« PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: GOOD NEWS AND BAD | Home | Book Packaging »

How Is This Ally Different From All Other Allies?

user-pic

Richard Cohen kindly defends Mearsheimer and Walt from allegations of anti-semitism, notes some points of disagreement with them that I would endorse, and then says: "Israel's special place in U.S. foreign policy is deserved, in my view, and not entirely the product of lobbying. Israel has earned it, and isn't there something bracing about a special relationship that is not based on oil or markets or strategic location but on shared values? (A bit now like Britain.)" As far as that goes, that seems correct to me. But, again, we don't give the U.K. anything like the level of aid we give to Israel (we do, of course, help it and our other NATO allies out with security guarantees and other stuff). And the U.K. provides more in the way of concrete assistance to the United States, sending troops to fight alongside ours in Iraq, for example.

I think Cohen does us a service by refocusing attention away from the motives of the relevant people (be they Mearsheimer and Walt or the "Israel lobby" or whomever), to the merits of our policy. Unfortunately, the middle ground in this debate tends to vanish entirely. Either you're supposed to get all trenchant and denunciatory about Israel, backing divestment schemes and UN condemnations or else Israel should be our number one recipient of foreign aid and our number two donee should be a quasi-bribe to Egypt to not be unduly mean to Israel. But why not, as Cohen suggests, treat Israel roughly the way we actually treat Britain? Or perhaps Portugal? Or as I suggested earlier, India? On the AIPAC history page, they say:

Recognizing the risks Israel took for peace at Camp David and the persistence of the Arab military threat. Congress [in 1980] approves a $4.9 billion aid and loan package. From 1985 on, Congress annually provides Israel $3 billion in all grant aid. This assistance evolves into one of the most important symbols of the strengthof the U.S. Israel ties.
I don't know exactly what the situation was in 1980, but in 2006 it's very hard to see what the "Arab military threat" to Israel is really supposed to be. The IDF is plainly superior to the Syrian military, and that's all to the good. But it raises the question of what giving these $3 billion a year accomplishes. As an expression of American ideals, it's a strange choice compared to, say, malaria treatments for poor countries. As a strategic gambit, it make sense now that the Cold War's ended and Israel's neighbors aren't clients of a superpower rival.


36 Comments

| Leave a comment

Screw AIPAC, but I have no idea from your argument exactly why we should treat X like Y, if their needs are different, apart from some call to "fairness" or "consistency." Do you really think that Israel's security situation is similar at all to Britain's? Only to the extent that they are both islands.

As an expression of American ideals, it's a strange choice compared to, say, malaria treatments for poor countries.

Fallacy of the excluded middle.

Why does providing $3B to Israel mean that the US doesn't have money to provide to malaria treatments in poor countries? I see no link there, not when we are spending $250M for a bridge 50 people in Alaska, and $10B per month for a war for 1 person in the White House.

I don't know what the correct amount to fund Israel (population 6M) is, but I don't understand at all your logic in comparing Israel's security needs to that of Britain (island, population 60M), or India (population 1B).

And I suspect that the reason that Israel is not in Iraq is not because Israel doesn't want to help us in Iraq, but perhaps for other reasons?

Here's an idea.  Maybe if we could exercise the diplomatic initiative to get more than three out of the 22 member nations of the Arab League to recognize Israel, effectively lifting its virtual state of war with the only non-Arab state between Iran and the Atlantic coast of Africa, we could concentrate American largesse on things like, say, malaria treatments for poor countries (not that we couldn't manage it besides the single-digit percentage of foreign aid that goes to Israel anyway).

Perhaps the Israeli electorate (an electorate in the Middle East... go figure), could be consistently confident in its security situation to hang onto a government long enough to cut a deal for an independent Palestine, and the hotheads in Palestine would have fewer shopping opportunities for semtex and katyushas.

At least Matthew now acknowledges that the aid package didn't just appear out of thin air, but resulted from Camp David.

It's a tiny but of progress in Matthew's understanding, but you've got to take baby steps before you can walk or run!

Anyway, one would like to have Matthew actually state that he understands that we provide the massive amount of aid to Israel and Egypt as a direct result of Jimmy Carter's promises during Camp David:

Carter, supported by Department of State experts, played a key role during the intensive rounds of bargaining, eventually compelling both sides to compromise short of their maximum demands by offering massive amounts of foreign aid.

link

So, to sum up:

Q: How Is This Ally Different From All Other Allies?

A: Jimmy Carter's Promise Made Them Different.

If Matthew really wants to further his understanding, he should rephrase his questions as follows: Why Shouldn't We Break Jimmy Carter's Promise?

Israel: 21,000 sq. kilometers
Britain: 244,000 sq. kilometres.
India: 3,287,263 sq. kilometers.

Should aid be apportioned as a linear function of population, or square of the radius (linear function of area), or some formalistic function of poverty level, or some formalistic function of economy, or to some formalistic function of the return on investment, or on the basis of fairness, or on the principle that "the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few or the one".

Just what are you proposing?

Israel is an island?

Bummer, we got interesting times.

Broder, Fukuyama, Cohen, ... Have you told Josh that you're moving to TNR?

A few commentators on this site have proved Cohen's closing argument:

Whatever the case, their argument is hardly rebutted by purple denunciations and smear tactics. Rather than being persuasive, Mearsheimer and Walt's more hysterical critics suggest by their extreme reactions that the duo is on to something. These tactics by Israel's friends sully Israel's good name more than Mearsheimer and Walt ever could.

Israel's special place in U.S. foreign policy is deserved, in my view, and not entirely the product of lobbying. Israel has earned it, and isn't there something bracing about a special relationship that is not based on oil...

Well, it's not based on Israel's oil, anyway. I suspect that having a really hardened proxy state right next to the rest of the Middle East is certainly part of the consideration, however. Nuclear reactors don't just bomb themselves, you know.

Zionista, you said...

Here's an idea.  Maybe if we could exercise the diplomatic initiative to get more than three out of the 22 member nations of the Arab League to recognize Israel...

I'm sure you're aware that recognition is being withheld in lieu of a peace between Israel and Palestine. And of course, the Israeli government, as well as the US, are also making noises about how Hamas has not recognized Israel either. 

But shouldn't recognition be an outcome of negotations and a genuine peace process, and not established as a precondition for only one side? Why is this being demanded of Hamas and the Palestinians, yet the illegal Isareli settlements are even now, as we speak, being enlarged? Why not make demands of those things that are causing the turmoil to continue from both sides, rather than just one?

I'd say the reason this topsy turvy view of things appears so normal to so many is because of the success of the Israel Lobby in setting the terms of the debate. 

Wordie,

First, I agree with you regarding the settlements.  The settlement policy was always a bad idea, grown worse with age.

But shouldn't recognition be an outcome of negotations and a genuine peace process, and not established as a precondition for only one side?

However, the big mistake you and most observers of the Arab-Israeli conflict make is the mischaracterization of it as a simplistic two-party conflict that requires only the elusive fair deal to settle.  When I submit the idea of recognition of Israel by more than only 3 out the 22 member nation Arab League, I refer of course to the wider and unfortunately much more complicated conflict between Israel and the overall Arab establishment.  Israel and the emergent Palestine do officially recognize each other, and while the mechanism for diplomatic negotiation remains something of a prototype (to put it kindly), there remains no functional diplomatic exchange between Israel and the Arab establishment, even as the Palestinian Authority seeks counsel from the Arab League.  This is not healthy for the progress of a negotiated 2-state solution to the conflicting national rights between the Jewish and Arab peoples of the former British Mandate (which, I will say again so we may be clear about it, are not mutually exclusive).

We all heard alot about sovereignty from the Arab establishment in the runup to the US invasion of Iraq.  But the value of sovereignty flies out the window when the conversation turns to the non-Arab national thorn in Amr Moussa & Co.'s proverbial side.  Palestine was always preferable as a bromide than a genuine cause to the Arab establishment, whereby Arab supremacy remains the gray area between authentic national sovereignty and 19/20th century pan-nationalism.  Currently, for example, Lebanon is prohibited from entering into a peace treaty with Israel without a multilateral settlement.  Historically, Arab supremacy must be held at least equally responsible for the denial of Palestinian national rights as the international community holds the establishment of Israel since it was the League of Arab States walking out on the UNGA vote establishing partition in 1948, launching a coordinated attack on the emergent Israel, and subsequently occupying most of the lands designated for Arab Palestine with a greater interest in deploying a siege-strategy of economic, cultural and political boycott of Israel over realizing the national aspirations of the Palestinian people.

The pattern exists whereby the more confident the Israeli electorate is with its security situation the more likely it is to advance the leadership of the Rabins and Baraks; while the less confident the Israeli electorate is with its security situation the more likely it is to advance the leadership of the Netanyahus and Sharons.  Surely the Arab establishment has noticed this pattern as well.

It's really very difficult to say what the UK gets out of the 'special relationship'. In fact in as much as the UK is obliged to join in US policies driven in part by Israeli lobby actions in US politics, the Israeli lobby gets the UK Labour party to fight Douglas Feith's wars, despite the fact that the Labour party's typical activist is rather likely to favour boycotting Israeli products since Sharon took power.

Here's TNR on Britain - can you imaging an Israeli politician saying the same?

Earlier this month, the select Foreign Affairs Committee from the British House of Commons paid its annual courtesy call on official Washington. Its visits are usually festivals of bonhomie, filled with sherry toasts to the transatlantic relationship and florid tributes to the eternal Anglo-American alliance. While those were in abundance as usual this year, a new, strange anxiety lurked behind the public pronouncements of mutual admiration. This anxiety revealed itself at a breakfast briefing with British reporters in a swish Washington hotel, when one historically pro-American Tory member of Parliament rose to ask a less-than-genial question about the special relationship: "What do we get out of it?" No one quite knew what to say to this unwelcome piece of breakfast realpolitik..

"I think Cohen does us a service by refocusing attention away from the motives of the relevant people (be they Mearsheimer and Walt or the "Israel lobby" or whomever), to the merits of our policy."

Our policy is enabling Israel to colonise and ethnically cleanse the arbas in and around Jerusalem, then blame the arabs for not accepting these colonies when offered a 'generous peace'. That policy has no merits and is one reason why millions of arabs and muslims hate us.

SherryB

 THIS is what happens to countries who don't support Israel. From Norway's Aftenposten:

 

 "USA threats after boycott support US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice threatened Norway with "serious political consequences" after Finance Minister and Socialist Left Party leader Kristin Halvorsen admitted to supporting a boycott of Israeli goods. The reaction was reportedly given to the Norwegian embassy in Washington DC, and it was made clear that the statements came from the top level of the US State Department, newspaper VG reports. VG claims that two classified reports promised a "tougher climate" between the USA and Norway if Halvorsen's remarks represented the foreign policy of the new red-green alliance of the Labor, Socialist Left and Center parties. Norway's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, responded immediately with written explanations to both Israel and the USA, clarifying the government's stance, while Halvorsen distanced her party's policy from that of the government's.

 (Aftenposten English Web Desk/NTB)

 

 It appears you either support Israel OR you lose your relationship with the US. I still say that we've made Israel our 51st state. Why not just say it?

SherryB

This is the link to the Aftenposten article.

 

http://www.aftenposten.no/english/local/article1196096.ece

 

 

Not only is Israeli aid (along with the Egyptian aid too) hurtful to US interests, it inhibits the progress towards peace in the region. Our aid blunts the costs to Israel of its occupation of the West Bank, the Palestinian's primary bargaining tool, and weakens its incentive to agree to a peace plan which would form a Palestinian state that has both de jure and de facto independence.

Sherry B,

THIS is what happens to countries who don't support Israel.

It does not appear a response to Norwegian non-support for Israel so much as to Norwegian threats to boycott Israel by its Finance Minister.

Yes, you have raised the insightful point that Israel and Britain have different needs. However Matt's point is actually that we generally base financial assistance towards and close alliances with foreign countries on the basis of what we get out of it. We use this calculus in our close alliance with Britain, we get troops in Iraq and support from them on other issues. With Israel we don't get anything but headaches from the Arab countries.

If Israel needed the aid for humanitarian purposes or self-defense, that would be one thing. But nuclear Israel is hardly threatened by the non-nuclear Arab states, and could easily defeat them conventionally as well.

As for a "logical fallacy," its not. We have made that choice to give Israel 3 billion and not give it to malarial aid. It's already been done. Your fallacy is to put words in someone else's mouth and claim that Matt says we don't have money for both.

Lastly, it doesn't if Israel really wants to help us in Iraq, it doesn't. It doesn't help us in any real way for all our money. It is in fact a massive burden on US foreign policy in the Middle East.

Sherry B,

It appears you either support Israel OR you lose your relationship with the US.

The Peoples Republic of China routinely votes against Israel in UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, yet still enjoys Most Favored Nation status.

newellsb,

Our aid blunts the costs to Israel of its occupation of the West Bank, the Palestinian's primary bargaining tool, and weakens its incentive to agree to a peace plan which would form a Palestinian state that has both de jure and de facto independence.

Wouldn't routine Qassam rocket attacks from Gaza (from which Israel had withdrawn troops and settlements earlier this year), the elevation of a Palestinian militia who refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist to the head of the Palestian Authority government, and ongoing suicide bomb attacks as recent as a week ago last Monday, have some part in Israel's reluctance to dive headlong into a spontaneous total withdrawal from the rest of the territories?  Or are we really supposed to buy into the legendary Jewish lust for money?

newellsb,

We have made that choice to give Israel 3 billion and not give it to malarial aid. It's already been done.

Aren't those really two separate choices?  The fallacy seems to remain in that the former choice would somehow prhohibit the latter.

newellsb,

Not only is Israeli aid... hurtful to US interests....

This clause in your comment surely echoes Walt's and Mearsheimer's thesis, but I hadn't found a clear definition of US interests in their paper (LRB version). 

What exactly are these US interests anyway?

As a strategic gambit, it make [less] sense now that the Cold War's ended and Israel's neighbors aren't clients of a superpower rival.

Israel's neighbors were not always clients of a superpower rival. They became clients after the US and its allies were perceived by the Arabs to be solidly on the Israeli side of the Arab/Israeli dispute.

If the US had sided with the Arabs, it probably would have resulted in the end of Israel as a Jewish state, but that probably could have been negotiated to occur with much less disruption and violence than actually ended up happening.

(If the US sides with the Arabs today, that probably will result in the end of Israel as a Jewish state, but that probably can be negotiated to occur with much less disruption and violence than will actually end up happening.)

The US switching sides certainly would have immediately ended any talk of Egypt, Syria or Iraq allying with the militantly atheist Soviets against the US.

Zionista...

First, I will try to be brief here, because it seems unfair to Matthew Yglesias to send his thread, which was focused on a current issue, off into a futile discussion of the history of the Israel/Palestine conflict.

I will note however, that although you acknowledge that the settlement policy was a bad one, you appear to give it short shrift, and don't seem to see just how much the settlement policy has been one of the major impediments to resolving the conflict. How can Palestinians to take Israeli claims of wanting peace seriously, when all through the negotiations, over the decades, the Israeli implicit policy has been to expand them and strengthen them as much as possible in order to take more land from the Palestinians, all the while insisting that the Palestinians meet their demands before negotiations can take place. If the Israelis truly were interested in their own security, then surely such a bad policy would have been halted long ago. Instead, they continued the policy and expected the US to pay for it.

In many ways, I believe the Arab League argument, and the harkening back to the Israeli version of the events of 1948 is a red herring. I'm not sayng the Arab League isn't important, but the primary issue today is between the Israelis and Palestinians, and to bring up the other states, as if this is yet another issue that needs to be solved before Israel can engage in negotiations, is just putting another roadblock up in the efforts toward peace. Similarly, your comments about 1948 reflect a one-sided view of events, but I will not get into that here.

Let me state it again, just to make it clear. I don't wish to participate in a discussion of issues tangential to the topic of the thread. The issue of the Arab League, or the recognition of Israel by other states, is not related in any significant way to the topic at hand.

Now let's get back to a discussion of why a country with a very high standard of living (2005 GDP per capita was $22,300), an extremely efficient military, and anywhere from 200 to 400 nuclear weapons, needs 3 billion a year from the US for security or any other reasons. This question is especially relevant since Israel insists upon continuing its expansion of the illegal settlements (it is going on now - the Gaza withdrawal was a drop in the bucket), which not only exacerbate the current tensions (thus requiring more US military aid?) but also result in "facts on the ground" that increasingly make a settlement more difficult to achieve. In other words, why should the US fund, albeit indirectly, illegal settlement activity which only increases the violence?

Arnold...

You seem to see only two possible actions for the US to take: taking the side of Israel or taking the side of the Arabs. It is seeing the conflict only in terms of these extremes that perpetuates the problem. For there is a third way (and maybe more ways) to look at the situation. It does require a tolerance for ambiguity which political realities tend to work against, but it is this: we must start from the realization that the creation of the state of Israel was a reasonable and just action when looked at from the point of view of the West, but an unjust action when looked at from the point of view of the Arabs; all the subsequent problems stem from this dilemma. We must accept this ambiguity, and try to move forward to the best compromise, giving neither of the two sides favored status, if we are to be a fair broker of peace.

As Matt said,

Unfortunately, the middle ground in this debate tends to vanish entirely. Either you're supposed to get all trenchant and denunciatory about Israel, backing divestment schemes and UN condemnations or else Israel should be our number one recipient of foreign aid and our number two donee should be a quasi-bribe to Egypt to not be unduly mean to Israel.

The best answer is a course somewhere in the middle of those two extremes; although my own arguments probably are seen as placing me in the "dununciatory" camp, in reality my hope would be for a solution in which both sides recognized there was no choice but to compromise. Our strategy so far - our aid having allowed Israel for so many years to avoid this realization (and other forces perhaps allowing the Palestinians to avoid it as well) - has been to enable the conflict, rather than to help end it. We need to change to a "friends don't let friends drive drunk" approach toward both sides, because at this point it appears that neither is able to deal with the situation entirely rationally (this is understandable given the years of bloodshed, but it must not be allowed to continue).

I wanted to add the general statement that it's possible to denounce the things that Israel does that prolong or exacerbate the conflict, or that harm the Palestinian people, without being "anti-Israel" as the term is generally understood (without, for instance, thinking Israel should cease to exist, or hating Israel or the Jewish people). Wishing an equitable solution, and aware that one's own government has taken a side, and realizing that by doing so it has given that side a tremendous advantage (that advantage apparently leading away from a just solution rather than toward one), does lead one to be more critical of Israel. But criticism of Israeli policies and actions does not make one anti-Israel any more than criticism of US policies and actions makes one anti-American. It's the purpose and intent of the criticism that makes the difference.

we must start from the realization that the creation of the state of Israel was a reasonable and just action when looked at from the point of view of the West, but an unjust action when looked at from the point of view of the Arabs
... and we are the West. I'm not sure the West being an honest broker is possible under these conditions.

Israel did not accept the 2002 Saudi offer partly because it wants to keep some occupied land, but also because after accepting it, Egypt and Saudi Arabia would still be one mass protest or election away from reverting to being openly hostile to Israel. Same for the Palestinians.

You are right the Arabs see Israel fundamentally differently from how the West sees it. But that fundamental difference has implications that I think you miss.

It would be very difficult for the US to continuing guaranteeing Israel's existence as a Jewish state, but somehow not be perceived as the far enemy of the Arabs. And there are substantial strategic costs associated with the US being the far enemy of the Arabs.

Problem is that it would be very difficult for Israel to continue existing as a Jewish state without substantial visible US support.

Is the solution to find a way to offer compensation that the Arabs consider fair, but does not leave the Arabs in a strong enough position to defeat Israel militarily? Those are two directly contradictory goals. If there is a middle space, it is not easy to find.

Wordie,

I will note however, that although you acknowledge that the settlement policy was a bad one, you appear to give it short shrift, and don't seem to see just how much the settlement policy has been one of the major impediments to resolving the conflict.

It can never be a good idea to settle a nation's citizens on lands not so much as even annexed by that nation.  That said, from the point of view of the Arab establishment Ashkelon, Tel Aviv and Netanya are illegal settlements, which justifies the firing of Qassam (and lately Katyusha) rockets into Israel from Gaza (and Israeli military responses against such attacks as somehow "criminal").

The issue of the Arab League, or the recognition of Israel by other states, is not related in any significant way to the topic at hand.

I can appreciate the desire to close your mind to the complexity of the overall Arab-Israeli conflict.  As long you hold on to your faith in the idea that one party in the situation has any significant influence on its circumstances, it will remain in your mind a relatively simple conflict to resolve.

... and we are the West. I'm not sure the West being an honest broker is possible under these conditions.

Perhaps you are right, but it seems to me that the Europeans have evolved in their understanding of the conflict over the years, while the US has not. A recognition of the basic dilemma that I presented earlier would certainly bring us far closer to being able to perform appropriately in the honest broker role.

Israel did not accept the 2002 Saudi offer partly because it wants to keep some occupied land, but also because after accepting it, Egypt and Saudi Arabia would still be one mass protest or election away from reverting to being openly hostile to Israel. Same for the Palestinians.

Yes, there are problems that extend beyond the issue of land, but the question is how far a just land settlement might go toward solving those problems. If Israel offered a substantial amount of quality land, far greater than what has been proposed so far, and if such a negotiated agreement was put to a vote of the Palestinian public and approved, the more extreme elements in other Arab countries would be substantially co-opted from taking action, as to do so would be opposing not just Israel but also the Palestinian choice in the matter. There would of course be a risk that the Palestinians would not approve such a deal, but most recent polls measuring Palestinian attitudes toward resolution of the conflict suggest it is a minority who are truly hardliners, who aren't willing to accept any peace deal with Israel (interestingly, I think the number of Palestinian hardliners is roughly equivalent to the number of Israeli hardliners).

The issue of Jerusalem would be key in such a settlement, and making the city an international one is the best solution to resolve the problems of religious jurisdiction there. Many in the pro-Israel camp tend to downplay the importance of Jerusalem to Muslims in order to justify it's takeover by Israel, but without a just solution in Jerusalem, the fighting will never stop. The internationalizing of the city is not a great solution, but it is the best one compared to all others.

You are right the Arabs see Israel fundamentally differently from how the West sees it. But that fundamental difference has implications that I think you miss.

It would be very difficult for the US to continuing guaranteeing Israel's existence as a Jewish state, but somehow not be perceived as the far enemy of the Arabs. And there are substantial strategic costs associated with the US being the far enemy of the Arabs.

Problem is that it would be very difficult for Israel to continue existing as a Jewish state without substantial visible US support.

That's why I think that once a negotiated settlement is achieved, a large international peacekeeping force whose charter is to stop violence on both sides would need to be deployed, with the understanding that it was to be disbanded as soon as a secure peace was achieved. Israel would argue that it does not want to leave its security in the hands of others, but such a force need not impinge on Israeli internal security. Along with international peacekeepers, Substantial investment on the part of the international community in building up a strong Palestinian infrastructure and educational system would also go along way in ensuring peace, and undercutting extremist elements.

And yes, these things would cost a great deal of money. But why not divert that $3 billion that the US offers to Israel annually (and I've read reports that the amount is actually substantially more than that) into efforts that are designed to bolster a peace, rather than favoring one side in such a way that hostilities inevitably will be increased and perpetuated (as the Sharon/Olmert unilateral plan is sure to do, and the decades-long settlement policy has done). If the US were to fight in the international arena for such a plan, and help to fund it, it would go far in reducing the perception of enmity among Arabs, but at the same time protect the continued existance of Israel. By pouring our money into a neutral peacekeeping force, rather than Israel itself, the strategic costs associated with our support for Israel would be reduced, and over time, with the success of a Palestinian state, would probably cease to be a substantial issue.

One other issue that is rarely mentioned, but could contribute to a peaceful outcome, is the return of educated members of the Palestinian diaspora, once a peace is underway. One of the reasons for increased violence is the breakdown of the Palestinian educational system that occured as a result of the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon. The existance of large numbers of unemployed and uneducated young men in the Palestinian territories that occurred as a result is a substantial threat to the existance of Israel. There needs to be an alternative to Hamas, and perhaps this could be found with the return of educated Palestinians to the new Palestinian state.

I am in no way advocating the abandonment of Israel as an ally (perhaps because of my own Western point-of-view?), but do believe that we need to go about things in a radically different way. Should not a  realist approach to foreign policy acknowledge that there would be substantial strategic costs involved in the abandonment of an ally? 

Is the solution to find a way to offer compensation that the Arabs consider fair, but does not leave the Arabs in a strong enough position to defeat Israel militarily? Those are two directly contradictory goals. If there is a middle space, it is not easy to find.

Yes, that is exactly the sort of solution - a middle space one - that must be found. However difficult it might be - and I don't think the goals are necessarily contradictory, just difficult to achieve - it is the only sort of solution that can conceivably bring peace. I think it will take a neutral outside entity to propose such a deal, as neither the Israelis or Palestinians, after so many years of tit-for-tat violence and turmoil, appear capable of seeing anything but the old options, none of which has so far worked. What I'm proposing has lots of flaws, I'm sure, and can be criticized on many levels, but it surely would be better than where we appear to be headed now. 

What if a little bird whispered in GWB's ear that the best way to avoid being remembered as "the worst President ever," would be to actually achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace with a bold new initiative along the lines I just outlined? He's a lame duck anyway, and the way things are going, he has little to lose.

Zionista...

I downrated your comment because of this:

Or are we really supposed to buy into the legendary Jewish lust for money?

There just simply was nothing in newellsb's post that would justify such a comment. By trying to associate newellsb's post with a ugly bigoted stereotype about Jews, you appear to be trying to avoid discussion of newellsb's other points.

Using over-the-top rhetorical devices does nothing to advance the discussion.

Although I disagree with some of the other things you said, I won't get into that here, as I wish there to be no doubt about why I downrated your comment.

Wordie,

I believe the Arab League argument, and the harkening back to the Israeli version of the events of 1948 is a red herring.

Upthread you had asked,

But shouldn't recognition be an outcome of negotations and a genuine peace process, and not established as a precondition for only one side?

How do we accept a peace process as "genuine" when it lacks any diplomatic mechanism? 

Far from being the red herring you suggest it seems to me to be quite reasonable to suggest that the lack of a regional diplomatic infrastructure, or rather sustaining a regional diplomatic infrastructure that ensures Israel's diplomatic isolation, is a great recipe for ongoing US foreign aid at the current levels as no peace process can appear genuine without some diplomatic foundation.  How is Israel supposed to comply with the Arab League's Beirut Peace Proposal, which calls for Israeli withdrawals from all occupied territories including the Golan Heights and the Shebaa Farms area (which Lebanon and Syria can't decide between themselves who has the greater claim) without at least the diplomatic integrity that can only be established by recognition? 

How is Israel supposed to comply with the Arab League's Beirut Peace Proposal, which calls for Israeli withdrawals from all occupied territories including the Golan Heights and the Shebaa Farms area (which Lebanon and Syria can't decide between themselves who has the greater claim) without at least the diplomatic integrity that can only be established by recognition?

The Arab League's Proposal called for a withdrawal on the Israeli side and a corresponding recognition on the side of the Arab League. Israel instead rejected this proposal, putting the cart before the horse by insisting that recognition come first. The US should not support "cake and eat it too" approaches to diplomacy on the part of Israel.

Security needs and the "complexity" of the situation are frequently cited by conquering nations to justify their conquests. These same arguments were used by Israel for years in defending the continued occupation of the Sinai and southern Lebanon. Yet ultimately when these areas were returned to their rightful owners, the security of Israel was increased, not threatened. 

Israel's long-term security needs will be best addressed by a negotiated settlement. Abbas has indicated he is willing to meet and Israel has rebuffed him. The excuse that Abbas does not represent the Palestinian people is another red herring, because the result of negotiations would be put to a vote of the Palestinian people - such a decision would have profound legitimacy. The US should not be funding a brutal occupation, nor supporting it diplomatically. The continued blind support of the US for an Israel engaging in illegal expansionist policies undermines our own security interests. And on top of that, we're paying over $3 billion annually to do so! The longer we go without a settlement, the greater the appeal of the more extremist elements such as Hamas; an agreement would go far in neutralizing their appeal.

What will bring peace is the return of Palestinian land, the redirecting of our annual $3+ billion to a multinational peacekeeping force and intensive Palestinian economic development, and an internationalized Jerusalem. 

Wordie,

What will bring peace is the return of Palestinian land, the redirecting of our annual $3+ billion to a multinational peacekeeping force and intensive Palestinian economic development, and an internationalized Jerusalem.

Exactly how are we to reconcile that recognition is supposed to be a "precondition," but none of the above is?  Come on, Wordie.  What you and the Arab League are trying to bamboozle as a "peace initiative" has all the stink of an ultimatum:  "Do everything we say, and then we'll talk."

Exactly how are we to reconcile that recognition is supposed to be a "precondition," but none of the above is? Come on, Wordie. What you and the Arab League are trying to bamboozle as a "peace initiative" has all the stink of an ultimatum: "Do everything we say, and then we'll talk."

The proposal I put forth recognizes that return of Palestinian land is not a "concession" for the Israelis to make, but rather is a requirement of international law. The occupation is illegal, yet Israel and its supporters have so dominated even the very language we use to discuss the conflict that the average American is completely unaware of this.

"Security?" What country would not have security problems while occupying another's land?

"No recognition?" As head of the PLO, Arafat already recognized Israel in 1993, and made serious concessions to Israel during Oslo. And what did Israel do? Here's what Bill Moyers said about it in a June 2003 segement of PBS NOW:

Since the 1993 Declaration of Principles, which resulted from the Oslo peace process, there have been several handovers of land to differing degrees of Palestinian civil and security control. The Oslo Peace Accords anticipated the halting of settlement building and the growing removal of settlements. Instead, during the intervening years the number settlers on the West Bank has doubled from about 100,000 to 200,000. (emphasis mine)

Yet somehow that addition of 100,000 illegal settlers, a doubling of the population in the West Bank in a mere 10 years, is never mentioned as a reason for the violence, only the Palestinians are supposed to modify their behavior (terror) before negotiations can take place. And the settlement activity continued full force during the time that further Oslo negotiations were to provide a resolution of the status of that same territory. It is for this reason that I have come to believe that the US simply is unable to act as a fair broker. I am no supporter of terror, but such a one-sided approach can never work.

The US makes noises from time to time about its opposition to the settlement policy, but there's never any teeth put into the objections. A cutting of of all aid to Israel until all settlement activity ceases completely is the minimum we should do. Why have we not done this? I credit AIPAC and the Israel Lobby, in that the average person in the US simply has no awareness of the connection between the settlements and Palestinian terror; instead Palestinian violence erroneously has been linked subconciously in the minds of Americans (to the extent that any of them really think much about the middle east) with our own experience of 9/11 (much as Saddam was erroneously linked with 9/11, to justify the invasion of Iraq). This is what millions of dollars worth of propaganda efforts can buy.

Now, insofar as the Arab League recognized quite rightly that Oslo's vagueness is a part of what led to this mess, they certainly aren't going to make the same mistake that Arafat made, are they? Nonetheless, the requirement by Israel that the Arab League be made a major part of the negotiation is nothing more than an attempt to add so much complexity to the situation that nothing is ever accomplished, a situation which favors Israel, as it permits the unacknowledged Israeli policy of slow, incremental theft of land from the Palestinians to continue. Note that despite the Gaza pullout, the settlement policy continues unabated, and in fact there was a net gain in illegal settlers in 2005, despite the evacuation of Gaza. Yet again, the impression is left somehow that this is not the case.

The US should not be funding such behavior on the part of Israel.

Matthew, you made a mention of "shared values" as a reason for continued support of Israel. Well, here are some values I think we in the US should not share:

  • Occupation of another people's land (this is acceptable neither in Israel nor in Iraq)
  • Extra-judicial killings
  • Collective punishments
  • Discrimination against non-Jewish Israelis in land laws
  • Torture

(Note that the above was in no way a complete list.)

The values we supposedly share would not allow any of the above, yet these are activities in which Israel routinely engages. This is not meant to imply that there are not other important values that we share with some (but not all) Israelis, but just to point out that the "shared values" argument has some big holes in it.