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A Rehashed Complaint

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Speaking of health care, Ed Kilgore recommends this proposal from his colleague David Kendall which says, among other things:

All Americans pay for the cost of medical treatment of people without health insurance. Government should pay for coverage for those who cannot afford insurance, but those who can afford it should be required to buy it.

This is just what I was talking about below -- if you try for a big bang reform that's supposed to be politically feasible, you wind up getting behind ideas, like this one, that are still politically challenging, but also lack the substantive merits of single-payer health care. We're helpfully informed in the long version of the plan that this avoids a "false choice" which is a good buzzword, but I think there's actually a pretty real choice here.

The short version of the story is that the mandate-and-subsidize combination will ensure that some mandated quantity of money, X, will be spent on health care. Or, rather, X will be spent on health insurance. On the output side, X is going to equal actual health care expenditures plus marketing costs for the private firms plus profits for the companies plus overhead. In other words, for X dollars in mandated consumer spening you're going to get considerably less than X dollars in insurance company spending on health care. In Medicare, by contrast, over 95 percent of the dollars brought into the system via taxes are spent on actually buying health care for patients.

What's more, the mandate system is going to lead to a very strange form of market competition. Normally, market competition leads to better-and-better value over time in the form of improved products, lower prices, or some combination. But an important element of that is everything you sell, you normally sell at a product. Unless something very strange is going on, if you make more cars you want to sell more cars.

The mandate systen, however, isn't going to be a very normal market. The idea is to force people like me who have low health care costs to over-insure ourselves while simultaneously forcing companies to offer coverage to people who have high health care costs to sell them plans at sub-market rates. In the aggregate, those numbers add up. So if there were only one insurance company, everything would be fine. Or, alternatively, if the government handled all the insurance it would be fine. But the idea here is to have competing plans.

The way to make money under this system, however, is to get people like me who are being forced to buy more insurance than we need to sign up, while discouraging people who are going to demand more services than their premiums cover from signing up. This is going to create some very perverse incentives. Basically, you're going to want to invest a lot in marketing gimmicks to get me to join your plan, while going out of the way to get a reputation as a company that does a bad job of providing health care to sick people.

Presumably, however, the purpose of having a national health care policy is specifically to help sick people.


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You're making two arguments of which one is lousy and the other is better.  You should drop the lousy one, which is this:

 

On the output side, X is going to equal actual health care expenditures plus marketing costs for the private firms plus profits for the companies plus overhead. In other words, for X dollars in mandated consumer spening you're going to get considerably less than X dollars in insurance company spending on health care.

 

You're arguing that a competitve market with multiple for-profit companies is inherently less efficient than a government monopoly--is that really your position?  If you believe this, you would have been a big fan of shopping for shoes at Soviet department stores.  This 'competition is inherently less efficient than a government monopoly' argument should be dropped forever by advocates of single-payer healthcare.

 

As for perverse incentives (your second argument), that's better, but not a slam dunk.  Suppose an insurance company puts together a plan that appeals to young healthy people but not older sicker ones.  Does that mean windfall profits?  No--because, it's a competitve market.  Some other company can put together a competing plan that similarly appeals to healthy young people and compete on price to sign people up.

 

This is exactly the situation with auto-insurance.  Government mandates that auto-owners carry minimum insurance.  Some drivers live in safer areas, have better driving records and have other characteristics associated with safe driving (are neither under 25 or over 65, have good credit ratings, etc).  And these people are charged less.  But insurance companies don't necessarily make more money on good risks than poor ones, because it's a competitve market.

 

But, with auto-insurance we accept that it's OK for some people to be charged more -- a lot more.  Sometimes the reasons are under their control (how they drive) and sometimes not (their age and where they live).   Are we likewise willing accept such differences in the cost of mandated health insurance?  If so, then the existing auto-insurance market is a reasonable model.  But if we believe that the cost of health insurance should be the same for everybody regardless of risk, then such a system won't work. 

 

 


Comparisons to auto insurance are not too meaningful, since not everyone needs automobile insurance, there is no certainty that those who have it will ever have an accident, and indeed the fraction who experience a large dollar loss is fairly low overall.  Whereas essentially everyone will have a medical claim, and a very large percentage will require large-dollar services at some point in their lives (usually, but not often, later).  So the marketing strategies and cost differentiators which characterize auto insurance don't really apply to health care cost leveling.

 

In any case, no liberal that I am aware of is advocating a single-provider ala National Health.  They are advocating a single  _payer_ similar to France's.  To the best of my knowledge there is plenty of competition in France among doctors and hospitals, although there as here most people choose one doctor and stick with him/her and his set of hospitals for long periods of time.

 

sPh 

You're arguing that a competitve market with multiple for-profit companies is inherently less efficient than a government monopoly--is that really your position?

I can't speak for Yglesias, but what the hell, it sure is MY position. Take off your blinders about "competition" and ask yourself who the customers are? Hint: they by and large aren't the consumer. They're the consumers' employers who have a different set of criteria - cost containment uber alles, not necessary the best health care for the buck.

 

In furtherance of that aim, the competing insurers hire large numbers of people whose primary job it is to deny claims, to look for some other entity to stick the bill with. Ever had an accident? Ever get a letter from an insurer asking you in polite terms if maybe there wasn't someone else "we" could sue? There are economies to be gained simply by not needing to hire bureaucracies to deflect claims.

 

Of course we may need to rethink the general applicablity of the  "governement always bad, private always good" dogma to every situation, before we can make real progress, but that seems a small price to pay, don't you think? 

bluebell

Presumably, however, the purpose of having a national health care policy is specifically to help sick people.

 

I had a conversation with a Catholic, Republican, Vietnam Veteran, MBA, budget analyst the other day who simply put it this way:

 

"I think it is morally wrong to deny health care to anyone".

 

We should start with the moral value.  Start with the goal.  Courageously assert the premise.  Stand with the rest of the Western world in declaring health care a human right. 

 

Then figure out how to deliver it. 

In other words, for X dollars in mandated consumer spening you're going to get considerably less than X dollars in insurance company spending on health care. In Medicare, by contrast, over 95 percent of the dollars brought into the system via taxes are spent on actually buying health care for patients.

But the question is, how many dollars does the money spent on the insurance company bureaucracy save in health care?  Perhaps the insurance company gets a 20% discount in exchange for taking 10% of the money spent.  Less fo a percentage of the money goes to health care, but the government still saves money. 

But  

 

"You say I'm a dreamer.  We're two of a kind.  Looking for some perfect world that we both know that we'll never find." - Thompson Twins, "Hold Me Now"

The fiduciary responsibility of CEO's of health care companies is not to provide good care but to maximize profits.  What we need is a system that aligns goals and incentives to provide the best quality care at reasonable cost. 

 

How in the world can people pay costs that can reach $100,000/year for one drug much less the costs of providers and diagnostics?  Parenthetically, the above drug is one whose research costs were largely borne by taxpayers. 

 

We need a single payer system whose goal is quality affordable care for all citizens.  One that will bargain with providers, big pharma and medical technology companies to assure their pricing is realistic and reasonable. 

 

I acknowledge that we can"t do everything and that difficult decisions regarding the extent of coverage need to be made.  This form of triage, would assure the best use of resources.  What we have now is  economic rationing without any rationale except that if you have money you can get care--a system that leaves out most of our population.

 

bluebell, I think you have put this quite well. It is the human value, the human need for health care that is primary. Then we go about providing that health care for each other in the best way we can.

And socializing the health insurance part of our health care system is by most accounts the best, most efficient and cost effective way to do this.

Just look at the efficiencies the Social Security Administration brings to retirement and disability benefits. Very low overhead for a huge program. Government has the capacity to do some things very well.

Would I be correct in assuming that you like the idea of Consumer-Directed Health Plans, which are still multipayer competitive group, but with the major difference being that the "customers" are group buyers representing the insured themselves, not employers?

This is, to a large extent, the way the Federal Employees Health Plans work.

Even beyond the moral, there are pragmatic reasons for national health care. Cost inefficiencies for employers and the increasing numbers of uninsured -- including people who can pay but are considered uninsurable -- are not the only issues.

Private fire departments didn't work because if you leave an uninsured building burning, it may spread to insured buildings. Even in an era of public fire service being an assumption, people and organizations can buy additional protective devices and services. That my area has an outstanding fire department doesn't mean that I don't have smoke alarms and extinguishers.

The often forgotten benefit of universal care is public health. Lack of available coverage, and I admit there are some people who have to be forced to accept treatment, increases the chances of epidemics -- and we are facing more and more possible infectious diseases, much more worrisome than the hype over bird flu. Those that claim it's about to imitate the 1918-1920 pandemic have not studied the detailed virology.

Most of us know the triumph of eradicating smallpox in the wild. Not as many know that aggressive public health programs are closing in on the eradication of polio; the Western Hemisphere was thought to be polio free, but there were a few recent isolated cases. Smallpox also had a few final isolated cases.

Indeed, that $100,000 drug may have an artificially inflated price, due to a wide range of factors. You are correct, though, that cost-benefit decisions do need to be made.

Even if resources were effectively infinite, the decisions are hard. For example, I can think of several drugs that, at best, defer death or irreversible dementia by just a few months. I also think of these drugs as really not true market drugs, but as a wider research study -- in some cases, they turned out to be prototypes for drugs that had longer benefit and were more cost-effective.

I'm not convinced, however, that single-payor is the only answer. Multipayor consumer-directed health plans (CDHP), as long as the consumer groups are large enough to have market leverage, do offer potential benefits of a market approach. What is clear, however, is that employer-based is irrevocably broken, due to the increasing cost and capability of medicine, the fiduciary responsibilities of the employer CEO as well as the healthcare CEO, and the trend away from traditional employment and benefits to domestic and foreign outsourcing/contracting/offshoring.

With the employer-based system, even if one can afford to pay insurance, it often simply is not available to individuals that do not meet healthcare companies' risk models. Either single-payor or CDHP are large enough to spread risk over the population and avoid the peaks and valleys that disincentivize maintenance care until catastrophe strikes.

If the same barriers to entry as in the medical professions were there in the engineering professions, programmers would routinely take home salaries of half-a-million dollars a year, and the US would be entirely uncompetitive (instead of only marginally so) in the IT world.

I am not an economist, but evidence of the barrier may be the following - assuming Indian MDs are as capable of Indian programmers, one should examine the ratio of renumeration of US physicians to US engineers in the US; and renumeration of Indian physicians to Indian engineers in India. I think the US ratio is greater than 3, while the Indian ratio is less than one. Some of this points to natural barriers in trade in the health services that do not exist in the IT industry; but it also probably points to a barrier in entry into the US health services market.

Having some fairly extensive experiene both in engineering and medicine -- and programmer doesn't equate to engineer -- the barriers to entry are legitimate. There's a surprising consensus among physicians that it takes about seven years to make some diagnostic and therapeutic techniques reflexive, including the physical skills. I have just enough of some of those reflexes to know limits -- and also to have some physicians trust me to do them in field situations, outside the US, when there's no one else with aclue.

I don't know where you get this $500,000 figure for programmers, since US primary care physicians run about $160,000 a year. Some procedure-oriented specialties, in major cities, can run a million a year. And yes, I know programmers that got -- and were worth -- $500,000, or even better in stock options.

Exactly what are the barriers to entry that you contend are inappropriate? For that matter, are you saying physician fees and availability are the core of medical costs in the US?

Comparisons to auto insurance are not too meaningful, since not everyone needs automobile insurance, there is no certainty that those who have it will ever have an accident, and indeed the fraction who experience a large dollar loss is fairly low overall.  Whereas essentially everyone will have a medical claim, and a very large percentage will require large-dollar services at some point in their lives (usually, but not often, later).

 

I would say that on all those counts, the comparison is apt.  Everybody does need auto insurance (except for a relative few who don't own cars).  And there is no certainty that people will ever make a large-dollar medical claim (people die suddenly of both illness and accidents all the time -- a long, expensive, lingering illness is by no means inevitable).  Furthermore, medicine could (and probably should) be treated like both auto repair (and dentistry, for that matter), where people handle predictable, non-catastrophic expenses themselves and rely on insurance for large and unexpected expenses.

 

But using the auto-insurance model, people would be charged very different amounts for insurance based on risk.  Is that OK?  To some extent, I woud say that it is.  Yes, 25-year-olds would be charged much less than 55-year-olds, but on average, 55-year-olds are wealthier than 25-year-olds.  So why not a law requiring insurance with subsidies for the poor and also a formula (based on income and wealth) for the max any person will have to pay for insurance?  Yes, wealthy old people would pay a lot for coverage--but why shouldn't they? 

 

In general, if government was to mandate health insurance coverage, that would require solutions to the problems of affordability.  Let's get the principle that all Americans must be covered by insurance established and adjust subsidies as necessary to make it work.
 

Lastly, it makes little sense, I think, to argue for a single-payer model, when the single-payer model north of the border is presently having serious problems and undergoing significant changes to permit private secondary insurance and care. 


 


 

 

 

Shouldn't the first purpose of a national heathcare policy be to prevent people from getting sick and keeping people healthier as well as helping sick people?  Incentives need to be changed so that healthcare providers monitor healthy people and those with chronic illnesses.

Daniel A. Greenbaum

1. The AMA gets to tell every medical school in America how many new students they can accept every year.  That is not a restriction on quality, it's a pure restriction on supply.

 2. Medical students have to go through hellish work shifts that resemble hazing rituals, bear little resemblance to actual work as a doctor, endanger patients, and exist only to shrink further the supply of doctors.

Under the employer-based system, the lack of such incentives is financially understandable. Employers constantly look for lower cost, so they may change plans fairly frequently, or what the industry calls "churn".

With churn, the preventative medicine care dollars spent by the first company may result in savings to its replacement company, when the insured doesn't get seriously ill. As long as the benefit managers are rated by short-term stock value, avoiding spending makes their stock look better.

Perhaps one transitional approach would be to give tax incentives to preventive care. You give me an interesting idea to think how it might work.

You will have to be more convincing as to why any competition among insurers is useful.  With single payer, there is still competition among doctors and hospitals, who actually deliver the health services.  There is really no justification that I can imagine to rivalry among insurers.  As MY has stated, it perverts the incentives to deliver good care.

In point of fact, the number of medical school seats is not set by the AMA, but by the American Association of Medical College. Am I correct in understanding that you believe that a lack of physicians is a major part of the healthcare economics problem -- as opposed to physician debt, geographic distribution of specialists, and number of specialists?

The number of graduate medical education [GME] (internships, residencies, and fellowships) are set by the 24 constituent organization of the American Board of Medical Specialties, such as the American College of Surgeons. The final decision on number of seats per GME program, however, is up to the societies, not the ABME.

Medical students have long hours, but it is the GME participants that have the hellish hours. In some cases, especially in surgical specialties, there is a distinct relationship between their workload and work in their specialties. This is definitely not true for every specialty, and, indeed, some specialty programs rarely work extreme hours.

Canada's equivalent oversight organization, incidentally, cut by 10% the number of medical school seats. In Canada, the number and type of GME seats are set globally, and their policy is that at least 50% will be primary care. For an assortment of reasons, the US system favors GME for specialists and subspecialists. If desired, we can go into those reasons.

I can't speak for Yglesias, but what the hell, it sure is MY position. Take off your blinders about "competition" and ask yourself who the customers are? Hint: they by and large aren't the consumer. They're the consumers' employers who have a different set of criteria - cost containment uber alles, not necessary the best health care for the buck.

 

It arguably true that the consumers are not currently 'customers' in American medical care, but that need not be the case.  Both dentistry and veternary medicine demonstrate that markets can work for health care.  Compared to human medicine, both dentistry and veternary medicine provide better service without skyrocketing costs (my wife is on staff at a major university medical center -- they show new hires a training video contrasting the quick friendly efficient service "john" receives when he takes his dog to the vet compared to what he receives himself when he goes to the doctor).  And that's without single payer.  With single-payer we could end up like Canada of which it has been said, "This is a country in which dogs can get a hip replacement in under a week and in which humans can wait two to three years."

 

http://makeashorterlink.com/?R23652EBC

 

(Which is why legally-enforced single-payer healthcare in Canada is in the process of being replaced by two-tier system). 

 

Granted, neither dentistry nor vet medicine have any parallel to ultra-expensive end-of-life care.  Which is why at least catastrophic insurance for everyone makes sense.  But dentistry and veternary medicine give us every reason to belive a market can work for ordinary, routine medical care.

 

 

Matt, you misunderstand how insurance works. Essentially you say that:

 

Claims = Premiums - Administrative Costs - Profits

 

In reality, (well-run) insurance companies make much of their income by investing a portion of the premiums they collect. The equation is therefore:

 

 

Claims = Premiums + Investment Returns - Administrative Costs - Profits

 

For government programs, the equation would be:

 

 

Claims = Premiums (i.e., Taxes Dedicated to the Program) - Administrative Costs

 

Insurance companies could have an advantage over the government if their investment returns exceed their profits (and any administrative costs they have in excess of the government's administrative costs). It's also worth pointing out that insurance companies do not necessarily have to be for-profit--or, if they are for profit, they can be organized as mutual insruance companies, which distribute their profits to the policy holders rather than to outside shareholders.

 

It seems to me that in deciding whether private insurance companies should be involved in a universal health plan, the issue to consider is whether the investment function of insurance companies is worth preserving. One could design a government program with an investment component, but we've generally been reluctant to allow the government to make investment decisions.

Investment returns only refer to time characteristic of holding money.  In other words health insurance companies tax (it is called premiums, but its effect is the same as tax) EARLY and hold onto your money for some period before they spend it.  Using this arbitrage they appear to generate a benefit called investment return.  What is missing from this equation is the cost.  The cost is that you must give up the money early, losing the opportunity to generate whatever benefit you might have gained yourself. 

 

If the government were to arbitrage your taxes in a similar way, you would be up in arms.  Don't be fooled by such nonsense. 

 

The real difference between insurance companies and the government is that insurance companies cost 12 - 25% for administration, while government costs about 5%. 

 

If its good for me it must be Good 4 A Merica

Schemes such as the one you recommend citing Kilgore are a mess.  American experience with means tested benefit programs is that they become stigmatized, fail to reach the intended population, and become second class services.

 

The private markets demonstrate that they are willing to undermine the population's interests while generating growth salaries for corparate health care and medical specialists.

 

Hodge-podge systems will never fix the problem.  It is time for serious consideration of single payer systems.  The reason that legislators won't go for it is not fear, it is because they are all susceptible to the influnce of the lobbyist environment.  These are not separate issues. 

 

If its good for me it must be Good 4 A Merica

Just tax me an extra 1%, and give me health insurance for the rest of my life.

What's so complicated about that? And for all those insurance company workers who are about to be out on the street - look on the bright side: at least you'll have health insurance! It's not as if you were doing something productive, anyway. 

Actually, the whole analogy sucks.  Cavities just aren't as potentially damaging as an number of medical conditions and most people do not expect the same level of care for pets as for temselves and their families.

I regretfully didn't give the preceding post by Sinceimust a high rating, as I don't consider telling someone there "analogy sucks," and then giving an oversimplified response.

Even if there were no universal health coverage, a significant number of veterinarians deliver cheaper primary care, at higher quality and often more humanely.

Compared to human medicine, both dentistry and veternary medicine provide better service without skyrocketing costs (my wife is on staff at a major university medical center -- they show new hires a training video contrasting the quick friendly efficient service "john" receives when he takes his dog to the vet


I'm sorry, but the analogy is disastrously bad. Pet owners are routinely faced with medical expenses that are beyond their means (e.g., chemotherapy, spinal surgery, etc.) and the most common outcome in these cases is euthanasia. It certainly places a nice upper-bound on veterinary health spending, but try implementing a similar solution in a human medical establishment: for example, give a parent the choice between their child's bone-marrow transpant and a painless death.


Furthermore, the technology and R&D investment made by veterinary health care practice is far below what's necessary to keep human beings alive in the comfort that we're used to. The vast majority of veterinary medicines were either developed for human beings (e.g., phenobarbitol, various antibiotics, surgical techniques), or are unexpected offshoots of human medical research. Despite this enormous funding advantage, many of the medicines that are available to vets are those that have been widely abandoned for human treatment due to side-effects, but since there's so little spending on adapting modern human medications to pet care, vets stick with them. Finally, veterinary practices rarely provide the advanced medical procedures that have contributed to our explosive health care spending (e.g., routine CAT scans, MRIs.) So given comparatively primitive medical care and a largely human-funded research bank, of course spending is lower.


All that said, veterinary costs are still _very_ high. For aged pets, you can spend thousands per year on care. The insurance industry that's sprung up around veterinary practices has largely survived by minimizing payouts based on age and pre-conditions (and by not being very reliable)-- partly because there is a small, select pool of individuals who purchase insurance, and it's very easy to get in and out of the market: thus limiting companies' ability to pool risk. Any human health insurance company which provided similar service would be rapidly put out of business.

Wow. What a remarkably glib dismissal of a huge problem. Are you sure you aren't really a Republican? Your attitude ("they aren't being useful, who gives a damn what happens to them, or to the economy as a result") has a distinctly right-wing flavor.

I do not have much idea why medical costs are so high in the US - I think it is correct that currently per capita spending is somewhere between 50-100% more than that in the other advanced economies, without a significantly better outcome or better availability (actually, on both counts, probably worse).

If we do not want to impose price controls, then we have to use free market mechanisms to drive down the cost. Now, one may argue that medical care is intrinsically expensive, there is no way to be profitable or self-sustaining at less than a certain unit cost. I want that assumption examined. The cost of doctors is just one of many things that needs to be examined.

The goal has to be that except for catastrophic events, the average American can afford to pay for health care out of his/her own pocket. I also believe that just as automobile insurance is for accidents and not for routine maintenance and gasoline and so on. health insurance should be only for major problems. We should not socialize or subsidize the cost of routine stuff except for the poorest people.

BTW, there are other professions - e.g., science post-docs and assistant professors - who are as bright, work long hours, and as far as I know, at a pittance compared to the medical profession.

I'm sorry, but the analogy is disastrously bad. Pet owners are routinely faced with medical expenses that are beyond their means (e.g., chemotherapy, spinal surgery, etc.) and the most common outcome in these cases is euthanasia. It certainly places a nice upper-bound on veterinary health spending, but try implementing a similar solution in a human medical establishment: for example, give a parent the choice between their child's bone-marrow transpant and a painless death.

 

Yes, which is exactly WHY we would require persons (but not dogs) to carry catastrophic coverage--that's the point.  People make decisions all the time at lower (but not insignificant) levels of expenditure.  Do I opt for a cheaper bridge or a more expensive tooth implant?  Inexpensive glasses or Lasik surgery?  (And also -- am I paying more for my dentist than my neighbor?  If so, and he's happy with his care, maybe I should switch).  There is no reason whatsoever that a similar dynamic could not apply to routine medical care (but bone-marrow transplants for childhood leukemia do not come under the heading of 'routine medical care'). 

 

I don't know what you think typical physician income is, but the gap between the high and low ends are widening. Even in primary care, 70 hour workweeks are not uncommon, and medicine has a number of hazards that indeed, some science post-docs face -- I remember being very, very respectful in a hot virology lab. Researchers can spend the time being fascinated by their work. Do you think clinicians have no stress when telling someone they will die, unpleasantly, and soon?

If your analogy was to firefighters, I might consider it more fair, both in workweek and danger. Not all physicians, of course, do dangerous things.

My concern over your argument, however, is that you say you don't understand the cost factors, but go ahead and offer policies based on intuition. The cost models are complex, but not inaccessible. In this subthread, for example, Digamma made some incorrect statements about who decides on the factors governing physician supply. You and others seem to assume that the most important cost issue, since it's the first thing you address, is physician income. I have tried to offer specifics, although I don't really care to go out and develop a tutorial to type in here. Please do a bit more research, such that you can go into a discussion of healthcare knowing why it is more expensive in the US.

I'm not an expert in health insurance, just a frustrated consumer.  I've never heard of plans such as you describe.  They sound like they might be an improvement if the group buyers are really representing the insured, rather than a third party with a built-in conflict of interest.  But I'm not sure how this representation would be achieved.  Are the buyers actuallty elected?  If not, how do the consumers hold them accountable?

The other side of the coin here is that part of the reason health insurance costs have risen so much since 2000 is the poor performance of the investments made by the insurance companies (which of course was true of the larger investment community as well).

 

I guess I'm not a great believer in entangling these two streams of finance.  As another poster pointed out, the consumer could presumably have achieved similar returns if he'd been allowed to pay lower premiums and keep the money himself.  Once again, conflict of interest enters the picture.  The insurer now needs to decide whether it should put the money into better care or investing for return. 

 

 

Re: there is no certainty that those who have it will ever have an accident,

Actually the probability that any given driver will (sooner or later) have an accident is close to 100%. In fact on the average every driver has an accident about every four years. Of course the vast majority of those accidents are very minor, and may not involve any pay-out by the insurers at all.

Re: Just tax me an extra 1%, and give me health insurance for the rest of my life.
What's so complicated about that?

Well, um, the numbers don't work. If healthcare spending is, say, 15% of GDP then very obviously taxing you at 1% will not work. Sure, we can cut back some on that figure by not covering everything at 100%, bu tI suspect the healthcare tax, if applied as a flat rate across the board, would still have to be at least 10%.

For the sake of clarity, you need to provide some dollar numbers with your performance data.  For example, the physician who works 70 hours a week has how much pre-tax income?  Is this at age 32 when s/he may still have considerable medical school debt, or at at 45, when its just associated with lifestyle objectives?  How much public funding did s/he have for his education?  How does his/her medical school debt compare with the debt of other professional graduate school graduates?

 

Typically, these stories selectively leave out information such as that physicians are earning anywhere from 50% to 200% more than other people in comparable stage of life, that only a small part of this goes to paying things like medical school debt, partly because medical education is highly subsidized, and that the supply side of health care service is restricted (otherwise, where would all those physicians find 70 hours a week of work?) supposedly for quality reasons, but incidentally having a substantial economic benefit for physicians. 

 

Still, to be fair, it is the health care corporations, not the physicians, who are the real hogs in this business.  These include the insurance companies, but also include nursing homes, hospitals, manufacturers of health care technology (including, but not only, drugs), and .. oh yeah.. insurance companies.  Physicians are merely the privleged elite that make the whole thing go.

 

*Update* 

 You may be intending to associate that $160,000 per year with those 70 hours a week, I am not sure.  That still doesn't answer the other questions.

 

Here, however, is some information that might be of interest.  The median individual income of all males over 15 in the United States in 2004 was $30,000, it was not that much for females.  To get to that $160,000 that median person is going to have to work not 70 hours a week, but 210+ (for reference, the whole week contains 168 hours).

 

However, you may consider that an unfair comparison, so lets look at the highest paid group, people with professional degrees (including physicians, by the way).  The MEDIAN pay for this group is $90,000 (males).  Now, we can assume that these median MBA, MD, JD, etc., holders are already working 55 + weeks, in many cases, so to get to $160,000 they are going to work up around 100 hours.

 

Now, my point is that I would like to never again see any defense of physician salary on the view that they earn it.  They are privleged in this society because they have joined a privleged niche that the rest of us don't like but cannot do without.  They use monopoly like power to keep their pay up. 

 

 

 

If its good for me it must be Good 4 A Merica

It seems to me that there are two steps, one of which would put pressure on the current insurance companies, and the second would introduce rational government spending into the current system

Step One: Insurance companies should be required to separate out of our premiums a) profits and b) administrative costs.  Eventually they ought also to se