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Where'd The Case Go?

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Lawrence Kaplan went to Iraq, did some reporting, and came back to Washington to publish an article that allegedly makes the case for staying in Iraq. Reading it, I see a lot of reporting and some analysis, but I don't see the case. The view seems to be that Iraq is dysfunctional and that if US forces leave it will become even more dysfunctional, perhaps sliding further down the path to civil war. The problem I've always, always had with this argument is that it doesn't demonstrate anything unless you can also make the case that keeping our troops there will solve the problem.

Thirty months ago the reason US troops couldn't leave Iraq was that Iraqi institutions didn't work and if we left the country would slide toward civil war. Eighteen months ago the reason US troops couldn't leave Iraq was that Iraqi institutions didn't work and if we left the country would slide toward civil war. Twelve months ago the reason US troops couldn't leave Iraq was that Iraqi institutions didn't work and if we left the country would slide toward civil war. Six months ago the reason US troops couldn't leave Iraq was that Iraqi institutions didn't work and if we left the country would slide toward civil war. Today the reason US troops couldn't leave Iraq was that Iraqi institutions didn't work and if we left the country would slide toward civil war. Is this going to be different six months from now? A year from now? Consider me skeptical.

The analogy between continued US military presence and a peacekeeping operation is ultimately weak. The way peacekeeping works is that you've got some armed factions fighting each other. Then, through negotiations, they reach a settlement. But there's mutual distrust between the factions. So they agree to invite a third party to send forces into the area, enforce the terms of the agreement, and help make the agreement workable. This is good stuff. The US and the West more generally has an unfortunate tendency to under-fund and under-commit to operations of this sort, which actually have a pretty decent track record. In Iraq, though, the problem is that there is no agreement. There's no accord to enforce, there's no peace to keep.


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The problem I've always, always had with this argument is that it doesn't demonstrate anything unless you can also make the case that keeping our troops there will solve the problem.

This is a great point. It exemplifies a very common fallacy, though I'm not sure what you'd call it. It's the assumption that continuing a failed course of action will eventually succeed, provided you try harder: "The patient is worse; obviously we haven't applied enough leeches." "My girlfriend won't even talk to me now; maybe I need to go pound on her door at 3am."

There's actually a key difference, though, in that when we invaded, we took on the national obligation of cleaning up the mess we created. This is where the whole "reality-based" thing fits in: just because we have that obligation doesn't mean that we're capable of fulfilling it. So what is it called when you have an obligation and you can't fulfill it, so you give up? I think the term is default. What it really comes down is are we prepared to default on our national obligation--it may not be my obligation (I opposed the war before it started)--but if I'm going to identify myself as American and enjoy the many benefits connected with this identification, the social contract still binds me to this obligation on some level.

If the answer is that we have to default, then the answer should be that we will default as soon as possible. But it's very difficult for some high-powered pundit to come to such a humiliating conclusion. 

The view seems to be that Iraq is dysfunctional and that if US forces leave it will become even more dysfunctional, perhaps sliding further down the path to civil war. The problem I've always, always had with this argument is that it doesn't demonstrate anything unless you can also make the case that keeping our troops there will solve the problem.

 

Would you say this about missions in Bosnia, Kosovo?  (Aren't there still SFOR peacekeepers in Bosnia?  The Dayton accords were in 1995)  Would you say this about the peace-keeping troops in Sudan--"Jeez, they're not solving the problem.  Therefore, we certainly shouldn't keep them there or put in more troops, we should pull them all out."  Of course not.  Granted, how we got to this point is different in Iraq than in Afghanistan, than in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sudan.  But in all cases, we're dealing with an external force trying to keep sectarian violence from flaring into open warfare and mass casualties.  Isn't it usually the left that accuses America of being impatient?

 

Would you say this about missions in Bosnia, Kosovo?  (Aren't there still SFOR peacekeepers in Bosnia?  The Dayton accords were in 1995)

Part of Matt's point was that our troops in Iraq are not positioned as peacekeepers and are not effective as such. The peacekeepers in Bosnia may still be there, but they are effective in keeping the peace.

The United States does not technically have a responsibility to help these factions "get along."  Our obligation is to restore infrastructure, assist in the development of the new government, and train an Iraqi security force.  If civil war does indeed become a reality, the U.S. military has no obligation to meddle in that affair.  It appears, thankfully, that our commanders agree with that assessment.  Depending on the severity of the civil war (which hopefully will never come to fruition), the American responsibility may be greatly decreased if the new government fails and/or the trained security force dissolves into their various religious sects.  In this instance, infrastructure restoration becomes the only obligation facing the United States.  As a consequence, many troops could be brought home.  In point of fact, however, this is very unlikely.  Bush has staked too much in this war to allow it to sink into civil war.  Our troops would likely remain in the country--even if only hunkered down in the Green Zone.  But the point remains: an Iraqi civil war presents a great opportunity (and a legitimate excuse) to reduce troop numbers in the country.

The problem I've always, always had with this argument is that it doesn't demonstrate anything unless you can also make the case that keeping our troops there will solve the problem.

 

In an ideal world, that would have been the question to ask before we even started this adventure.  But as we all know, the Bush Administration systematically ignored those voices that said that our presence would NOT solve the problem and might even contribute to it.  This is a strategic blunder of the highest magnitude, for which we will pay a price for generations.

 

But that is separate from the decision whether to pull out now that we are there.  In that case, the key question to ask is whether we making the situation better or worse.  Liberals almost uniformly say worse while many if not most conservatives say better.

 

The probable truth is that we are making it better and worse at the same time.  Our presence offends many and leads to attacks on us.  But it also prevents the different populations from waging all out war on each other.  Kaplan is arguing that on balance, the latter is becoming the stronger case.  I can't say whether he's right, but at least its a serious argument.  The argument that we should pull out completely immediately - i.e. the orthodox left/liberal position - by contrast is totally unserious as it does not even stop to consider the disastrous consequences of an all-out civil war between the Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq. 

 

There's a frequent assumption on the left that things can't get worse than they are now.  That has always been wrong.  They can get way, way worse.  And that needs to be factored into the thinking here, not just whether we can solve the problem in some neat and tidy way.

 

Bush has staked too much in this war to allow it to sink into civil war.

Of what relevance is Bush's personal stake in the conflict? This seems to be the same fallacy that Matt pointed out. Bush may not want to "allow" civil war, but his strength of will does not override reality. Either it's possible to avoid civil war or it is not. And if it is not, then it doesn't matter whether "Bush has staked too much" or even if our nation as a whole (note: "L'Etat c'est moi" is not in the constitution) has too much at stake.

Second, if it is possible, but it requires exorbitant national resources, then Bush may have so much at stake that he would work tirelessly to commit those thousands of lives and hundreds of billions more to see it through. That doesn't mean that we as a nation have to let him.

... infrastructure restoration becomes the only obligation facing the US

How do you define infrastructure? Restoration? 

If this is reconstruction I question your logic since bad security has severly limited reconstruction to date and with civil war would be impossible. 

 

C'mon. Agree or disagree with the invasion/occupation, your expectations for how quickly Iraq should have functioning institutions that can gird against a civil war are unreasonable.

"You broke it, you own it." That's pretty much the entire case, and it's basically unanswerable, because it's based on ethical criteria, not pragmatic ones. Taken to it's logical conclusion, the "Broke it- Own it" school doesnt have to care whether or not we are going to succeed- we would be obligated to try anyway, even in the face of near certain defeat, because we are responsible for the suffering that is happening there, including the civil war (there would be no civil war or sectarian violence if Saddam were still there).

 

Unfortunatly, because of the way the American people were misled regarding weapons of mass destruction, they had never debated nor arrived at a consensus that we should invade Iraq for the purpose of promoting democracy there. Thus, there is no reason why the American people should continue to absorb causualities in a cause they were never really committed to in the first place. This creates an ethical dilemma with no good solution.

 

Another problem is that it takes years, sometimes generations, for nation building to succeed. Bosnia and the Sudan will never really be stable until the current generation passes away, and another generation has grown up under conditions of peace and stability. That is also what happened in Germany and Japan. Perhaps we can bring democracy, stability and prosperity to Iraq, but there is no reason to expect that it could be done in three years. No one has ever done it that quickly.

 

Of course, in Bosnia, and hopefully in the Sudan, losses and costs are acceptable in part because many nations share the burden. Unfortunately, because of the way the Bush adminstration has dealt with our traditional allies and the United Nations with regard the war in Iraq, burden sharing there is unlikely.

 

Another practical issue is that there is a tradeoff between the number of troops we have over there and the amount of time it will take to install a stable government and economic infrastructure, if that is indeed possible. That is, the fewer troops we have over there, the longer it will take, and the less likely it will be that we will accomplish our goals quickly. "Troops vs. Time" are the two horns of the dilemma we are caught in. (not that flooding Iraq with troops alone would do the trick, but having enough resources to do the job is a necessary condition if our plans are to achieve their goals in the timeframe we find acceptable). Yet, because of the lack of visible progress so far, and the success of the insurgency to maintain chaotic conditions, the American public is unlikely to support increasing the number of troops committed to Iraq.

 

So- on pragmatic grounds we have difficult choice. Take the gamble that we can do the job in the time we have with the resources we have committed, or get out now and take the costs, including loss of national prestige and the likely increase in global terrorism.

 

On balance, I still favor staying there, but with some sort of timeframe measured in years. Which is the most likely outcome of all- if visible progress has not occurred by the time the Bush administration has ended, then the next administration, no matter which party it is, will likely experience overwhelming pressure to cut our losses and get out. Bush started this, he has to end it.

Our obligation is to restore infrastructure,

 

Which after three years is not restored... 

 

assist in the development of the new government,

 

Which after three years is not developed... 

 

and train an Iraqi security force.

 

Which after three years is not trained.

 

But we'll probably turn the corner any day now...

 

Dissent Protects Democracy

Our presence offends many and leads to attacks on us.  But it also prevents the different populations from waging all out war on each other

 

Is that really true?

 

The insurgents can attack at will. The events of this week clearly show we're not doing anything to stop Iraqis from killing each other.

 

The only thing that has prevented an all out civil war is the Iraqi religious leaders, Sistani in particular, have not advocated it.

 

The clerics hold the cards, and if they call for all out war, there is nothing our 160,000 troops in Iraq will be able to do to stop it.
 

Dissent Protects Democracy

The problem I've always, always had with this argument is that it doesn't demonstrate anything unless you can also make the case that keeping our troops there will solve the problem.

 

I rarely agree with Brad the Dad, but I do in this case.  Matt's analysis is a bit too simplistic here. 

 

Suppose 500 people are being killed a month in Iraq, in part due to the US presence, but 5000 would be killed each month if we left, then that is certainly one reason for staying.

 

Similarly, suppose casualties continue to accelerate if we stay, but they accelerate at a slower pace than they would if we left, then we have another good reason for staying.

 

Of course the crucial question is just what would happen if we leave.  Would things get worse?  How much worse?  These are certainly tough problems of estimation.  But we do have to do our best to try estimate the answers, in an intellectually honest way, if we are going to act responsibly.  These are the debates we should be having; but it is not adequate to say that we should get out of Iraq simply because our presence is not solving the problem.  Regrettably, our choices may now be between living with a bad problem and causing a worse problem. 

 

Gettysburg's argument about the nature of our obligations toward Iraq raises important issues.  But frankly, whether we have an obligation to stay in Iraq, and under what circumstances, appears to be an increasingly moot point.  If all hell breaks loose in Iraq, if civil war erupts, if pipelines and wellheads are blown up all over the country, if arms smuggling, refugees and other kinds of spillover spark intervention from other countries in the region, and bring them to the point of conflict, if shipping is disrupted, then we can be quite certain that, even if we leave,  we are going to be right back in Iraq and other places in the region in no time.  In fact, I would say the most important consideration in favor of a continued US presence is to deter intervention by other countries.  Of course, I would much prefer if this kind of peacekeeping and deterrence operation coupld be carried out by some coalition of neutral countries.  But I don't see many takers lining up.

 

And I certainly wish we are not in this situation to begin with.  My dominant emotions about the situation in Iraq are anger and intense bitterness.  One of the reasons I was so opposed to this war was the fear of the kind of chaos the war would spread, and its potential to ignite a regional conflict.  But Bush did invade, stupidly and criminally in my book, and now we have to figure out how to deal with the consequences of that decision.  Some day, perhaps Bush and his lying cronies can be tried for war crimes and locked up.  But that is not going to fix the problem we are in.  The administration has blown a hole in the dike, and the water is rushing in.  We have to stop it - or at least slow it down.

 

Returning to Matt's discussion, it certainly would be good to find some way of solving the problem.  Does he have any suggestions?   He may alos have meant to suggest that a US withdrawal would leaves things no worse, and perhaps better, than they are now.  Does he have an argument for that conclusion?

Yes.  Out of the Balkans, now.   

 

"You say I'm a dreamer.  We're two of a kind.  Looking for some perfect world that we both know that we'll never find." - Thompson Twins, "Hold Me Now"

The clerics hold the cards, and if they call for all out war, there is nothing our 160,000 troops in Iraq will be able to do to stop it.

I would argue that's quite wrong.  In fact, that is one of the things that our troops do exceedingly well.  In Afghanistan, we intervened on one side (the much weaker side, in fact) of a similar conflict in much more challenging terrain, and the more powerful force was routed by the weaker one with only a few U.S.  personnel on the ground to guide the smart bombs.

With the U.S. troops in the country, small scale guerilla operations are possible, but real military operations are not.  As it stands, the militias can engage in skirmishes, car-bombings, and the like, but not all out war.  With the U.S. out of the picture, the dynamic would change dramatically.



 

The problem I've always, always had with this argument is that it doesn't demonstrate anything unless you can also make the case that keeping our troops there will solve the problem.

 

Thirty months ago the reason US troops couldn't leave Iraq was that Iraqi institutions didn't work and if we left the country would slide toward civil war... Today the reason US troops couldn't leave Iraq was that Iraqi institutions didn't work and if we left the country would slide toward civil war. Is this going to be different six months from now? A year from now? Consider me skeptical.

 

Well, technically, we don't need to have this part of the situation improve in order to argue that keeping our troops there is solving the problem.  The issue isn't necessarily whether we can leave in a year, three years, five years, etc. and Iraq can take care of itself.  The issue is whether we can prevent a civil war for as long as we stay in Iraq.  A lot of hawks would be jsut fine with us staying in Iraq forever.

 

"You say I'm a dreamer.  We're two of a kind.  Looking for some perfect world that we both know that we'll never find." - Thompson Twins, "Hold Me Now"

The solution is political, not military. Even our own Generals say this.

 

And the reality is, despite the purple fingertips, the Iraqis are not interested in politics. If it wasn't a mosque this week, it'd be a different mosque next week.

 

Just about the only thing the Iraqis can agree on is they don't like us.

 

A majority thinks it's OK to kill Americans. 80% want us out.

 

Perhaps we should oblige.

 

Dissent Protects Democracy

CSCS

I would argue that progress has been made with regard to the new government.  Whether or not that government survives the present crisis has yet to be seen.  Infrastructure reconstruction has certainly been a problem as has training Iraqi soldiers.  To lament on the situation, however, is not productive in the least.  Bush has repeatedly stated that the U.S. will see the job through to the end so we might as well accept that.  Getting trapped in a paradigm of failure is neither progressive nor helpful.

So who's side would we take? Or would we be an equal opportunity bomb dropper?

 

And in my book, guerrilla war counts as war.   

 

Dissent Protects Democracy

Matt's point has long been - and i agree - that there are no ways for the US to "solve the problem."

 

but let's follow your logic for a moment: suppose US forces staying result in a status quo of 500 dying a month ad infinitum. suppose, on the other hand, we leave under the terms of the Murtha proposal, a serious civil war breaks out, 5000 die per month for 3 months, and then a resollution is reached.

 

in short, we can suppose all day: we don't know the future. we do know the present. and in terms of the present and the self-interest of the US, it's hard to see what we are - or have any hope of - acoomplishing.

Towards the end of the aborted presidency of John Kennedy he was asked how he thought we could successfully pull out of Vietnam, something Kennedy was intent on doing. He said, "Simple, just get them to ask us to leave."  Unfortunately, the power structure in Iraq will never ask us to leave.  One of the many blunders we made in Iraq was to encourage, in fact blatently support the return to Iraq of very rich Iraqi's, think Chalabi, and see to it they assumed positions of power in the government.  The Shiite population of Iraq, even though it is much larger than the Sunni population, is at the same time predominately poor, very poor.  In fact it has been so since the death of the prophet in the late 7th century.  They see themselves as marginalized, yet again, under the existing government, which explains their insurgency.  The Sunni insurgency is to be expected, given their numbers.  (We are not about to remove the likes of Chalabi because he insures our continuing hand in the oil pot.)  Given our track record, it's hard to believe that reconstruction can ever keep up with our blunders.  I'm afraid we can't win in Iraq, so it's merely a matter of when do we lose, the time of which we can control. 

i don't know that they aren't interested in politics; they simply aren't practiced in politics. right now, we have different groups with agendas that don't lend themselves to common ground, which is rarely a good basis for politics.

 

i may despise bush-ism, and ann coulter may think i'm treasonous, but we both want the united states to continue as a functioning entity. is that really true of the different factions in iraq, which was, after all, as some of us pointed out endlessly prior to the war, a phony nation state invented to serve the interests of british imperialism.

C'mon. Agree or disagree with the invasion/ occupation, your expectations for how quickly Iraq should have functioning institutions that can gird against a civil war are unreasonable,

 

 

Ummm, are you talking about Matt or the Administration?

I'm not lamenting -- I'm taking a good look at the reality of the situation.

 

The Kurds are biding their time. The Sunnis have pulled out. The Shiites are running their own death squads and torture chambers.

 

How much longer do we participate in the charade? 

 

What's productive is getting Bush to change course. Rumfeld needs to resign, and new ideas need to prevail. Either that, or we get out.

 

Either choice will take political pressure. And not "accepting" Bush's stay-the-course plan. 

 

Dissent Protects Democracy

The insurgents can attack at will. The events of this week clearly show we're not doing anything to stop Iraqis from killing each other.

 

 

This is the fallacy at the heart of the liberal critique of the war: since attacks continue, it must mean that we are doing nothing. By that logic, how does any army win any war?  After all, as long as the enemy is able to attack, it must mean you're sitting around twiddling your thumbs.

 

Back in the real world, there are the real military operations, patrols, training of Iraqis and rebuilding projects going on that are very much contributing to Iraqis not killing each other.  That attacks continue does not in any way make these activities irrelevant.  It just means the job isn't done. 

 

There's so much to criticize in the way this war has been run without resorting to nonsensical statements like "we're not doing anything to stop Iraqis from killing each other."

Part of the problem here is that Americans often assume that every problem has a solution.  But in international relations, sometimes that isn't the case.  Some conflicts cannot be "solved" in the sense of achieving a fair resolution that would enable both sides to stop the fight.  In my opinion, the Arab-Israeli conflict is one example of this.  There isn't a settlement that Israel could offer that would cause the Arabs to say that enough is enough and now let's try peace.  But it may be that the Iraqi Sunni-Shiite conflict is another.  What's so infuriating is that we are constantly being told by the Administration that a resolution is around the corner, when serious observers know that is nonsense.

So who's side would we take? Or would we be an equal opportunity bomb dropper?

 

Well, the government's side in general.  But in specific cases, the U.S. might veto a massive assault against the Sunni heartland by the predominantly Shia military.  But, in fact, the U.S. won't have to drop those bombs against tanks, artillery or masses of troops, because neither side will attempt use these things if the U.S. refuses to allow it.

 

And in my book, guerrilla war counts as war.   

 

I don't think is a question of of counting or not counting, it's a question of the numbers of casualties (which could be an order or two of magnitude higher with unrestrained civil war rather than sporadic, low-level guerilla fighting).

 

Well, having just read the first page of Kaplan's article, I'm incredibly irritated at his myopia. He begins with the example of the civilian wing of Baghdad's airport, which USAID renovated in 2003, but which is now falling apart because maintenance has been assigned by al-Sadr's Interior Ministry to a bunch of poor adolescents from Sadr City. Kaplan's conclusion: "Not everything the U.S. enterprise touches here turns to gold. But everything it lets go of does seem to turn into dirt."

 

This is such an idiotic and amateurish conclusion, it's hard to believe that Kaplan has spent years looking at development issues in the third world, though I know he has. The reason why the civilian wing of the airport is falling apart is the very same reason why donor-driven foreign-funded infrastructure projects fall apart all over the third world: they are built without a genuine partnership with an interested, responsible and committed local partner who will take responsibility for continuing the project after the donor leaves. If I waltzed into a small town in Texas and built a first-class hockey rink, then turned it over to the municipality, would I have any right to complain that two years later it was being used to store tires? Of course the airport got treated as a spoil in the political system; of course al-Sadr uses it to shore up his political base rather than to grow the country's international image. Duh!

 

If the things the US leaves turns to dirt, that's because they weren't properly built - with local commitment, involvement, and responsibility - in the first place. And if as a donor nation you try to do things that way, you get what you deserve: dirt. And none of this is any argument for staying longer in Iraq - except perhaps to gain the proper humiliating experience to be able to finally learn how to do development and nation-building the right way next time.

cscs

In all honesty, I would consider supporting a withdrawal if civil war erupts in Iraq.  Today's calls for peace by both Shiite and Sunni clerics, along with the daytime curfew, seems to have eased the tensions for the time being.  There is an excellent opinion piece in today's Wall Street Journal (2/24/06) in which the author, currently in Baghdad, states that U.S. efforts have visibly shifted from facing insurgents to training Iraqi military personell.  This is encouraging.  As recently as November we were seeing U.S. troops (with Iraqi troops participating in support) launching counter-insurgency operations on a large-scale.  This was troublesome simply because as long as our forces participate in such activities, al-Zarqawi is justified in retaliating.  I am glad our forces have stopped or slowed such operations because a less-visible U.S. force is not good for al-Zarqawi.  If civil war is avoided, we will begin to see troop reductions later this year.  I would say that is the best we can hope for.

Fine. You got me --  I should have been more precise in my language. But the overall point is the same: while Bush and Lieberman keep yelling Progress!, there has not been much.

 

And the fact is while we're there, the attacks and the violence are not going to stop. We can continue to play this charade to make the pro-war supporters feel better, with platitudes like "we need to get the job done." 

 

Or, we can come home. 


Dissent Protects Democracy

Vic,

You said pretty much everything I wanted to say. The only thing I would add is that characterizing the Iraq War as "peacekeeping" is probably erroneous. What we are engaged in is a classic guerilla war. To be fair, it seems some one realized late in 2004, and changed our strategy accordingly, starting with the Battle of Fallujah.

As with any guerilla war, the end is unlikely to come quickly or with any finality. The primary danger is the loss of political will in the interim. I would guess that organized resistance will continue for about another three to five years, and violence will likely continue sporadically for at least another decade. This isn't a war I would've chose to start in the hindsight, but I agree that having kicked over the Iraqi applecart we are morally obligated to help pick up the apples.

Noel

In all honesty, I would consider supporting a withdrawal if civil war erupts in Iraq. 

 

I agree completely. So, I guess the next thing we'll start arguing about is when to call it a civil war? :-)

 

And, yes, the things you mention are good things. I am for anything that means less U.S. troops getting killed. But as long as we are there, we will incite. As Matt says, we are not really solving any problems.

 

What's more realistic is troop reductions based on when Karl Rove says it's politically expedient to come home. Troops reductions will likely have nothing to do with Iraqis being trained or anything that's happening on the ground. 

 

Dissent Protects Democracy

But the overall point is the same: while Bush and Lieberman keep yelling Progress!, there has not been much.

 

Well that depends on your definition of "much", doesn't it?  Again, you are assuming because the job isn't done, there hasn't been much progress.  I tend to disagree. I think we've made quite a bit of progress, even though the country is far from stable.

 

Saying this does not in any way imply that I think we are near the end.  And I agree with you that the Bushies' constantly telling everyone that we're further along than we actually are is spectacularly dishonest.  But that doesn't mean there hasn't been progress.

 

But let's assume that progress is glacial, for the sake of argument.  You still have the question of what is the least bad option?  Which is worse: the continuing slow trickle of casualties and political polarization that our continued presence in Iraq causes or the removal of our forces and the country becomes a giant Lebanon - lawless, full of terrorists and a magnet for meddling regional powers.  Which is worse?  You haven't said.

its easy matt. the usa is solving the problem of it all becoming a bigger problem. not much, but something.

J. McCutchen "JmacSF"

San Francisco. CA

 Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Einstein

 

 September 5, 2003

Regis Debray, Le Figaro

The Americans seem to have gotten them­selves into an intractable mess in Iraq. They must now choose between a historical debacle if they hang on and a temporary setback if they let go.

"We cannot leave Iraq before it is stabilized," declared a former CIA officer. But to maintain a prolonged foreign occupation of Iraq is to destabilize it only further. Once the invader departs, there will no doubt be a civil war, which will accelerate the dismemberment of the nation, giving rise to a fundamentalist regime, which will make at least some people miss the era of Saddam.

On the other hand, if the occupation persists, one can foresee a multifaceted terrorist es­calation eating away at U.S. forces and aggravating ethnic and religious divisions. The Americans will bring in reinforcements, including Fijians and Norwegians. They'll talk of the final fifteen minutes and of last gasps. A coup d'etat or uprising will be inspired in Teheran (terrain more favorable to the West than Iraq is) but with irritating repercussions in Najaf, which will be transformed into a base of retreat for vengeful ayatollahs. The Americans will cling to Iraq as "useful" and ensconce themselves inside supposedly unbreachable bastions. Then, as the death toll mounts by the hundreds, the "bring the boys home" movement will spread like an oil slick across the United States, and a new, Democratic administration will make the prudent decision to stop the hemorrhaging when the vital interests of the United States are not at stake. But how many lives will be ruined in the meantime?

Upthread, mw attempted an analogy - Bosnia, Kosovo, Sudan:

Granted, how we got to this point is different in Iraq than in Afghanistan, than in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sudan.  But in all cases, we're dealing with an external force trying to keep sectarian violence from flaring into open warfare and mass casualties.

First sentence, MW grants difference. The second, he takes it away. Kosovo and Bosnia are peace-keeping missions which were established to safeguard the Muslim provinces from "external" Serbian aggression.  In each case, the external force was introduced to stop mass killing and open warfare, a goal which was rather swiftly accomplished under UN not NATO Command. Neithre case is remotely comparable to Iraq or Afghanistan or Sudan for that matter where peacekeeping has been impossible in an open civil war.

By contrast, the US forces have been fighting as an Occupying Power and invader and since 2004 as mercenaries in a civil war between the Shia/Kurd dominated government and the Sunnis (with notable exceptions - the Mahdi Uprisings and the seriously deteriorating situation in Basra).  85% of Iraqis want us out. Yet we fight on with the following indisputable consequences:

  • US troop presence fuels the insurgency
  • It allows the Shiites to build militia control of the security forces
  • It allows the Kurds to use their militia in a campaign of reverse cleansing in Kirkuk - preparation of the ground as it were for the upcoming referendum which when it passes secures an oil revenue source and hastens the inevitable secession - The Sunnis who are most aggrieved are kept at bay by the mercenary occupying force
  • US troop presence strengthens a government with close ties to Iran; strengthens and encourages Iran's nuclear development; ensures the emergence at US cost of Iran as the hegemonic power in the Persian Gulf
  • US troop presence destabilizes not only Iraq but the entire Middle East region as well
  • US occupation has significantly contributed to the rise of political Islam in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain
  • The Iraqi security forces are only marginally better prepared today than one year ago. Violence has held steady or has increased.  Oil and electricity production has continued a steady decline. 

BradTheDad's criticism that withdrawal advocates often fall into a facile "all will be well only if and when" is well taken.  Things can get worse and may for a short while. Certainly, the well-recognized negative consequences must be weighed against the less well appreciated but real short term benefit  that the US troops to some indeterminable degree, prevent Sunni forsees from launching major attacks in the Kirkuk area and also prevent concentrations of force for large scale operations against the government.

That said, Brad should have left well enough alone, quit while ahead:

 

In an ideal world, that would have been the question to ask before we even started this adventure.  But as we all know, the Bush Administration systematically ignored those voices that said that our presence would NOT solve the problem and might even contribute to it.  This is a strategic blunder of the highest magnitude, for which we will pay a price for generations.

But that is separate from the decision whether to pull out now that we are there. 

What happened that suddenly the blunders predicted so accurately before the war are no longer material to a the decision about how to fight it?  Why should we stay the failed course when experience of three years only establishes the 20/20 foresight of pre-war predictions of disaster?

Let's be honest about what really happens when the Stay the Courses launch intor doomsday demonics - what happens is that all alternative courses - over-the-horizion air and ground forces- UN - Arab League etc - disappear. Bush uses this non-sequitur of failure to justify and sustain even greater failure. Silenced for fear of being seen as weak, politicians who know better, choose instead to remain accomplices to the very failure and weakeness they posture against. Bush muddles his way through, staying the same course to new depths of the same quagmire. Nothing has changed. Blunders forseen. Blunders accomplished. Blunders beget  blunders It only gets worse.

Time for honesty here - the war which was not in our interest to begin with is no more in our interest to prosecute three years later when  the most dire pre-war predictions have been met or surpassed. Time for honesty - we are not succeeding, failure is a fact not an option. Time for honesty - this calamity has no discernable end point, no strategy, and there are no good choices. 


The war was not a mistake. I made a mistake when I forgot to pick up cat food. This was is a disastr of unimaginable proportion which is getting worse and worse. The US cannot sustain this effort financially, militarily or politically for the many many years it will take chasing chimerical "success" promised in Bush propoganda points nowadays.

The burden of proof isn't on those who propose alternatives to catastrophe.  Theirs is the presumption of competence and presicience. The blunderers bear the burden of failure and preseumption of incompetence.  Enough already of the pottery barn wisdom and snake oil peddler's slogans.