Obviously, no matter how important one views nonproliferation, it is a policy that has only instrumental value - one that is pursued to accomplish other ends.  In the case of nuclear weapons nonproliferation, the obvious end is the prevention of the horrific destruction caused by the use of nuclear weapons.

Some have argued, and feign to believe, that the example of the Cold War, in which the two superpowers refrained from a nuclear exchange despite several close calls, indicates that the more countries that possess nuclear weapons the better.  They say that universal nuclear proliferation would bring us a secure world based on universal deterrence.  I think that idea borders on lunacy.

Nuclear weapons are uniquely awful and dangerous weapons.  While their destructive power might be so great as to deter their use in certain strategically simple circumstances, it is easy to imagine very many circumstances in which the risks posed by their existence is intolerably high in anybody's book.

The fact that the use of nuclear weapons was successfully deterred during the Cold War doesn't impress me at all, and has much to do with the very peculiar bipolar circumstances of the Cold War balance of nuclear terror.  Maintaining a deterrent standoff in a two-person game is simpler by far than maintaining that standoff in a three, four, seven or fifty person game.  The more players, the more the moves in the game become perilously rapid, correlate with outcomes that are impossible to calculate, and produce a chaotic disequilibrium of crazy ebbs and flows.

I am dismayed that at this late date, after enduring the gloomy nightmare of omnipresent nuclear peril during the Cold War, we still have to have a "what's the point of nonproliferation" discussion.  The NNPT and the regime it created is a very good treaty - a tremendous international achievement.  Now is no time for progressives to lose their bearings, and fall into confusion about whether or not nonproliferation is a good thing.  The good news is that in most of the world the treaty still has strong popular support.

I am not at all one who thinks that the Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons in simply in the cards.  Iran is a signatory to the NNPT and is bound by international law not to develop nuclear weapons.  And the prospect of nuclear competition between Iran and Israel in the Middle East should fill us all with terror.  We really need a fully denuclearized Middle East - there can be no doubt of that.  And the matter is urgent.  This for several reasons:

First, because, Israel is a very tiny country, and is particularly vulnerable to a nuclear first strike.  An adversary would need only a small handful of weapons to literally destroy Israel.  Thus, the time between Iran's first acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the time at which their arsenal became a critical threat will be very short.  And in circumstances of heightened tension between Israel and Iran, the risk of miscalculation and the incentive for hasty preemption will be intolerably high.  In addition, both states have political cultures that contain ideological devout and uncompromisingly fanatical components, which creates the added risk of decision-making that is not bound by practical, earth-bound standards of rationality.  The fact that Israel's weapons program is thoroughly secret is also highly dangerous, and a potential cause of miscalculation.

However, Iran is fully justified in fearing Israel's nuclear arsenal, and it is not at all surprising that they may be dedicated (we don't know for sure) to building a nuclear deterrent.  If we in the US lived in such close proximity to a state that was thought to be armed with hundreds our region, we would feel the same way.  What is needed now is a dedicated global effort, with pressure coming from all sides, to press all of the countries in the region to create a nuclear-free zone.

The good news is that virtually everyone in the world would like to see such an effort succeed. Almost every country in the world has a colossal stake in the Middle East, and views the possibility of nuclear war there with great alarm.  If the United States would join the emerging global call for a nuclear-free Middle East, it would be joined by all the major players in the global community, and we could collectively exert tremendous leverage and get the job done.  It would also earn the US back a good deal of lost good will.  If President Bush is looking for a signature initiative to repair his historical legacy, this is it.

By the way, Michael floats the notion - though only as the position of one of the extreme sides in his imagined debate - that one reason for supporting nuclear nonproliferation in the case of Iran is that if Iran has nuclear weapons "it will be impossible to ever dislodge the ruling regime, and thus that those goals others hold dear – democratization, human rights, counterterrorism – will never be realized."

I can think of nothing that would do more to damage the global nonproliferation effort than the spread of the belief that the main reason nonproliferation is pursued by powerful countries is so that they can maintain the freedom to intervene in the domestic affairs of weaker countries.  I hope we don't hear a lot of talk of this kind from well-placed strategic thinkers and well-known pundits, because the talk itself is highly dangerous, and only increases global suspicion.  Nonproliferation and disarmament can only be accomplished in the context of a general commitment to international law.

J. McCutchen "JmacSF"

San Francisco. CA

Excellent point. Another instance of a salutary aspect of the Cold War.  Too bad history didn't end and the Hegemonic Hyperpower fades - rather more rapidly thank to recent policies wer moving toward a highly unstable multi-polar system with lots of bombs

It's sometimes useful to carry on this sort of discussion at Michael Levi's very abstract level, but foreign relations are carried out in a much more concrete world.

The abstractions may give us some bounds on actions in the real world, but I don't see that coming out of this discussion.

Here’s what worries me: Without substantial consensus on the global context for nuclear nonproliferation – which we don’t seem to have now – effective nonproliferation policy may not be possible at all.

I take it that what is intended here is a global consensus, more than a consensus in the American government, which would have to be included in a global consensus.

We, of course, have the NPT, which is a consensus of sorts. There are, however, specific issues like the problems of Article IV and what it allows to non weapon states, on which there is little consensus. The NPT Review Conference in May 2004 did not produce such a consensus.

The priority of NPT relative to other national interests is only one factor in the lack of such a consensus. The problems with Article IV are another; the perception that the nuclear weapon states are not complying with Article VI is another. The specifics of nuclear weapon capability and security assurances in general in Asia are another. Adequate control of nuclear materials, particularly but not exclusively in Russia, is another.

Levi's end points

putting everything on the negotiating table with the sole goal of getting Iran to drop its nuclear program.

an all-or-nothing approach that demands resolution of every outstanding conflict (over terrorism and Israel, for example) before a nuclear deal can be reached; for all practical purposes, this means advocating regime change.

are thus unhelpful. Clearly the solution to the problem of Iran's nuclear program lies somewhere in the middle and depends strongly on the other factors I've listed.

The context that Levi is looking for must incorporate those factors. A simple agreement on priorities, as his post demonstrates, is nowhere near enough.

It is useful to consider what the extreme views may be in trying to develop a consensus. But limiting that consideration to only one factor implies a linear approach to consensus that, at best, will require a very long time, and, at worst, will never amount to anything useful.

It's not unknown in diplomacy for multiple actors to come together on less than perfect consensus to deal with a problem. That seems to be what is happening in the EU3 and the United States relative to Iran. We haven't yet found a consensus for a multiparty world; as noted above, it's much easier to deal with a two-party system. It's even possible that the solution to the Iran crisis will contribute to that consensus.

[Please excuse the poor line breaks and boldface where I intended italics; or maybe it will all post just the way I want it to and it's the previewer that doesn't work. You guys have to get a better editor.  ;-(  ]

If you ever come back, I'm curious about what you mean by:

Many, of course, have tried to find foundations and policies between these extremes – in the Iran case, usually recommending deals that cap Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for limited economic and security concessions on the part of the West.  I’m personally a fan of that position, but I’ll admit that there’s no indication that either Iran or the United States feels similarly.

What constitutes "limited economic and security concessions" to you?  I'm especially curious about "limited".

Asking Iran to give up its sovereign right to enrich uranium and to put its nuclear program at the mercy of international supplies that have  historically been more unreliable for Iran than they have been for any other country is asking for a very major concession.  That's a far bigger concession than other nations that have been found with full-blown secret weapons programs have been asked to make.

Assuming "limited" means much less than "substantial", would you be opposed to substantial economic and security concessions on the part of the west - and why?

Also if the alternative to limited concessions is presented as bombing, it seems there were no limited concessions at all and this was just an exercise in threats from the beginning.

So what big things would you suggest?  Just to calibrate the discussion, do you consider the things the EU3 put on the table in their offer in August 2005 to be big things?

In practice the fact that Iran is moving forward though slowly economicly despite near maximal hostility from the West makes me skeptical that there is such a thing as a big thing the West can give Iran that will not appear from a Western perspective to be giving up all of the West's bargaining chips.

For example, Europe could greatly improve the terms of trade between the EU and Iran, which would be mutually beneficial but would still leave US sanctions fully in place.  From the Western perspective that would be so much of an improvement that it would seem to be giving up all the West's bargaining chips.

Short of that, Europe can offer Iran spare airplane parts, - that Iran believes it is already guaranteed under international law but denied - offer a limited restatement of the NPT guarantees that Weapons states will not attack non-weapons states with nuclear weapons, - which is less that what weapons states have already committed to under the NPT - offer to accept Iran's arrangements to procure fuel from Russia - which already have the premium for facing the hostility of the West priced in and offer future discussions about further incentives, i.e. nothing committal.

Besides finessing the issue by calling small things big things there is a structural inconsistency between putting big things on the table and not giving up "all" our bargaining chips.

I'd love to be proven wrong by seeing a specific example of a big thing you believe Iran could be offered that would be short of giving up all our bargaining chips but I do not expect to be.