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Christian nation or nation of Christians?

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I think Professor Blackton is distorting my argument slightly (or at least the argument I intended to make). The misunderstanding may lie in the concept of the Christian nation. Obviously, the founders thought, correctly, that they were creating a nation in which most people would be Christian. Many of them were devout Christians themselves, and even those who were deists, like Jefferson, showed great respect for Christ's moral example. They did not, however, create a nation where Christian scripture was meant to be authoritative, where Christianity was subsidized and endorsed by the state, or where Christianity was considered a prerequisite for civic participation. (On this point, I think Professor Blackton and I are in agreement -- we just seem to differ on what the phrase "Christian nation" means).


It was, after all, no oversight that the word "God," much less "Jesus," appears nowhere in our Constitution. And it's not quite right to say that the founders never thought about non-Christian religions. Jefferson's 1786 statute establishing religious freedom in Virginia was the basis of the 1rst Amendment. In his autobiography, he wrote that an amendment referring to Jesus Christ as the source of religious liberty was "rejected by the great majority, in proof that they meant to comprehend, within the mantle of its protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and the Mohmmedan, the Hindoo and the Infidel of every denomination."

Similarly, the Treaty of Tripoli -- negotiated by Washington and signed by Adams -- says, "As the government of the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion,-- as it has in itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion or tranquility of Musselmen [Muslims]…it is declared by the parties that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries."


I know these are shopworn examples, but they remain relevant. It's important not to anachronistically assume that the founders were pluralists in the modern sense, but they knew what they were doing when they separated church and state.


One of the most useful books on this subject is actually by three noted evangelical historians -- "The Search for Christian America" by Mark A. Noll, Nathan O. Hatch and George M. Marsden. It's written for other evangelicals who are longing for a past that the writers know never existed. "The founding fathers may have read the Bible, but explicit references to Scripture or Christian principles are conspicuously absent in the political discussions of the nation's early history," they write. "As one might expect from the nature of the documents, biblical texts do not appear in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, or the new state charters. But conscious reference to biblical or Christian themes is also almost entirely absent from the places where it might be expected -- the pamphlet literature advocating independence, the various state debates over the Constitution, and the political disputes of the 1790s. In short, the political spokesmen who read the Bible in private rarely, if ever, betrayed that acquaintance openly in public."


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Some of the founders were deeply religious, but none of them were "Bible-believing Christians" as the Religious Right likes to pretend. They belonged to churches that were mainline (and rather stodgy) or else quite liberal: they were not Evangelicals or, to use the 18th century term, Pietists. As a group they held some very un-orthodox notions and they are far more akin to today's religious Left: they'd get along with our Bishop Spong better than with our Robertson.

I quoted the Treaty of Tripoli elsewhere in these threads.

It was very clear in its statement that the United States was in no sense established as a "Christian Nation."

That Treaty alone pretty much puts paid to the Christian Nationalist notion that the Founders had any interest in that, regardless of what the citizenry might have wanted.

The best Web site I've seen so far about these issues is here.

Very comprehensive site.

I think your statement is very close to the proper balance in terms of how we'd view it today.

I do think it's important to point out that relative liberal views then and now are substantively different. Many of today's evangelicals hold views that would seem radicaly liberal to the conservatives of the early days of this nation and colonial times. Likewise many religious liberals of our day would have been at the heretical, even pagan, extreem in revolutionary American society.

While there's very careful avoidance of a specific diety or religioius position in the gamut of founding documents there is the reference to "divine providence."

I think it's fair to say that, at the very least, the founding fathers weren't hoping for a secular humanist populace and policy to dominatee the lives of the future inhabitants of this nation.

Please provide examples to support these claims.

I think it's fair to say that, at the very least, the founding fathers weren't hoping for a secular humanist populace and policy to dominatee the lives of the future inhabitants of this nation.

Where do you get this idea? I think it is exactly what most of them wanted.  

What is wrong with secular humanism anyway? Please explain what is wrong with these values? I think those sum up what I know about the views of Jefferson, Paine, Washington, Lincoln and many others who had a role in forming our country.  Its the only reason we've lasted as long as we have.

Its an important point that when the country was founded, the only widely-discussed explanations out there for how we came to be on Earth were religious ones. Without our understanding of evolution and the origin of the Earth and the universe, it is very understandable that people would default to a divine origin. I don't think its fair to point to the religious beliefs of the founding fathers (whatever they might have been)as evidence that they would have wanted a Christian nation. Many of them would likely have very different beliefs (Jefferson certainly comes to mind) if they were exposed to this critical scientific understanding. People believed a lot of things back then that we now know to be untrue. Its a ginned up argument by the right that sounds compelling if you don't think about it for more than a minute (which they can count on in most cases).

You need but look at the fact that the roots of the currently referenced Evangelical movement largely emerged after the first great awakening and after the American Revolution. So, as many of the currently held beliefs and specifics that distinguish the current Evangelical movement had not yet been manifested as they would be in the second and third awakenings.

I'm admitadly not some profesor steeped in deep research into colonial and revolutionary religion, but I think this and a reference to wikipedia, or any real look into the specifics of the Great Awakenings, will largely confirm what I've stated if one keeps in mind the roots of what is currently refered to as "Evangelist" Theology.

Jefferson is an excellent example. He was extreemly liberal in his views YET he didn't abandon a belief in God, hence the deism.

I agree with you in saying that it's premature to judge what the Founding Fathers would ascribe to in light of what we know today. But I'm pretty certain they wanted to keep it wide open on all fronts. Not necesarily because we can say for certain which way they would have gone, rather because they saw wisdom in keeping things as open as possible. But statements like "nor prohibit the free exercise thereof" (refering of course to religion) indicates that they held the right to religious, even if irrational in the view of some, thought and ideas to be open game.

I don't think those mentioned individuals could have easily fathomed their paradigms without God somewhere in it.

I don't have issues with many of the values, especialy those shared by the Fathers you mention, it's what you center them on (or in my perception what lacks at the center) that I take issue with. There are a great many Human secularist values that I think a great many of the theologicaly minded people of this world could really gain by implimenting. But just because you can learn alot from someone doesn't mean you should trust them to be your teacher.

No one wants to ban religion. I just don't want it to have any influence on policy. Policy should me made on facts, not fantasy or superstition. God told George Bush to invade Iraq and look where that got us.

It was, after all, no oversight that the word "God," much less "Jesus," appears nowhere in our Constitution.

 

Yes and this reinforced with a strong message in the 1st amendment sends a very clear message that the people who set up the framework for our government did not want a theocracy...

I know the other side had their supporters and the issue was contentious even in the 18th century but the people who wanted a state religion lost their argument.  To use probably an over simple analogy...let's say there is legislation proposed.  There is a heated debate and the vote is close.  The losing side can't say "well the vote was so close we are going to still view our position as the law of the land".  They can't and neither should the revisionist historians who want to see the Wall of Seperation taken down.  But what is problematic is in the intervening time they have breached the Wall whether it be with "God" on our money (isn't that ironic the last I heard God wasn't about money), then in our Pledge of Allegiance and now in many governmental policies...all these breaches of the 1st amendment after the fact give the would-be theocrats the foundation for their revisionist propaganda...

I know these are shopworn examples, but they remain relevant.

 

Maybe but there is nothing wrong to try to make the discussion as simple as possible even if the arguments are not new ones.  I think some on the left are giving some credibility to too much of what the theocracy supporters claim by engaging in discourse about this issue.  I think if we say "yes Christianity is deeply rooted in American culture but the founders were explicit about not mixing religion and politics" and stick to that, it would be the best argument albeit simple...

No one wants to ban religion. I just don't want it to have any influence on policy.

What the hell is the difference? Not to be rude but if the objects to which the majority of a populace dedicates themselves cannot be an influence on policy then you cannot in anyway be genuinely pro-democracy. You can disagree all you want with the policy and reasons for such in a democracy, but once you deny the majority to make the policy just because they don't fit your perception of ration within the finite and flawed confines of your grasp on reality then you cannot honestly say that you are for any true democracy or representative government. Heck to even suppose that the macro issues in policy have definative answers in logic, reason or science is inane. There are simply too many facets left as assumptions in such large calculations for the logical formulae of mere mortal men to ever calculate anything that's going to be more certain towards success than gut reactions can be. You are living in a fantasy world where logic and ration are simply words you use to feel empowered. You are among the most deluded of souls if you think raw intellect or reason or logical paradigms can solve the substantive issues of the day. Just sit back and observe the demographic colapse of the first world over the next fifty years if you have any question as to the impotence and futility of raw appeal "facts" to formulate overarching policy for any or all governments and peoples.

God told George Bush to invade Iraq and look where that got us.

For one so ready to claim the fiat of facts you're sure ready to state incorrect ones.

H.R., I believe this is a very very important point, and I am glad you brought it up for discussion.

The *whole point* of Secular Humanism is that, as a philosophy, it invites skepticism. Oh, wait... It's *founded* on a principle of skepticism with respect to delivered wisdom, by anyone claiming to be a teacher. Much like the scientific method, secular humanism invites independent validation of authoritative teaching.

As a consequence, your point that "But just because you can learn alot from someone doesn't mean you should trust them to be your teacher." is essentially moot: It is true but not supportive of your conclusion. Secular humanists learn not from a teacher, but rather as a joint exercise in learning from perceived reality, and validated by experience.

Secular humanists do not claim to be teachers, they claim to be students.

Finally, though it's not stated explicitly in the Secular Humanist Declaration, a central pillar of the philosophy (a "faith" if you will), is that reality is discoverable and that said discoveries are (must be) shareable and subject to investigation and validation by all who choose to try.

That is, incommensurable subjective experiences ("revelations," "oceanic feelings," "near death experiences," etc.), no matter by whom reported, are, as evidence of reality, right out.

J. McCutchen "JmacSF"

San Francisco. CA

They did not, however, create a nation where Christian scripture was meant to be authoritative, where Christianity was subsidized and endorsed by the state, or where Christianity was considered a prerequisite for civic participation

 

Michelle's argument with Dr. Blackton (if that's what it is for I think there's no daylight twixt on the pt) distracts somewhat from the real point here - the FF's intended in the First Amend. a separation of church and state and the exercise of freedom of  all religion - ALL means even the Jacobin line - commuhnisses, transhumans (old Trekkies???), Klignons, etc

This is an extension of my questions down below. But if a revelation is available to all who seek it properly, yet never in the realm of the empiricaly provable, is it then inherently outside of a secular humanist perception of reality?

Secular humanists learn not from a teacher, but rather as a joint exercise in learning from perceived reality, and validated by experience.

I certainly look for validation in experience. That is the foundation of my faith. It's not empiricaly discovered, but it is personal validation. That validation has, as forthcoming extensions, the need to accept some sources as bona fide and authoritative teachers. So while my whole theology is based on a personal validating experience not all my acts or knowledge proceeds directly from such, that is I don't seek a personal validating experience for every Item but I take the key and foundational experience(s) as the foundation for my 'acts of faith' much in the way that may a scientist accepts many concepts learned about as simply being true, or true enough to be the basis for later work. I'm not sure if secular humanism demands that your validated experience must be conveyable empiricaly, if it does then I'm not able to abide, personaly, this aspect of secular humanism. But if personaly validating experiences, even if confined to the subjective observances of the individual, can be seen, for the individual, as legitimate then I may be, at least in part, humanist.

Finally, though it's not stated explicitly in the Secular Humanist Declaration, a central pillar of the philosophy (a "faith" if you will), is that reality is discoverable and that said discoveries are (must be) shareable and subject to investigation and validation by all who choose to try.

Does this universal testing by every individual demand that they, or at leat one of them, must be able to validate and share these things beyond the empirical realm. I mean can you have shareable investigative and validating means that is available to all who try but inherently beyond the bounds of the empirical?

Caveat: I speak for myself not as a representative of any particular community; what I write here is based on my study so far, and is subject to update as I improve my understanding...

In direct answer to your question, and to Ellen's question:

But if a revelation is available to all who seek it properly, yet never in the realm of the empiricaly provable, is it then inherently outside of a secular humanist perception of reality?

The short answer is no. It is not inherently outside a secular humanist perception of reality. However such revelations have such a long history of inconsistency and abuse that such reports are subject to extra-strict testing.

A bit of hair-splitting semantics too... I have not seen the secular humanists using the phrase "empirically provable": The secular humanist philosophy as I understand it takes the same approach as the scientific community. Conjectures transition to hypotheses to theories to "laws" as they are observed repeatedly and refined by the shared experience of the community. (Remember that a "law" is simply an observation for which no counterexamples have been found after thorough study, not an explanation for how a phenomenon works.

In a way, the language of secular humanism does not really contain a concept of "empirical proof". The goal is to gain consensus about reality in a way that we can basically count on those statements as if they were true, knowing that someone may someday find a counterexample. Most likely, new experience leads to adjustments that affect boundary conditions. A great example is Newtonian physics, which work well enough to serve as a set of "laws" with respect to my bicycle and car, but not so well when we get to relativistic situations. Newton's "laws" are not sufficient to allow GPS to function directly, and require adjustment due to the relativistic effects of gravity. (I was fascinated that early in the implementation of GPS, the enginers had a configuration setting that to select between relativistic computations versus Newtonian computations. Once launched, the GPS operators determined that the relativistic mode was required!)

I imagine many secular humanists entirely reject the possibility of metaphysical experience, many others allow for the possibility but see it happening any time soon, and a subgroup that accepts that possibility and is looking forward to seeing evidence of it.

There are very very few people that think that all of reality is known, so they generally leave room for new knowledge.

Here I must speak for myself and nobody else: The way I understand it, there is plenty of room for joy in "the real world". Just Thursday, my wife, my brother and I were enjoying a wonderful thunderstorm on his front porch. We celebrate experience with unmitigated joy (and other feelings too...) just like people who attribute some aspects of their lives to metaphysical forces.

I hope my response to your previous up-thread question is mostly sufficient for this question too.

Does this universal testing by every individual demand that they, or at leat one of them, must be able to validate and share these things beyond the empirical realm.

Perhaps I don't understand your question. If not, try to bear with me. As I understand it, yes, the basic idea is that concepts are considered "real" only when people can count on them as if they were true, and that tends to require that their experiences be empirically observable (Thst's going a little bit out on a limb, though; these may be "boundary condition" questions...)

I mean can you have shareable investigative and validating means that is available to all who try but inherently beyond the bounds of the empirical?

I do not claim certainty one way or the other. I don't think there is a group of secular humanism police that says that people aren't allowed to investigate metaphysical experiences! :-) :-) It is up to people to share their experiences however they wish. And if they discover that their shared metaphysical experiences really work for them, then they can probably talk others into trying it, and if it works for them too, then it's possible to start accepting the phenomenon as "real".

I'm not sure if secular humanism demands that your validated experience must be conveyable empiricaly, if it does then I'm not able to abide, personaly, this aspect of secular humanism. But if personaly validating experiences, even if confined to the subjective observances of the individual, can be seen, for the individual, as legitimate then I may be, at least in part, humanist.

I believe the philosophy addresses the relationships among individuals acting responsibly toward each other and among the members of the community. Therefore, the question of legitimacy is only in the realm of these relationships and interactions, not in the realm of personal experience. In this way, it's "philosophically libertarian": Believe what you wish, and you are welcome to share your beliefs with anyone willing to listen.

It's when someone claiming metaphysical privilege starts imposing his/her will or beliefs on members of the community unsupported by independently verified experience, that secular humanists "cry foul".

In fact, that's the conceptual framework that caused me to respond to your post. The important point of secular humanism is not that one isn't permitted to feel that his/her experiences are personally legitimate. It is rather that simply being a teacher (in the prophetic sense) is not a sufficient condition for faithful acceptance of that person's teachings by the community.

In a way, this concept in secular humanism requires some discipline: It would be easier (for me) if I could simply be faithfully certain of the truthfulness of representatives of a given religion, and could simply follow the rules as they've been set forth, certain of my path. Based on my experience, however, it's just not that straightforward.

This isn't to say that a life lived by faith is easy, by the way. As far as I can tell, secular humainism simply asks its adherents to exchange one discipline (living a life of faith as expressed in a religious tradition) for another discipline (living life according to a set of principles that we can be sure we don't understand fully, but trying anyway).

I recently read The President of Good and Evil by Peter Singer, who I understand to be a relatively well-esteemed modern philosopher. The premise of the work was determining what ethical framework Bush operated under, and if it was defensible. I think his argument is a pretty solid response to this very question. Basically, he talks about public reasons and justifications, to be used in the discussion of public policy. I'm a poor philosopher, so I'll quote the relevant passages.

First, he explains the terms:

Philosophers and political theorists holding a wide variety of philosophical views use the terms "public reason" and "public justification" to describe a broad framework for a discussion in which everyone in a community can take part. Supporters of the idea of public justification see democratic politics not so much as a battle for power, settled by elections, but rather as a kind of public conversation about issues of common concern, with a decision-procedure for reaching temporary closure on these issues when the time for action has come. When we take part in this conversation, we seek to justify our views to others, and in so doing we should acknowledge the fact of political and religious pluralism. We should show that we recognize that we live in a community with a diversity of political and religious views. Hence we should offer reasons that can appeal to all, not only to other members of our own community of belief. Otherwise there can be no public conversation that embraces the entire society; we are implicitly dividing society into separate communities that do not seek to persuade each other. That is a recipe for increasing antagonism and mutual hostility between separate groups, divided along lines of belief. From Northern Ireland to Sudan, in Nigeria and in India, we have many examples of such societies, and the destructive conflicts to which they give rise, from past history and from our own times. Debates within a broad framework of public reason are one way to cross the divisions that separate these communities of belief.

Then he provides an example:

Now take another issue. Suppose someone says, "We should clone human beings because aliens have told us to do so." We would, if we were to take this ridiculous claim seriously, ask for evidence that these aliens really exist, that they have told us to clone humans, and that there is some reason why we should do what they tell us to do. Suppose that the response to our questions is, "I have encountered these aliens in moments of deep despair, and they have entered into my head and my heart, and I love them and know I can trust them. Open your hearts to them, and you too will come to love them and see that they are right." If we are told that no evidence for the existence of the aliens will be offered, and we should take these claims on faith, we would, rightly, refuse to pay them any further attention. So suppose, then, that someone tells us that human embryos should not be destroyed because "human life is a sacred gift from our Creator." He also refuses to offer evidence, and when asked how he knows this, says it is a matter of faith, and we should open our heart to the Lord, and to Jesus, his only son, and we too will see things as he does. That answer may be more widely held than the justification that the bizarre Raelian sect has given for setting out to produce a human clone, but as a justification for public policy within the sphere of public reason, it fares no better.

Finally, he explains the reason why your objection is completely unfounded:

At this point those seeking to extend the influence of religion into politics will object that to define public reason in a manner that excludes appeals to religious faith is to do what the theocrats do, but in reverse: to impose a secular framework on public life, thereby unfairly excluding religious perspectives. This sounds like a strong argument, until we realize that it is not religious beliefs, as such, that are excluded from the realm of public reason, but methods of reaching those beliefs that are not accessible to public justification of a kind that we accept in other area of decision-making. There is no reason or principle why claims about the existence of God, and what he or she wishes us to do, should not be part of public political debate. The problem arises only when religious belief is put into a realm that protects it from the usual rules of scrutiny. ... if, at some point, further inquiry is cut off with an appeal to faith, then the position is not one that other reasonable people have any grounds to accept, and the original recommendation for [the policy in question] has not been defended within the framework of public reason. It is not the content of the belief - whether it is about God, or gods, or evil spirits, or curses - that determines whether it is a matter of public reason, but the way in which the belief is held and defended.

Having read all of that, I have a somewhat related question for you. If you reject the principles of the Enlightenment upon which democracy was founded (that whole bit about policy being driven by reality as determined through empirical evidence), how could you even argue that democracy is good? Appeals to faith always simplify to an advanced version of "Because I said so," which is far more consistent with an authoritarian form of government.

Thank you and the other individual who's responded thus far to this frame of thought.

Regarding-

It's when someone claiming metaphysical privilege starts imposing his/her will or beliefs on members of the community unsupported by independently verified experience, that secular humanists "cry foul".

What of times in which there is either imposition by secular humanists against (whether they see it as thus or not) those who claim metaphysical connection? OR what if the claimed metaphysical imposition of will is not as verifiable or certain as is claimed by those who claim to be capable of discerning what is and isn't "inependently verified"?

I also appreciate an opportunity to think, argue and debate. That's how we refine our thinking.

What of times in which there is either imposition by secular humanists against (whether they see it as thus or not) those who claim metaphysical connection?

Freedom of personal conscience: My understanding is that secular humanist philosophy explicitly prevents imposition of belief sets by one group on another, so I think that your first question can be answered: That sort of imposition is outside the acceptable bounds of behavior. (Are you asking, for example, whether one group can tell another group not to get together to worship as they feel is appropriate? My answer is that the philosophy would not tolerate such an imposition. Secular humanism has come into being in reaction to exactly such inexcusable impositions.)

Then again, you may have something else in mind, and I may be responding to the wrong question.

OR what if the claimed metaphysical imposition of will is not as verifiable or certain as is claimed by those who claim to be capable of discerning what is and isn't "inependently verified"?

Sorry, I don't know what you are asking here. Try rephrasing the generic question or providing an example.

Fair enough.

I'll try again.

Look for example, at the disclaimers given by those trying to answer for secular humanism. Now take that same spirit and send it, as it must needs be sent, to every member of that community. That gives you a whole community in which there is not, beyond swaths of colaboration on sites referenced, any real certainty. It is of course more a philosophy than an organization, correct?

This all leads to terribly complicating problems. As you approach, for example, any issue of any real size you start to run into unknowns that render any real concensous as either impossible or one in which great numbers of consenting individuals are forced to take many statements and views "as is" in order for them to ever make any real kind of choice on the matter. Because in societal issues one doesn't often have the benefit of indefinently awaiting a secure answer.

So imagine a case in which most of those involved felt their decision was the one most reasonable and rational in light of known factors, since they cannot know for certain the actual nature of such a large question and implications of their decision they are forced to go merely by, at least in some degree, subjectively dictated biased effected conclusions--even if they all claim to heed human secularist ideals.

Now say in light of what is available to these individuals they see no infringment on the freedom of others. In their perspective any points of infringment claimed are just claims made in the spirit of a contrary, and seemingly 'illogical' claimants, rather than actual points of infringment. In other words, those that are crying 'foul' are judged by the vast majority, if not all, of those claiming some objectivity, to simply be furthering their anti-secular humanist agenda RATHER than having an actual legitimate complaint. But as this complaint is not visible to the vast majority of those on the secular humanist ticket, due to restraints inherent in humanity's capacity to fathom and utterly comprehend the issue and all it's angles, AND due to the possible disintrest, or even bias against said complaining entity, of some claiming secular humanism, their cries are allowed to be dismissed as invalid simply because any who claim they have validity are discounted for having alterier motives or connections to the anti-secularist agenda or something inherent in the current perception of secular-humanism makes proper discernment on the issue difficult if not impossible.

So you have a movement in which no one can ever speak for it as an individual BUT the whole of the movement can be manipulated to means and actions very much outside it's claimed ideals WITHOUT most of those claiming to be in the movement being conscious of the laps.

I apologize for the length of this and how it may at some points seem convoluted. I'm really trying to convey the issues I see as clearly as possible. Just as a potentialy helpfull aside I'd like to reference what I see as an intellegent addressing of the issues of anything, even a liberal ideology like secular humanism, reaching problems inherent to institutionalization. If you've ever seen the Connections series you'll likely recognize the name James Burke. I'd like to reference a talk he has available online--

http://smithsonianassociates.org/programs/burke/burke.asp

It's about a 45 min talk but worth the time, in my opinion. At one point he demonstrates essentialy that we only find what we are conditioned to look for. And that's roughly my point with secular humanism. There are inherent assumptions that follow even ideologies intened to do away with the appearance of assumptions. These can even be more insidious since many really come to believe that they are more disconected from assumptions than they really are. Thus you have the potential to inflict, as a community, the same crimes against other ideologies and world views as the community was edified to fight against.

Those examples sited by Mr. Singer are presented as though they are examples that are equivilant to what I advocate AND the reasons I advocate them.

But even that aside I would call your mind to the policy advocated on grounds that it is based on enlightenment ideals.

From your quotation of Mr. Singer--

The problem arises only when religious belief is put into a realm that protects it from the usual rules of scrutiny. ... if, at some point, further inquiry is cut off with an appeal to faith, then the position is not one that other reasonable people have any grounds to accept, and the original recommendation for [the policy in question] has not been defended within the framework of public reason.

Enlightenment ideals, if they could transcend inherent human limitations, would surely be my choice. But the problem comes in our acceptance, and silencing of the debate, on grounds that one group is using 'more' or 'more fully' enlightenment ideals in their analysis of the situation. They seem to utterly ignore the fact that the theories of inquiry profered by the enlightenment hit the wall of human limitations, hidden bias, limited perception and incapacities to comprehensively analyze, without the use of significant and limiting assumptions, with a resounding thud that often renders ideals and claims seeking attatchment to the authority of the reason paradigms born of the enlightenment null and void for their incompleteness. Yet by the very nature of the claims of enlightened thinking and the manifestations of human capacity limitations the line must always be drawn in ground and at points that are incomplete and hardly capable of being conclusively and certifiably based in purely enlightenment ideals and theory.

That comes to your question. What difference is a democracy that is led by a majority that thinks that God is telling them largely what to do or one in which the majority is under the delusion that the ideals of the enlightenment have given them a mandate any clearer or less problematic than those in the 'theocentric' democracy? Both are, at their core, operating under a base that is not verifiable or solid, one that's subjective. One claims that they are at 100 instead of 75 and as 100 is 25 integers closer to positive infinity that they should be the ones we listen to and count as 'rational' or 'reasonable' by the fact that they are demonstrably closer to infinity in their tally.

Democracy generaly works because a populace wise enogh to have any staying power would recognize the issues with either extreem. Either the discounting of claims as irrational simply because there are no empirical means of measurement beyond people's claimed personal experiences or the simple forfeiture of evidence because "the bible tells you so".


This statement below is rather interesting--

Otherwise there can be no public conversation that embraces the entire society; we are implicitly dividing society into separate communities that do not seek to persuade each other. That is a recipe for increasing antagonism and mutual hostility between separate groups, divided along lines of belief. From Northern Ireland to Sudan, in Nigeria and in India, we have many examples of such societies, and the destructive conflicts to which they give rise, from past history and from our own times. Debates within a broad framework of public reason are one way to cross the divisions that separate these communities of belief.

The above goes under the whole assumption that "Debates within a broad framework of public reason are one way to cross the division" Yet there is no conclusive proof for this statement. The very ongoing existance of a pluralistic society demands confrontation. But to demand that this confrontation must either be violent and destructive OR fit within the confines of your perception of what is and is not proper "public reason" is absured and arrogant. The very fact that human reason and ration and logic are confined to indefinent impotency in coming to conclusive answers that don't have massive assumptions as their underlying pillars should lead the logical human to keep open the idea that debate and dialog transcends the mere confines of enlightenment ideology.

For ages there's been concensous by most of the educated world that the precepts of my faith were in many realm overly cautious and detrimental to the prosperity of individuals. Things like tithing, abstainment from certain substances were all intially seen as eccentricities of a dogmatic cult. Yet come today and our eccentricities have landed us, as to material and physical well being, better off than many in the world. What's to say that current views and takes on enlightenment based thought will be any more correct in their current analysis of the state of things than the enlightened thinkers of the past?


This is my issue with the proposed 'enlightened' 'reality.' It is as pron to the inconclusivness and unreachable certainty that you find in many religious dogmas.

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