Grand Strategy as Order Building
In recent posts, Anne-Marie and I have been laying out some of the ideas that will inform the Princeton Project on National Security’s forthcoming report. The discussion among readers has been excellent. A conviction that many of us share is that America needs to develop a post-post-911 grand strategy. That is, it is not enough simply to promise to fight the “global war on terror” (or GWOT) better than the last guys did. Instead, we need to pull back and ask more basic questions about America’s interests, threats, and opportunities.
If Tom Friedman were making this point – and he probably has or eventually will – he would say: what we don’t need is a GWOT 2.0, what we need is a PATC 2.0. Ok, what is that? PATC stands for Present at the Creation, which is the title of Dean Acheson’s famous memoirs in which he describes how he and his colleagues built the postwar American-led system. My point is that we need to think about international order building today with the same ambition and imagination as Acheson and Co. did with PATC 1.0
So here are what I think are the key ideas for a new American grand strategy – or PATC 2.0:
1- Grand Strategy as Order Building
This is the point that Anne-Marie and I are advancing. Namely, that in thinking about American national security we should not be fixed on a specific threat but rather on creating a congenial and cooperation-friendly international environment in which the United States can accomplish a wide variety of national security goals. A critical assumption in this argument is that today the United States confronts an unusually diverse and diffuse array of threats and challenges. Indeed, when we try to imagine what the premier threat to the United States will be in 2015 or 2020, it is not easy to say with any confidence that it will be X, or Y, or Z.
Moreover, even if were could identify X, Y, or Z as the premier threat around which all others turn, it is very likely it will be complex and interlinked with lots of other international moving parts. Global pandemics are connected to failed states, homeland security, international public health capacities, etc. Terrorism is related to the Middle East peace process, economic and political development, non-proliferation, intelligence cooperation, etc. The rise of China is related to alliance cooperation, energy security, democracy promotion, the WTO, management of the world economy, etc. So again, we are back to building the cooperative infrastructure that will allow the United States to tackle specific yet shifting security challenges.
One of the arguments that Frank Fukuyama and I made in the Princeton Project on National Security grand strategy report of last fall was that we should shift American grand strategy from a “war on terrorism” to an Asia-centered grand strategy. The judgment we were making is that over the long run, the rise of China will have a more profound impact on American national security than incremental shifts up or down in the fortunes of transnational terrorism. This is not to belittle the al-Qaida threat – we offer ideas on this danger as well. But the point is that it is important for the United States to pull back and invest in the creation of an international environment to handle, well, come what may.
So order building can be defined as investment in international cooperative frameworks – that is, rules, institutions, partnerships, networks, standby capacities, social knowledge, etc -- in which the United States operates. To build international order is to increase the global stock of “social capital” – which is the term Pierre Bourdieu, Robert Putnam, and others have used to define the actual and potential resources and capacities within a political community, manifest in and through its networks of social relations, that are available for solving collective problems.
This brings us back to PATC 2.0. In building order, we are in essence returning to a type of grand strategy that America has long pursed with great success. This is where I have a friendly little debate with John Lewis Gaddis and others about American grand strategy in the 1940s. The traditional argument about American grand strategy during the Cold War is that the Soviet threat drove American thinking – it brought us containment, extended deterrence, alliances, and a willingness to bind the country to multilateral agreements. There is great truth in this argument. But I argue in After Victory and elsewhere that the United States what not just pursuing a Cold War grand strategy, it was also creating order and community among the democracies in the West. The United States was not just attempting to defend the “free world” from Stalin’s Red Army but it was also trying to prevent a return to the 1930s. It was this fear of depression and chaos within the West itself that led Acheson and his colleagues, at least in the first instance, to seek to create a stable, open, and managed postwar international system.
To be sure, the Soviet threat loomed large by the late 1940s – and anti-communist was indeed at the center of American national security. But even as the Cold War intensified, Washington pursued a more general strategy of order building. NATO was the capstone of this effort to bind the Western countries together and thereby face the Soviet Union from a position of strength.
So grand strategy can be “positional” in orientation – that is, aimed at a specific enemy or threat, or it can be “milieu” oriented – that is, aimed at strengthening the wider environment in which the United States operates. In a world where it is the “unknown unknowns” that worry us, a milieu strategy makes greater sense.
2- A Vision of International Order
If grand strategy is order building, the next question is: so what sort of order – or milieu – should we be seeking to create? Don’t focus on threats or strategies – focus on the desired vision we have of international order and, after this, talk about strategies to get there. Indeed, one of the best ways to distinguish different ideological positions on American national security is simply to ask the question: what sort of international order would you like to see in place in 2015 or 2020?
Many people have noted Bush’s Wilsonian rhetoric about the promotion of freedom and democracy, but I am skeptical that Bush’s vision of international order is anything remotely like that of Wilson or the other liberal internationalist presidents of the post-1945 era. In fact, it might well be that one of the attractions of democracy promotion for Bush and other conservatives is that is relieves the United States of having to get too engaged and committed at the global level. After all, if democracy solves all the great threats that face us, we don’t need to get tangled up in global institutions and commitments. A world of democracy is one where we can be sovereign, separate, exceptional, and unilateral. There is a big difference between promoting democracy so that America can wash its hands of global problems and promoting democracy so we can strengthen democracy community and establish more effective and far-reaching forms of cooperation.
The liberal internationalist vision of order includes the promotion of democracy – indirectly, bottom up, riding the waves of modernization, etc. – but it does not begin or end with democracy promotion.
I think a liberal vision of international order includes the following aspects.
(A) Open markets. We all know the reasons. Trade and investment are drivers of growth and development. They create vested interests across the global in stable and continuous political relations. They provide vehicles for the integration of states – large and small – outside the Western system. If China is to become a “stake holder” in the existing global system rather than a challenger, the first and most specific incentives for doing so will be through its economic integration. The alternatives to open markets in an international order are market relations organized along national, regional, or imperial lines. We have been down those paths before.
(B) Social bargain. If the United States and its partners are to uphold an global system of open markets, it will need to redouble its commitment to the social bargain. That is, it will need to strengthen and reinforce the commitment to social protections from economic distress. We call this the welfare state. There are losers in a system of open markets, but winners win more – so some of those winnings must be used for social protection and adjustment. Likewise, if the United States wants to see other countries buy into this open order, it will need to help and support those states establish the sorts of Western social support structures that will allow for stable-emerging democracy to co-exist open trade and investment.
(C) Multilateral, rules-based governance. This means that the United States is committed to exercising its power through an array of regional and global institutions. This was one of the great innovations of PATC 1.0. The United States and its partners put into place permanent governance institutions – ones that they themselves would dominate – to provide ongoing streams of cooperation needed to manage growing realms of complex interdependence. The conviction here is that rules and institutions are useful tools for the United States, multiplying its power in many ways.
As I have argued many times, a rule-based international order empowers rather than constrains the United States by structuring bargains and facilitating cooperation that benefit both the mighty and the weak. By getting other states to operate within a set of multilateral rules and institutions, the United States reduces its need to continuously pressure and coerce other states to follow America’s lead. The United States does accept some restrictions on how it can use its power, but in doing so, it increases its influence by striking consensual bargains to ensure the cooperation of other states. The rules and institutions that are created serve as an “investment” in the preservation of America’s power advantages – something that is particularly important today as the United States prepares for a more diffuse distribution of global power.
(D) Cooperative security. In this liberal vision of international order, the United States will remain connected in close alliance ties with other democratic countries. NATO and the U.S.-Japan alliance are at the core of this alliance system – and these security pacts will be expanded and strengthened. The alternative vision is the Bush administration’s coalitions of the willing.
With the end of the Cold War, the American alliance system has seemed less vital to some people. What these folks forget, however, is that the postwar security pacts have always been about more than simply deterrence and containment of Soviet communism. The alliances have also performed the function of providing “political architecture” for the political community that bridges Europe, North America, and East Asia. The alliances provide mechanisms for each side to send signals of restraint and commitment. They provide institutional channels to “do business” across the Atlantic and Pacific. They keep the United States engaged in Europe and Asia – and they allow leaders in Europe and Asia to be engaged and connected to Washington.
Importantly, the American alliance commitment to Europe and East Asia and the wider security cooperation fostered by the alliances have been about more than just collective defense. They are not only tools of power, but they also provide the bulwark for “zones of peace” that rest on a shared political identity. As such, the Bush administration’s view that alliances should give way to coalitions of the willing is to diminish the deeper logic of America’s postwar approach to international order. Cooperation security must be the centerpiece to PATC 2.0.
Note that in this vision of international order, democracy promotion is not a key feature as such – yet it is a liberal vision. What is going on? The answer is that if the United States succeeds in reestablishing and strengthening PATC 2.0, the international order itself – frameworks, open markets, security partnerships – become the ways and means by which democracy is spread and new democracies are integrated into the system. It is a different way of thinking about democracy promotion as a national security imperative. The focus is on strengthening the international order – and the social capital that is manifest in a functioning community of democracies – and, by so doing, you create a more favorable environment for countries to come into the democratic fold.
3- Hegemony and American Power
One of the interesting debates that Anne-Marie and others have been having is: should the United States make remaining the sole superpower a first-order national security goal? The Bush administration has enshrined this goal – no peer competitor – in its basic national security doctrine. Anne-Marie has argued that “we need to be strong enough, and spend enough, to protect ourselves, secure our vital interests, and promote our values. But we do not need to spend enough to be the world’s ONLY great power, to be the world’s policeman, lender of last resort, and problem-solver.”
I essentially agree with Anne-Marie on this. I do think the United States has a unique – and even indispensable – role in keeping the global system open and stable. Certainly, the United States uniquely has the power to disrupt global relations. This is the negative power of a hegemon. But the United States also has the positive power of a hegemon to support global rules and institutions, provide public goods, and bring countries together to solve problems. In this sense, I am a American hegemonist – liberal hegemonist to be sure – that believes that the world does not need to fall back to a more traditional balance of power system. But my point is that to remain the leading state the United States has to believe in enlightened ways that will keep it at the center of the global system.
In addressing the basic question of whether the United States should try to remain alone as a global superpower, it seems to me that two observations are critical.
(a) The first is that the United States is not automatically indispensable. That is, if the United States neglects its liberal hegemonic duties, fails to provide public goods, and puts itself at odds with a consensual, rules-based order, other states will gradually find ways to oppose and work around the United States. There are alternatives to an American dominated world order.
(b) The second is that the distribution of power will continue to evolve, and over the long-term America’s preponderant global power position will give way to other rising powers. In some ways, this is already happening. The United States can stay on top – defined in terms of relative material power capabilities – for a long time. And no single state may replace the United States with a similar commanding portfolio of power. But America’s relative power advantages will decline over the long term.
If these two assumptions (contingent indispensability and gradual relative decline) are in fact true, the implications for American grand strategy are clear. The United States should be investing today in the rules and institutions of the global order – making itself indispensable and laying the groundwork for a world where other global powers lurk. This, of course, is precisely what “grand strategy as order building” is all about.
In the Bush vision, international order arises exclusively from U.S. preeminence, with America wielding its unchecked power to keep others in line and enforce international hierarchy. In this alternative vision – grand strategy as order building – international order arises from the coupling of America’s preeminence with its liberal founding principles, with the United States wielding its power to craft consensual and legitimate mechanisms of international governance.
Great piece
To summarize the points:
Grand Strategy as Order Building
Open Markets
Social Bargain
Multilateral, Rules-based Governance
Cooperative Security
Liberal Hegemony
Perhaps you can somehow integrate in a couple of other concepts:
Universal Connectivity, which has to do with the internet and the human/cultural awakening it supports, but also extends to the idea that nations which understand each other, talk to each other, can even manage to think like each other based on exposure to use of language, are less likely to polarize and attack each other. Security through increased connectivity.
Universal Quality Education. This is not to necessarily promote US financing of education systems around the world, but to promote a universally accessible liberal education, which allows every human to get the training needed both to succeed in a global economy and to assimilate into a global liberal framework. This would for example include finding ways of injecting basic liberal notions into strict religious training systems, which might otherwise be rejectionist and even violence-prone.
Also, another interesting theme is energy-politics. Many emerging powers and also otherwise marginalized states have oil and gas as their ticket to first-class status in the new global order.
The US cannot stop this, but can act to position itself as a broker of energy flows and extraction, which has been doing.
This clearly has the potential to be the main ongoing turf battle of this century.
What principles should apply here, in terms of US policy and in terms of ideas that speak to equity, shared prosperity, decency?
Perhaps this item could tie in with a point about the environment, combining how we use its fruits for growth and protect/sustain it ... in a similar way that nations can sell rare resources for profit and prosperity, but also view themselves as members of a larger cooperative community based on treating other nations well.
May 12, 2006 8:23 AM | Reply | Permalink
Since this posting is so lengthy, why don't we start off by questioning the first analogy -- Ikenberry's reference to Acheson and his Present At The Creation.
We can notice, at once, that Truman and Marshall were confronted with an highly energized, militarily powerful post-World War II Soviet Union seated on the Elbe. At the time there was no way to determine whether Stalin would accept the occupied marches of eastern Europe as adequate defensive spacing. A counterbalance -- Fortress Europe -- seemed the answer, and thus, the United States established NATO, funded the Marshall Plan, and subverted leftist political parties and trade unions throughout Western Europe.
But what is the state of the world today? Here's what Ikenberry and Slaughter say:
Their "critical assumption" is that the "United States confronts an unusually diverse and diffuse array of threats and challenges" of which the "premier" one is difficult to "imagine" or to predict with any "confidence."
If that's the case, the sensible policy is one of threat-specific ad hoc responses and particularized cooperative ventures with other nations where ours and their interests happen to be conjoined.
What we should be doing is taking away Ikenberry's and Slaughter's gold-plated shovels before they dig themselves -- and if they should ever get jobs in a future Democratic Administration, us -- into a hole.
May 12, 2006 9:09 AM | Reply | Permalink
Excellent essay.
You've pitched it at just the right level to appeal both to other intellectuals who will actually dig their teeth into it and critique and change and write about it, and hopefully, to practitioners who might someday actually do something about it through NGOs,partisan politics, pressure on Congress, executive branch, etc. etc.
I think a big contribution of the piece is to include the social welfare claim, and to put it second, rather than last. Too many of our foreign policy experts want to out-Repo the Repos, and demonstrate that we are as tough on terrorism and national security as they are. The CAP folks are a classic example; God bless 'em, but talking tough doesn't make an integrated foreign policy. Needs to be balanced with the social welfare imperatives of foreign policy. Otherwise it puts the foreign policy piece at odds with the fight for a more progresive domestic
program that must be the center of any campaign for a better America.
Jimpols is absolutely right about needing to include more attention to one of the big things that makes this moment in time unique -- the profound technological changes and the attendent tectonic societal changes as we move from an industrial to a post industrial knowledge based political economy, at home and abroad. The world is still spikey and not flat (per Friedman) but life has become more distributed and interconnected which the shorthand version of your essay doesn't address, yet which increasingly affects the structure and use of power in all its forms - military, economic, political.
Seems to me that your big challenge will be to keep social welfare/education/equity high on the agenda ('competitiveness' is one way, 'social cohesiveness' is another) despite the preferences of many 'high policy' types to squeeze it out; to keep the focus on forests and not weeds; and then to push the frame into the public debate beyond the campus cogniscenti and think tankers.
E
May 12, 2006 10:23 AM | Reply | Permalink
The best stylistic aspect of this essay is that it fits so well into a mindset I believe we can use. For many people, having the United States be number one is a major reason for their existence. In my case, this mainly comes out in international sports. I may be disabled and suriving on a shoestring budget but our team just did well. Life is ok.
Others extend this into international relations. Many people wanted to invade and conquer Iraq (in the secrecy of their own hearts) to show the world how powerful we are. By extension, they get to show how powerful they are. I say we need to get these people invested in putting their money where their mouths are.
If the United States is the greatest country in the world, why are we not exporting our greatness? If pandemics in Africa can create failed states that can harm us eventually, why are we so stingy with foreign aid? If educating the world means more people educated in Western values, why are we not spending more on proven models of educational success. All it takes is three meals a day for the school aged children and their parents can afford to let them go to school. Obviously, there are problems involving security and other more complicated issues but we are the United States. Let's start acting like we're the best.
John
For more go to my online journal.
May 12, 2006 12:56 PM | Reply | Permalink
I agree strongly that strengthening and building upon the liberal international order that the US helped establish post-WW II is critical and should be the organizing principle of AFP.
A couple of comments: (1) I probably believe more strongly in the need for US international leadership, at least in the medium term. I do so not so much from a nationalistic point of view, but rather from a Kindelberger/Mandelbaum/Haas/etc. belief that the type of cooperative international system we envision requires a strong guiding hand, a country that can assume a disproportionate share of costs and coax others into playing a constructive role -- in Mandelbaum's words, to provide public goods.
Over time, others may be able and willing to assume more of that role in various areas. Moreover, as the institutions and practices themselves are strengthened, the need for a such a benevolent hegemon may become less necessary. But for now and the likely foreseeable future, the US is the only possible option.
(2) The Order Building strategy is no easy task. I believe that you are correct that US post-WW II strategy derived not simply from the Soviet threat, but also from an attempt to avoid the errors and policies that led to the depression and WWII. The strategy you (and I) advocate, in essence, is a deepening and strengthening of the post-war international order to encompass additional countries (in particular China and Russia) and additional substantive issues. Here are a few hurdles.
(a) We are not emerging from the horrors of the twin shocks of the Great Depression and World War II. Those major dislocations "smoothed" the way for the cooperative system. They convinced the US to engage the international system like never before and convinced other countries that such a system made sense. Everyone was thinking big thoughts.
(b) We do not face anything like the Soviet threat at this time. Clearly, that threat contributed to our and our allies willingness to strike the bargains we did. It convinced us of the need to abandon our unilateralist conception of foreign policy and helped sustain our leadership as a contrast to the prospect of something worse, Soviet domination. The closest analog right now would be jihadists with a nuclear weapon. Although clearly a horrible, horrible prospect, I don't think that alone it will motivate Russia, China and others to become stakeholders in liberal international system (or even our allies to deepen existing institutions).
In a sense, the "easy" work is already done. The countries most likely to participate have signed on. I worry that absent the dislocations or security threat that helped spark the original "creation," it will be very difficult to take the system to the next level.
(c) The other factor that sustained American leadership and the international institutions it sponsored was the belief that the US was actually constructing a system that benefited all parties. I don't want to overstate this point, but there is certainly greater doubt about that proposition today.
Partly this is because the nations we are attempting to co-opt into the system have such different histories and perspectives. But even among our friends, our motives have come into doubt. That is in part structural. America's preponderance of power, particularly in the absence of a countervailing force such as the Soviet Union, is considered by many a danger unto itself. States are more likely to balance (even if it is "soft balancing") than bandwagon under such circumstances. In other words, the US is working against a headwind.
The other source of resistance stems from the Bush Administration's policies and rhetoric. Above all, the war in Iraq and its justification raise the possibility that the US will act to destabilize the international system and in disregard of the institutions and norms we believe should be strengthened and expanded. All of this reversible, but it makes a difficult task all the more so.
FWIW, here's a short review of Gaddis, Surprise, Security and the American Experience, that I wrote a couple of years ago. It addresses some of the same questions we're discussing here.
http://www.amcips.org/programs/policy_analysis_papers/age_of_terrorism.htm
Have a good weekend.
May 12, 2006 2:43 PM | Reply | Permalink
"we should shift American grand strategy from a “war on terrorism” to an Asia-centered grand strategy."
Why am I not surprised?
The US needs another massive "enemy" to drum up public fear of, and Osama just ain't filling the bill because he hasn't done anything in four years.
Pathetic. And the con rolls on.
Here's the bottom line, folks.
NONE of this addresses the fundamental issues of WHO is financing and running the states you all are preaching to - let alone the nature of the state itself (pointless of me to bring this up, I know, but, hey, correctness demands it.)
NONE of this addresses the flaws of the people actually running those states, and even less the flaws of the people voting for - or being oppressed by - those state actors.
Also, none of this adequately addresses the impact of massively destabilizing technologies which will come into existence over the next half century - nanotech, biotech, AI, possibly even cheap power.
In other words, this is the usual "pundit-speak" - long on words, short on specifics, and missing ALL the critical underlying issues of human nature and society.
May 12, 2006 3:05 PM | Reply | Permalink
The judgment we were making is that over the long run, the rise of China will have a more profound impact on American national security than incremental shifts up or down in the fortunes of transnational terrorism.
Finally, something I can agree with...but only conditionally. Unless the threat of a middle-east nuclear exchange is contained or eliminated there will be no predictable future.
May 12, 2006 5:33 PM | Reply | Permalink
In this, I would actually have to agree, but for a different reason.
Who says America gets to control anything? Right now, China is doing a full court press across Africa and South America, with Nigeria and the Mercosur countries.
The best America is going to able to manage is to respond appropriately in some cases. For the most part, even that won't be possible.
A couple of weeks ago, I listened to one of the NATO generals explaining that he was competing with the Chinese for joint military exercises with NATO countries. A few days ago, Nigeria allied itself with China, so much so that the Nigerian rebels threatened China. Yesterday, they started blowing up things.
That isnt the first time this has happened. CHina is making deals across the world, and quite a number of third world countries are choosing up sides, and more often than not, America is involuntarily finding itself not on the governments side.
I have to admit, I would love to live in the world you painted, but it is just not going to happen. What will happen will be a vastly accellerated replay over the next five years of the cold war, followed by a worldwide economic collapse that will make the early 2000's seem idyllic.
I wish you the best of luck. If there is anything I can do to help, just ask. I would love to be found wrong, I am not looking forward to what the next five years are going to be like.
May 12, 2006 7:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
the sensible policy is one of threat-specific ad hoc responses and particularized cooperative ventures with other nations where ours and their interests happen to be conjoined.
Well, that strategy sure has worked well for the last 5 years.
NATO was created to deal with the Soviet threat. The only time it ever intervened militarily was in the former Yugoslavia. The EU was created as a coal and steel trading organization. Its signal accomplishment has been the integration of Southern Europe (and now East-Central Europe) into European democratic and economic norms (open societies, open markets). ASEAN was created to stop communist expansion in Southeast Asia. It's now basically a regional stabilizing economic and political organization. None of these organizations have anything to do with the initial purposes for which they were created anymore, and they're all terrific and productive institutions.
Obviously strong multilateral institutions need to be checked occasionally by democratic processes, to make sure they have the consent of the people they affect. But anyone who can look at the last 20 years of American history and argue that we have been better off when we've acted uniilaterally, or only relied on "ad hoc coalitions"...well, I don't know which planet you've been watching..
"When God ariseth, and when he visiteth, what shall we answer!" - Rev. Benjamin Hancock
May 12, 2006 8:16 PM | Reply | Permalink
If there is a nuclear exchange in the middle east, it will increase the likelihood of China's strategic rise. China has no real dogs in that fight. It's the US's prestige that will be damaged and the US that will be required to extend itself to contain a war or rebuild in the aftermath. China will bide its time and continue to grow.
"When God ariseth, and when he visiteth, what shall we answer!" - Rev. Benjamin Hancock
May 12, 2006 8:19 PM | Reply | Permalink
Well Ikenberry is looking at the grand architecture here so it is unfair to criticize him for not specifying things in detail.
Looking at the grand architecture I am uneasy about accepting this homogenizing of the human race. There is something unappealing about the vision. I see too much of Fukuyama's "End of History" in it. Some kind of final exhausiton of the human spirit in a "Hegelian" terminus. I think that to some degree or another diversity and competition are healthy at the transcultural/transnational level. A universal liberal democratic order might actually turn out to be unhealthy for humanity. Why is there such a furious drive to "End History" and close the book on human evolution at the cultural level? There is no Archimedian point from which to pass final judgement. True we look at the world and from our western perspective we see ourselves as having found "the right way to live". And for all I know, it's true. But that's one of those things that might be an "unknown unknown".
p.s. 'unknown unknown' as in something we think we know but really don't because it is false.
May 12, 2006 8:32 PM | Reply | Permalink
Well, that strategy [threat-specific ad hoc responses and particularized cooperative ventures] sure has worked well for the last 5 years.
I get the ironic tone but don't get your drift. Any threats to the United States not met successfully over the past 5 years?
May 12, 2006 9:01 PM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen "JmacSF"
San Francisco. CA
The Post WWII alliance system, though not as moribund as many would have it, from its inception through the Cold War, was little more than a tool of US policy. The problem today is that we're still acting as if nothing much has changed in the world since 1989 except perhaps that we are eating more and and listening less.
It is time that we listened for all the reasons John mentions and not the least of which is that the US cannot sustain its power or protect its national interests if it continues to treat allies with diffidence and disdain. We must find ways to sustain a more cooperative less domineering posture in our international relations. To rebuild viable alliance structures, we must recognize real limits to our power. We must learn to let go creatively and allow other nations a real stake in the re-ordered system. Or perhaps the G-8, the OAS etc have actually made a difference lately, and I just missed it.
Two criticisms then of an otherwise solid effort:
1. The document should devote more attention to regional structures. This is a real political challenge but if anything, now with Bush Doctrine in tatters, the PNAC vision of America the Dominator, on its face so manifestly delusional, in practice so incredibly reckless, the task should be a bit easier.
The US with its partners must focus on the development and strengthening of regional means of dealing with regional problems along the lines of Steven Walt's concept of "Regional balancing". This requires real limits, real surrender of control, is not an easy sell to the US political order. . In the concrete, it means that we don't invade countries claiming that we're protecting the region when no nation in the region wants or needs our intervention. In the concrete, it means recognizing democratically elected governments like Hamas; recognizing Russia's primacy of interest in former soviet republics. It means that when US vice-presidents travel to Kazakhstan they shut the hell up. It means engaging Iran and distinguishing US national interests from Israel's.
2. The Problem of Nation-states and Globalization - a glaring omission. Globalization has diminished the attachment of citizens to the national and local civic structures. Peace, stability, US national security, and economic advantage depend in a very vital way on strengthening nation-states and their political/social substructures. Leaving aside the sorry state of our own reserves, "social capital" and structures of civic engagement aren't built at the UN or in Geneva or at Davos or posh G-8 venues but nationally and locally. Their considerable advantages notwithstanding, globalization and multinational ism undermine local sovereignty, initiative, attachments, democratic processes, the public trust, sense of efficacy and confidence.
anything
May 12, 2006 9:06 PM | Reply | Permalink
2400 US servicemen and women in Iraq are no longer able to respond to your query. But I am sure Osama bin-Laden would be happy to address your question via videotape. Several Janjaweed commanders in Sudan, and perhaps a Mr. Ahmadinejad of Iran, might be able to volunteer some suggestions as to how the US's alienation of China and Russia (not part of our "ad hoc coalition" since our interests don't temporarily "coincide") has enabled their respective efforts.
"When God ariseth, and when he visiteth, what shall we answer!" - Rev. Benjamin Hancock
May 12, 2006 9:22 PM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen "JmacSF"
San Francisco. CA
TH.."Grand Strategy" is supposed to be long on grandiloquent broad brush stroke and short fine detail. Secondly, a US grand strategy is perforce a US centered strategy, a blueprint for achieving US national interests in the world. China is certainly a rival, a potential adversary if not militarily, then economically, politically as potentially at least are any number of other states alone or in combination especially if the US continues with the Wyatt Earp act. That said, I would agree that Ikenberry's effort suffers from excessive internationalist cant and Cold War Hegemonic nostalgia.
May 12, 2006 9:33 PM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen "JmacSF"
San Francisco. CA
"China has no real dogs in that fight"
Do we?
May 12, 2006 9:36 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'm afraid you're posting to the wrong board.
We here don't think Saddam was a threat and don't think a response was called for. I'm not sure what the consensus in respect to Iran's continuing to enrich uranium is, but I think a majority here would say its doing so is not a threat to us. And I, personally, don't quite see how a bunch of Sudanese desert rats presents a threat to the United States.
I await hearing what threat to the United States has gone unmet.
May 12, 2006 9:43 PM | Reply | Permalink
Well, the point is that you CAN'T look at a "grand architecture" if your foundation is on quicksand because you've ignored critical salient facts in pursuit of the "50,000 foot" view.
My main point is that Transhumans are going to close the book on human evolution at the PHYSICAL level within fifty years. Beyond that, any evolution that takes place will be post-biological and posthuman.
Long before that, say, within 25 years, there will be massively disruptive technologies under development.
What do the pundits do when life extension is pushed from 80 to 120 years? That should happen within 25-30 years, if Aubrey Grey is right.
What do the Arabs do when nanotech enables shale oil extraction for pennies a gallon?
That's just off the cuff, there's plenty more to be found.
Worse, none of this pundit-speak addresses the bottom line issues critical for practically everybody involved, which the supposed "grand architecture" is supposed to solve.
It reminds me of the line in one of the Frank Herbert Dune books where someone is asked, "Can your strategy be reduced to the level of the ambitions of a governor's wife?"
In other words, "grand architectures" come a cropper when they meet the real world faster than a military strategry unravels when it meets the enemy.
May 12, 2006 11:19 PM | Reply | Permalink
I await hearing what threat to the United States has gone unmet.
Short-term or long-term? Short-term threats, I don't think there were any. Certainly not "terror", which is a distraction at worst, but can hardly scratch the paint on Fortress America in reality.
Long-term threats... How about global warming? Over-reliance on oil? Massive external debt? Slow but steady slide towards fascism? Erosion of post-WWII world order? Major trade imbalance? I don't know...
Of course, one might argue that these threats weren't exactly unmet; the United States met them all and helped push them along.
May 12, 2006 11:53 PM | Reply | Permalink
"an unusually diverse and diffuse array of threats".
The world looks that way from a fortress America perspective. Break out of that perspective and the future holds "an unusually diverse and diffuse array of opportunities." No where does Ikenberry's Grand Strategy address the challenges of meeting the opportunities of the future, but instead seeks to offer ways to politely, and condescendingly, manipulate the "threats" to America's hegemony. A revival of post-WWII "order" is not going to be relevant in the 21st century.
McCutchen's comments in his "The Problem of Nation-states and Globalization" speaks volumes more about the real lives of people than Ikenberry's entire essay. America's security, and future prosperity, will be effected more by what happens in small businesses on Main Streets around the globe than by all the handshaking at Global Institutions. In a wired world where a 10 year old girl in Nairobi can spend the afternoon at the Guggenheim, Global Institutions are just a place where fat, balded-headed guys and painted women in high heels talk endlessly about the good-old days.
"what sort of international order would you like to see in place in 2015 or 2020?" That's not the question. What sort of world do you want to live in - that's the question! This once was a country where we greeted the morning full of wonder, excitement and thrill, anticipating what the day may bring. Today we peer over the embattlement each sunup, surprised that the lunatics didn't kill us in the night. It's all in our heads, and we've got to quit it, or peer over that embattlement each morning and watch as the world goes on without us. Indispensible? Get real. The world doesn't need us nearly as much as we need them.
May 13, 2006 1:04 AM | Reply | Permalink
And some of us don't think it is all that bad. (Sorry Ellen, TPMCafe is very diverse. It is just one of the things I love about it)
Lets take those worries in order.
Even ignoring the debate over global warming existing, the fact is, most attempts at combatting it have been impractical.
Curbing most of the activities that generate global warming require voluntary cooperation by private individuals, who have shown no interest in the sacrificing for the common good. Short of a draconic intervention, how would you propose getting them to cooperate?
What the government IS doing is working on our dependence on oil. If you have been listening for the past few days to CSPAN, you would have heard the hearings on alternative source, including some pretty impressive committent to ethanol product...33 new plants going up, plans for distribution systems, etc.
It's a practical politics kinda thing, it gives employment to factory workers, corn farmers and coal miners, if nothing else.
That massive external debt is not as quite as bad as it seems, a lot of it is going to purchase chinese infrastructure. Borrowing money for investments is not quite the same as wasting it. The US makes a tidy profit paying off low cost loans while making a much higher profit investing. In the meantime, that's money our nation's rivals DON'T have to invest in themselves.
As far as fascism goes, I have lived though these episodes before, several times in the past five decades. They never last, and we are on the downside of this swing already.
We have the neocons, a couple of generations ago it was the trusts, and so on and so forth. The dance continues, and our next generation will have their own, This has been going on since the first civilizations arose along the Tigris river.
As far as the erosion of the post World War II order, that was bound to erode, it was three generations and three totally different worlds ago. WHat exactly would you have had America do?
The third world countries had to start converging sometime. If it helps, they hate almost everyone, not just the US. Including each other, actually, one recent takeover of a Latin American oil field was from another Latin American country.
May 13, 2006 6:14 AM | Reply | Permalink
Haven't heard of "transhuman"'s before. From your comments, it sounds like another of those "master race" philosophies of the mid twentieth century. Could you give a definition?
Anyhow, of course there are going to be massive change, there always, somehow the world doesn't seem to be much affected by it, even in the long term. Names and players change, but the new world order IS the old world order, just with a different roster.
An architecture is just a vision of the future to guide your decisions, and their vision is fairly attractive. I don't think it is achievable, even as a vision, but thats a different matter.
Finally, "the ambitions of a governers wife" only count in old science fiction novels. In the real world, the directions we take are done by a complex interplay of social forces, and the actions of any human, and any short term tactics, rarely have any significant effect in the long term.
May 13, 2006 6:42 AM | Reply | Permalink
As a fat, bald headed guy, I resent that. And global institutions are just a manifestation of the real economic powers that govern our societies, if they didn't exist in their present form, they would in some other form, with exactly the same agenda.
So I challenge you. Lets take the the current situation in Nigeria. How exactly would you apply the Grand Strategy to that situation? In looking for opportunities or threats, what should America actually do?
May 13, 2006 6:54 AM | Reply | Permalink
Curbing most of the activities that generate global warming require voluntary cooperation by private individuals, who have shown no interest in the sacrificing for the common good. Short of a draconic intervention, how would you propose getting them to cooperate?
What is required, Randyjg2, are laws and their enforcement. No doubt that's what you meant by "draconic intervention," but there is really no reason at all, corporate and individual greed aside, to stop short of it. Either you take the climate problem seriously or you don't. Obviously you don't, since you imagine there is still a debate about the existence of global warming for you to graciously "ignore."
May 13, 2006 7:07 AM | Reply | Permalink
If the United States is the greatest country in the world, why are we not exporting our greatness? If pandemics in Africa can create failed states that can harm us eventually, why are we so stingy with foreign aid? If educating the world means more people educated in Western values, why are we not spending more on proven models of educational success.
Is it really necessary to explain why the vast majority of Americans are utterly uninterested in these things?
Let's ask them: "People who are poorer, sicker, and less educated than us are lazy, inferior, corrupt good-for-nothings who don't love Jesus. We're already taxing hard-working Americans up to their eyebrows so we can give away half the Federal budget in foreign aid! All these people need is to start acting like Republicans and Christians and they'll be fine."
I'm not kidding. Liberal intellectuals talking to each other is not going to do it.
May 13, 2006 7:21 AM | Reply | Permalink
Yes Al Qaeda.
It was in the making for over a decade.
Ellen I am bit puzzled by the benefits of an ad hoc system. Would not one in which aceptable norms were increasingly accepted around the globe a better choice?
Daniel A. Greenbaum
May 13, 2006 8:08 AM | Reply | Permalink
Human evolution seems to be going on apace even now.
Daniel A. Greenbaum
May 13, 2006 8:11 AM | Reply | Permalink
Isn't that why there is a need for multinational institutions. The United States can't act everywhere nor be successful in every event. However, global institutions still need Americas leadership.
Daniel A. Greenbaum
May 13, 2006 8:15 AM | Reply | Permalink
Actually, it's probably more a matter of thinking to myself that "Wenn ich Überstrategie höre ... entsichere ich meinen Browning."
May 13, 2006 8:33 AM | Reply | Permalink
Re Randy's comment: an interesting excercise -- what policies do you get following the JI approach (has it a name yet??), in contrast to others?
You asked it of Nigeia..cd equally ask how it wd make a difference in 5 other real world challenges/opportuties the US faces: Taiwan, WTO, Kyoto, Venezuela, immigration, for example). That's work some wonks shd do if they want to push the frame forward...
But take the case of Nigeria...
A start would be for democratic nations to put more pressure on President Obasanjo to adhere to the Nigerian constitution and step down after 2 terms in office, instead of trying to re-write the constitution in a power grab to protect himself and his cronies and their oil-fattened bank accounts.
Another would be for countries to express their concern about growing violence in the Delta from people whose livlihood as fishermen has been destroyed by oil pollution, and hope that the next president will address their problems.
This is more than a 'two-fer' because it addresses genuine human rights issues, (activist Ken Sera-Wira was hung for his opposition to a previous government's human rights policies;) it focuses on a particularly grotesque form of environmental degradation (I have a bunch of friends from that region who speak of the shocking desolation they see when they visit their home communities); it engages with a regional leader; and it helps strengthen our access to oil over the medium term. Policies shd do different good things, if possible.
But how, precisely, does the Ikenberry frame drive these actions? After all, this is a second or third tier concern right now (not a fundamental threat to US national interest, nor an obvious easy opportunity to do good.)
If lib multi was followed in the first place, issues like this wd be more likely to be pursued. The current bunch is a little distracted right now... not much time to focus on anything but Iraq, which led them to pay insufficient attention to IRan, which....etc etc., all bec of their own misguided efforts at global hyper-domination. WHich we assume a new foreign policy frame wd discourage. Also, this wd have to be done through multilat channels, not unilaterally. Etc Etc
Still, the starting point needs to be Kache's requirement.....what kind of world do you want your children to live in? A world more secure? Healthier? A country with fulfilling jobs paying living wages?
That's a 50,000 foot question that needs to be kept front and center.
May 13, 2006 8:53 AM | Reply | Permalink
Re Randy's comment: an interesting excercise -- what policies do you get following the JI approach (has it a name yet??), in contrast to others?
You asked it of Nigeia..cd equally ask how it wd make a difference in 5 other real world challenges/opportuties the US faces: Taiwan, WTO, Kyoto, Venezuela, immigration, for example). That's work some wonks shd do if they want to push the frame forward...
But take the case of Nigeria...
A start would be for democratic nations to put more pressure on President Obasanjo to adhere to the Nigerian constitution and step down after 2 terms in office, instead of trying to re-write the constitution in a power grab to protect himself and his cronies and their oil-fattened bank accounts.
Another would be for countries to express their concern about growing violence in the Delta from people whose livlihood as fishermen has been destroyed by oil pollution, and hope that the next president will address their problems.
This is more than a 'two-fer' because it addresses genuine human rights issues, (activist Ken Sera-Wira was hung for his opposition to a previous government's human rights policies;) it focuses on a particularly grotesque form of environmental degradation (I have a bunch of friends from that region who speak of the shocking desolation they see when they visit their home communities); it engages with a regional leader; and it helps strengthen our access to oil over the medium term. Policies shd do different good things, if possible.
But how, precisely, does the Ikenberry frame drive these actions? After all, this is a second or third tier concern right now (not a fundamental threat to US national interest, nor an obvious easy opportunity to do good.)
If lib multi was followed in the first place, issues like this wd be more likely to be pursued. The current bunch is a little distracted right now... not much time to focus on anything but Iraq, which led them to pay insufficient attention to IRan, which....etc etc., all bec of their own misguided efforts at global hyper-domination. WHich we assume a new foreign policy frame wd discourage. Also, this wd have to be done through multilat channels, not unilaterally. Etc Etc
Still, the starting point needs to be Kache's requirement.....what kind of world do you want your children to live in? A world more secure? Healthier? A country with fulfilling jobs paying living wages?
That's a 50,000 foot question that needs to be kept front and center.
May 13, 2006 8:53 AM | Reply | Permalink
There are "multinational institutions," and then, there are "multinational institutions" -- grand strategic alliances and cooperative tactical organizations.
For example, post-9/11 America and Europe was particularly concerned to check al-Qaeda's ability to use the international money transfer systems to fund its terrorist projects. Other countries were interested in their citizens' use of the systems to avoid tax obligations.
Here, a "multinational institution" is an appropriate particularized response, and as long as the number of the "willing" is large enough, those who aren't "of the willing" will find themselves on the outside looking in. There are thousands of these types of cooperative technocratic/bureaucratic organizations -- a primary interest, as a matter of fact, of Slaughter.
A "grand strategy," in my view, adds nothing of importance to the job of answering threats, practically.
May 13, 2006 9:01 AM | Reply | Permalink
Professor Ikenberry,
You seem to write the same essay over and over. We have already been treated to your broad and lofty philosophical conception of “liberal order” several times. Despite slight shifts in emphasis from piece to piece, little is added. We get it. Might it not be time for you to pull your head out of the clouds and propose some concrete institutions and initiatives?
Open markets, multilateral rule-based governance, a social bargain and cooperative security – these are quite familiar anchors of post-war Western liberalism and the liberal forms of internationalism popular in Europe and America. We’ve heard all this before – for decades in fact. How do you propose we go about implementing them in a world in which the older international institutions are unraveling?
After all, the post-war generation of American dynamos who were “present at the creation” didn’t just sit around spinning visions of Shangri-la, El Dorado and Atlantis, and debating the subtleties of Grotius, Kant and Wilson. They created actual organizations and institutions, developed the practical tactics to implement them and then did the hard and dirty political work necessary to give their ideal conceptions a concrete and imperfect life.
I have already offered criticisms of your foreign policy agenda, and I don’t want to do it again. But I will say that language like this concerns me:
If grand strategy is order building, the next question is: so what sort of order – or milieu – should we be seeking to create?”
It concerns me because it reflects a deeply unrealistic view of US capabilities and the US position in the world. The United States is not in a position to “create” anything. Despite the clear US edge in military terms, the United States in 2006 is decidedly less powerful in relative terms than the United States of 1945, or at any time since then. Any international order that we can participate in building will require a consensus among a lot of very different countries, some of which are not entirely friendly to our interests, and which have different notions about the ideal international order. But we can’t wait. Developing a vision of the best of all possible international orders is not entirely without value; but a much more important and pressing question is what kinds of international orders we have half a chance of building in the current, dangerous environment.
May 13, 2006 12:03 PM | Reply | Permalink
You guys seem to be dismissing the very notion of a grand strategy and I'm not sure for any good reason. Perhaps you are more focused on the trees than the forest. Not that I don't enjoy that discussion as well. I think having a grand long-term plan is useful especially given the position we have in the world. It seems to me that Ikenberry is making the argument for a liberal hegemon (slightly amended in this installment) as opposed to the Bush doctrine on the basis of rational self-interest itself. A version of realism I suppose.
And I do see that he makes a pretty good case for it. I've always thought that the mere projection of raw power eventually leads to superior opposition and thus defeats itself. At least that has been the experience at the state level and at the international level as well. We need only look at how this Bush Doctrine is unfolding to see how counterproductive raw power policy really is.
Ikenberry envisions in his grand strategy that eventually the United States' hegemonic power will wane and other (unknown) powers will emerge. He does not explicitly say that this new emerging hegemon will have the same liberal democratic characteristics such as we have. And a good argument to be made that it would, is that we will have put a liberal democratic infrastructure in place globally so that any new emerging hegemon will naturally continue on this path. In short liberal democratic ideological hegemony is permanent (Fukuyama). Military/economic hegemony will be (in the long run) transitory. That does not square with his advocating of trilateralism ( US-Japan-NATO) at the core of the scheme thus excluding China and Russia. I suppose Ikenberry views them as (with the help of the core power's pressure) evolving into reasonable versions of liberal democratic states. I'm not so certain of all of that at all. Having been effectively excluded from the core power system that Ikenberry envisions, what incentive do they have to fashion themselves in our image. Even Fukuyama admits that it is not at all certain that democratic governments can outpreform (economically/militarily) authoritarian ones. He gives the Asian Tigers as an example. These are rather abstract concerns, I realize, and perhaps not germane to the present mess we find ourselves in. Nevertheless I think NOT having these rather abstract discussions takes away from shorter and medium term decision making debates that we face now.
May 13, 2006 12:30 PM | Reply | Permalink
I agree strongly that strengthening and building upon the liberal international order that the US helped establish post-WW II is critical and should be the organizing principle of AFP.
You might as well propose "strengthening and building upon" the Treaty of Versailles, Chunche. That world is gone.
May 13, 2006 1:14 PM | Reply | Permalink
After the British empire was lost, Churchill asked: "What can we do?" The answer: "Not much."
John's essay seems oblivious to the Bush-engineered reality. The train has left the station: anti-US coalitions are forming just as we speak, in Latin America, in Russia, in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, etc. The post cold war years of the US ruling the world are over. The option of being a hegemon, liberal or not, is now off the table.
This was bound to happen anyway, but Bush was a catalyst.
Almost certainly, the realists will win this debate, and John & Anne-Marie will lose -- and whether they end up in government won't make a bit of a difference.
What they get right is the need for the US to repair its international credibility. This will take a long time, and until that happens
Friedmanese like PATC 2.0 will only draw a chuckle from the rest of the world.
May 13, 2006 2:16 PM | Reply | Permalink
Squeaky Rat, can you elaborate? Do you really believe that NATO, the US-Japan Security Agreement, IMF, WTO, etc. are irrelevant today? I do not. I think that they are critically important for essentially the same reasons as Ikenberry (and others) has laid out here and elsewhere. Why do you think otherwise? The terrorist threat? If so, generally or only in the case of nuclear or other WMD terrorism? And if so, what replaces the post-war liberal international order to deal with that threat?
Some have suggested that preemption should be the new organizational principle, though that argument has died down post-Iraq (which was more properly an exercise of preventive rather than preemptive war, as there was no imminent threat). My take is that preemptive and even preventive military action will be neceesary against terrorist groups in rare circumstances. However, preemption cannot possibly deal with the myriad of other security problems that face the US or even the vast majority of what constitutes the war on terror.
What do you believe is the best organizing principle for today's challenges?
May 13, 2006 5:10 PM | Reply | Permalink
"Some have suggested that preemption should be the new organizational principle, though that argument has died down post-Iraq (which was more properly an exercise of preventive rather than preemptive war, as there was no imminent threat)."
Well, that "died-down" argument is the entire basis for the upcoming war in Iran - so expect it to be discussed some more shortly.
And the war on Iran is so far from being "preventive" as to be ridiculous.
Let's attack Finland now - they could have nuclear weapoms by the end of this century if they wanted to and started now...
Not to mention that the term "preventive war" is so stupid as be not worth discussing.
"Let's have a war to prevent having a war..."
Brilliant...
May 13, 2006 5:46 PM | Reply | Permalink
Do your own Google, troll.
The actions of any human have no effect, eh?
Is that why Bush is ignoring Osama these days?
May 13, 2006 5:48 PM | Reply | Permalink
Of course, the biological - and even more so, the cultural and social - evolution continues to date.
Once technology shifts to a postbiological basis, human evolution will cease (at least for those who make the Transhuman shift - some humans will probably remain - the issue will be if enough remain to support the species.)
Then the only human reference will be a historical one - Transhumans originated from humans, but will be so unlike humans as to make the human reference irrelevant.
Almost no human characteristic other than conceptual processing will make the transition from human to Transhuman. And that conceptual processing will be so accelerated and expanded as to make a human look like a chimpanzee - if not an even lower mammal.
All this should happen within this century. More exact timelines are not feasible at this point. My guess is by 2050 to 2075 the transformations should be beginning. The speed of those transformations will be on an accelerating curve and should be completed by 2100.
This is why it's called a Singularity - the exact nature of the conditions on the other side of the "event horizon" cannot be comprehended by those on this side (although we can speculate and make some reasonable guesses.)
May 13, 2006 5:56 PM | Reply | Permalink
Go to agree with that.
The last time the US had to go into major soul-searching was after Vietnam.
Iran will prove to be two to four times as big and damaging to the US as Vietnam was - and perhaps have more geopolitical impact than even Vietnam since it will take place in a more volatile region with more geopolitical significance than Southeast Asia does even now thirty years later.
And the Iran war could (not for certain, but quite likely) bring terrorism home to the United States in a major way. And this in turn will have serious consequences for US domestic policies and civil liberties - especially given the people in charge now.
In another thread, I've questioned what will Bush do if Iranian car bombs start going off in Times Square?
I've also asked, what will Bush do if the Iran war starts a major anti-war movement similar to that during Vietnam?
What would have happened to the US if the Internet had been available during the Sixties and Seventies for the anti-war movement to use?
Maybe we now see the reasons for the massive surveillance of US citizens and the government's warming to the telco's notion that the Internet must be regulated...
COINTELPRO is back, folks. And the Bushies know why.
May 13, 2006 6:04 PM | Reply | Permalink
In another thread, I've questioned what will Bush do if Iranian car bombs start going off in Times Square?
I'm not sure what he will do, but his approval rating will go up 30%.
May 13, 2006 6:22 PM | Reply | Permalink
We could get into quibbling over whether your advocacy of "threat-specific ad hoc responses" invokes only "threats to the United States", and whether only existential "threats to the United States" are considered or whether threats to American interests are also included, and whether American interests include an interest in not condoning genocide.
But the point is that fundamentally, and not to mince words, your entire worldview is completely screwed up.
The REASON the United States invaded Iraq was because we were pursuing a policy of ad hoc responses to perceived threats, in coalition with those other nations who saw their interests temporarily coinciding with ours. The United States will continue to engage in pointless and idiotic semi-unilateral foreign policy and military buffoonery as long as it disregards the advice and interests of longstanding allies, and refuses to knit itself more thoroughly into a coherent world order. You would rely on the government of the United States to produce an assessment of "threats" which always coincides with your own. This is a hopelessly error-prone and even naive way of setting up the system.
The United States has very frequently, over the past forty-odd years, launched wars to "defend" itself and its interests against threats which arguably did not exist. The egregious episodes were not those, such as Kosovo and Gulf War I, where our allies all broadly agreed with us and joined in the effort, and where there was explicit sanction or participation by international bodies such as NATO and the UN. No, the egregious episodes were those, such as Vietnam, Panama, and Iraq, where the U.S. acted essentially alone, with a narrow ad hoc coalition. Unilateralism is the cause of the US's tendency to invent nonexistent threats. And if we sometimes act in concert with international organizations to resolve a problem which threatens others more than ourselves (e.g. Kosovo), this is, frankly, no tragedy; it's a moral victory.
"When God ariseth, and when he visiteth, what shall we answer!" - Rev. Benjamin Hancock
May 13, 2006 7:37 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'm afraid that when the United States of America chooses to walk off a cliff, there's no force in the world -- legal or moral -- capable of preventing her from doing so.
May 13, 2006 10:15 PM | Reply | Permalink
Of course it is. You can always pass laws to make anything you want happen, the Nazi's were famous for it.
So I would like to ask you a question. At what point is it draconian to pass a law to restrict someone else from doing something that you feel is wrong?
Obviously there are cases where it isn't draconian, but what criteria do you apply?
Obviously, a considerable portion of America doesn't take the global warming seriously, or they would stop using cars. (By the way, I use public transportation almost all the time)
It really applies to a lot of issues here in America, such as Pro-Choice/Pro-Life, Immigrant rights, or even hate speech laws.
Is it right only for causes you approve of? WHat about ones you aren't certain on?
May 14, 2006 12:03 AM | Reply | Permalink
"Once technology shifts to a postbiological basis, human evolution will cease (at least for those who make the Transhuman shift - some humans will probably remain - the issue will be if enough remain to support the species.)"
What exactly is involved in this "Transhuman" shift? Will all religions disappear, and we will all be atheists?
How exactly will those of us who don't make the "shift", disappear?
May 14, 2006 12:45 AM | Reply | Permalink
Actually, he will probably take a vacation at his ranch while FEMA rushes off to help New Orleans. Remember, Hillary is a New York senator.
But Iranians are not going to be bombing anyone. They are making a bid to be leader of the Arab world, and, thanks to the destruction of Moslem political structure due to the Iraqi war, have a good chance of succeeding.
Sponsoring terrorism is no longer a way to become a leader in the Arab world, anymore. Nationalism and internal development are the Zeitgeist of the area, especially since it gets you lots of Chinese investment and support.
Thats why Iran sent the letter.
May 14, 2006 12:59 AM | Reply | Permalink
Hang around, you'll find out!
May 14, 2006 1:20 AM | Reply | Permalink
Only among his base.
I just read an article that analyzed the 29% number.
In reality, among everybody but Republicans, he is now in his TEENS in poll ratings. The Republicans are the ones holding at 29% - for now.
87% of everybody else disapprove of his "leadership" - that's worse than Nixon who only got 66% disapproval.
If he doesn't launch the Iran war in the next couple months, we're going to see George be the first President to hit maybe ZERO to FIVE percent approval ratings. The real right wingnuts of course will keep him from hitting zero - unless they just fall into the "margin of error."
May 14, 2006 1:25 AM | Reply | Permalink
Doesn't matter if the Iranians don't do it - some other Muslim group will.
And if they don't, the Mossad will...
May 14, 2006 1:27 AM | Reply | Permalink
And that illustrates the problem.
Nigeria is, since a short time ago, officially a Chinese client state, the US and it's allies has no influence over it at all.
And China needs the oil, and has to deal with its own 700 million poor, and will not even consider anything more than a token response. And that is happening all over the third world, including Cuba.
Human rights aside, right now, I don't see any policy getting us either jobs or security.
From the economic research point of view, the current world situation says some interesting things about future policy. Angus Maddison of the OECD has written extensively on the influence of economics on foreign policy and national power. http://www.theworldeconomy.org/publications/worldeconomy/
Taken in the present world context, the economics are so confused I don't see how anyone can even understand what the world is becoming well enough to formulate a grand strategy.
The most profitable investments right now are in converging third world countries. The economic literature has been full of economists trying to figure out why, in that case, are the poor countries lending the rich countries enormous amounts of money at lower returns than if they invested in their own country?
Now comes the really interesting part. The US is investing a lot in purchasing Chinese assets, as opposed to their own country but the Chinese are also investing in third world countries, rather than their own.
The reason appears to be that noone, in any of the countries, has faith in their own future, but a lot of faith in everyone elses.
The net result seems to be that America will end up owning most of China, China will end up owning a large part of the third world, and what the heck does that portend for foreign policy when the economic world is completely disjoint from the geophysical world?
Add in the fact that "virtual worlds" economies are now fungible, and have a GNP thats greater than many third world countries, and everyone is less worried about grand strategies than simply trying to figure out what kind of world we are becoming.
As near as I can tell, if you are an America and want job security, move to a non English speaking country. The Indians just had a major "immigration style" riot in one of their cities, over english speakers getting all the good jobs. Here in America, we had the reverse. Heck even out own students are getting turned away in favort of foreign ones.
As near as I can tell, everyones future is brighter almost anywhere else but in their own country. What the heck that portends for foreign policy, I don't know.
Take America and Mexico as an example. If America were to declare a trade war on Mexico, about a third of Mexico's workforce is here in America, and more than a third of Mexico's economy, as well, thoroughly integrated into the America economy.
Realistically, what does that imply for America's foreign policy when America can't take any macro moves without hurting itself as well?
May 14, 2006 2:06 AM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen "JmacSF"
San Francisco. CA
The History Channel this morning carried a welcome message from Your New Friendly Bankers and Mine...
The CEO of Hong Kong Shanghai Bank (USA! USA!) on the History Channel this morning gently but firmly explaining the facts of life for AmeriKa in the Post- Bushevik World DisOrder...My impressionistic and occasionally cryptic paraphrase...(for decryption) try the History Channel....I wonder if Li Kai Shing (the Elder) remembers our twenty minutes of pleasntries and sweet nothings 'round his personal conference table 20 years ago - back in the Day before History's RequiemYa think?May 14, 2006 11:01 AM | Reply | Permalink
"Thats why Iran sent the letter."
Ah, someone else read the letter too. That's right randy, the letter wasn't addressed to George Bush (or whomever reads his mail to him). It was really addressed to the Moslem world.
You make a really good point, that sponsoring terrorism is no longer the way to claim leadership in the Moslem world. (Hamas win elections more because it produces social services than becuase it recruits suicide bombers). And Zarquawi's barbarism allows even Ahmadinejad to claim to be a moderate.
Little noticed by the Western press, Ahmadinejad and Indonesian President Yudhoyono are exploring calling a conference of developing nations - outside of the UN - to mediate a settlement between Iran and the Bush regime over Iran's nuclear program. Grand Global Institutions beware, when you can't deliver, the mice will mutiny and run the ship. I have a feeling John Bolton will wish he had a UN to go to some day....
May 14, 2006 2:31 PM | Reply | Permalink
"You guys seem to be dismissing the very notion of a grand strategy "
Oh heavens no! Why even New Zealand has a grand strategy. The difference is, theirs begins by taking account of their real role in the world.
All this crap about America being the indispensible leader overlooks the fact that the world is not following. And not going to follow us unless we are leading the world to SOMEWHERE!!
That's why I think the real question is, where do you want to be in twenty years. Where's the "vision thing" in this discussion? If we can paint a picture of the city on the hill then maybe others will say, "OK, now their's a goal, and yeah, your role in getting there sounds plausible, let's do it". That is indeed what the architects of the Cold War paradigm did, though they used a negative (Sovietism) instead of a positive. We can not frame the future the same way, as a contest between Islam and Billy Joel.
If we are going to lead the world to a better place, then we need to define that place. Because if we don't, others will. And he who has the best vision and the plausible road map for getting there is going to be the leader, even if he happens to live in New Zealand.
Spreading liberal democracy (elections and a bill of rights) is not a worthy goal, until we've discussed a global minimum wage. Until we discuss re-missioning the World Bank towards investing in local endogenous entrepeneurs instead of being a scam to help muti-nationals cripple local competition, we're only going to be leading ourselves around in the dark by candle light.
Until we can paint the vision of where we want to go, all we're really saying is "We're bigger, we're better - follow or die". And it doesn't matter if it's George Bush saying it, or the Democrat's candidate in '08 - it's all a bunch of arrogant non-sense to 96% of the world's inhabitants (yeah, those people you think you want to lead).
May 14, 2006 3:30 PM | Reply | Permalink
Uhh, while everyone is talking about wherre America should lead, I really think you ought to read this article from CSM last year.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0705/p06s02-woaf.html
I don't think our opinion counts anymore.
Would someone explain to me how the Christian Science Monitor came to be the best investigative journal in the industry?
May 14, 2006 11:36 PM | Reply | Permalink
Actually, it wouldn't help. For several months now, my analysis has shown one or more outside influences has been strongly affect diplomacy across the entire set of third world countries.
I am no professional analyst, but what my efforts show is that there are strong Chinese "worldviews" behind the diplomatic influences.
I think that some Chinese (not necessarily the Chinese government)are advising on political moves. It may be an outgrowth of that CSM article I quoted earlier.
The interesting thing is that Venezuela and Chavez are also showing some Maoist influences. Whether he just found a "little red book" and liked it, or there are some Nepalese connection, I don't know.
It is really kinda spooky. Everything seems to be headed for something big happening in 2010-2011, but I haven't a real clue as to what, or r ather, I have contradictory clues as to what is going to happen.
May 14, 2006 11:50 PM | Reply | Permalink
I agree with most of what you say. The world is looking for a new model. And the Chinese are indeed only too happy to offer their assistance in that regard. But the need for a new model is not something the Chinese invented - it's real and the West (and the China) is offering only bankrupt ideas.
But I think you underestimate Chavez. He is consciously trying to offer an alternative to Chinese influence and has actually countered some Chinese moves in Latin America. Venezuela, at this point, is attracting every leftist of every stripe. Trotskyists, Maoists, you name it, are showing up from all over the world. In that chaos it's easy to loose sight of what's really happening and what appears to be the ideological fad of the day. If you get on the ground in Venezuela you'll be surprised to find that Chavez is the moderate 5 days out of the week.
May 15, 2006 11:01 AM | Reply | Permalink
I would have to agree. I am just not certain that neo bolivarism is all that attractive a model for the rest of us.
I don't really study South America politics, but as near as I can tell, this is not going to end well for anyone concerned.
From what little I was able to tell, the entire area seems to be gearing up for a continent wide civil war in the next few years.
I would like to like Chavez, but I always consider both sides of the issue, and his other side seems pretty dark.
Repression of the press and attacks on free speech, bigotry and antisemitism, covert operations here in the States and in other South American countries, the list seems to go on and on.
Given all that, I really don't see why progressives seem to be uniformly in favor of Chavez, I would think there would have been much more debate.
May 15, 2006 2:14 PM | Reply | Permalink
Umm, John. I really didn't understand that post at all. Could you possibly rephrase it?
May 15, 2006 2:20 PM | Reply | Permalink