern subs and detection capabilities, I would guess that the North would make some efforts to put a nuke near our Naval forces. It would be better for them if they could do it with a missile warhead, but I think they'll plan on using a sub until they have that missile capability. And they aren't likely to have cruise missile capability any time soon - unless they buy some from Israel, which isn't impossible, as Israel seems to want to do business with the North.

There really is almost no need for the North to have a missile capable of reaching the US, since that would only be for a suicide attack if we were to attack them. For that reason only, Kim would want one, perhaps. But he could get the same benefit out of using his subs to deliver a nuke directly into a major US Western port city. He already has that capability.

SDI has had 20 years and still can't hit a thing. Compare that kind of time period in development to that for our going to the Moon or for offensive weapons of any sort, including no doubt weapons able to defeat a missle defense program even in the immeasurably tiny chance that one could develop. And bear in mind that a missile defense doesn't just have to be good, like a weapon: it has to be perfect, since any bomb landing on America is good enough. When has any military program been perfect?

Brett, it's easy to scare people into supporting anything with words like "threat," especially since some threats are very real. That doesn't make the solution any more real or more in our interest. Perhaps you were smart enough not to be snookered into the Iraq war, say, but fell for this one. Perhaps not. But we have to stand up to that kind of illogic.

The original motivation for SDI was to avoid arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. It's amazing that the program's outlasted that impetus, but that's another reason to oppose it: military programs take on a life of their own, not only costing a fortune, but also skewing miliitary and diplomatic priorities ever after. Hey, now it's Bush's opportunity not to apologize for totally blowing it with North Korea for years now while he focused on his imaginary threat from Iraq.

John

http://www.haberarts.com/

There are three main aspects to BMD, boost phase, midcourse, and terminal.

One thing to realize is that missile defence, with possible exception of boost phase defence, is technologically infeasible. Once the warhead is in the vacuum of space, it can launch baloon decoys -- and a baloon envelope for a good measure, to look exactly like the decoys.

Your argument applies to midcourse, because simple balloons have different aerodynamics on reentry, and differentiate from the warheads quite well in a terminal defense system. The major limitation of terminal defense is that it is principally a point, not area defense. Prior arms control agreements limiting it to the national command center or an ICBM field coupled it to a deterrence strategy. We have three such systems in different phases of development, SM-3 and Advanced PAC-3 in initial deployment and ABL in test.

Boost phase intercept depends significantly on engagement geometry. In general, if the launch field is within a reasonable distance of a coast, SM-3 or the Air Force experimental airborne laser has a chance against it. Boost phase against an inland launch site, as in China, would probably require either space-based bomb-driven X-ray lasers or a large system of orbiting mirrors and ground-based lasers. X-ray lasers can't be developed under the treaties against nuclear weapons in space.

The large mirror systems would be extremely expensive and could divert so much of the budget that there may not be enough for greater threats. Remember that a single Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine carries more warheads than China can now launch. Deterrence may be more sensible than actove defense, and, with China and Russia, there is enough basis for constructive engagement that it's not particularly advantageous for them to start a war with the US.

There is rather little in common between ballistic missiles and anti-ship weapons. As long as NK has weapons close enough to the coast to be engaged by shipborne boost-phase weapons, why should it not be parked, in international waters, near the Korean coast? Remember that the AEGIS ships have significant antisubmarine, antisurface, and antiaircraft capability. Since this would likely be a US-Japanese operation, the Japanese can make considerable contributions of AWACS, maritime patrol aircraft, fighter defense, their own AEGIS destroyers, and some quite advanced nonnuclear submarines. Any US task unit would, even not visibly, be escorted by one or more attack submarines, the most potent antisubmarine weapons.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

Personally, I prefer LDS. Snorting Mormon missionaries is mind-altering in a way that nothing else approaches.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

I agree uncertainty does have deterrent value. Nevertheless, even though we don't know the specific battle logic of this system, it's not unreasonable to assume it commits 2-3 interceptors per inbound, which, depending on its discrimination, may include decoys. With 10 interceptors, one MIRV-ed ICBM can overwhelm it, or 4-5 single warhead ICBMs. How many interceptors are planned? How much is their incremental cost?
--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

The system installed in Alaska with some fanfare is the totally ineffective midcourse defence.

Boost phase could be effective against a country as small as North Korea, but it depends on NK being backward with anti-ship missiles. If they do not master any kind of medium-long range missiles, boost defence is unnecessary. The benefit exists only if NK masters ballistic but not anti-ship missiles. Allegedly, Russians developed very deadly surface skimming supersonic missiles.

The biggest objection to missile defence projects is that either they are inherently ineffective, or provide expensive solution for only some of the future scenarios, while diplomacy could solve the problem more comprehensively for a fraction of the cost.

You must have liked that guy HiveRadical who was posting during the religious arguments, then.

You are correct that Phalanx is a questionable terminal defense against Sunburn (SS-N-22). For that reason, Phalanx is being replaced with Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) as terminal defense. Early models were installed as far back as 1985 on the amphibious ship Pelelieu, and Phalanx is being swapped out for it on US and German ships. There's a joint upgrade program with Germany that also lets it engage helicopters, aircraft, and surface targets. Greece and South Korea are also buying it.

You are correct that RAM probably would not be operated with a man in the loop.

The problem with a sea-skimmer is that it comes into the radar horizon of a ship with very little time to engage. If you look at my post again, I specified the surface task group was under AWACS cover, which could spot the Sunburn much farther out, and give the AEGIS ship targeting information via JTIDS for a SM-2/SM-3 intercept at considerably longer range.

In an Iranian situation, survivability against Sunburn would most depend on airborne radar, linked by JTIDS to the SAM shooters. For that matter, fighters with look-down-shoot-down capability could engage them, if the fighters were available.
--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

I just did some Google research. It would seem the SeaRAM replacement for the Phalanx is indeed a good system and, combined with long-range reconnaissance, makes the sea skimmer ASM less certain as a strategic weapon.

However, I found one guy who disagrees:

"None of the interception systems you describe, and even the ones you don't mention like mbda's SeaWolf/SeaRAM systems which could be argued are superior systems to Radeon's RIM platforms, have been proven (in the tests you mentioned or otherwise) of being able to defend specifically against Brahmos/Onyx/Sunburn class high-velocity, steep angle, sea skimming approach missiles with evasive approach capabilities. These missiles have active on-board radar that track incoming counter-measures and initiate evasive approach, a feature none of the test missles (Rascal, Mk-31) posses. The random movements of the missile and the velocity make it impossible for a incoming interceptor to recalculate trajectory for interception. That's the real secret behing it's deadliness. Not just the speed. Also, by the time it is in range for ECM such as jamming, the missile is travelling at such a great velocity and is already on the proper trajectory for impact. At that range and velocity it's a matter of split seconds. The missile is coated with radar absorbing material, so IR is the only type of tracking that can even see it."

I think I read someone else mentioning that the Sunburn and Moskit ASMs can modify trajectory to evade incoming countermeasures. Also, I've read that the US only tested these systems against SIMULATED Sunburns using similar airframes without the equivalent Sunburn avionics. If true, and given the speed, and the mobility of the launchers, the combination would seem to be make it feasible that Iran could score one or more hits on US Navy ships in the Gulf.

The major assumption would be that that our ships would be within range of the Sunburn, which is not certain. I think somebody, I think it was that War College war gamer Colonel Sam Gardiner, who said that we'd know if the US was going to attack Iran when our carrier battle groups moved OUT of the Gulf, as the risk from these ASMs would be too great.

On the other hand, the US Navy has promised to keep the Straits of Hormuz open if Iran were to attack oil tankers there. Of course, the problem with that is that no tanker captain would go there after one is sunk anyway, but the concept implies US Navy vessels - probably not carriers, though - near to those Straits. At the very least Navy aircraft and subs would need to keep watch for Iranian patrol boats - assuming any are left after the initial reaction. Land-based mobile launchers are more difficult - we never did get all the SCUDs in Iraq in 1991.

Now, in the case of North Korea, I'd say the odds are the US Navy would stay far enough away from the NK coast that the Sunburn wouldn't be feasible to use. The only situation that might change that would be the North's air force using "swarm" tactics that they have allegedly practiced to close with US fighters protecting the US ships and try to slip through a Sunburn-equipped fighter in the process. Doesn't seem like it has a high degree of success probability.

On the other hand, the North also allegedly would try "swarm" tactics with their patrol boats and subs on the US Navy. There I'd say it would depend on whether those NK naval craft had any "swarm" fighter escort - otherwise the US would simply blow them out of the water with our own fighters before they got close enough to use Sunburns.

It will interesting to see how this plays out if either war begins.

Good points, all.

Especially the points about don't get close enough to a Sunburn launch point to enable anybody to use one, and hit them at long range before they can go evasive.

The only problem I see with the latter is the short flight time. Two or three minutes is not a long time to engage a target - especially a target which needs to be engaged in the first minute or so of its trajectory, because in the last minute it is evasive - although I am not familiar enough with how fast the cooperation between an AWACS and AEGIS actually is.

In other words, if a Sunburn is launched at a US warship in the Straits (let's leave the carriers out of it, as they're probably out of the Gulf completely), what is the probability that it can be spotted, the data transmitted, and a counter-weapon launched in the first minute or two after the Sunburn's launch, and that the counterweapon can approach and hit the target either in the first minute or two OR in the next minute or two, despite any evasive capability in that last minute?

That would seem to be the crux of the issue. Can we spot and engage the target before it becomes evasive, and if not, can our counterweapons engage the target once it DOES become evasive, given the short time frames?

Of course, this also ignores the jamming capability of the warship defenses, which are also extensive. I have no information on whether these jamming capabilities are effective against Sunburns. Since the US supposedly has never had a fully avionic equipped Sunburn to test against, do we know whether these things will work well in such a scenario?

No, I mean jamming the Sunburn's guidance systems, not the Navy's. Some of the guys I read yesterday were big on the Navy's missile jamming capability as a significant part of the CIWS.