America's "Security Trap"
So where are we in the grand debate about American national security?
Iran is now at the center of public debate, but there are deeper dilemmas and controversies that beset America’s global position that must be confronted if we are to find a coherent, enlightened, and sustainable post-Bush foreign policy.
Bush foreign policy is failing – but it is important to come to grips with why it is failing. To be sure, it is failing because Bush stumbled into an epic disaster in Iraq. But the problems are not just about policy incompetence, ideological blindness, or high risk policy choices gone bad. I would argue that Bush foreign policy is failing – in the large sense – because it is inconsistent with the realities of a transforming international system that shapes and limits the way the United States can effectively exercise power and – more importantly -- assert its authority.
Because of this, the Bush administration has run into trouble, or as I would put it, it has gotten America caught in a “security trap.” It is a security trap in the sense that as the Bush administration tries to solve the nation’s security problems by exercising its power or using force, it tends to produce resistance and backlash that leaves the country more isolated, bereft of authority, and, ultimately, insecure.
The problem is that when liberals take over the reins of foreign policy, they too will fall into this trap unless they understand the problem and devise a grand strategy that works with rather than against these evolving global realities.
Let me explain.
To start, the Bush administration does not understand the full implications of the two most historic transformations in world politics in half a century -- the rise of American unipolar power and changing norms of state sovereignty. The first of these transformations is the most obvious. It is the near-monopoly on the international use of force that the United States has enjoyed since the demise of the Soviet Union. But the second – an eroding norm of Westphalian sovereignty marked by rising acceptance of intervention in the internal affairs of states – is no less important. These dual epochal shifts in the underlying character of the international system make American power -- regardless of specific Washington foreign policies -- more worrisome to other states than in the past. (If you want to read more on this, I discuss this argument in a working paper entitled “Why Bush Foreign Policy Fails.”)
The rise of unipolarity is fraught with implications for American foreign policy. On the one hand, the fact that the U.S. is the only superpower gives it unprecedented options and opportunities. It can say no to other states and go it alone more readily than in the past. But it is also the case that other states find it easier to “free ride” on American policy than in the past – so this opens up new disputes between the United States and its partners about the provision of global public goods – security, open markets, frameworks for cooperation.
But there is another implication of the rise of unipolarity that is more subtle and utterly critical: a shift in the underlying logic of order and rule in world politics. In a bipolar or multipolar system, powerful states “rule” in the process of leading a coalition of states in balancing against other states. When the system shifts to unipolarity, this logic of rule disappears. Power is no longer based on balancing and equilibrium but on the predominance of one state. This is new and different – and potentially threatening to weaker states (whether they are friendly to the U.S. or not). As a result, the power of the leading state is thrown into the full light of day. Unipolar power itself becomes a “problem” in world politics.
The erosion of norms of state sovereignty makes this problem worse. The gradual decline of Westphalian sovereignty is reflected in the triumph of the postwar human rights revolution. We celebrate this accomplishment – Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The implication is that the “international community” increasingly is seen to have legitimate interests in what goes on within countries. Over the decades, the international community has added more realms of internal state activity that it has a stake in. Most recently, the new threat of transnational terrorism has opened up states even more to outside scrutiny. Sovereignty is increasingly contingent.
This has had two implications. First, eroded norms of sovereignty have created a new “license” for powerful states to intervene in domestic affairs of weak and troubled states. That is, the norms of state sovereignty have less “stopping power.” There are fewer principled and normative inhibitions on intervention. But second, eroded sovereignty has not been matched by a rise of new norms and agreements about when and how the “international community” should intervene. After all, who speaks for the international community? This erosion of the norms of state sovereignty has ushered in a new global struggle over the sources of authority in the international community.
This global struggle – or crisis of international authority – has been exacerbated by the rise of American unipolarity. After all, only the U.S. really has the military power to systematically engage in large-scale uses of force around the world. Indeed, the two developments reinforce world-wide insecurity about American power: the United States is the only global political-military power and the revolutions in human rights and transnational terrorism call forth new reasons why intervention – in the name of the international community or global security or hegemonic management – may be necessary.
Two other shifts in the global system reinforce this “problem” of American power. The end of the Cold War has eliminated a common threat that tied the United States to a global array of allies. The end of this Cold War threat has meant that the U.S. does not need these allies in the same way as in the past but it also means that other states do not need the U.S. as much as in the past. As a result, American power is less clearly tied to a common purpose (Cold War: containment of communism. Today: not sure). This makes American power less intrinsically legitimate and desirable in the eyes of states and peoples around the world.
The other long term shift is the rise of democratic community. The world is increasingly filled with democracies – and together these democracies form a sort of democratic community. This fact of democratic community has paradoxical effects on American foreign policy. On the one hand, it gives the United States the ready access to partners and the ability to pursue complex forms of cooperation. American power itself is seen – because the U.S. is a democracy – as more benign and accessible to other democracies. The United State, in turn, is surrounded by affluent, capable, and friendly states. On the other hand, these democratic states are not likely to respond to domination or coercion by the United States. Indeed, they will expect the United States to operate within rules and institutions of the democratic community.
It is this situation that appears to have caused the Bush administration so much grief. The Bush invasion of Iraq and general disregard for rules and institutions has triggered an outpouring of resentment and disapproval across the democratic world. Whatever pressure the United States can bring to bear on its democratic allies and partners is offset by the public opinion within these democratic states. The Bush administration has discovered the limits of its power in the age of democracy. It has gotten into trouble – losing credibility, prestige, respect, and political support – when it has been seen to side-step or disrespect the rules and norms of the liberal order.
There are other layers to this problem – and I will discuss them in later posts. As I will argue, America’s “security trap” is manifest not just at this general level but also in more specific ways as the Bush administration has attempted to fashion a security doctrine to go after specific rogue or outlaw states and as it has articulated a no peer competitor hegemonic strategy. To get ahead of myself, my argument is that the Bush administration has walked into a security trap and proceeded to make it worse.
But the message to liberals is that they too will see their foreign policy fail unless they are clear eyed about the structural setting of twenty-first century global politics. Ultimately, the problems with Bush foreign policy will not be fixed by getting rid of Rumsfeld or even Bush. In the end, the only way forward for the United States is to place at the center of its post-Bush grand strategy the goal of strengthening and defending an international order built around agreed-upon rules and institutions buttressed by American hegemony and public goods provision and the intense cooperation made possible by democratic community. Bush wants to spread democracy. America’s goal will also need to be build and work with democratic community.
Do you agree that with Michael Mandelbaum both that Wilsonian ideals have largely though incompletely triumphed in the world? I take it you do not. Do you agree with Mandelbaum that world does not really object to Americas unipolar power as evidenced by the lack of any effort to build a counter military alliance?
Recognizing the problems you outline what role with economics play in part overcoming some of the these problem? If trade can exacerbate competition and make it seem worse than that it does require certain norms of trust and trading mechanisms. Nations that are in chaos will not be attractive to trading partners or lenders.
Daniel A. Greenbaum
April 21, 2006 5:44 PM | Reply | Permalink
The gradual decline of Westphalian sovereignty is reflected in the triumph of the postwar human rights revolution. [Emphasis added]
"Westphalian sovereignty," the Prince commands within his jurisdiction, has never prevented the Athenians of this world from working their will upon the Melians.
As Ikenberry would say, "Let me explain."
First, review the actions of the premier democracy in the post-World War II world -- the U. S. of A. The list of countries whose Princes' policies this state found unacceptable and acted to change is legion: Guatemala, Iran, Lebanon, Cuba, Congo, Vietnam, Domincan Republic, Grenada, Panama, etc.
Second, note this state's quiescence (and often, support of) in the face of "human rights" violations by the "Prince": Spain, Portugal, the South and Central American juntas, Uganda, South Africa, Burma, Croatia, Serbia, Timor, etc.
Note further that the single example of a so-called "human rights revolution" is the recent history of Kosovo. And nothing happened vis-a-vis Kosovo until the U.S. and its NATO allies decided that Kosovo was no longer part of Serbia, that Serbia was acting as an invader, and that Milosevic was embarrassing leaders who thought quite highly of themselves. Nothing contra-Westphalia, here.
Democrats don't have to look for a new foreign policy on any theory that "Princes" no longer have full authority within their borders. They never have. Nothing has changed.
If Ikenberry needs an excuse to deploy our military might, he'll need to come up with another theory to justify it.
April 21, 2006 9:09 PM | Reply | Permalink
Ellen
The problem with your list of countries where actions took place post WWII and now is the absence of the Soviet Union. The Soviets both did not respect sovereign borders and were seen in the United States as a mortal enemy. The latter led to many foolish and even immoral actions by the United States.
However, with the UN and even more the Helsinki Accords human rights have been elevated to more than a domestic concern. One of the many problems with Bush is the way he turned Al Qaeda into another potential Soviet Union or perhaps will allow China to play that role. This too is likely to lead to knee jerk foreign policy adventures that have little to do with human rights or Westphalia.
Daniel A. Greenbaum
April 22, 2006 9:15 AM | Reply | Permalink
Some of us would argue that America's moment as the world's only "superpower" has passed. Since the end of WWII we have lost (or at best tied) in every major military offensive we have entered: Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq being the most obvious. But we have not done well in Latin America or Haiti either.
The rise of China and India as major commercial competitors is also something we haven't been able to control. Unlike the days of the banana republics we haven't been able to create client regimes to offer us favorable trade and investment deals.
In addition the rise in the world demand for raw materials and the US's inability to control supply has put us into a position we don't know how to handle. Strong arm tactics to secure supplies are failing. We have no national industrial policy to deal with this issue. What is needed is a recognition that the US will no longer be able to grow using underpriced foreign raw materials and labor. In addition we don't have much to offer as exports to the rest of the world that isn't based upon militarism or agriculture.
China will shortly shift from making cheap stuff for export to making better quality stuff for internal markets. They won't need us anymore. The US needs to plan for a transition from empire to one major power among several, including Japan, China, India and the EU. It is even possible that the old Soviet sphere will re-emerge as an economic zone some day.
The old empires of Spain, England, France, etc. didn't go quietly off the world stage, but they went just the same. We can plan for an orderly transition to a sustainable society or we can expect social unrest and a continual effort to use military power to stem the tide. Excessive militarism has already diverted half our federal budget from infrastructure development and social programs to this useless sector.
--- Policies not Politics
Daily Landscape
April 22, 2006 9:29 AM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen "JmacSF"
San Francisco. CA
Every exercise of power induces the formation of countervailing centers of power. That's what's happening as the US tries to impose unipolar power in a world-system already tending toward increasingly multi-polarity. For the problem of unipolarity and the unfolding grand disaster of US grand strategy in a slightly different key
Insecurity With Insolvency - Andrew Bacevich
April 22, 2006 9:42 AM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen "JmacSF"
San Francisco. CA
In other words I do not accept as necessary much less inevitable the premise that democratic regimes will accept much less butress US hegemony at the expense of their own. It certainly won't happen in the Middle East and neither with China or India.
April 22, 2006 9:50 AM | Reply | Permalink
This Administration and the following ones also have to deal with non-state international actors that transcend borders and create separate "centers" of power.
Multinational corporations do everything they can to make borders irelevant when it is in their best interest (e.g. flows of capital and parts without regard for source or endpoint) and to use borders when it is useful (e.g., cheaper labor pool due to lower living standards).
It is not clear to me how international treaties and alliances based on sovereign states constrain multinational corporations.
April 22, 2006 11:50 AM | Reply | Permalink
One aspect of the "security trap" is that somehow we bought the idea that security requires world domination.
Take Italy as an example. It does not dominate a single country. How about her security? Seems OK to me. Surely, that's because of our military might and NATO? Well, so whom we protect Italy against? Libia? Albania? "Islamic world" that they face across the sea? The Swiss? This mental exercise shows that Italy faces no real threats -- in the military sense of the word.
How about ourselves? We are even less threatened than Italy. Now we have a "new class of threats", terrorism, but there is nothing new about terrorism. It is basically international police problem, and resources needed are intelligence, police, courtes etc, not M-1s, B-2s or F-15s. 9/11 seems to be to terrorism what Chernobyl and Bhopal were to industrial accidents -- a tragic outlier, but not a dawn of a new terrible world.
"Security trap" is that we have basically unopposed military force, which leads some of us to delusion that it can solve problems that cannot be solved that way, like securing oil supplies. If we want China to buy less oil on the world market, we have basically one tool: win in the bidding contest. It turns out that oil becomes expensive and Chinese have increasingly more money to buy it; even worse, they can get yet more money for oil by lending less money to us (this sneaky manouver may dawn on them one day). Unless we abandon "free trade" for frank piracy, there is not much that we can do.
"Refashoning other regions" was another possible application for our superior forces, but we learned that while no one can oppose our attack, we do not have a better capacity to wage a dirty war than, say, Algeria. Algeria handled an insurection that was every bit as nasty as that of Iraqi Sunnis, and they did a dirty, ineffecient but ultimately effective job. We are doing a job that is dirty, inefficient, and who knows how effective.
Another application of an overwhelmingly superior force: prevailing upon a number of countries that they should not be getting nukes. Which begs a question: why they crave nukes to begin with? Well, because we have an overwhelmingly superior force.
It is harder and harder to show any value for money that we get from our military presence around the globe. Perhaps retaining a retaliatory capability is good (if you cross us, we can smash your cities) but "projecting capability" is largely futile (no, we cannot convert them forcibly to Christianity).
April 22, 2006 12:00 PM | Reply | Permalink
Korea, and Vietnam were not won because of a failure of arms but a failure of desire, It is not yet clear to me that Afghanistan is lost. The United States could have destroyed both Korea and Vietnam. The existence of nuclear weapons made that a very dangerous but not impossible task. The bigger problem is that Americans aren't Romans are British. It is the problem in Iraq. As a nation we do not fight wars with limited political goal very well.
As I have mentioned before I have a friend who believes that Iraqis don't believe they are defeated and that we should smash some of their cities, at least the Sunnis. We have arguments about this including that Americans could not stomach such a policy.
As for our economy remember that in the 1980s Japan was going to take over from the United States. Instead Japan reliquified the United States and fell into a 15 year depression. It is possible you are right, it is Paul Kennedy's analysis, but it is possible the growth a large middle classes in China and India will make the world safer and provide enormous markets for America.
Daniel A. Greenbaum
April 22, 2006 4:03 PM | Reply | Permalink
One aspect of the "security trap" is that somehow we bought the idea that security requires world domination.
I once read that the Romans thought that to secure their emipre, they needed to conquer all its enemies. Which sounded like a terrific idea until it turned out that the more they conquered, the more enemies they had. The larger the Roman empire was, the longer its border and the more barbarians waiting at the gates.
April 22, 2006 4:53 PM | Reply | Permalink
It is harder and harder to show any value for money that we get from our military presence (and our willingness to deploy it in combat) around the globe. piotr
Well said.
Apologists for our economic and political elites -- and I won't name names (see, above) -- regularly rationalize and mystify the use of military power for selfish economic goals (yes, remember Smedley D. Butler) as the cost of sustaining a "human rights revolution."
Please. It's fine if your romantic ideals are at odds with your continued willingness to live in an amoral military-industrial security state, but don't expect the rest of us to accept as true the fantasies you need to tell yourselves in order to be able to obscure the reality of the ethical and moral challenges you daily live with.
April 22, 2006 5:07 PM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen "JmacSF"
San Francisco. CA
Out of the mouths of babes
April 22, 2006 6:53 PM | Reply | Permalink
Before one uses the Romans as a counter example remember their empire lasted over 400 years in the west and 1400 years in the east. That is not a bad record by any standard.
Daniel A. Greenbaum
April 22, 2006 7:03 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'm a little hesitant to go along with the application of Hobbs' term 'Leviathan" to the organization of the international order as opposed to the (non)/organization of a state. Obviously the characterization of "man to man" in a state of anarchy has to be different than the characterization of "state to state" in the global realm. But I'm not going to quibble with it since I take the author to be making a rough analogy. I would dissuade Mr. Ikenberry from entretaining any idea that a "liberal Leviathan" role can be carved out for the United States in the future. I think that's where the analogy falls apart. We can imagine a "liberal Leviathan" emerging at the state level and that's exactly what John Locke did with Hobbs' ideas. And we can of course also imagine a more authoritarian Leviathan emerging too. But when we are talking about the international community of nations, I simply cannot see how the Untied Staes can be morphed into a begnin "liberal" Leviathan. The very justification for the formation of a state---something that both Hobbs and Locke share--is for the benefit of those INDIVIDUALS who enter into such a (hypothetical) contract. Nowhere in their writings do these theorist inject as part of the rational motive for contract to be for the benevolent well-being of other states or the global community. Perhaps I missed that in their writing. So it is perfectly logical for Bush to opt for a conservative Leviathan role with exceptionalism and all, even if, in the end, it is self-defeating as you say. I say the only real option the world has is multipolarity. As for the fate of the nation-state, I would not dismiss its survival into the medium-term just yet
April 22, 2006 8:22 PM | Reply | Permalink
Ellen,
even "selfish economic goals" (oil? bananas?) are not served by our military activity, except for contracts that we give to military contractors.
Japan achieves similar results using an incredibly bloated transportation budget.
April 22, 2006 8:39 PM | Reply | Permalink
"Nation-states" are probably not terribly relevant to a discussion of current geopolitics.
Artificial states such as Iraq, Indonesia, Turkey, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the states of sub-Saharan Africa are not nation-states and thus, require for stability the rule of a strong man or elite clique to intimidate the warring "nations" within them.
Under such conditions -- often brutal -- there is always the opportunity -- taken where commodity wealth is on offer -- for the unipolar power to engage in mischief.
April 22, 2006 8:59 PM | Reply | Permalink
Well, on a geological timescale, it's less than an eyeblink. In the homo sapiens sapiens history, it is significant.
An empire could last hundreds of years when it took weeks, if not months, for people and information to get from one end to the other. In the age when information gets from anywhere to anywhere else almost instantly, and people can get there in a day, time isn't what it used to be.
These days, no empire is going to last anywhere close to 400 years. Let alone if (when?) global warming hits hard before the end of this century.
April 22, 2006 9:05 PM | Reply | Permalink
Ellen, you wrote: "If Ikenberry needs an excuse to deploy our military might, he'll need to come up with another theory to justify it."
I don't read Ikenberry, here or in his book After Victory, as at all a militarist. He was against the Iraq war. I read him as advocating the construction of international institutions that will bind the help to reign in the worst sorts of excesses the US and other nations might otherwise engage in, and facilitate addressing problems of international scope.
I believe he sees the post World War II institutional order--entailing the construction of NATO, the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the Marshall Plan as notable examples--as on the whole successful and instructive.
Which gets to your excellent points: "First, review the actions of the premier democracy in the post-World War II world -- the U. S. of A. The list of countries whose Princes' policies this state found unacceptable and acted to change is legion: Guatemala, Iran, Lebanon, Cuba, Congo, Vietnam, Domincan Republic, Grenada, Panama, etc.
Second, note this state's quiescence (and often, support of) in the face of "human rights" violations by the "Prince": Spain, Portugal, the South and Central American juntas, Uganda, South Africa, Burma, Croatia, Serbia, Timor, etc."
It is not clear to me that Professor Ikenberry reads or responds to comments in response to his posts. But if you do, Professor, and can be encouraged to step away from the drawing board for a few moments, would you care to comment on Ellen's point about the operational reality of US conduct during the post World War II period?
In particular, how does that reality bear on your theory emphasizing the restraining nature--for the US as well as others--of the international commitments the US entered into post WWII, in ways you believe have broadly served the interests of the US and the rest of the world?
Isn't Ellen correct in the sense that, rhetorical respect for national sovereignty norms aside, the US has throughout the post-WWII era intervened in the affairs of other nations frequently and in many ways not envisioned by the international norms that exist on paper, and even since the end of the Cold War?
I believe you see the post WWII reality as much more successful overall than not (or than it would have been in the absence of the international institutions) while Ellen sees the gap between the rhetoric and reality as suggesting that in reality we did not even undertake the experiment you see us as undertaking on the whole successfully during that time period.
One of the most obvious implications of what Ellen is saying is that, to the extent much of the rest of the world perceives a yawning gap between US rhetoric vs. US policies, not just during the Bush years but for decades now, doesn't that deeply compromise the ability of the US to lead (post-Bush) in the sort of project you are advocating?
I ask these questions as one who wants to be sympathetic to what you are suggesting, mainly because I don't see better alternatives in an era in which many problems of global scope--such as global warming, nuclear nonproliferation, combating al qaeda, combating the spread of communicable diseases, for example--requiring broad international efforts to address them are the reality for now and the forseeable future.
Ellen's comments imply that US hypocrisy badly damages our credibility to lead in post-Bush relatively enlightened ways. Surely that is true. But to my way of thinking it somewhat begs the question of what we should try to do, given the various alternatives.
April 23, 2006 7:16 AM | Reply | Permalink
"Nations that are in chaos will not be attractive to trading partners or lenders."
But isn't there another philosophy that flies in the face of such a statement, where US military power is used to plunge a resource-rich state into anarchy/civil war, to generate profit by shocking global markets and by the fact that the deteriorating system on the ground means that only US corporations can operate with any measure of confidence in that state.
ellen makes good points, it is not the drive for "human rights" that drives these interventions in anything but name. but the cause of human rights is a good cover for the Bush-style treasure hunt version of foreign policy.
it is arguable that the "security trap" is part of an ideology that directly equates any threat to corporate profit (which also now includes the potential profits lost by NOT acting militarily) with the nation's security. are these two things truly one and the same? what policy changes would disentangle the two to a greater degree?
April 23, 2006 9:36 AM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen "JmacSF"
San Francisco. CA
April 23, 2006 9:43 AM | Reply | Permalink
Read Robert D. Kaplan's "Old States, New Threats" (Washington Post, today) for a far more realistic assessment of the modern world.
Scrap away Ikenberry's fake scholarship and you're left with typical liberal whine; the rich and powerful are too rich and powerful, America is the worst sinner, and the solution to all problems is forced redistribution.
April 23, 2006 9:53 AM | Reply | Permalink
What evidence is there of that? Despite the wringing of hands the U.S. is still a huge manufacturer. Unless you are looking to destroy Ford, GM, GE, Dupont and Dow to name a few you do not want to shock the commodity markets upward.
It seems to me that a Marxist driven analysis of U.S. foreign policy doesn't explain the facts. The United States as the largest trading and financial country benefits from stability. If anything one could argue that that U.S. policy has been so driven by stability that it has led America to prefer dictators over democrats.
Daniel A. Greenbaum
April 23, 2006 9:58 AM | Reply | Permalink
Ellen
How are you defining nation state? If I understand your meaning modern Germany isn't a nation state either. Brazillians have told me that their problem that they are really five countries in one.
The lack of historical nation states is one reason for the collective efforts around the globe. It is also why the world looks to the United States. Our territorial ambitions are limited.
Daniel A. Greenbaum
April 23, 2006 10:03 AM | Reply | Permalink
I read Kaplan and do not see why it is more realistic. Nation states aren't disappearing but none of the states he mentioned are a threat to the United States. It is precisely because non-state actors are going to be increasingly important that the United States is the key nation. It is one of the problems with the Left, not Ikenberry.
Bush and his administration seems to have been unable to imagine an Al Qaeda and prefereed to confront a traditional nation state in order to instill a level of fear of American power in the world. They squandered an opportunity to build links with virtually every nation in order to confront the instability non-nation states can bring to the world.
Daniel A. Greenbaum
April 23, 2006 10:08 AM | Reply | Permalink
America's "Security Trap" isn't really a security trap at all. Substitute "Oil Trap" and now you have the idea what really fouls American foreign policy. Our elected leaders are terrified by anything that could increase gas pump prices, regardless of the cause.
April 23, 2006 10:26 AM | Reply | Permalink
The key error of the neocons, shared by many Democrats, is that they have fallen for the hawk fallacy. They believe that any threat to American hegemony, anywhere in the world, must be met with military force or the threat of military force. We fail to learn from our mistakes in places like Iraq, because the mistaken assumptions of the hawks are never challenged. The hawks will simply conclude, as in Vietnam and in Iraq, that we didn't use enough military force. They blame war opponents and the media for stabbing the military in the back. And they never question whether military force should be used in the first place.
As a result, we'll just keep repeating the same goddamned mistakes over and over again.
April 23, 2006 10:47 AM | Reply | Permalink
of course it should be Hobbes and not Hobbs. The rest are typos. Sorry about that.
April 23, 2006 11:22 AM | Reply | Permalink
I don't believe that for a second. When Bush took office, oil was about $25/barrel. Now it's $75/barrel. War in Iraq and saber rattling with Iran greatly contributed to driving the prices up so much. No, our elected leaders are not terrified by anything that increases gas pump prices, they want the prices to go up. Either that or they're totally stupid - but whatever one may think about Mr. Cheney, he's not an idiot.
April 23, 2006 12:21 PM | Reply | Permalink
The argument -- used by many about Vietnam -- that we just didn't want it enough is laughable. Behind it seems to be the complaint that we wimpy American people -- and most notably those shod in Birkenstock -- were to blame.
It may not be fun to accept that, big, rich, self-approving and militaristic though we are, we have not been sufficiently competent at careful observation of other cultures and politics, and we are lousy, unwilling planners. Maybe when we go into places like Korea and Vietnam we're deluded by the notion that the strength of our muscle obviates the use of brain. Sheesh! Look at Iraq! Afghanistan!
That McNamara film should be watched on a yearly basis by every American until we finally catch onto what went wrong in Vietnam. And we might want to consider that the same, well, nuttiness prevails among the "civilian military" today. It must be genetic!
I don't think we're going to be secure again until we have an administration which substitutes intelligence (both kinds) for flash.
April 23, 2006 12:28 PM | Reply | Permalink
Bush foreign policy is failing .......... To be sure, it is failing because Bush stumbled into an epic disaster in Iraq.
I really don't see Bush as having stumbled into an epic disaster in Iraq. This was not an accident of blindly wandering, kind of like a slow motion accident. No, it was a predetermined (well before his first nomination for President) incursion into the affairs of a foreign power with a long history of antipathy with the Bush family and their associates. Bush pulled every lever of power afforded to him by the Presidency to make this invasion happen, including lying about the intelligence to support it, so yes, blame his foreign policy failures in large part on Iraq, but don't say that he stumbled into it, because he didn't stumble, he dove headlong into it, purposely, intentionally, and with malice.
April 23, 2006 1:58 PM | Reply | Permalink
Heck, it even goes beyond world domination. We have a childlike belief that we and we alone are entitled to be entirely invulnerable. We and we alone are entitled to wander in arrogance and ignorance anywhere on the planet and be free from any threat of harm.
April 23, 2006 2:25 PM | Reply | Permalink
We did not care about the culture of Vietnam. The war was fought to show the Soviets how tough we were not about the specifics of Vietnam.
Westmoreland and the army used the wrong tactics and strategy as well. They wanted to fight a conventional land war as was fought in Europe.
With all that said. The United States could have bombed the dikes in the North. There was a great deal more that could have been brought to bear against Vietnam. However, not only did Johnson not want to bring in the Soviets or the Chinese any more than they were already involved but it is hard to image that it would not have been tolerated.
PW yes look at Iraq, look at Afghanistan. The United States could bring a great deal more devastation than we have. The political goals of leaving behind functioning countries limited the military option.
If the goal was complete unconditional surrender not of the leadership but of the nations you don't believe that could have been done? I believe you are very mistaken.
Daniel A. Greenbaum
April 23, 2006 3:16 PM | Reply | Permalink
BOOM! Oops, there go the hearts and minds...
April 23, 2006 4:04 PM | Reply | Permalink
As Michael Mandelbaum points out in his recent book "The Case for Goliath," while the nations of the world have the resources to easily balance American military power in a grand alliance, they have refrained from doing so.
Instead of dogmatically applying a formula that no longer is relevant, you should give some thought as to why so few states today consider the US to be a threat, inspite of its regular military actions.
April 23, 2006 4:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
Ok. Repeat:
I'm a little hesitant to go along with the application of Hobbes' term 'Leviathan" to the organization of the international order as opposed to the organization of a state. Obviously the characterization of "man to man" in a state of anarchy has to be different than the characterization of "state to state" in the global realm. But I'm not going to quibble with it since I take the author to be making a rough analogy. I would dissuade Mr. Ikenberry from entretaining any idea that a "liberal Leviathan" role can be carved out for the United States in the future. I think that's where the analogy falls apart. We can imagine a "liberal Leviathan" emerging at the state level and that's exactly what John Locke did with Hobbes' ideas. And we can of course also imagine a more authoritarian Leviathan emerging too. But when we are talking about the international community of nations, I simply cannot see how the United States can be morphed into a begnin "liberal" Leviathan presiding over the global community. The very justification for the formation of a state---something that both Hobbes and Locke share--is for the benefit of those INDIVIDUALS who enter into such a (hypothetical) contract. Nowhere in their writings do these theorist inject as part of the rational motive for contract to be for the benevolent well-being of other states or the global community. Perhaps I missed that in their writing. So it is perfectly logical for Bush to opt for a conservative Leviathan role (internationally) with exceptionalism and all, even if, in the end, it is self-defeating as you say. I say the only real option the world has is multipolarity. As for the fate of the nation-state, such as it is, I would not dismiss its survival into the medium-term quite just yet.
April 23, 2006 7:26 PM |