If you're not a utilitarian, then there's no reason why treating animals better would require treating human beings worse. Singer, however, is an advocate for infanticide.

Singer is the "Party of Death;" he comes as close as anyone does to fitting right-to-lifer's carticatures of the left. Treating apes and other animals better is a laudable goal, but Singer definitely does believe this better treatment entails treating disabled humans worse.

Of course all of these arguments using aliens as examples are completely unconvincing to actual pro-lifers since they all believe that there are no other species (on earth or in the heavens) that share the relevant property with humans. That is to say, only humans are "made in the image of God." That's why there's a bright-line distinction between humans and non-humans. The genetics is a proxy for that fundamental difference.

Well, what about the "future potential" issue? An adult gorilla isn't going to get any smarter in 10 years, but a 1 year old human will eventually grow up to be an "unambiguously morally worthy" adult.

Doesn't that future potential give the infant/fetus/whatever some moral standing too? Even if you're a cold-blooded utilitarian, doesn't utilitarianism tell you to take into account future utility (i.e., it doesn't tell us to go smoke crack to maximize our pleasure, because smoking crack has ramifications down the road)? How does that work for a future moral being?

This isn't clear cut to me, but to call a 1 year old morally equivalent to an adult gorilla seems wrong to me.

Or, to put it another way, if a spaceship showed up tomorrow and some creatures came out we'd be interested, morally speaking, in their psychological properties rather than their biochemical ones. This is why it's clear to Star Trek viewers that Vulcans are entitled to the same "human rights" as the rest of us even though we aren't told anything about Vulcan biochemistry.

Well, we are told that Vulcans have copper (instead of iron) in their blood.

But more to the point, this is pure anthropomorphization. Vulcans are treated as people in the Star Trek world because they look like people, not like apes, dolphins, fish, or ants. If Vulcans looked like ants...?

The fundamental (abortion) argument here is whether or not a fertilized egg is measurably "human," and as such commands some sort of moral priority. If true, then true: people naturally prioritize the existence of people, just like fish are preoccupied with making more fish.

Consciousness: we have the ability to comprehend our motives in ways fish do not, but that doesn't mean we don't feel the same reproductive instincts.

King Kong, Jekyll/Hyde, Frankenstein, Dracula, Wolfman, the Hulk, etc: all tragic horror stories of humanity in monster guise. Every single one an abortion.

While I'm free-associating, let me say that morality is all too often considered the property of religious frames.

Saying that all born humans don't have an absolute right-to-life under any and all circumstances is not the same as advocating infanticide.

It may not be "advocating infanticide," but it is permitting infanticide, yes? And, under certain "circumstances," also saying that infanticide is not morally wrong.

I would think that depriving an existing person of life would qualify as harming him. And really, it's not just little Tommy.  Any person, child, or adult, whom no one depends on could be killed provided it is done painleslly.  And even if someone does depend on him, so what?  They could be killed too.  Problem solved.

To go the full Godwin here, the only thing wrong with Hitler was that he didn't anasthetize the Jews first, and that the Jews provided Germany with a lot of useful scientific knowledge and economic expertise that Hitler deprived the Germans who survived WWII of. 

"You say I'm a dreamer.  We're two of a kind.  Looking for some perfect world that we both know that we'll never find." - Thompson Twins, "Hold Me Now"

Pro-lifers are pro-life not simply because of their belief in fetal personhood, but because they think the above interests are at the least not very important and more likely bad for society.

I think that it is rather unfair to say that someone who thinks that the competing issues do not outweigh someone's life therfore must not think that they are very important. It would be more fair to say that they do not think that the above interests are as important as saving a life. And really, the only interest you mention that could reasonably be said to outweigh the fetus's/embryo's life (under the hypothetical situation where the fetus/embryo is universally considered a person) is the right of the women not to gestate a fetus against her will.

If you grant that the fetus/embryo personhood (which I assume means that it is morally equivalent to a born child), then arguments for abortion that involve "the societal interest in having children be wanted" also logically would apply to childrenin orphanages who cannot get adopted, who, as unwanted children, ought to be put down as we do with stray dogs and cats. Arguments about "gender equality" for women (as opposed to those that are primarily about the right to control one's body) would also justify a woman whose husband was not contributing enough to raising the kid killing the kid.

"You say I'm a dreamer. We're two of a kind. Looking for some perfect world that we both know that we'll never find." - Thompson Twins, "Hold Me Now"

They could be killed too. Problem solved.

Don't think so. You'd have an ever growing tree of relationships. And it's for that reason that the Holocaust is a very poor example.

Firstly, Hitler didn't have control of all Jews who were, in any way, emotionally or economically dependent on those he killed. And secondly, there's no warrant for cutting off dependency at the border of the Jewish community.

Note: I'm sure you did recognize that the person being killed cannot be conscious of the fact that he's being killed. That knowledge would cause suffering.

I would think that depriving an existing person of life would qualify as harming him.

I don't see how that's self-evident. You sound like one of those people who pictures himself floating up near the ceiling looking down on his hospital bed and watching himself become a corpse.

Vulcans are treated as people in the Star Trek world because they look like people . . . .

You mean it's lucky for the Vulcans we're equipped with mirror neurons.

My Code of Conduct (morality?) is based on empathy, imagination, and memory. Thus, I would not wish to do to another what I would not wish him to do to me.

But I can't remember what it was like to be 3 years old.  I guess it's lucky we find babies to be cute. 

Well, here's how I justify my limited carnivorism.

As far as we can tell, one of things thhat distinguishes humans from most other animals is the ability to conceive of a future.  In a sense, when you kill a person, you're taking more from them than just the moment - you're taking from them the future they anticipate, the ability to spend more time with their loved ones, etc.  Objectively, you may take some of these things from a chicken, too, but subjectively, the chicken isn't going into that good night thinking about how the chicks are going to grow up without her, because the chicken isn't going into any minute with thoughts of those kinds.  The chicken isn't invested in its future the way my neighbor is.

So, to my way of thinking, treating animals morally involves treating them humanely when they are alive, and killing them in a way that doesn't cause suffering.  (Not that it happens that way.)  Therefore, I reason, eating very little meat is as good as eating none - if we all ate not so much, factory farming wouldn't be financially viable, and all food animals could live decent lives.

How does this bear on Timmy?  Well, Timmy is a problem for me - I'm not sure that the fact that he has the potential to conceive of a future soon enough is enough to put him on the person side of the line, in my analysis.  Maybe my story about Timmy above (that even if we don't have a moral obligation to Tim, we have an innate squeamishness about doing him in that ought to be respected) works.  But for now, Tim is coming between me and my bacon (thanks, Timmy!)

I don't think a "genetic content" view of personhood would resonate much with right to lifers. For one thing, they'd then have to accept evolution. 

John 

http://www.haberarts.com/

Why do you assume that pro-Lifers do not accept the possibility that alien species exist? Because they are (presumably) Christians? I have never encountered any opinion on the existence of intelligent extraterrestial life which was based on any theological argument. I have encountered Christian discussions as to whether ETs would be fallen or unfallen, and if fallen how they are offered salvation (through Christ's incarnation as a human, or did Christ have to incarnate as one of them?) And CS Lewis even wrote sicence fiction stories with inteligent (and unfallen) aliens in them.

Unfortunately, the more biology and medicine advance, the less clear the definition. If the definition of an "infant" is other than the first union of spermatozoan and ovum -- which I don't assume -- then it becomes increasingly difficult to draw lines.

In trauma medicine, there is a phrase that perhaps deserves wider use, possibly with a bit of modification: "injuries incompatible with life." My most memorable personal experience was with a victim of a very nasty pedestrian-vs-auto accident, where some helpful bystander attempted to apply first aid. Yes, the victim was bleeding very badly from the head. Yes, tourniquets are back in fashion as the last layman resort for controlling hemorrhage. No, a tourniquet around the neck is not best current practice for even extremely bloody head wounds.

In this case, there was sufficient damage to the skull and brain that the tourniquet made no difference. Too much of the brain was gone. No one had a problem declaring the victim dead on arrival.

Now, let's turn to fetal development, and, specifically, the neural tube disorder of anencephaly. Anencephaly means that very little of the brain, certainly all sensory and intellectual components, simply do not form. If the breathing centers in the brainstem do not form, essentially it's a stillbirth; there is no way to start spontaneous respirations. For other reasons probably a bit graphic for this discussion, even if there is partial brainstem formation, life outside the uterus is measured in hours or short days, with no possible interventions.

Anencephaly can be detected in utero by ultrasound, and is widely considered a solid justification for therapeutic abortion. Bioethicists still debate whether or not any resuscitative efforts should be taken if the birth is a surprise.

Is this infanticide? Anencephaly is a much more clear-cut example of a condition incompatible with life than, say, Tay-Sachs disease. An infant with Tay-Sachs will start breathing, but, in the most common form, will have a life expectancy of five years at most, with the latter part having lost most consciousness, although there is some evidence that pain sensation is the last thing to go. There are extremely rare variants of juvenile onset (universally fatal) and onset in late adolescence or young adulthood (not necessarily fatal).

Alpha-fetoprotein analysis of amniotic fluid will reveal the presence of Tay-Sachs, and there is also a definitive physical finding at birth. What are the ethics of starting respirations in the newborn here, in a much more complex situation?

Now, turn to adults. Among trauma surgeons, it is a widespread consensus that a victim of blunt trauma (e.g., a steering wheel in the chest), found pulseless at the scene, can safely be assumed to have injuries incompatible with life. If there is a heartbeat, the only thing that may save the individual -- and with a very low probability of minimal success, to say nothing of neurological function -- is to open the chest and directly massage the heart. Traditional CPR is useless.

What is the ethical issue here, even assuming there are no other victims contending for emergency treatment? Is the situation of adult trauma incompatible with life ethically different than passive infanticide (i.e., no life support)?

There are no simple answers.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

Did Magda and Joseph Goebbels

--- mercy kill,

--- euthanize,

--- kill, or

--- murder

their children?

Let me see if I can clarify Matt's point. 

There is a difference in kind between people and animals.  There are differences in kind between the species of non-human animals.  And there are some kinds of animals that are more similar to humans than others.    

There are differences in degree in each kind.  Matt is a better pundit than Ponnuru, W is a worse president than - oh, I don't know - Hoover.  

But we don't generally draw moral lines based on differences in degree.  We draw them based on differences in kind.  Ponnuru and W are both still people, so we try to afford them human rights and dignities. 

Biochemists believe that animals are different from people only in degree.  So the moral lines they draw w / r / t animal rights are arbitrary.  

Moral bright-liners believe that people are one kind of being and animals are all another kind (People lord over beasts, and that's all there is to it).

Now, Matt rightly holds that the truth is somewhere in between. 

Here's how I think about it:   

People are different in kind from other animals. People:

1. think discursively. Dolphins and Apes solve problems, sure. But only people design tools in the abstract when not trying to solve a problem like how to reach the bananas off the high branches that day given hands and a couple sticks at the base of the tree.  And
2. form cultures with intergenerational conventions and the idea of law. Other animals may live in groups, but their social order is based on either the will of a physically dominant group member or some genetic caste system (there are queen bees and there are worker bees. etc.).  

But that doesn't mean that some animals aren't more like us than others.  

Kinds can be more or less similar to one another.  Human discursive thinking is more similar to an ape's problem solving than to an ant's aimless wandering.  Human cultural conventions are more similar to the gorrillas' despotic generational rule than to the ants' genetically defined societal heiarchies.

While differences in kind allow us to distinguish between people and all other animials, degrees of similarity between kinds mean it is reasonable to assign widely divergent moral considerations to different species. 

So both the bright line rule and the biochemical point of view are plainly wrong.  The truth is in between. 

p.s. Anyone with considerable experience babysitting during teenage years probably knows how those researchers were onto something. The dirty little secret was that you just couldn't find it in yourself to be as nice to those not-so-cute babies when they weren't related to you. The cute ones give your average self-centered teen joy and therefore get more attention away from the refrigerator, TV set, or test tomorrow.