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Nuking Iran's Nukes? Say It Isn't So

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This afternoon, at the Aspen Ideas Festival, Wolf Blitzer interviewed Israeli Ambassador Daniel Ayalon on the rather pertinent question of what to do about Iran's nuclear development project. Amb. Ayalon claimed that while Iran was unlikely to develop nuclear weapons for 3-5 years, they could complete the crucial enrichment process technology in the next 9 months, give or take. He admitted that Iran learned from Israel's attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, and has hidden or buried many site so that neither America nor Israel could take out all of Iran's nuclear program. But, he suggested, taking out some of the program would still be worthwhile, because it would slow the process down.

I was raised in Fairbanks, Alaska, where one learns early that you don't annoy a bear--you shoot to kill, or you don't shoot at all if you plan on leaving the woods alive.

As someone who has lived in, and dearly loves, Israel, I can't see how a strike that just wounds can possibly help that country--or ours.

A wounded, angry Iran can strike back via five to ten different terrorist organizations they sponsor throughout that region--in Israel, and against our soldiers in Iraq. And they could still develop nuclear weapons afterward.

Moreover, Iran today is in many ways like Eastern Europe during the Cold War--the huge youth bulge is nationalistic, but know they are being fed lies by their government, and therefore tend to be contrarian. Thus, Iranian youth is among the most PRO-American population in the Muslim Middle East. But they are nationalistic about nukes, for the time being. A half-@@@ed strike would turn this pro-American force against us--with repercussions that would last generations.

In the short term, we need to stop Iran from getting the bomb--using diplomacy, economics, and covert action. Over the long term, we need to help this young population take their country back from its repressive leaders. But let's not endanger Israel, and our troops in Iraq, with ill-thought strikes that won't stop the immediate problem--and will create a new level of hatred we will have to deal with for the next 30 years.


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Yup - neocon.

While the bottom line of the article is correct - attacks on Iran are a bad idea - the premise is still that Iran is a "problem" - which it isn't, according to all known data - and that Israel has a point to be discussed - which it doesn't.

"As someone who has lived in, and dearly loves, Israel, I can't see how a strike that just wounds can possibly help that country--or ours."

It also ignores the utterly OBVIOUS reasons why Israel would WANT the US to attack Iran, and has been ratcheting up the rhetoric for it for several years now.

The article also hints that the REAL way to deal with Iran is full-scale attack, not a "strike that just wounds." This of course is a neocon idea.

"In the short term, we need to stop Iran from getting the bomb--using diplomacy, economics, and covert action."

No, we don't - first because there is NO evidence that Iran HAS a nuclear weapons program, and secondly because even if they DID, it is not in our interests to prevent them from getting one, for a number of reasons I've covered elsewhere here in the past.

"Over the long term, we need to help this young population take their country back from its repressive leaders."

No, we don't - first because it's not our place to be working for regime change in other countries, and secondly because any attempt by the US to "help" the Iranian people will work against their success in changing their own government and society - as it has already. Almost all the Iranian dissident groups have dismissed any US "assistance" as compromising their position within the country among their own people.

"But let's not endanger Israel..."

Ah, here we see the true motivation...

Yup - neocon, Likudnik, Zionist, some combination of these.

UPDATE: You see, this is where the fun is. You go to the Truman Project site and you see some general principles and some rhetoric - but no details.

Then you come here and you see the first issue that comes to the fore is - Israel wants to bomb Iran. And while the notion is supposedly rejected, the underlying notions remain unchallenged - that Iran is a "problem", that the US needs to involve itself in "covert actions" to defuse the Iran "nuclear project", and that the US needs to support Iranian dissident groups to affect regime change - without using the term.

So here's the fun: a Democratic faux neocon project that wants to emphasize the same neocon nonsense we just spent a week trashing Peter Beinart for, while proclaiming itself an "alternative" to the neocon vision.

What's wrong with this picture?

I'll tell you - it's called "intellectual dishonesty". It's the attempt to pass off one's agenda as something other than it is in order to con people into accepting and working for your agenda against their best interests. It's a HALLMARK of the neocon philosophy - inherited from their Trokysite origins and their Leo Straussian philosophy - and you don't have to be a Straussian to adhere to it. And whether such a policy is adopted by Democrats or Republicans - or even "anarchists" - it's still intellectual dishonesty.

I like the "annoy the bear" metaphor. It strikes me as a good talking point for Democrats arguing about foreign policy more generally. Seems like we've annoyed one heck of a lot of bears in the Bush years, where we should have been building on post-9/11 sympathy and taking out bin Laden. Even for Iran, the annoyance policy does not begin with the recent nuke issue. (Think of invading their neighbor unprovoked or, for that matter, the Axis of Evil.) And we paid for it by setting back the cause of reformers there, quite possibly turning the tide in their last elections.

John

http://www.haberarts.com/

Iran isn't much like Eastern Europe despite the desires of simpletons who have never actually been their to portray the conflict with Iran in cold-war terms, nor are the people there "nationalistic" because they are "being fed lies" about their nuclear program. First of all, unlike Eastern Europe, Iran is not behind any sort of Iron Curtain. Iran is one of the best Web-connected countries in the Mideast region, and Farsi is by some accounts the fourth most popular language on the Web. People there watch the latest Hollywood movies on bootleg copies, have access to satellite TV and radio, and in short are quite aware of what's going on.

Second, what you refer to as "nationalism" is what we would call "patriotism" when the same feelings are displayed by Americans about their own country. Believe it or not, Iranians love their country too.

Third, the gov't doesn't have to feed them any "lies" about the nuclear issue, since the facts as they exist in reality are enough: Iran has every right to have nuclear power, and the Israelis are pushing the US to attack Iran using that as a pretext. Every Iranian knows that Iran's nuclear program started under the Shah, with the full support and encouragement of the US and Europe. Every Iranian knows that Israel has its nuclear weapons threatening Iran, and every Iranian knows that the US has threatened to nuke Iran. And every Iranian knows their history of how foreign powers have issued illegal ultimatums to Iran in the past, whether the Russians and the British, or the Americans today, in order to dominate the country. And they deeply resent it.

Finally, this myth of the "pro-American" youth is fodder for the simple-minded arm chair analysts. Iranian youth may like to eat hamburgers and wear jeans as do youth anywhere, that doesn't mean they necessarily like George Bush and want to see Iran turned into another banana republic. The US has done a wonderful job of exposing its own hypocricies in Gitmo and Abu Ghraib, so the "pro-American" thing is mostly history by now. Iranians aren't stupid, they're capable of nuanced thinking.

What on earth does being pro-American have to do with liking George Bush? Aren't they kinda, you know, at cross-purposes?


While you're correct, the "annoy the bear" metaphor just goes to the idea that Iran and other "rogue states" ARE "dangerous bears" - and they're not.

If the Dems were to take up that talking point, they'd be pushovers for the Republicans - and the neocon Democrats - to say that instead of annoying the bear, we should take out the bear - which is the implication of her article, notwithstanding the professed notion that attacking Iran directly is a bad idea.

And THAT is the point of her article and her project - to make the Democrats (even) more warlike than many of them are already.

As I've said elsewhere, anybody touting "national security" as a primary issue in a country which outguns the rest of the world combined has an agenda that isn't aiming at peace.

And not revealing that agenda is basic neocon behavior.

The point, in case you missed it, is that the repeated mantra of "Iranians are pro-American" is an overly-simplistic cantation that some have adopted to suggest that the Iranian people would welcome Bush administration efforts to topple the IRanian regime or deprive Iran of her nuclear rights, whether through overt attacks or through sanctions and covert action as suggested by the author of this article. They won't. Iranians love their country too - regardless of what their views on their government may be ( and despite the popular representation in the US, all Iranians aren't opposed to their own gov't either) and they have a long, long history of resenting foreign interference in their country's affairs. This isn't the first time that the Big Powers have issued ultimatums to Iran. Read the history.

Of course, Iranians don't necessarily "hate" America either of course. We have to get away from these simplistic characterizations that become conventional wisdom merely through repetition by pundits - most of whom have never actually set foot in Iran and don't really know anything about the place.

Incidentally, what the author totally misses is that Bush's threat to nuke Iran (and saying that it is an "option" constitutes such a threat) is a total violation of international law and a War Crime:
http://iranaffairs.typepad.com/iran_affairs/2006/04/bush_threatens_.html

"The double standard could not be more transparent. When Ahmadinejad said 'Israel must be wiped off the map,' the US media and commentators feigned mass outrage. Some claimed that Ahmadinejad should be indicted for "inciting genocide" , while others speculated about his sanity. But when Bush threatens to murder hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women and children in a nuclear holocaust, the Western media's silence is deafening."

Moreover, Iran today is in many ways like Eastern Europe during the Cold War--the huge youth bulge is nationalistic, but know they are being fed lies by their government, and therefore tend to be contrarian. Thus, Iranian youth is among the most PRO-American population in the Muslim Middle East. But they are nationalistic about nukes, for the time being. A half-@@@ed strike would turn this pro-American force against us--with repercussions that would last generations.

Over the long term, we need to help this young population take their country back from its repressive leaders...

You're really big on movements of young people and generational thinking, aren't you Ms. Kleinman? Are you betting on the Iranian millenials?

Seriously, I think a bit too much is made of this "pro-American" youth bulge. Youthful rebels generally grow up to be fairly conventional citizens and subjects. I think we can predict that succeeding Iranian generations will be somewhat less revolutionary than the 1979 generation, since such is generally the case with countries that undergo revolutions. The further the revolution recedes into history, the more the political culture of the country settles down into institutionalized patterns.

But I also think we can predict that the Iranians of 10, 20, and 30 years from now will be a politically and culturally divided lot, with various stripes of reformers and traditionalists, materialists and theocrats, cosmopolitans and nationalists. Like most political cultures, most of the time, their preference will be for evolutionary change in Iran's new constitutional institutions - institutions that are still in the process of definition - rather than a revolutionary overthrow. They will seek to consolidate the stability, security and prosperity of the state estabilished in 1979 by the Iranian Revolution, and their dissent from certain extreme aspects of the revolutionary regime will push them toward gradual constitutional reform, not violent upheaval.

I also think we can predict that the Iranians of succeeding decades will tend to view global affairs through the prism of their own national interests - just like the people of most countries. That is already increasingly the case as the revolutionary generation ages, and the state stabilizes. Iranians will seek nuclear weapons if they see the possession of those weapons as conducive to national goals, national independence and national interests. They will not seek these weapons if they estimate the cost of pursuing them exceeds the benefit of having them. If various countries in the world do not want Iran to have nuclear weapons, those countries should be prepared to put up packages of incentives and disincentives pushing Iran in the desired direction. However, I wouldn't place much faith in a unified sanctions regime. The attitude of the world's great powers is hardly uniform toward Iran, and the interests of these powers conflict in many ways. Iran is more likely to be pursued as an occasional ally or partner in great power competition, as a reliable and friendly source of petroleum, and as a check against the interests of rival foreign powers in the region, than to find itself as the isolated object of global opprobrium and sanctions.

Dealing with Iran should be based on a realistic appraisal of Iran's geographical and strategic position, its resources, its economic needs, its military vulnerabilities, its neighborhood and rivals. This forms the most secure analytic framework for interpreting the behavior of a state. To pin our hopes on a rising generation of supposed America-lovers is to succumb to naive and wishful thinking.

The notion of "generations" is in any case somewhat artificial. Every day, older people die and younger ones take their place. It is mostly a gradual and continuous process, and doesn't come divided into generational quantum leaps.

I think one thing we all have to accept is that Iran is likely to emerge as the dominant regional power in the greater Middle East - even a sort of regional superpower. It's vast size, large and well-educated population, important resources and vital and enviable geographic location would all suggest this is the direction it is headed. Unless we are prepared to engage in a brutal campaign of economic and material warfare, in oder to divide Iran, disrupt its society and thwart its rise, we probably have to accept the fact that we are going to live in a world in which Iran will be the dominant player in the large region bounded by Russia to the north, China to the West, India to the south and the Eastern Mediterranean to the West.

Now some countries are going to enjoy good relations with Iran, relations which will benefit both countries. It may as well be us. If not us, it will be our rivals.

It can be enlightening to look at the differing history of Arab and Persian cultures in forming alliances and cultural exchange. One of the reasons, I believe, for the somewhat greater success of building democracy in Afghanistan is that much of the culture is Persian, and the idea of the loya jirga was not a radically new idea.

One of the sad things about the assassination of Ahmed Shah Massoud on 9/9/2001 is that this Northern Alliance military leader strongly supported a free press. Even today, a portrait of a radio station manager with Massoud can act on a censor like garlic on a vampire. One of my area specialist friends says this is especially impressive, given that there's no direct way to translate "free expression" into Dari. Dari, one of the two major (and dozens of minor) languages of Afghanistan, is also called Western Farsi. I wonder if the concept translates into contemporary Iranian Farsi?

Apropos of connections, while the Shi'a link between Iran and southern Iraq is often mentioned, it's interesting to note that even with the desire for Kurdish self-determination, Kurdish is another dialect of Farsi.
--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

I think that the metaphore is very good: an Alaskan grizzly is dangerous after being shot, but not necessarily otherwise, as a matter of fact, usually it is not.

Iran may be exceedingly dangerous after being attacked. We do not know fully its capability to strife the Gulf, and the opposite shore, with rockets, but Iran may well have the capability of severely curtailing the oil export of the entire Gulf region. Iraq may burst in flames agaist us -- if majority of Shia would turn against us and get weapons from Iran, we have Vietnam scale conflict with 1/3 of Vietnam era ground forces and no local allied force. Afghanistan may go the same way.

Iran may well be aided by Russia and China who would not mind USA being reduced to a mere superpower, as in "one of ...". The more reckless we are, the more motivation we give to oppose us.

And if our attack were nuclear, I guess that China and Russia would go to nuclear high alert. This is the basic textbook scenario for the beginning of WWIII (meaning, it starts with Iran).

May be I was too charitable in my estimate of Rachel's intentions.

I also wish Israel well, and that means that one has to ignore some of the advise we get there. Israel is annoyed because Iran makes some attempts to fund Hamas, and it may well be successful later. Iran also attempted to smuggle arms to Palestinians and again, it may be succesful in time. In short, Iran is a very conventional, as opposed to nuclear, opponent. However, it is not Israel's position to worry about global results of a policy --- this is up to us.

Back to intentions: what does it mean to use "economics and covert action"? Good meaning: work to reduce demand for oil and thus economic power of Iran. Recruit more intelligence assets. Questionable meaning: sanctions without cooperation of Russia and China. Very, very questionable: send special forces to Iran with the tasks including sabotage and assasination. The latter may backfire like a bombing campaign.

Politically -- and the Truman Project claims its purpose is to advance the Democratic Party's political prospects -- the "bear metaphor" is guaranteed to cause voters to picture Democrats as weak, sapless worrywarts.

There's only one "bear" in the forest -- the United States of America!

And if ya don't believe it, leave it!


You miss my point.

Kleinfeld is suggesting that Iran is dangerous even WITHOUT being "shot". I'm saying they aren't.

Of course, once they ARE shot, then Iran is dangerous. I've been making that point here for the last six months.

Is Kurdish a Farsi dialect?

This is the firt time I heard about it. These languages are obviously in the same family, but so is English and Dutch.

Dari (and basically identical Tadjik of Tadjikistan) is indeed described as Farsi dialect, but Pashto, the language of the southern half of Afghanistan (and NW Pakistan) is not.

Incidentally, evil characters in Tales of 1001 Nights are Christian, Jewish and Kurd, as contrasted to Arabs, Persians and Turks (Turks were basically forming aristocracy in Arab and Persian lands at the time).

A

Wikipedia has a fairly lengthy article showing the derivation of the several dialects of Kurdish from Farsi. As I understand it from some people who have experience with the languages, the difference between Kurdish and Farsi is much greater than between Dari and Farsi. Dari and Farsi speakers apparently can communicate to a degree that a Kurdish speaker could not, much like an English and a Dutch speaker won't have much in common besides grammar.

I can't speak to the purity of the argument, but I was amused by an explanation I heard of Afrikaans, as Dutch without much grammar. I know a few words of Afrikaans, but I can't construct a complete sentence. My Scandinavian friends are amused at, but appreciative, of my attempts at their languages. Apparently, I have a gift for speaking Svensk to the Danes and Dansk to the Swedes. Again, this is no more than greeting and perhaps ordering in a retaurant. The Scandinavians seem very amazed that an American likes a wide range of fish dishes.

Pashto, frankly, confuses me. I've been told by some people that it is yet another Farsi dialect, but what I've heard more often is that it is a dialect of Urdu, using Arabic rather than Sanskrit orthography for its written form. Definitive answers on this would be appreciated.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

Dari is understandable by a Farsi speaker.
"Kurdish" actually consists of two - perhaps three - different versions that are not mutually understandable.

Farsi is an Indo-European language (whilst for example Arabic and Hebrew are Semitic) and as such it does have much in common with many European languages.

I understand there are incompatible dialects in Kurdish. Structurally, does it not derive from Farsi?

Any experience with Pashto? Is it understandable to an Urdu speaker?

Thanks!
--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

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