When John Bolton visited Qatar this past weekend, his statement—dismissing allegations of plans to resort to force against Iran and advocating a peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue—was intended to quell concerns of another US-led military action in the region. But these empty rhetorical gestures bear little weight when evaluating the credibility of the Bush administration’s diplomatic efforts. Bolton and the administration seem to be selectively lifting from Wilde’s script for their own production of “The Importance of Playing Earnest.” Instead they ought to consult the playbook of Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations and James Dobbin of the Rand Corp who join the list of regional and security experts advocating dialogue with Iran.

The question to be posed should not be one of force versus diplomacy, but rather what type of diplomacy and with whom. If Bolton and the administration can convince the public that their version of diplomacy is simply not force, then that lowers the bar for diplomacy and resigns the US to a confrontational strategy, one that only delays procurement of nuclear weapons and postpones direct conflict. Sanctions—which seem to be the trajectory of US and European efforts on the Security Council—could only slow down Iranian nuclear development, but it is debatable by how much. Moreover, the US would also have a case for a military response were it to be faced with diplomatic deadlock at the Security Council, an equally likely situation given Russia and China’s positions. Neither sanctions nor a pre-emptive strike offer optimal outcomes. Yet they are the only visible paths at present.

It is unlikely that any of the Security Council players will climb down from their obdurate positions. And it is equally unlikely that Iranian leaders will swim against the tide of national sentiment and capitulate to Western powers by simply ceasing and desisting from all nuclear enrichment activity. This first-mover paralysis can only be broken with a bold gesture by the most powerful global player. So long as US diplomacy efforts remain within the confines of the Security Council and do not extend to Iran, we will foreclose on any prospects of a peaceful, optimal resolution.

But by breaking from our staunch refusal to negotiate with Iran, the US can also play to Iranian public sentiment, exploit riffs between hardliners in power, and undermine Iran’s recalcitrant position on nuclear weapons development. Takeyh and Dobbins explain:

The hardliners associated with Mr Ahmadi-Nejad insist that conflict with the US is inevitable and that the only means of ensuring regime security is through possession of a strategic weapon. In contrast, pragmatists led by former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, are said to be arguing that Iran's ongoing integration into the international order requires accepting certain restrictions on the nuclear programme. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, seems prone to appease both factions without conclusively resolving the dispute.

As Iran's nuclear programme matures, another dynamic is entering the debate: public opinion. Far from being a source of restraint, the emerging popular sentiment is that, as a great civilisation with a long history, Iran has the right to acquire nuclear capability. Such nationalistic sentiments further restrain the choices of the clerical elite.

To properly address the complexities of the Iranian challenge, Washington should appreciate that its policy of relentlessly threatening Iran with economic coercion and even military reprisals only empowers reactionaries and validates their pro-nuclear argument. In order to achieve its counter-proliferation objectives, the US must build the other side of the equation by explaining the benefits Iran would derive from abandoning the same nuclear option that India, Pakistan and Israel have successfully chosen. Only an array of incentives will allow Iran's leaders to justify suspending the programme in the face of nationalistic public opinion, aroused in no small degree by continual US threats.

Takeyh and Dobbins go on to argue that this move, particularly multilateral diplomacy, would bolster our coalition rather than fracture it as the current strategy has done.

A more tactically nuanced US diplomacy would also have the best chance of sustaining the fragile international coalition. After years of inconclusive European negotiations and now tortuous UN diplomacy, it is time for the Bush administration to appreciate that the only way to act against Iranian proliferation is through participation in direct negotiations with Tehran. Given that Iran's nuclear ambitions are motivated by its unpredictable neighbourhood and its tense relations with America, a US-Iran discussion on how best to stabilise the Persian Gulf could go a long way towards diminishing the theocracy's nuclear appetite.

The newly announced US-Iran official talks on ways to stabilise Iraq provide an ideal occasion for the two sides to begin exploring those issues. Such talks need not deal with or even mention the nuclear issue - and if, as a result of those talks, both parties are reassured about the other's longer-term regional intentions, that could lead to more productive dialogue on the nuclear issue in another forum.

Bilateral talks should not diminish the need for multilateral diplomacy. On the contrary. If the US, Russia, China and the three European powers proposed talks with Tehran on issues of common concern in exchange for suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment activities, this would give Iran's pragmatists a viable path out of their dilemma. US participation in such multilateral talks would be the best way of holding the key Security Council members together, increasing the pressure on Tehran and offering Iran, at the same time, the widest range of incentives for responsible behaviour.

The administration has yet to offer a reasonable case for refusing to negotiate with Iran despite calls from our allies. The response has been that it would somehow send the wrong signal to the international community. But the double-standard set by bilateral talks with North Korea belies this claim. Moreover, a refusal to negotiate sends an even graver signal to the Iranian people, their leaders, and the region—that we could care less for their regional security concerns. A “Just Say No” policy fails to accord due respect for the complexity of diplomacy and a history which hardens Iran against “international dictates”.

The fact is these are no ordinary international security circumstances. The stakes are much higher as Jessica Matthews of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace points out:

What is at stake is not a choice between 9 and 10 nuclear weapons states, but a choice between 9 and 30 or more.

The major powers may yet be able to unite to stop Iran at this late hour, but not without a decisive change in American policy. Washington's choice is simple: does it want to stop Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons badly enough to deal with Iran's present government?

Like the Clinton administration with Iraq, the Bush administration has been unable to make up its mind, locking its policy into a cycle of self-defeating half-steps. The combination of ''axis of evil'' threats, partial support of European negotiations and publicly announced financial backing for the opposition in Iran ensures only that we will fail either to negotiate an end to the nuclear program or to overthrow the present regime. The administration must, finally, hold its nose and recognize that the nuclear challenge is the indisputable priority.

Rather than disingenuous claims and limited diplomacy, it’s time for the administration to actually exercise earnest and use the planned talks with Iran to negotiate a wider set of issues inclusive of their nuclear enrichment activities.