J. McCutchen "JmacSF"

San Francisco. CA

who have lost any sense of national loyalty or cultural tradition, Appiah says: "What distinguishes the neofundamentalis ts, violent or not, is that they exemplify the possibility of a kind of universal ethics that inverts the picture of cosmopolitanism I’ve been elaborating. Universalism without toleration, it’s clear, turns easily into murder.

Isn't that exactly the challenge if not the problem of internationalism?

Mr. Ikenberry, 

Much of your analysis is based on the distinction you draw between tribalism or ethnic nationalism - a principle of group unity and group identification based on inherited racial or ethnic ties - and civic nationalism, or group identity "that is composed of commitments to the nation’s political creed."  The latter principle of unity and identity is clearly then an ideological one, and you seem to attach the best part of the burden for the resolution of global conflict, and hope for the future, on the spread of a global order grounded in a particular form of civic nationalism based on commitment to one particular creed - democratic liberalism.

While I don't disagree entirely with the potential significance of the spread of ccertain ideologies - and more important the practices of good government that go along with them - I have a number of very strong reservations about this approach, and believe it dangerously overestimates the value of ideology in the preservation of peace.

First, I think you are a little too casual about the distinction you recognize between a civic nationalism that happens to include a strong ideological component, and a more amorphous and cosmopolitan global civil society based on a credal commitment to democratic liberalism.  It is true that common commitment to the ideological component of democratic liberalism tends to foster certain kinds of solidarity among democratic liberals who are citizens of different nations.  But those individuals are also members of particular nation-states, each with its own national interests and principles of loyalty, and all of which are perfectly capable of going to war with some of the others in the right circumstances.

Also, I think you overestimate the importance of ideology in the  preservation of modern nation-states.  American national identity, for example, is not based on a credal commitment alone, or even primarily, but involves also a commitment of fidelity to a particular, historically contingent, political community.  Recall that one doesn't become an American simply by adopting a creed.  One has to be born into that community, or else apply for citizenship, and then have that citizenship bestowed by those who are already in the community.  The tie is cemented by an oath of allegience, which American scholchildren are still more or less compelled to recite.  The core of that recitation is a loyalty oath taken to a particular republic - a revolutionary political regime that has existed in general form for about 230 years, and in a more well-defined for about 217 years.  From the beginning that republic has been fiercely nationalistic, and has demanded loyalty from its citizens.  It fought a bloody civil war, for example, to prevent one part of the political community from seceding from the rest.

It is very hard to say to what extent American political unity is determined by ideological commitments of the head, and other sorts of sentimental commitments of the heart.  But surely a major component of the preservation of unity and loyalty is raw power.  The United States is a political community, a state, which like all states is held together by the institutionalized organization and exercise of power.  For much of its history, just to take one example, soldiers were conscripted.  It is nice to think they all fought for the noblest of reasons - but I assume the fact that one could be shot for desertion has something to do with it.  Right now, we have lots of soldiers in Iraq who might like to leave, and probably would if there was no penalty to pay, but do not have that option.

Similarly, it is fine to think that obedience to the law is underpinned to a large extent by "respect for the rule of law".  But surely, the capacity of the state to seize law-breakers, and then punish them, has much to do with the effective rule of law wherever it is found.

I would also point out that American citizenship, along with its rights and pre-fashioned commitments, is inherited.  What makes a community count as an "ethnic group" is a vexed sociological question, but the grounds of American identity certainly do not rest on ideology alone.

Many other kinds of communities have been based on an ideological unity that transcends the boundaries and jurisdictions of particular political communities.  Christianity, for example, was a very inclusive doctrine, and built a widespread global community on an ideological basis.  However, we see that that is no automatic recipe for peace.  First, because all creeds are exclusionary - even if the creed includes supposed commitments to "tolerance" or "turning the other cheek" or "patience" - and the political communities formed by those creeds express this exclusionary identity through conflict with those outside the community.  So Christendom made incessant wars against the non-Christians on its periphery.  Second, because the intensity of the ideological commitment itself sometimes leads to sects and denominations, and a breakdown of peace within the community.  Third, because the ideological commitment can never entirely thwart the forces of greed, self-seeking, pride, small group identity and lust for power that are at work within the community.

Communism and Islam are other ideologies that have been at the foundation of widespread, multi-ethnic, multinational communities. Each has had a mixed record as a preserver of peace.

So I am somewhat skeptical that the core to the resolution of conflict lies in ideological change.  Deep ideological unity and commitment can in many cases help to preserve peace - but it can just as well be a source of conflict.  Peace within societies, and among them, is maintained by a complex network of power relationships in which certain of the powers are in balance, and some dominate others.

That is why I think we cannot afford to place so much of our hopes in the spread of liberal ideology.  Nor do I think that we should endeavor to build a sort of Grand Concert of Liberal Powers to institutionalize the ideal of liberal order you admire.  In the current situation, I believe, that would be precisely the wrong approach.  It would be a provocative, exclusionary act which divides the world into two, under one conception of the difference between the "civilized" and the "barbarians", and would almost certainly guarantee a new Cold War, with an intense ideological focus.  We need to work on building broader, more practical, less lofty institutions for limited global governance and conflict resolution.  Let's turn down the ideological edginess of theoretical reason, and put practical reason to work on living in the same world together.

The precursor to the era of globalization appears to have formed around ethnic identity rather than civic nationalism. Aside from the post Cold War re-unification of Germany, the trend has a distinct ethnic decentralization, such as that exemplified by the breakup of the Soviet Union.

What is defined as civic nationalism is only now undergoing its truest test. What is perceived as a western multiculturalism may have only succeeded within a confined basis. This is much like a exemplary student of western civilization assumed to be fully complacent as to the ways of world. Global multiculturalism, with its vast panorama of ethnicity, culture and religious belief, provides a far more challenging nature to western societies than heretofore imagined. Sort of like a slower tempo collision of the type found in Jean Raspail’s Camp of the Saints.

The formation of a cosmopolitan ethos usually presumes a triumph of western values, as if any melting pot should assume a loaded deck. True globalization may produce an cosmopolitan incubator of a different kind, one that requires a more extensive knowledge where philosophy knows no borders and the very presumptions of the nationalism formerly thought so stabilizing proves more wanting than ever imagined.

In the end, our sense of civic nationalism revolves around a fragile structure of common ground that provides some semblance of unity and continuity, all the while keeping the more profound semblances of divinity and ethnicity at bay. If "universal morality" can ever be presumed, it might have to begin with a cosmopolitan version of evident truths.

In the philosophical presumption of Claude Buffier, the cosmopolitan will be compelled to accept a disposition of nature that "can be neither proved nor disproved," but "practically followed even by those who reject them speculatively." One cohesive sentiment might well arise in a universal concept of human dignity. Has the "western model" mastered the intricacies or does it remain open to the arriving firmament of global ideas.

The whole argument misses the point in my opinion. While there is nothing wrong with searching for a universal global moral values framework that can unify everyone and resolve all social conflicts peacefully, let’s not expect too much from it. Three studies that I remember from my graduate school days (and I don’t remember the original cites, so I apologize in advance):

1)      It is more effective to change behavior first and then wait for beliefs to change by themselves- changing behavior (by means of laws or by rewarding them) changes feelings and beliefs more effectively than changing beliefs (by means of persuasive arguments) will change behavior.

2)      Studies show that small teams of people, such as those you might find in the workplace, are more likely to work together more effectively when they have short term concrete goals to accomplish than they are if all they have is a common sense of a long term mission or vision.

3)      People are more likely to resolve differences and conflicts when you can convince them to step away from their espoused positions (which are more likely to be broad and idealistic) and you can convince them to share their interests (ie: their short term concrete needs). That one I can remember: any book on negotiation by Roger Fisher or William Ury.

I find it difficult to imaging a common moral or ethical framework that could unify, say, the United States, China, and Zimbabwe. The US is an individualistic, market driven culture based in popular representative democracy, China is a collectivistic one party market driven dictatorship and Zimbabwe is a bloody tyranny bent on preserving its’ power at the point of a gun. What common moral or ethical ground could there be? But ask yourself what goals and objectives we may have in common.

What I propose, therefore, is a tactical approach to international conflict. Find common ground where you can to achieve short-term goals, especially in the economic sphere, and be prepared to fight when absolutely necessary. Trust that the international arrangements that are necessary to allow the majority of countries and interest groups to work together in their own self-interest also corresponds to the enlightened liberal framework that we have developed over the last few centuries. Expect a few setbacks every now and then (you know, the odd world war or terrorist incident) and trust that these incidents will not of themselves derail the direction of history, which is inexorably heading toward greater international integration.

Don’t worry about grand visions. Persuade people to behave nicely, and their hearts and minds will follow.

Interesting post; I'm not sure that I agree, but I'm also not sure that I don't, or that I can really articulate an objection in any case. But if I can, it starts with this:

I find it difficult to imagine a common moral or ethical framework that could unify, say, the United States, China, and Zimbabwe. The US is an individualistic, market driven culture based in popular representative democracy, China is a collectivistic one party market driven dictatorship and Zimbabwe is a bloody tyranny bent on preserving its’ power at the point of a gun. What common moral or ethical ground could there be? But ask yourself what goals and objectives we may have in common.

If the moral frameworks in question were the policies and objectives that comprise the domestic and foreign policies of a China, U.S. and Zimbabwe, say, it’s true that any genuine and broad agreement is unlikely.   But despite living in societies that are structured so fundamentally differently, it’s not at all clear that individuals from each couldn’t find common ground – indeed, I think it’s quite likely that most of the time, any three of us in a room could agree upon a pared-down but fairly rich set of values (I’m going to stipulate that now; if you disagree, let’s argue about it down the page). 

There are two things to derive from this.  First, I think it calls into question whether what happens at the level of states can really be described as a moral framework at all.  Sure, government policies to a degree arise out of shared moral values, but if I’m correct that individuals from states with irreconcilable policies can still achieve broad agreement on moral questions, I think that drives a wedge between policy and morality per se. 

But more importantly, I take it that the point of the article, and perhaps the books, is concerned as much with the individual as the state.  Cosmopolitanism, in particular, is concerned with the question of what our moral obligations to distant individuals are, and that the thesis is in part that these general obligations are best met by cultivating a certain kind of attitude.  Perhaps, if we all read Appiah and took him to heart, this would eventuate in certain policies at the level of nations, but it seems to me (from this article) that the book is foremost a work of ethics, and only secondarily one of politics. 

In the final analysis, all of this doesn’t lead me to an objection to your general point.  I think you are right that specific instances of cooperation, at both the individual and the state level, forge bonds that are stronger than shared ideology.  But having said that, I think it’s a mistake to think that cosmopolitanism, as advocated, is ‘grand vision’ rather than small-bore relationship-building, and a mistake, too, to think that the development of common moral ground across contrasting identities cannot be a big step to forging lasting alliances.

you seem to attach the best part of the burden for the resolution of global conflict, and hope for the future, on the spread of a global order grounded in a particular form of civic nationalism based on commitment to one particular creed - democratic liberalism.

Part of my initial reaction to this post was that there was a good deal of liberal democratic back-patting afoot, but then again, I’d say that there really is something universal here, in the sense that it isn’t just an idea that derives from the Western political tradition, but is rather a historically common solution to an ever-present problem.

I guess the story we are telling about the emergence of democratic liberalism is that the Western nations, riven by sectarian violence, increasingly sought to construct a non-sectarian civic identity, by getting out of the business of religion and ethnicity, and constructing the state and its citizenry as a distinct identity that transcends (or, perhaps, politely ignores) such distinctions. But this problem is surely endemic in human societies - it did not begin with the Reformation and spread from Europe to the rest of the world, as we imagine that liberal democracy did.  And it probably takes forms that are relatively alien to liberalism, except in sharing a general approach to the problem of sectarian divisions.

Assuming that religious and ethnic divides have been a constant challenge to the integrity of societies over time, it seems to me that there are roughly two solutions.  You can force the construction of a common identity, assimilating clans or other groups through the promulgation of a set of religious myths, by authoritarian force, or through state largesse, etc.  Over time, for instance, this must be roughly what happened in prehistoric Japan, where the formation of a national identity was long in the making, but is rock solid now (except on the frontiers).  But assimilation isn’t necessarily the only strategy to forging a nation: today or two millennia ago, you can find ways to promote non-assimilated harmony, creating a set of common incentives or values to smooth the sharp edges of intra-state identities. 

The latter is the path that Western liberalism has taken, but surely, that isn't the only example.  I'd venture to guess that this strategy has been with us as long as have sectarian divides.  One early example may be Ashoka, the Indian ruler who is commonly thought to have been Buddhist, but who may have been in the business not of promoting Buddhism (in what he actually wrote, he almost never refers to any particular religion) as much as the business of constructing a bland, non-sectarian civic religion that was palatable to the many religions active in the territory he ruled. 

There probably aren't any pure examples of one vs. the other strategy - as you point out, part of our American identity is based on a mutual respect for the autonomy of the individual, and part on factors that press for a more assimilated, unitary - in a word, ethnic - identity.   But my guess is that as long as there have been people waking up to the reality of senseless bloodshed, there have been efforts to promote forms of civic nationalism that may have more or less in common with modern liberal democracy.

Liberal democracy isn’t much more likely to take over the entire world forever than was Ashokan quasi-Buddhist paternalism, and I have to agree that ideology has its limits as a force for peace.  For one thing, there is nothing about civic nationalism in principle that precludes international aggression, and for all the truisms about how liberal democracies don’t wage war against one another, strategies for quelling domestic divisions almost always play up external ones. 

But if the strategy at work here is to construct a society that allows for clashing identities without encouraging clashing arms, it seems to me that success by definition lessens the tribal element in international relations, at least insofar as one sees other nationalities as just more of the same difference as one sees distinct groups within one’s own society.  And if I’m right that liberal democracy is just one flowering of a much older family of strategies, then we should take some comfort in the degree to which it flourishes.  Two or three millennia ago, as far as I know, using state power to force assimilation was the norm, and efforts to encourage civic nationalism something of an oddity.   Now, it’s pretty common.  And if the family is indeed bigger than liberal democracy itself, we don’t have to count on freedom being now and evermore on the march as the only hope for world peace.  A future with some democracies interspersed with some other forms of civic nationalism might do just as well, on the international stage, anyway.

Prof. Ikenberry raises some important questions in this essay, building on Appiah's call for greater cosmopolitanism. I have a more realpolitik set of concerns, more rooted in the excercise of power and the search for remedy.

First, Prof. Appiah himself underestimates the influence of power in these considerations. In the pair of essays I've read (one in the NYR of Books), he plays down self-interest and the desire for control when he discusses, for example, the need to share cultural treasures and artifacts across borders. There is such a huge asymmetry between the developed north, and the poor and weak states of Africa, for example, in their capacities to control their national patrimonies, that the appeal to cosmo'm seems so unrooted in contemporary political economy as to be suggestive but unrealistic.  Kind of telling the West Africans to 'get over it' when 'their' treasures are ransacked and end up in Berlin or Boston.

Power also comes into John's argument beyond the plane of esthetics or political theory.  Lots of what is happening in much of Africa, for example, has less to do with rather rarified political theories, but the sheer breakdown of law and order, and the rise to power of thugs who care little for ideology and care a lot about loot.

My second point loops back to my earlier posts on this site about the imperatives of what I call 'cultural competence' in this globalizing world that builds cosmo'm at the same time that it re-builds local nationalisms.  As important as it is to consider big framing questions, it may be equally if not more important to ask concretely how one builds up the attitudes, skills and knowledge that can let the cross-border conversations flourish. This is a universal problem.  Cultural competence is as necessary for the Bushsites as it is for the nationalists and chauvinists in the Middle East or SOuth Asia or Central Africa.

Still, Sen and Appiah are smart guys, and it sounds like it's worth while to go out and buy their books!

Your post forces me to reformulate a little bit. I shouldnt have focused so exclusively on nation-states as examples, since Appiah and Sen were both talking about social movements like fundementalism and the effect they seem to be having on individual identity. Both seem to feel that globally there has been a loss of cosmopolitan identity that they both recommend as the best antidote to nationalism, fundementalism and like movements. This is a valid point.

OK, so my argument has to change somewhat- people join these movements because they satisfy some basic need- provide a sense of security and belonging that protects them from economic turmoil and social change. People turn to confrontational social movements when they perceive that their traditional way of life is under attack.

The solution to this is not going to be to convert them to some sort of cosmopolitan "citizen of the world" definition of self-identity- this would do nothing to protect the traditions they fear losing. Indeed, cosmopolitan tolerance is often attacked by these movements as part of the very thing threatening them, part of what they need to defend against. It seems inherently extremely unlikely that we could convince a significant number of the adherents of these kinds of movements to "switch idenitities" as it were- that's expecting too much from them. So I stand by my proposed solution- find tactical opportunites for people of different mindsets to work together, and their values and ideologies will follow.

I guess the question is whether or not the two strategies are incompatible - my first instinct was to say that they aren't, but now I'm not so sure.  The key, I think, is the degree to which fundamentalism is threatened by 'cosmopolitan tolerance.'  My first reaction was to say that you are right on how we should engage with these insular ideologies - focusing on cooperation on common goals makes a lot more sense than trying to create richer common values.  But, the thought went, the expansion of insular fundamentalism doesn't mean that there aren't sizable populations that are open to more meaningful dialogue, and potentially receptive to a broader, more cosmopolitan sense of identity.  If the goal is to contain the damage that can be done by insular fundamentalism, there is no reason that we can't pursue a dual strategy - cooperation with some groups, and dialogue with others.

However, the key is that growing cosmopolitanism appears to be an incitement to insular backlash, and the dual strategy may be impossible.  In which case, I still think that there is value in pursuing greater bonds of identity with those who are receptive.  But I really don't know which approach is more effective. 

Further reflection #2: 

Alas, they are a bit less articulate when it comes to proposals and programs that might help create and extend a world of cosmopolitanism and freely chosen and shifting identities.

Where in the world does there exist, or has there ever existed a place where one is free to choose one's identities?  Of course we can always join certain clubs or other relatively insignificant groups.   But our ties of obligation and loyalty to the larger, more significant groups choose us; we don't choose them.

Were Americans during the Cold War free to choose an identification with the Soviet Union or the Communist Party, for example?  Are contemporary Chinese free to choose identification with Japan?  Could a contemporary American "freely choose" an identification with Iran?  In any case, we never really choose these identities.  Insofar as we may choose some sort of formal affiliation with a large group, that is only after we already feel an identification with that group.

Further Reflection #3:

There is more than a faint whiff of intolerance and obsessive cultural imperialism in this supposed paean to tolerance. We are told that we must extend the "culture of tolerance" which, it turns out, is no other than liberal Western society.  This we are told is literally "our only hope."  There are some perfunctory comments about celebrating differences and about being willing to learn from one another.  But one gets the rather strong impression that Mr. Ikenberry is only really willing to learn from other people who already agree with him - other ideologues of "Western liberal order."  And this learning from others, it seems, can only take place in a shared space that is already characterized by "universal values".

Everything in this anticipated utopia of cosmopolitan tolerance is supposed to be governed by the mysterious and imperious framework of "civil society", and all other expressions of identity and difference must be tamed and subjugated to this civic mechanism.  It is suggested that the triumph of the West consists in its success in "pushing ethnic and religious identities down into civil society," rather than in providing space for the free expression and flourishing  of ethnic and religious identity, community and diversity.

Liberal order - itself a disarming but tension-filled expression - requires "semi-privatizing" those identities - in other words turning them into neutralized, individualized and rather inauthentic semblances of their former selves.  Full expression of religious or political commitment in alternative communities is not allowed.  One mumbles prayers, I suppose, in the privacy of one's conscience while worshipping publicly at the magesterial legal alters of civil society.  (Yet even privatized difference is increasingly old hat in the new liberal world order, since many contemporary "liberal" technocrats assure us that the "age of privacy" was a historical anomaly and is ending - and good riddance to it.)

 
Mr. Ikenberry says "it matters that the leaders of today’s advanced democratic states are not seeking to legitimate their power by making racial or imperialist appeals."  And yet they are certainly seeking to legitimate their power through ideological appeals.  Why is the subjugated other supposed to feel more comfortable about the latter than the former?  Of course if one does not belong to the right ethnic or national group, one might feel excluded by a racial or national appeal to the legitimation of power.  But suppose I don't share the right ideology?  What about all those people around the world who don't agree with the lofty, uncompromising and puritanical political sentiments of G.W. Bush's second inaugural, for instance?  What do we say to them?  Tough luck?  Get with the program or get out of the way?

The terror of unruly non-Westerners generates a certain amount of fear-mongering.  We are also told about the need for the containment of ethnic and religious identities inside civil society; and that if these identities don’t remain primarily embedded in civil society, new and dangerous political conflicts will break out across the old Western liberal world.  This civil society of which we hear so much sounds increasingly like a scary totalitarian order that is progressively crushing true cultural difference and identity in favor of the only permitted form of group identification: ideological identification with Western liberalism.

With all these commanding and regimenting pronouncements about "liberal order", it is no wonder that contemporary liberal society seems increasingly less .. well liberating.  Instead it seems to have evolved into an iron framework for the only approved and appropriate relations among human beings, and an increasingly oppressive and frightening thing.

How far this has come from earlier American liberal ideals, which seem to have avoided so much talk of "pushing" "containing" and "embedding" cultural and religious differences in a domineering and universal national culture, but imagined a very modest and limited government linking largely independent communities.

Remember that for an early American Puritan, to take one example, an Anabaptist or a Quaker or a Roman Catholic or a Deist was as much a creature to be feared as a Sunni Muslim or a Chinese Communist or a Bolivaran Socialist is to his more secularized descendants.  And yet these early Americans managed to create a political framework in which all of these groups were tolerated, and free to form their own communities - they even managed to leave room for weird communities of Amish, Shakers and Free Love Utopians.   Yet today, outside the bounds of sexual, artistic and gustatory tastes, contemporary liberalism shows little real spirit of tolerance whatsoever, and seems consumed by a rage for order, and a desire to change everyone and fix them.

Ah, the fine art of simultaneously pursuing dual incompatible strategies. Actually, there is nothing wrong with finding short-term tactical common ground with members of movements that we are otherwise in strong disagreement with- while at the same time adopting a framework of cosmopolitan tolerance ourselves. In retrospect, that is, I think, more or less what I do myself. The problem comes when one sets up some sort of global identity as a universal end state that we are trying to promote for everyone- and therefore to see the failure of that identity to spread as a problem, even a cause of despair. I dont think that the "Citizen of the World" type self-identity is ever going to appeal to more than a small percentage of the general population, and that is actually ok. We dont need everyone to share a common sense of identity, the same "global vision" in order to get along and work together to our mutual advantage. Thank goodness.

Of course the flip side of this is a movement that feels it must spread it's intolerance because they have defined themselves, or some larger group that they belong to, as morally superior to everyone else. Taken to an extreme (Nazis, Marxists, Al Qaeda) the rest of us cant tolerate them. A confrontation may be inevitable. Yet that, too, is no cause for despair. So far, the humanistic side has won all open confrontations.

Ultimately, I think tolerance is a function of economic well-being. People who are optimistic about thier future and are busy going about thier business dont have the time or the motivation to oppress or exploit anyone. Hate is grounded in fear. No fear, no hate. I hope.