Given the venue for the announcement, it's more likely intended as a reminder to NK that the system is operational (to whatever extent). It may also be somewhat of a system test.

No way would we risk shooting and missing.

I'm not sure the system even has an operational command and control system, so it really means nothing to say they turned it on.

It is a PR announcement, with two audiences. First, the American people. They need to justify the expenditures on the system by showing the American people that all that money produced something that can be "turned on" when the threat requires. Never mind that there is no threat to the U.S, there also is no system that can protect the U.S.

Second, this is definitely intended for North Korean consumption. Remember that they consider missile defense to be a part of their deterrent posture. It doesn't need to work if we actually shot off an interceptor. We just need to convince the bad guy that we might be able to shoot his missile down to stop him from shooting it!!!

Its all theater.

For now, lets stick to R&D, and save activation for genuinely dangerous situations.

How is this consistent with the one percent doctrine?  Mr. Cheney believes:  " if there's a 1% chance * [that Pakistani scientists are helping al-Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon], we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response. It's not about our analysis . . . It's about our response."

*of a North Korean missile launch

There is of course also the matter of this very detailed study by the American Physical Society. The report focuses on boost phase defense because as it notes deployment of warheads can be nearly instantaneous once boost phase is exited. A chief conclusion is that to hit even the more primitive liquid fuel based missiles likely to be deployed by North Korea in the near future requires proximity--400-1000 km or 250-600 miles. Last I checked, the positions in Alaska for the Rumsfeld-Bush-Cheney defense system are well outside that. Of course, many intentional or unintentional modifications can mitigate the effectiveness of the interceptor--I would remind th readers that the SCUDS of the first gulf war had an unintentional spiral in their trajectory which surely contributed to the massive failure of patriot missiles to hit their
mark.

In short, it is once again an indication of the BushCo will to foist a predetermined agenda on the world whatever the circumstances, and to exploit favorable circumstances as soon as they arrive.

I work with the Communitarian Network in Washington, DC, and coming from this perspective the United States' reaction embodies a completely confused approach to harmonious international relations. "Enabling" a defunct system that only serves to alienate foreign governments seems to be a foolish response to an international nuclear situation. Instead of building up the defenses, the United States should approach this as an opportunity to work with the international community to promote nuclear deproliferation, and certainly continue talks. By "turning on" the missle defense system, the United States has chosen to react to an international relations crisis with an extremely close minded approach, which has, in turn, done absolutely nothing about the problem.

"Does anyone else see this as an admission that we have become a gutless, fearful, afraid of shadows country?"

See Josh's post about how we tortured a mentally ill low-level Al Qaeda guy, then ran around the country defending against "plots" that never existed except in his deranged mind?

This is how the state works.

And it only works if the morons who put the state in power are like that - gutless, fearful, afraid of their own shadows...

America today.

"Land of the free and home of the brave."

Bwahahahahahahahah!!! Tell me another - hasn't been true for two centuries, if it even was then.

The ambassador to Japan, Thomas Schieffer, used the expected WH language when asked if the US would shoot down an missile; "We have options that we have not had in the past, and all these options are on the table". (BBC)

Seems like the US is hoping NK will stand down and not embarrass the US into testing and exposing the defense system, and NK is daring the US to show off its defenses.

And it risks the chance of undermining whatever deterrent value the missile defense has, if the U.S. tries and fails to shoot a North Korean missile down.

Isn't there a deterrent value in activating the system?  And what is the deterrent value of not having it activated at all? 

For all the chatter about making the Ft. Richardson system, intended for midcourse intercept, operational, there is an interesting silence about ships and aircraft off the coast of Japan. Navy SM-3 missiles are on selected AEGIS ships (late Ticonderoga VLS class cruisers and Burke class destroyers). SM-3 has boost phase intercept capability, and also a much more convincing test record than the NBMD system. Indeed, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (i.e., Navy) is scheduled to get SM-3 this fall, for its own Burke class destroyers.

Also, the Air Force prototype airborne laser system is intended to have boost phase intercept capability, and conceivably might be deployed.

North Korea has no credible capability to attack properly escorted sea or air missile defense platforms of these types.
--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

Arming it and not intercepting, or not even attempting to, is bad for the credibility of our defensive threats re: our missile shield. No one cares if it isn't aimed at us--we know it isn't, everyone knows it isn't, but yet people (Maybe not you) are still arguing to hit, if not preventively strike it--if we don't shoot it down after turning on the system people wonder why. Oh, because they can't and they didn't want to risk displaying that in living color to the entire world. In either case it was a dumb move.

Given what is at stake if we miss, and given the problems with the GBI which as I understand it is what would be used against a potential ICBM, anything less than 90% would be too risky given what I stated above about if you miss. The world will throw out every "test" and say, look, when they aren't rigging their tests and they are going against an actual live target it doesn't work.

For me, you risk more than you could ever gain from this move.

First, a couple of caveats, and perhaps a useful digression. I am not suggesting it be shot down -- in fact, I think it's more useful to see the flight profile and know much better what they have.

I haven't actually worked out the intercept geometry, although, in general terms, the data are available. My effective use of calculus is several more cups of coffee away. Nevertheless, I'd give the Navy TBMD system a high probability, especially if there is more than one ship shooting. It's fairly standard Navy (Standard SM-3 missile) and Army (Patriot PAC-3 missile) procedure to launch pairs of interceptors, judge the probability of hit as it steers them in, and, if warranted, launch another pair. Reports of the Army NBMD system at Fort Richardson gives it 9 or 10 missiles, so it has to be economical.

Do note that if the North Koreans are doing a true test with an aim point somewhere in the Pacific, below the horizon of the NBMD radar, Fort Richardson can't even see it to engage it. Only boost phase systems can engage.

The Air Force airborne laser would also have a good chance, but it is still a prototype. A particular limitation is that there may not yet be portable facilities for the laser's fuel.

A digression here, about why I strongly support theater BMD but oppose national BMD. TBMD is inherently more flexible, as long as it can operate in or above international waters. I don't think that any probable adversary has a serious chance of taking out properly escorted antimissile groups. Isolating North Korea has always been a capability. Sometimes we forget, however, how many potential hotspots are in reasonable range of international waters. While some potential paths are too far inland, think of the regional stabilization opportunities should there be conflicts between India and Pakistan, Iran and Israel, etc.

I still remember the early US and USSR spaceflight program. Wouldn't it be an anticlimax if the North Korean missile blew up on the pad, just because it had a leak? Early programs were full of fireballs...

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

No, not at this stage considering the missile itself poses no threat to us, the DPRK does not, to anyone's knowledge, have a working nuclear weapon, and if they did it isn't clear they have the know-how to miniturize the weapon for deployment atop an ICBM. It is an empty vessel, and it is being tested, presumably with a target somewhere in the Pacific Ocean.

As for the 90% issue, it is dependent on the type of weapon system and the circumstances--in this case the chances that something bad will happen are greater than the chances that something good will happen for the US strategically.

MAD doesn't seem like much of a defense. It is an outdated relic of the Cold War. I don't really like being a nuclear hostage. What kind of defense relies on not defending the American people?

And deterrence is not reliable. There is an unknown to deterrence. You can never prove when deterrence was successful. You can only prove when it fails. We can't prove that we deterred the USSR. We can only say that they chose not to launch.

And yes, NBMD works best for more low profile threats. North Korea or Iran seems to be that type of threat (I am not arguing that they could hit us, just that they could be developing very small arsenals.) Isn't it better to have some defenses that none at all? Isn't it better to have something to fall back on if deterrence fails rather than just saying "well, the system wasn't 90% reliable, so we chose to be totally unprotected instead of somewhat protected"? I'll take my chances with a NBMD that is 10% reliable rather than having absolutely nothing.

And all other state actors may need to be deterred by threat of denial is to believe that we can knock down their ICBMs. And even if deterrence fails, we can attempt to intercept.

My point about deterrence was that you can't be sure what makes an actor choose not to act. The Soviets were prepared to lose up to 40% of their population. One of the Soviet leaders (maybe Gorbachev)even said that the Soviets never believed in MAD. Their population meant nothing to them.

What did deter them? We don't know. To know that we would have to get into the heads of the decision makers. It might have been MAD, it might have been domestic politics, it might have been psychology, narcotics, etc. To say that threat of death is what deterred them has many flaws. If that was all it took to deter, then we would never have troops prepared to go into combat.

You act as though I don't care about homeland security. I'm an off-shore balancer with quite a few isolationist tendencies. We could afford to pay for NBMD AND protecting the electrical grid, etc. if we didn't spend so much money and resource molding other countries the way we want them. I would much much much rather spend money here at home on all those things you mentioned than to spend it elsewhere.

Plus, the entire BMD shield is a layered system; the theory being that there are multiple chances for engagement. And the BMD budget was chopped pretty substantially. I'm more worried about wasted money on unconstitutional federal programs like medicare and social security than I am defending the country.

And lets not forget that the realist believes that the center of international politics resides with the states not acts of terrorism.

Actually Star Wars would have worked. Look at Project Clementine. After it succeded, Clinton chopped it because he realized that it was Star Wars technology.

And my rephrase is that the realist sees the states as the most important actors in international politics, not subnational groups.

P.S. Sorry, I'm a horrible speller.

"Given the shaky track record of these defenses even in highly controlled tests, activating the defense strikes me as a stupid move."

Shaky track record against the new Russian moveable warheads, but against the simpler missiles technology of N. Korea the U.S. defense system is overpowering.

"no chance that North Korea can hit the U.S. with a nuclear warhead".

There is no way any of us could know whether North Korea can hit or not hit the U.S. with a nuclear warhead unless we had top security clearance inside N. Korea.

"it risks the chance of undermining whatever deterrent value the missile defense has, if the U.S. tries and fails to shoot a North Korean missile down".

Not to try because we might fail? I do not see as an option, especially if N. Korean can reach the U.S.

The hard parts of missile nukes are the pesky engineering details of miniaturizing the warhead and increasing the throw weight of the missile. Neither is easy, and the US and Russia spent decades chasing incremental improvements.

These are not the result of seeing a blueprint, but of learning the arts of precision machining and enhancing reliablity of control systems. Like learning to play trumpet, it's not enough to be told how. Plutonium nukes are really hard to make (and make work). Uranium nukes aren't small enough for missiles.

When North Norea can orbit a satellite I'll start to worry, a little. When they test a nuke I'll worry. Until then, let's all relax. Better to let them think we're so confident we don't have to even paint their missile with radar, rather than preemptively attack their beginner's effort.