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Beyond Neo-Con Culture?

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Appreciate the comments on ‘cultural competence’.  

A big problem is that the ‘community’ (Bunch? Herds??) of foreign policy professionals is split along all sorts of lines, as the commentaries here demonstrate. There are traditional conservatives, neo-cons, liberals, realists, etc. But one especially deep, far reaching and dangerous cleavage  is the stark dividing line between those who inhabit the traditional national security culture, and those in the globalist culture. Each has its own journals, think tanks, conferences and watering holes; each has is own norms and lingo; each has its own foundation sugar daddies.  Each has its own culture. Those drawn to and acculturated into the globalist culture concentrate on the environment, human rights, and maybe a little humanitarian intervention. And they mostly like the UN.

The folks in the national security culture prefer force structures and throw weights. They’re not crazy about the boys in blue helmets.  Each culture thinks the other is deeply flawed, and often misguided. And as Huntington might predict, they rarely communicate directly with one another.  

If  you are interested in framing a sensible ‘progressive’ (yes, I know, as yet undefined) foreign policy, then there has to be a way to bridge these two cultures, and to do so consciously and deliberately. Alas, can’t be done just with words on the page or the digital post. Requires more active engagement and long difficult conversations over scotch and soda – and white wine. But don’t underestimate how difficult it will be to change institutional cultures.  

ges asks if we should instill CC throughout the general population, or mainly train the foreign affairs elites to be more culturally competent. I think both. At the risk of sounding trite, America really is  becoming more interdependent with the rest of the world, not less. CC really is, or should be, a growing priority for all Americans and taught in secondary schools everywhere. So far, it isn’t. At the same time, the service academies (Annapolis, etc.)  NDU, the Foreign Service Institute, as well as professional schools like Woodrow Wilson, LBJ,  JFK etc.  need to rapidly expand their CC offerings.

Munguza is on track about the neo-cons cultural obtuseness, especially the crew now in control. They do seem to think the other guys are stupid. Not sure this is moral relativism, though. Mostly it's "my morals right or wrong. Your morals, wrong". They are pretty consistent on that note.


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One of the things that seems missing is enough reality testing by either, or any, side.  The world that gave rise to the Wohlstetters and the Marshalls or the "Munich" model is gone. My counsin, a professor of Mid-East politics is fluent in Arabic has been to the Middle East and talked to many of the Islamists.  One does not get the feeling that is too true of anybody in the foreign policy establishment.


Daniel A. Greenbaum

Cultural Competence can be stressed by the media as well.

But without regard, IBM rewards managers who complete CC courses. As a matter of fact it is required. Therefore, managers also receive financial incentives for fulfilling their CC requirement. Splendid indeed. If it is good enough for IBM, why isn't it good enough for the service academies?

It is not good enough for the service academies, and schools alike, because of the "Nationalist" and "Parochial" idealogies these institutions may spew out. Such a stance may seem outright unmelodious, but that, is what I truly believe.

"Globalists" are going to be invited to the foreign policy table?

 

Typical male presumptuousness.  Reminds me of the story of the flea floating downstream on his back sporting an  *****  and calling to the bridge master to raise the drawbridge.

'there has to be a way to bridge these two cultures'

the problem is that the theorists are more concerned with protecting their own theory and thus attacking competing theories rather than creating better theory to improve practice. As Richard Little said 'Once you choose a theory you live in a closed world'. 

I think we may be witnessing the short and pernicious influence of the neocon.  Hopefully the AEI is in chaos - it's certainly putting out self-destructive statements lately.  Clausewitz said it well.  The neocons are the stumbling block to cultural competence.  Their forebearers were followers of Trotsky whose mission was the world-wide liberation of labor.  They were singularly unsuccessful, primarily because they ignored group or national cultures.  Perhaps with the neocons out of the mix, the world stands a chance of surviving.

Ellen,

I've met the flea and he comes in red as well as blue.

Globalists were at the foreign policy table in the Clinton administration; nationalists were not.

Now, nationalists are at the policy table and globalists are not.

Somewhere along the line the two foreign policy camps Ernie describes did come into being in this country. Regrettably, neither is culturally competent.

Ernie seems to use culture in the sense of "institutional culture" with the split between those who are warriors and those who are diplomats. That is a divide to be sure; but the dangerous divide is between the rather elite community of people who believe they should be the foreign policy decisionmakers is some theoretical world of deliberative democracy and the "people" whose many and varied forms of cultural diversity and social conflict are generating the politics of this century.

There are real differences in worldview, religious belief, economic interest and social standing at play in global politics. There are nationalisms, religious and other kinds of identity and as Michael Walzer reminds us in his new book Politics and Passion, there is passion.

Any search for a "progressive" foreign policy will have to come to grips with the reality that "most men and women are attached to their political-cultural identities and loyal to the states that represent (or tolerate and protect) those identities. Most of them want to be ruled by people they can recognize as their own -- who are familiar with their customary ways and common beliefs." (Walzer 137) 

The warriors in the national security culture may err by breathing deeply of nationalist fumes and militarizing solutions to political problems. But, the globalists, drawn to UN-centric diplomacy + HR, humanitarian and environmental NGO activity, fail because their cosmopolitanism is not rooted consciously in an American identity. Their international politics model is banking on the erosion of state sovereignty -- particularly the American state that they believe stands in the way of their utopian dream of a global regime. How is that a winning platform in national democratic elections in a time when passions are inflamed?

I commented at length here (must admit too much length, a bit of babbling included ) on your first version of this post which you put in the "Reader Blog" section.

 

I should say I think it a great post that it should inspire me to babble so much.

 

Would also like to note that I thought you might genuinely be trying to wade into participating in the Reader Blog section, rather than not mistakenly putting it there, and I thought that too was interesting. Professor Blackton has used Reader Blogs in the past as sort of trial balloon places  to good effect, mho.  

Of course the Coolidge Hoover way helped give us WWII.

 Artappraiser I think you aer partiially right about America but also incorrect. When America was founded it had the advantage of being a freerider while Britain played the role we did today.  England helped bring an order and peace especially to the trading routes that benefitted American merchants greatly.  However, America also alone against the Barbary pirates acted as Englands junior partner.  Americans navy and marines were very active.

The Monroe Doctrine directed first and foremost against the Spanish depended on the British Navy to be a real threat.  The American army was largely busy fighting the Spanish, the South and then the Indians.  Force sent to the Philipines commented that fighting the Indians made fighting the Philipinos relatively easy. WWII marked the reversal of roles for the United States and Britain.  Britain is now the junior partner to the United States.

 I do not think Americans was to be isolated they want global dominance on the cheap.  I think it is the rare American who really wants to live in a world in  which no one opposes tyrants and on one brings order to  the world.  For the United States to be less involved we either need to change our economy or start creating a much broader array of institutions with global reach that can act.


Daniel A. Greenbaum

Yep on both accounts!

The 2 'yeps' were in response to the misplacement of the second piece "Beyond Neo-Con Culture" as a separate post instead of continued thread, and the trial balloon idea...interesting point.

p.s. Would like to add to my babbling comment on the other thread that I found the Fukuyama article a very impressive piece of work, one that was obviously long thought out and long worked over (the latter making it flow well and look deceptively simple to scanners who did not read it with deep concentration. That's a permanently usable free archive link I just gave, so if anyone didn't read it well, you have another chance!)

 

It was obvious to me that Fukuyama was in part doing a C.Y.A. by saying that "they didn't read my work correctly". He could have objected much more strenously before to the misinterpretations. But he let them run with his ideas in the direction others took them, possibly because he did not have complete confidence in his own interpretation?

 

That which immediately caught my eye about the piece and that relates to my comment on the other thread is this:

 

He is still glossing over the end of the Soviet Empire and not thinking about that in the context of what he is saying. He simply used it as an example of where intervention and meddling works. He's not admitting to himself that Reagan and Carter meddling was in itself a big risk.

 

For example, he's not looking again at how East Germany has still not assimilated well into "Germany," and how it could cause future problems. Had he studied how those decades under a totalitarian welfare state ended, he might not have been so eager to think that intervention in Iraq would go so swimmingly.

 

Just because it worked out well, what makes him think what they did was a sure thing? How do you know at this stage in history that you effected anything, that "the people" might not have caused the same thing to happen? I think the essay shows he is coming around to seeing it Cal Coolidge's way, i.e., American common sense folk culture wisdom foreign policy,  but that he is not confronting all the demons.

 

Finally would like to add a summary thought concluding all: when are more American foreign policy think tankers going to confront their own culture? As I see it, deep in American culture is rejection of all the old meddling ways of "the old country." The founders, the waves of immigrants, all wanted to start a new world that didn't do things the way the old world did, that just stuck to the business of building an alternative that would be an example to the world, perhaps to make the old world change because they are jealous of you, rather than trying to use manipulative power over others to do things your way. This is actually a narrative in many individual families , it goes like this: my great-grandfather gave up everything in (fill in the blank) and came here with $2 in his pocket to start a new life. Among other things, implicit in that is  a rejection of interest in what other countries are doing. Some call it isolationism; I don't think that's a correct label.

Artappraiser,

Fukuyama has certainly taken his time getting around to correcting those policy makers who read the End Of History as a manifesto. His protest, however, is not only a day late but a dollar short.

 

In the article you link to, he makes a distinction between his "Marxist" type of argument that the historical process leads toward (and ends with) the complete establishment of global capitalism and the Neocon's "Leninist" approach which cites the need to create a break in the world process so as to introduce a new order. By casting himself as a neo-liberal, Fukuyama would seem to locate his politics far from the war party being thrown at the White House. But Fukuyama's analogy of Marx and Lenin reveals a fundamental duplicity in the neo-Liberal position:

 

One may refuse to identify oneself as an agent of historical change while expending a considerable amount energy making damn sure that you are with the winning team at the end of the game. In this regard, Fukuyama is a lot like T. Friedman of the NY Times. They both support policies while keeping their rear in the rear. If the policy makers fail, it is because they ignored their warnings. If the policy works out, then they are geniuses who had condidence when others lost their nerve.

    

Mr. Wilson, 

 

I'm very interested in learning more about the cultural split you describe between the globalist culture and the traditional national security culture.  Could you tell us more about this?  I have some rough notion of what you mean, but I'm not sure I get it completely.  Is it roughly the same as the distinction between "internationalists" of either the left or right and "nationalists"?  You say:

 

Each has its own journals, think tanks, conferences and watering holes; each has is own norms and lingo; each has its own foundation sugar daddies.

 

If you have the time, will you please spell it out and name names here?  And how does the distinction, as you see it, cut across the debate about neoconservatism?



From where I sit, the conflcit between neoconservatives and liberal internationalists is just an in-house debate among a broadly like-minded elite.  Both are profoundly culturally chauvinistic.  Both are determined to spread a neoliberal economic system based on the dominance of American capital.  Both preach virtually identical cultural and social values.  Both are hostile to any sort of leftist economic systems - though the noecons more passionately and fanatically so. Both are enamored of the same narrow range of political systems.  Both are allies of corporate power, and work to expand its role.  And both seem seized with the recurring nightmare that somewhere in the world there are people who are not yet Americans.  And above all, both are possessed of a deep conviction in their own entitlement to rule.

 

The only serious difference is over means.  The neoconservatives favor a more openly aggressive and revolutionary strategy of global transformation, while the liberals prefer to rely more on tact and diplomacy, and hope we can wheedle our way to dominance.  The liberals, it is true, have more hope for the UN - but mainly for a reformed and thoroughly westernized UN that does the west's bidding  and helps put an international seal of approval on western policies.  The neoconservatives, in the past, seemed inclined to dispense with the UN altogether - but seem increasingly drawn to the liberal approach.  In the past, there was also a significant difference between liberal internationalists and neoconservatives regarding Europe, with the liberals having a much more favorable attitude toward the continent, and envisioning a sort of Euro-American liberal imperium.  The neoconservatives once had a deeply hostile attitude toward the continent, but seem to be drawing closer to it of late.

 

So the gap between Wilsonian liberal internationalists and neoconservatives has been shrinking - and the writings of people like Fukuyama and Timothy Garton Ash seem symptomatic of this trend.  The gap between these opposing camps in the foreign policy elite doesn't seem nearly as large as the gap between that elite and the rest of us in America, who seem to have precious little influence over the direction of foreign policy.

 

I found much to agree with in DMO's comments, although I would demur somewhat near the end.  DMO says:

 

But, the globalists, drawn to UN-centric diplomacy + HR, humanitarian and environmental NGO activity, fail because their cosmopolitanism is not rooted consciously in an American identity. Their international politics model is banking on the erosion of state sovereignty -- particularly the American state that they believe stands in the way of their utopian dream of a global regime.

 

The globalists do have a utopian image of a global regime.  And it does seem committed on the whole to the erosion of state sovereignty.  But I disagree that the erosion is intended to include the American state.  Rather, their vision seems to depend on expanding US sovereignty, which follows the march of globalization and progress of American capital.  They see a path in which some states get stronger, and fill the vacuum left by the erosion of other states.  Or perhaps we can say that they are attached to a vision of expanding Euro-American sovereignty.  That is perhaps why so many US globalists are invested in the fate of the European Union, and see the eastward expansion of that union as the march of progress.

 

I suppose they are very impressed with global philanthropists like George Soros, who might use their unaccountable power to spread "liberalism" or "civil society" or some such thing.  You find that when they are pushed, "democracy promotion" is a euphemism for liberal capitalism or the "American way".  Soros, by the way, has made common cause with a wealthy gang of outlaws who seem fanatically committed to the destruction of the Russian state, along with their own self-enrichment.  He funds a lot of NGOs though.  In this way, Soros's own personal obsession with, and hatred of, Russia has become the policy of a whole bunch of global "liberals".

 

I think the globalists are just as chauvinist as the most ardent Jacksonian nationalists, and practice a politics that is just as much rooted in an American identity.  But their sense of what America is idifferes substantially from the Jacksonians.  By "America", the globalists mean a society forged in the enlightenment, on this continent, which is the avatar of global liberalism, and is universal in its aspirations and presumptions.

 

It is interesting that the neoconservatives and liberal isolationists have managed to sell their neoliberal, globalizing agenda as a form of "democracy promotion".  Whatever the virtues of neoliberal globalization, it is certainly not compatible with democracy.  The much-ballyhooed erosion of sovereignty they discern and promote is a fundamentally anti-democratic movement.  It consists of of wresting power from the hands of regional governments, and putting it in the hands of unaccountable multinational corporations, financiers and global NGO's - and also in the hands of a few powerful foreign states in the US and Europe.  But no people can possibily hope to be self-governing if they are not in possession of a strong and coherent state, dedicated to looking out for their own peoples' interests. 

 

I actually have substantial global ideals of my own, and hope along with the liberal globalists for the building of a system of global governance.  But, in my view, you can't have global government of any kind without a community of strong states that are capable of acting as coherent and reliable agents in the system.  And this is especially true if there is any hope for the government to be democratic.  So I tend to view the neoliberal undermining of many states, in favor of the unregulated rule of corporations, financial centers and a few states, as a long-term threat to both democracy and peace.

Whatever the nascent purpose of the Monroe Doctrine may have been, it seems fair to say that its subsequent "enforcement" was directed at British imperialism.  The United States never, during the nineteenth century, ever acted as a partner with Great Britain, junior or otherwise.

 

In fact throughout the nineteenth century -- from the annexation of Texas to the Oregon Boundary Dispute to the Mexican War to the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute (Britain's first real if grudging acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine) -- American foreign policy was principally directed against British presumptuousness, real or imagined.

 

Indeed, up until the Cleveland Administration when Britain signalled that it would no longer contest American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, United States foreign policy treated Britain as the country's most likely enemy in any future war.

At the time of the Monroe Doctrine France and Spain were also quiet active in the carribean. You are mistaken the United Staes role withthe British. The United States Nave was often used with the British navy to quell revolts around the world.

Daniel A. Greenbaum

Where?

In the Pacific. Our small fleet was often pressed into service by the British to assist them. I will get back to you with details.

Daniel A. Greenbaum

Hurry up, Daniel; this holding my breath waiting is turning me blue in the face.  Where are you, Lt. Pinkerton, where are you?

J. McCutchen "JmacSF"

San Francisco. CA

The Moment of Truth - NeoCons Jump Ship

 

While their first cousins, TPMC's foreign policy elite in exile, the Muscular Wilsonians, rail against the dangers of "too much realism", the US faces the greatest strategic disaster in its history, and yet not a peep, not one concrete proposal for what to do about the mess they helped create.  What is wrong with this picture? Their silence speaks volumes, and Ken Pollack still has a job at Brookings.

 

 

Interesting points, all.

2 responses, one on the cultural competence argument, the other on the differences beween these schools/camps/ideologies.

 

The cutural competence argument can be made irrespective of the particular doctrine at hand. It is based on CP Snow's 1959/60 essay called The Two Cultures in which he said post war UK faces a tough future if it doesn't find a way to bridge the modern scientific culture with the more generalist culture of Oxbridge. American faces a similar '2 cultures' problem, because in each and every one of the doctrines, there is a bifurcation between the security types and the global types. Is it more extreme in some doctrines and discourses than others? Yes, but is it all pervasive?  Yes. So among the many things we need to do in the real world, one is to get Americans - all Americans, not just the folks at the Woodrow Wilson School or IBM or  State Department (but them especialy), better able to bridge those 2 cultures, and a lot of others farther from home, in order to make a more humane and effective foreign policy.

 Working on a longer piece that explains the multiple meanings of culture, but enough for now.

On the other question, it seems a bit of an academic luxury to say hey all these guys are the same. At some level, there is truth there - depending on the telescope you're looking thru, neo-cons and Clinton libs can seem identical, or world's apart. In an IR theory classroom, maybe Bush and Clinton can be defined as the same. Certainly, economic neo-liberalism is all the rage these days among most foreign policy mavens.

However, it is probably the case that a liberal Clinton-like, Gore-ish administration wd not have gotten us into Iraq. Certainly other stumbles, but not that big one. 

The diff may not seem big to some in the academy, but to the American and Iraqi parents, brothers, sisters who lost loved ones in Iraq, that's a real big difference. It's also one thing to make an analytic argument to tease out conceptual and theoretical differences among arguments. It's another to take the imperfect world as it is, and figure how you can move policy an inch to the left or right. It takes big ideas, big conceptions, but also a view of the politically possible.

 

Sorry Ellen please take a breath. First off I can't lose you, you make me think and do a bit of reading. The books I want to look at wil not be in my possession until Wednesday evening.

Daniel A. Greenbaum

I know that General Odom (Ret.) thinks Iraq is a disaster. I also know that rejects most of the premises of the war. He cites Brent Scowcroft. Do you know if he rejects the idea of getting rid of Saddem under any circumstances?

In minor defense of Pollack he did not favor going to war when Bush did only that ultimately that Saddem should be removed. That actually seems to have been the view of everyone even the French and the Germans.

Daniel A. Greenbaum

J. McCutchen "JmacSF"

San Francisco. CA

Not to belabor the point - the point isn't that Bill Clinton's policy is a twin of Bush's neocon adventurism  They are "first cousins" - the elder prepared the way and in the event, Ken Pollack's  a perfect example as is Ivo Daalder's embrace of Fukuyama the Penitent

BTW Dan, Pollack was a hardcore cheerleader for war. I followed his antics closely. He was an important piece of the Bush warmongering in fact because he provided both link and credibility to the Bush WMD claims.  Why I remember Josh Marshall's TPM interview with the guy and my nasty-gram to Marshall..Cannot abide that man Fukuyama was on Keith Oberman tonight doing penance. I want Brookings to fire Pollack. He's a shill

On the other question, it seems a bit of an academic luxury to say hey all these guys are the same.

At some level, there is truth there - depending on the telescope you're looking thru, neo-cons and Clinton libs can seem identical, or world's apart. In an IR theory classroom, maybe Bush and Clinton can be defined as the same. Certainly, economic neo-liberalism is all the rage these days among most foreign policy mavens.

However, it is probably the case that a liberal Clinton-like, Gore-ish administration wd not have gotten us into Iraq....

 

There you go again, setting me off! Some very inspirational commenting. :-)

 

Yes! Absolutely. But I think this is related to the the pragmatist, semi-isolationist nature of "American culture." We don't have as a tradition that you start with ideology and go on that basis, that's Old World European academic and aristocratic attitude, that one has the hubris of thinking one can control what happens.

 

That the Bush administration got so heavily influenced by ideology is an anomaly stemming from 9/11. (Aside: by making our government go partly ideological, Osama won that one. 9/11 was some of the most powerful iconography of all time--virtually everyone could read the "meaning" of the message--we can knock down your big phallic symbol using your own culture of openess against you. It was pure ideological message.)

 

Bush himself didn't start out that way, heck, he had no foreign policy at all--remember when as a candidate Baker et. al. rushed in to give him foreign policy lessons? (That's how Condi got to be his big pal. Conspiracizing, sometimes I wonder how Machiavellian she is, how much she sought out his personal feelings on things, like both psychiatrist and good wife, and tried to form a sort of foreign policy for him to fit.)

 

Clinton is an excellent example of bridging the divide between ideological wonkdom and American pragmatism, and was rare in that. He liked ideological wonkdom, but not as in: chose one as a guide and then you can stop taking in other ideas. Taking it all in and making an omelette out of it.

 

There is nothing wrong with ideological shops existing, much someone like me has little respect for them as scholars! (Hell, I vehemently am on the side of the societal  benefits allowing-free-hate-speech so the existence of a serious neo-Nazi think tank would be no different to me than all the others.)

 

But there is something wrong with a leader in our culture that falls for it as a guide for all modus operandi; I would argue that it's virtually "un-American." Actually, our lack of ideological principles can also get us into trouble--one example--put all the Japanese-Americans in internment during WWII, based not on principles but on stereotyping from observation.

 

I would argue that the tradition of American culture is not to "do" ideology in government, and Obama backed me up here; I really do like this quote:

.....They don't think George Bush is mean-spirited or prejudiced, but have become aware that his administration is irresponsible and often incompetent.  They don't think that corporations are inherently evil (a lot of them work in corporations), but they recognize that big business, unchecked, can fix the game to the detriment of working people and small entrepreneurs.  They don't think America is an imperialist brute, but are angry that the case to invade Iraq was exaggerated, are worried that we have unnecessarily alienated existing and potential allies around the world, and are ashamed by events like those at Abu Ghraib which violate our ideals as a country.

It's this non-ideological lens through which much of the country....

 

9/11, because of both the ideological nature of the message, and that it ended up allowing some ideological neo-cons to influence actual actions, gave more play to counter ideology than getting back to reality and common folk sense! And unbeknownst to most voters, it also turned Bush more ideological than the Bush they voted for. When they hear he does Bible study, they think of it as your average normal Christian going to the text for inspiration, not that he's thinking that he's God's tool to execute some odd mixture of Wisonianism and Natan Scharansky.

 

The reality-based who study cultures no that there is no manichean "war of civilizations," no clear us v. them, but a continuum or rainbow of attitudes, just as I bet that there are plenty of joe-six-pack French guys right now who think all those Arab kids are bums except for Ahmed at the corner shop, he's ok, not like them others. It's ridiculous at this state of the game following 9/11 that anyone that considers himself a scholar would even fall for such simplistics. By doing so, they are falling for Osama's dream, and that of others like him. 

 

Thanks for interacting on the thread and sharing your thoughts. Gives me hope that things can get back to "normal" some day. :-)

P.S. This short one I just ran across going through old papers is fun on the culture issues. Our father empire is having an identity/ideology crisis that I would say we gave up on long ago. We picked a Constitution, flag, an anthem and moved on, not just allowing change, but expecting it. They're still seeking a ideology for their culture because change is so hard to deal with?

 Letter From Britain

Under a Big Tent Umbrella, but What Else Do They Share?

By Alan Cowell from London, Feb. 1 New York Times

.... Is Britishness just a plum-colored passport, or is it something else?....

 

I recall an email exchange with a British columnist, I think he was at the Guardian, about similar, when he wrote on some citizenship issues that were at the fore right after 9/11, it was something about the possibility of a pledge of allegiance. It's like the majority feel that they are non-ideological, but because there is no constitution there, is no there  there, and they can't be proudly non-ideological. I don't know how else to explain it. The idea of a pledge of allegiance bothered him, and he said something like, what do have to pledge allegiance to, what does the flag mean? What do we really have to be proud of or adhere to? I wrote, what are you nuts? The Magna Carta, et. al.? Can't you see it? It's all intertwined with their damn monarchy thing, that's why they have a hard time seeing it?

J. McCutchen "JmacSF"

San Francisco. CA

Preventive War: A Useful Tool Ivo Daalder James Steinberg The Los Angeles Times

Interesting series on the Military Channel the other night about the Roman Empire, about how they discovered the useful tool and launched preventive war only to discover new enemies and new demons after they conquered.

 Le plus ca change..I don't see that the distinction between the Indispensable Nationalists and the NeoCon carries much difference

Why I remember Josh Marshall's TPM interview with the guy and my nasty-gram to Marshall..Cannot abide that man Fukuyama was on Keith Oberman tonight doing penance. I want Brookings to fire Pollack. He's a shill.

 

Just curious.

 

This level of anger about talking heads and scholars in institutes and similar in the media (such as the recent string of comments elsewhere here about Chris Matthews being partially at fault for the Iraq war) simply amazes me, and has often struck me as ridiculous. It sounds almost as if it's very personal, like you know them.

 

Are you really that angry or are you being facetious? If you had money invested in Brookings or something, or were a colleague, now that level of rage would make sense to me.

 

But just putting the anger towards idea mongers? Reminds me of bar fights over nothing. Or as if it is just all another professional sports game.

 

The problem is we do have free speech here, we're not like Germany where the Neo-Nazi rock band has to submit their lyrics to the police before the big political event. And I do realize how powerful meme spread is, through talking points and the like, I do. I just don't think attempting to censor spread of any and all political ideas are intended in the First Amendment, that one has to not just live with it, but support it.

 

Shouldn't such anger be directed towards those who implement policy? And to the political party or coalition with which you might wish to affiliate? Instead of attacking thinker that have had success spreading their ideas, isn't it better to learn to spread one's own better?

 

P.S. I never liked or respected Pollock either. I gave him a fair hearing on the tube a couple of times and read a few pieces here and there. Since then, I switch the channel and I don't read and I don't pay attention. That's the way it's supposed to work.

        The Myth of the Sheltering Royal Navy

 

Fareed Zakaria has a nice quote from Theodore Roosevelt writing to Rudyard Kipling in 1918:  " .  .  . for the first ninety years the British Navy, when, as was ordinarily the case, the British Government was more or less hostile to us, was our greatest danger."

According to Zakaria's essay I was wrong in thinking that Britain had, by 1895, acquiesced in America's Monroe Doctrine pretensions.

 

As the British prime minister said of the doctrine at that time, "no nation, however powerful, [is] competent to insert into the code of international law a novel principle which was never recognized before, and which has not since been accepted by the government of any country."

Artappraiser,

I can't speak for jexter but I share his anger with those who argued vociferously for a course of action that successfully influenced informed public opinion and now carry no burden or take no responsibility for that influence. It is not personal, it has to do with intellectual morality.

There is an important difference between a Chris Matthews and a Kenneth Pollack. Matthews is a cartoon character who played to a crowd that believes that all nuanced policy is nothing but a substitute for the courage to pave the American way. Matthews didn't have to prove any credentials or develop any recognition from peers to perform his act, he just had to dab on the make up and get on stage. 

Pollack, on the other hand, demanded a hearing on the basis of his standing as a scholar. While it is true that it is those who implement policy who should be held responsible for what comes from policy, their intellectual handmaidens play a vital part in convincing the public what the facts on the ground are and  what the realistic alternatives are given those facts. This support has been particularly crucial for this Administration because of the extreme simplicity of their public statements.

My anger is not about wishing that I could censure these peoples' freedom of expression, it is about my consternation that they still have an audience. 

Artappraiser

 

I think in your combined posts make to very important points.  As Bernard Bailyn has pointed out the ideology of the Founders was  the losing ideology of England.  it was an ideology skeptical of power concentrated in any hands and also of enthusiasms.  They created a system in which you need do nothing but owe allegiance to the Constitution. 

 When that is combined with capitalism you have a country that is not ideological in the European sense and which does not have a sense of nationhood that is based on blood or soil. 

One of the many things that has made Bush so different and scary is that he has put these truths on their head.  He has been trying to use fear to drive an ideologically based set of policies and, unitl the port deal, a idea of what it means to be an American.


Daniel A. Greenbaum

[I]t is probably the case that a liberal Clinton-like, Gore-ish administration wd not have gotten us into Iraq.  ewilson

 

Yes, but not because their IR theories differ from Bush's.  We wouldn't be in Iraq, because 1) Gore's personality (psychology) is not Bush's and 2) Gore's politics (reelection strategy) would have been different from Bush's.

 

IR theory is tag-along rationalization, bull s**t excuses stylized to the second power. 

artappraiser,

I don't know why you're amazed.  

 

If an intellectual in a position of prominence at a major institution like Brookings or CFR decides to publish an argument in favor of a particular policy course, then they should expect that their argument might actually succeed in influencing people.  And if, in fact, their argument does influence people and plays a contributory role in a policy's enactment, then they are themselves partially responsible for the success or failure of those policies, and should be willing to accept  that responsibility.

 

I would say that Pollack's book, in particular, was enormously influential in its effect on US opinion leaders, and thereby contributed substantially to the success of the administration in selling the war to the public.  The winning over of opinion leaders played a very significant role, in turn, in securing Congressional authorization for the war.  And Pollack clearly intended to have an influence, releasing the book at the onset of the major public discussion over Iraq.

 

I actually respect Pollack, because his book was very clearly written, avoided most of the stupid arguments for the war that were floating around, and made the best case that was available for the war in an organized, logical manner.   And where he was wrong, I think he was sincerely wrong - that is, I tend to believe Pollock himself believed the case he was ma