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Star Wars and International Relations

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I've been reading John Ikenberry's book, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars and it's really great. Certainly, the ideas merit wider exposure and even though it was published in 2000 it sheds a ton of light on more recent events. But it's done in a bit of a dense, academic style. So it occurred to me that one of the main themes is actually captured pretty well in a famous bit of Star Wars dialogue (and perhaps he'll correct me if I'm going to far...) that you'll find below the fold:

Tarkin: The Imperial Senate will no longer be of any concern to us. I have just received word that the Emperor has dissolved the council permanently. The last remnants of the Old Republic have been swept away.

Tagge: But that's impossible. How will the Emperor maintain control without the bureaucracy?

Tarkin: The regional governors now have direct control over their territories. Fear will keep the local systems in line. Fear of this battle station.
"This battle station," of course, is the Death Star capable of eradicating whole planets in a single blast.

The book is about the choices faced by the leading country in the aftermath of a big conflict. Such a country is going to want to set up some kind of somewhat stable international order. And it's going to have a fair amount of freedom in choosing its course. One thing a country can do is follow American behavior in the aftermath of World War II and try to set up what Ikenberry calls a "constitutional" order, where interactions between countries are governed by institutions and political processes that you try to get the secondary members of the system to buy into more-or-less voluntarily.

The main alternative is for the leading power to try and establish a "hegemonic" system in which the strong country basically makes everyone go along with its desires by using its power to provide a mixture of coercion and direct incentives.

What Tarkin's talking about here is a leading power -- the Empire -- trying to do away with the former constitutional order ("the last remnants of the Old Republic") in order to create a hegemonic one (Palpatine Unbound, as it were). Tagge is skeptical that this will work -- the political processes may be cumbersome, but they're actually necessary to maintain the system's stability. It would actually be even more cumbersome for the center to be constantly trying to impose its will on everyone without the assistance of the bureacracy. Tarkin's counterproposal is that the development of the Death Star has changed the situation -- use it once on Alderaan to make an example of them, and in the future fear will keep the local systems in line.

And I think it's fairly clear that something of this sort was motivating the Bush administration in 2002-2003. The key decisionmakers took the view that technological developments (the "revolution in military affairs") had radically enhanced America's ability to overthrow foreign governments. Rather than simply keep this power in our back pocket for use when circumstances clearly warranted it (as in Afghanistan) there was a palpable desire to make an example out of Iraq to send a message. Or, as Jonah Goldberg put it:
Well, I've long been an admirer of, if not a full-fledged subscriber to, what I call the "Ledeen Doctrine." I'm not sure my friend Michael Ledeen will thank me for ascribing authorship to him and he may have only been semi-serious when he crafted it, but here is the bedrock tenet of the Ledeen Doctrine in more or less his own words: "Every ten years or so, the United States needs to pick up some small crappy little country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business." . . .

It doesn't work that way in the state-of-nature of the prison yard. Fighting and winning today means not having to fight at all tomorrow — and maybe, just maybe, changing the rules of the prison yard so that it's not a prison yard at all anymore.
Again, fear will keep the local systems in line and we can thereby avoid the chaos of the prison yard.

Except, of course, it hasn't worked very well. The alternative order-building strategy of liberalism and institutions was undermined by the war, while the war itself has had perverse effects. Countries more-or-less inclined to be well-disposed toward us regard our actions as erratic and unreliable, making them less disposed to cooperate, but countries more-or-less inclined to be ill-disposed toward us regard our actions as essentially ineffectual and are also less disposed to cooperate.

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Fear, violence, and control -- the only things the right knows or understands -- never, ever, ever, ever, ever work outside of the very short-term. This is demonstrated by copious evidence in our personal relationships, our communities, our state and federal governments, international relations, literature, film, oral traditions, homilies, the Bible ... really, you name it. That's the lesson humanity keeps learning over and over again.

And yet to be "serious" in foreign policy these days just is to express maximum belligerence, fear, and lust for control, no matter how patently insane the particulars.

WTF.

courtesy of Digby:

"Richard Perle said the following on PBS in October 2001...

...Because having destroyed the Taliban, having destroyed Saddam's regime, the message to the others is, "You're next." Two words. Very efficient diplomacy. "You're next, and if you don't shut down the terrorist networks on your territory, we'll take you down, too. Is it worth it?" Of course it isn't worth it. It isn't worth it for any of them."

http://digbysblog.blogspot.com/2003_02_23_digbysblog_archive.html#89861210

worth reading Digby's comments, too (as always).

It might be worth pointing out that although that particular strategy didn't work very well at all for the Empire in "Star Wars," they *still* tried it again in "Return of the Jedi."

I wonder if the left-leaning bloggers of the Empire at the time brought up cost to taxpayers of building two Death Stars. Those things couldn't have been cheap.

"Rather than simply keep this power in our back pocket for use when circumstances clearly warranted it (as in Afghanistan) there was a palpable desire to make an example out of Iraq to send a message."

First of all, Afghanistan did NOT warrant it. We turned a repressive regime into a failed state there for a bogus reason just as we have in Iraq. No significant difference except that the blowback from Iraq may be worse than Afghanistan - but even that remains to be seen.

Second, there's no "message sending" involved here. Both these operations were undertaken with the FULL INTENT to conduct even MORE such operations against Iran, Syria, and even Saudi Arabia.

Go back and read the neocon diatribes and documents. People are blowing up this toss-off of Ledeen's as some kind of policy statement. It isn't. While such a procedure may be part of the neocon view, the fact of the matter is that they intend to dominate the Middle East and they intend to do it directly by military force, not just intimidation. They've been trying intimidation for the last half century and it's not working anymore. So in these days of Peak Oil, they need to move directly. And so they are.

Afghanistan was just a side issue - and that's how they treated it. They wanted the pipeline, the heroin, and to put pressure on Pakistan and possibly Iran. The primary goals were always Iraq, Iran and Syria - and probably Jordan and Saudi Arabia as well at some point, the former for the Israelis, the latter for the oil.

They've destroyed Iraq - and now they're going to move on Iran.

They're not trying to "send a message" to Iran - they're trying to destroy it and take the oil just as they've destroyed Iraq and are TRYING to take the Iraq oil (or if Greg Palast is right, take the Iraq oil OFF the market). Only the insurgency isn't letting them get the oil (or perhaps they actually want a civil war there to insure the oil stays off the market, if Palast is right.)

Of course, it won't work - Iran will use the Vietnam strategy and bleed the US for the next ten years until the US economy, society and military collapses.

But then it's likely the neocons want that, too - the best way to establish a permanent dictatorship is after a major defeat and social upheaval - Hitler was the result of WWI and the resulting economic disaster.

Anybody with any sense of history can see the whole nine yards played out over the next ten, twenty or thirty years quite easily. The US is and will continue to be a fascist empire - until it is destroyed by revolution, civil war, or attack by external forces.

It's a historical inevitability. There's absolutely no way any such major power has ever been reversed from this course by "liberal" means absent a major upheaval.

Transhuman is wrong here. Unlike in Iraq there were legitimate reasons to attack the Taliban. Actually, if you believe that the goal was to chase out Al-Queda and deny them a stable base of operations, the invasion worked. You could make a pretty good argument that Al-Queda, as a centralized organazation, is pretty much destroyed.

Our objective in Afghanistan wasn't really dependent on creating a stable state. Of course, it would have been good for image if we could have. We screwed up Afghanistatn because we haven't been willing to put enough resources into its reconstruction. If we took a tenth of the money that has been spent fighting this war in Iraq and had put into Afghanistan we could have improved things considerably.

Sigh, of course rereading your comments again I think I shouldn't have bothered. You seem to be a few pickles short of a happy meal. Anyone who describes America as a "fascist empire" automatically loses on hyperbole.

Why would that ever work? We have no idea how our military would actually do if it faced equal opposition. Where is the fear inspired by killing a puppy? Even a rabid one?

I wonder some days if our military could actually fight a war against an enemy on an even footing in technology and resources. I hope we don't ever have to find out, but I still wonder.

It's unclear to what post you are responding, and also how you define "equal". If equality refers to a comparably equipped force, with numeric superiority, we actually have a rather good idea. Insurgency is the mystery, not matched forces.

Major exercise centers such as the National Training Center (for heavy armored forces) at Ft. Irwin were originally set up to train against Soviet forces. Quite accurately, that meant that US forces would be outnumbered three to one. Less accurately, but as more of a challenge, the Opposing Force at NTC has US, not Soviet, level maintenance and equipment effectiveness. The OPFOR is permanently assigned, so it fights over the same ground every couple of weeks, and has intimate terrain sense that a once-a-year unit can't.

NTC, and the light forces equivalent, JRTC at Ft. Polk, are extensively instrumented; every move is recorded and reviewed. The ground centers derive from the original Navy Top Gun concept: that pilots who survive their first five air combats tend to be the most effective. Top Gun also used numerically superior OPFOR, and it was no sin to lose simulated combat there, or at NTC or JRTC. The idea is that by the time units are out of training, they are more experienced than any units in history.

There are other training centers, which don't have tactical units that generals don't see anyway, for higher command levels, the former BCTP now called Warfighter. We don't know definitively, but, historically through Korea and probably Viet Nam, we'd have generals that utterly failed in combat. There is now a much clearer idea how candidates would do.

I am quite aware of the wise military maxim that no plan survives contact with the enemy. Nevertheless, there's a much better idea how conventional combat will go (see Battle of 73 Easting). We still are lacking in both training and doctrine for peace enforcement, although JRTC is working in this area. Unfortunately, Rumsfeld didn't want to apply JRTC lessons in Iraq.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

I don't think there can be any doubt that George Lucas is now the leading intellectual figure of our time.

(P.S. These aren't the Blogofascists you're looking for.)

This worked for Rome. Destroyed Judea and had about 200 hundred years of internal peace. Exception:That bitch in Britannia. Everything else was Rim-world.

Of course, haven't read the book. But without the counter-hegemon, I see it as pretty tough to maintain the "first-among-equals" status of the US in the post-WWII order. (If you believe the West was an actual int'l democracy, quit smoking that stuff.)

MY might like the idea of the US having only as much power as Ghana or Haiti, but Cheney and a few others didn't think it would work.


Nope - the Wachovski brothers.

Go see "V for Vendetta".


I remember reading about the desert warfare training center (forget where that is). The OPFOR there used to kick the crap out of the rest of the US units because of that "home ground" advantage and a lot of experience. Some of it was fairly funny, as I recall - wouldn't have been funny for real, of course, which was the point of the training.

Has the military made any attempts to set up a realistic urban insurgency training center that you know of? You'd think that with Iraq going into its fourth year that there would be a couple billion allocated in the budget for this.


None of that is clearly true.

First, getting rid of Al Qaeda could have been done without an invasion. Getting rid of bin Laden would have been even easier. Al Qaeda was never a significant organization in operational terms - and it has now mutated into a "movement" rather than an organization. All the attack on Al Qaeda did was establish the truth of its mission statement for radical Islamists worldwide. Every analyst I've read is saying that "Al Qaeda" (the movement, not the organization) is now bigger than ever.

Second, the Taliban had nothing to do with Al Qaeda per se - other than the fact that they refused (with good political and legal reason) to hand over bin Laden without any proof that he was involved in 9/11. Attacking the Taliban was nothing more than regime change for reasons unrelated to 9/11. Not to mention that the Taliban are still functional and growing stronger and probably would have continued to do so even with more US and NATO troops in the region - not to mention the risk as well of destabilizing the Afghan-Pakistan border in the process.

Third, there is no evidence that pouring more reconstruction money into Afghanistan would have changed the basic nature of the country any more than in Iraq. Afghanistan is a country of warlords and poppie growers. How much "reconstruction" would you have approved and what evidence is there that it would have worked? I submit - none.

The desert National Training Center is at Fort Irwin in California, near the equivalent Marine center at Twentynine Palms. At all of these centers, it's not a black mark to get beaten, if you learn from it, and the review is extensive. Of course, if the visiting unit does win most or all of the engagements, it's what they call career-enhancing, but for good reason.

NTC is for heavy (mechanized/armored) forces. The Joint Readiness Training Center, for light forces, is at Fort Polk in Louisiana. It includes forested and other rough terrain, but also an MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Terrain) "box" containing several "towns", the largest of which is named Shughart-Gordon after the two Delta Force operators who received posthumous Medals of Honor for the "Blackhawk Down" engagement in Mogadishu. JRTC has both a permanent guerilla force, as well as civilans that include an underground.

The Army is also working on a traveling MOUT system. There are now, incidentally, several billion allocated to IED detection and neutralization.


--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*


Yeah, Fort Irwin, that was the name that seemed to be in the back of my head.

Several billion for IED detection seems like overkill and a serious misappropriation of funds. No surprise for the Pentagon.

If you have proper doctrine, you're not going to be that worried about IEDs because you're not going to be rumbling around in Humvees and Bradleys wearing a sign saying, "I'm an idiot! Blow me up!"

They need to re-allocate those billions to proper doctrine and training.

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