Some observations coming out of the U.S.-China summit, for U.S-China relations and beyond:

The Bush administration still doesn’t get it about the significance of China’s rise. The agenda was strikingly unambitious for a meeting with the leader of a country that has the world’s largest population, astoundingly high economic growth rates, dynamically global diplomacy, and is generally big and prominent enough to have major impact on most of the major issues on our own foreign policy agenda. On the pomp and respect side, how could you just do lunch with the leader of such a country? And the protocol flubs, even if accidental peccadilloes and not intentional jabs, just should not have been allowed to happen.

While not the new ominous threat that some conservative groups think and want it to be, China also is not the system sustainer that many internationalists are trying to coax it to be.

China is mostly interested in pursuing its own national interest – competitively more than confrontationally, yet not very ready to trade off short term self-interest for broader internationalist goals. Iran non-proliferation and Darfur genocide running up against Chinese energy and other economic interests are cases in point on this last point.

In part as fall-out from Bush policies and in part through its own assets and strategy, China is in a very competitive position for enhancing its global influence. While George Bush went mountain biking, Hu Jintao went on to Saudi Arabia --- for a state visit, and one reciprocating for King Abdullah’s trip to Beijing just a few months ago. Chinese-Saudi trade has been growing 41% a year since 1999, and not just on the Chinese oil import side but also including major Chinese investments in the Saudi oil industry. The point is not that the United States is being supplanted, but that we are being competed with. So too in Latin America, where China’s trade with Brazil, Argentina and others has been growing rapidly and its diplomatic presence has become more dynamic, including as a convenient third point on the triangle to play off against Bush policies. Africa, too.

I see two major implications for U.S. policy towards China, and also more broadly. First is we need to worry less about others’ strengths and more about our own. Think of it as the non-Tonya Harding approach to training for the Olympics. Short of breaking the kneecaps of competitors, Olympic athletes have to focus on maximizing their own competitiveness. The other athletes will get stronger and more competitive. I need to, too. Yet Bush policies across the board have been squandering American power. The economic vulnerability opened up by the massive Bush fiscal and trade deficits; the vulnerabilities of our deepening energy dependence; our overstretched and morale crumbling military; our damaged global prestige and reputation; the sense among many countries that close relations with us can hurt more than enhance their security; our human capital problems here at home; our fundamental failures at domestic governance like Katrina that tear our own social fabric as well as undermine the appeal of our model abroad --- in these and other ways the Bush administration has squandered rather than strengthened American power and standing. Conservatives may still want to break China’s knee-caps; better to work on our own competitiveness.

Second is how much we have to gain from reclaiming our position as a major power that is committed not only to its own interests but also to common interests. So much of American power and influence has depended on the belief among other nations and peoples that we use our power and influence in their interest and not just our own. The world that lies ahead can’t be strictly a re-creation of the post-World War II international order; indeed, given globalization in all its aspects it needs to be one with even greater commitment to and effectiveness at global strategies of governance. China is making it clear that it isn’t very inclined, at least not yet, to take on the trade-offs of systemic commitments inconsistent with particular and immediate national interests. Not the only reason, but all the more reason, for the United States to take back and take on a role that can be in our own interests as well as those of the international community.