Neo-Conservative Culture and Our Foreign Policy

Reading Frank Fukuyama’s  thoughtful and provocative piece on neo-conservative foreign policy, I am struck by the important, and nearly invisible, role that culture plays in his analysis. It comes in two parts – the political culture of the neo-conservatives themselves; and their  cramped and dangerously simplistic view of other peoples’ culture. 

Fukuyama's essay in the Sunday New York Times  describes in detail the small group of neo-conservative policy intellectuals responsible for our disastrous policies in Iraq and in the greater Middle East. The values of this little group, their world view, their political preferences,  their gung-ho orientation toward action – in other words their collective culture – is laid out before the reader. Fukuyama’s piece is certainly not the first to dissect the ‘Vulcans’ (as they collectively called themselves); there is Halper and Clarke’s America Alone for example.  Still, Fukuyama accurately and with insight describes the group think of the ultimate Washington in-group.  

He describes a little community of foreign policy professionals who developed an in-bred ideology over many years that was effective enough to help them achieve power, and ironclad enough to filter out any knowledge or information that didn’t fit their pre-conceived notions of the way the world should work.  This is an elegant, negative example of how the professional culture of those responsible for foreign policy should not operate.  Remember Karl Deutsch’s admonition – “Power is the capacity not to have to learn” – at least in the short run. And as Ivo points out in his post, we need to learn from the mistakes of this administration in designing a new framework for foreign policy in the future.

One element of the neo-conservative’s own cramped culture was their near total unwillingness to take into account the culture of others. Their cultural arrogance appears again and again, including the administration’s decision to appoint L. Paul Bremer III as our head honcho in Bagdad,  an officer with absolutely no experience in Iraq who also spoke no Arabic. Their assumption that once invaded by foreigners all the Iraqis would simply lay down their arms and open their hearts to American troops was beyond naïve; it blithely assumed away nationalism, and hence was dangerous.  It assumed that the values we associate with ‘civilized’ and ‘mature’ cultures (read, ours) were nowhere to be found in Baghdad and beyond  – things like the human desire for autonomy and respect, the defense of the homeland, and protection of  indigenous religious and other values. They assumed  the forces of nationalism would be trumped by the desire for secularism, western democracy and American consumerism. The costly American tradition of misjudging local nationalism and misunderstanding cultural divisions, once on display in Southeast Asia in the 1960s, reveals itself again in 2006 as tragedy and farce.

Here at the start of the new millennium cultural competence is as important an instrument of statecraft as force structure, trade agreements and satellite deployments. More and more, Americans need to be able to think, act and move across borders -- physical and social -- which is the heart of cultural competence.  Diplomats and aid officials need cultural competence; but so do boots on the ground. And it is especially needed by those who are given the responsibility to design foreign and national security policies that put diplomats, aid officials and soldiers on the ground, in harm’s way.

The Vulcans demonstrated their cultural incompetence by failing to understand the limits imposed by their own view of the world, and failing to appreciate the cultural codes of others. American national interests will pay the price for many years to come.


Comments (53)

J. McCutchen "JmacSF"

San Francisco. CA

Simon Jenkins wrote a  very thought- provoking piece for the Sunday Times which I think fairly condemns the hypermoral exceptionalism of both NeoCon and first cousins the Muscular Wilsonians - the Indispensable Nationalists. 

Even America’s most robust champions plead that this is all grotesquely counter- productive. What is frightening is not the evil of much American foreign policy at present but its stupidity; the damage it does to its own objectives. What was terrifying about Soviet power in the cold war was not its mega-tonnage but the incompetence of those controlling it.

America and Britain claim the right to invade foreign countries in defiance of international law. This requires at the very least a defensible moral superiority. Americans take this supremacy as read. Moral high ground comes with apple pie and the flag. Yet this supremacy, already questioned by many Americans at home, is in chronic disrepair abroad. Young Europeans and Asians no longer remember the second world war and do not see the world Washington’s way. Their belief in America’ s wealth is secure. Their belief in its values and their relevance to foreign countries is evaporating, blown away by relentless American belligerence. Last year’s BBC poll of 21 countries gave a majority that declared George Bush “a threat to world peace”.

The result is to cripple America’s effectiveness as diplomat and power broker. Take Iran. The emergence of any new nuclear power is alarming. Yet it was tolerated in Israel, India, Pakistan and Korea. Partly because of its isolation, Iran now seems certain to develop a nuclear potential. To respond by increasing that isolation and thus the paranoia of Iran’s turbulent and unstable rulers is daft. The sensible realpolitik must be to give Iran no reason to turn potential into actual power, let alone to want to use it.

I doubt if there is a world leader who would nominate America as best qualified to handle Iran in its present sensitive state. The war-mongering of the neocon ascendancy — the calls for bombing and the constant listing of targets — seems to mirror the fundamentalist mullahs behind President Ahmadinejad. American policy in the Middle East is so counter- productive as to be the problem, not the solution.

 

 

J. McCutchen "JmacSF"

San Francisco. CA

We think that sovereignty means no one interferes in our affairs Ibrahim Jafaari, Prime Minister of Iraq

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Two points.  One of the interesting things about the neo-cons, at least the older members of the group, is their connection to Henry "Scoop" Jackson.  Most of the neo-cons were Democrats who were very anti-Communist, especially anti -Soviet Union, and very pro-Israel.  They broke with the Democratic Party as the McGovern wing took control and opposed both the Vietnam War and tended to be anti-Israel.


William Kristol indicated we were going to be in big trouble in Iraq even before the war began.  We was asked about the potential conflicts between the Shiite and Sunni Muslims after Saddem fell.  He totally dismissed this as a serious issue. He assured the audience and his questioner that Sunni and Shiite groups had gotten along.  He was so cavalier about this it was shocking.

Daniel A. Greenbaum

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Here at the start of the new millennium cultural competence is as important an instrument of statecraft as force structure, trade agreements and satellite deployments.

 

Good luck.

 

"Someone you'd like to have a beer with..." trumps cultural competence in our society.

 

Presidential candidate's never left the country? Ever?

 

No problem. 

 

Dissent Protects Democracy

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I think we also need to take into account the third role that culture plays in the neoconservative agenda--specifically, the way it depends upon reflexive support from moderate American voters for foreign policies that are perceived as strong and tough.

 

There is an element to American culture that takes pride in our role as a global superpower, views diplomatic solutions as weak and wishy-washy, and gravitates toward a foreign policy that takes decisive action against our enemies.  Time and again, conservative leaders have been able to paint liberal politicians as "soft on defense" for speaking out against questionable military actions or merely attempting to cut overpriced, unnecessary weapons systems.  The essential elements of neoconservative foreign policy are its twin assumptions that the American public will always side with those who advocate force rather than restraint, and that the rest of the world will only respect American power if with deal with them forcefully.

 

The challenge faced by those of us who wish to get these folks out of positions of power is to overcome these two powerful and persistent cultural assumptions in American politics.  The Iraq War, in and of itself, clearly demonstrates that neocon foreign policy is built upon false assumptions, and independent voters are now overwhelmingly coming to this conclusion.  But they are still deeply and profoundly suspicious of liberal internationalism, and all other foreign policy viewpoints that can be painted as "soft" or "nuanced".

 

Democrats need, without question, to build a consensus foreign policy platform that addresses the fears of average Americans while also working to shift our culture toward a more mature understanding of military power and its uses.  There is nothing "soft" about avoiding a costly and unnecessary war, nothing "weak" about restoring sanity to the defense budget, and nothing "strong" or admirable about people who shoot first and ask questions later, if at all.  At the same time, however, no winning political strategy can be based around downplaying or dismissing voters' fears, or simply trying to change the subject to domestic issues and praying the Republicans don't play the fear card again.

 

Until we can agree upon an alternative foreign policy vision, and sell it to the public, the neocons will continue to run the show. 

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One way to approach the issue is to separate the means and the ends. It would be totally possible to advocate and support global liberalism and democracy without suggesting that the use of the military or American largely going it alone are the necessary requirements of those ends. I would even go so far as to suggest the means were more dictated by Cheney's Hobbesianism than the neo-con's ideology.

World with a more useful U.N. and a series of other international institutions that eschews isolating countries but tries to engage them and bring them into the international system will take both American leadership, hard work and a fair amount of courage. It just won't work overnight.

Daniel A. Greenbaum

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At the same time, however, no winning political strategy can be based around downplaying or dismissing voters' fears, or simply trying to change the subject to domestic issues and praying the Republicans don't play the fear card again.

 

Amen. Iraq and security are the number one issue [sic]. (heh.)

 

But Democrats can also fight their perceived "softness" by, you know, actually taking a stand on big issues, and opposing and differentiating themselves from GOPs.

 

Less flag-burning bills. Less stay-the-course.

 

Less Lieberman. More Murtha.  

 

 

Dissent Protects Democracy

It has always been a mystery to me how neocons are able to compartmentalize their thinking about cause and effect.  Facts, such as the consequences of their mistakes, simply do not get in the way of their certainty about dogma.  Are they all "end times" folks? Have they actually visited Utopia?  It is an amazing capacity.                         South by Southwest

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An excellent article, I agree, and thank you for the link. But you left out the good bit about "America's collapse".

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Neoconservatives not only have little understanding of others' cultures, they have almost no understanding of the American culture - and they have even less faith and understanding of our democracy and how it works.  The contempt and dislike of democracy by the neocons is most blatant by the absence  of any reference to Americanism in their writings or inspiration of American exceptionalism.  While they seem to engage in endless tweakings of Leninism or Trotskyism and the application of Machiavellian machinations on modern societies, they seem incapable of inward examination of the American character or even what it means to be an American.

 

I was struck by this in reading their position paper on the New American Century.  It discusses all sorts of strategies to get power, retain power and exercise power, but there is no reasoning or explanation as to why we need to do this.  Power to the neocons, is an end to itself. To Americans, power is a tool and a means to a greater good or benefit to the people.  Neocons would never stoop so low as to read and apply lessons learned in American history, which is why they seem not to understand the most basic premise in forming policy, and which General Grant summed up succintly, "strategy must be the servant of policy, policy cannot serve strategy."  And that is exactly what's wrong with the Neocons' philosophy - they have no guiding policy grounded in Americanism.  If Liberals are to succeed in forming a foreign policy it must be guided by the principles and beliefs set forth in the Declaration of Independence and the American constitution.  Our policy must be one that says to the world that we believe that all people are created equal and all people are entitled to certain rights, that we cannot and will not meddle in other peoples' domestic arrangements without provocation and that if we are provoked we will severely rearrange their domestic affairs and that we will not and cannot any longer support, prop up or help hateful regimes that are ultimately harmful to their people and the world's people.  If the enemy of my enemy is a despot or a tyrant then we have two enemies of the people  - he cannot be our friend.  We will be allies of those who hold our principles and we will be wary of those who don't. 

 

No more manipulations, no more machinations, no more contrivances and strategems, but an honest, fair and open faith in what we hold sacred and believe to be true for ourselves.

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An ideologue has a subjective interpretation of observed phenomena.  In other words, the idea he holds is blind and deaf to outside phenomena.  I lived in an Arab country in the mid 70's and during the build up to the Iraq war, I was continually amazed at how completely uninformed its champions seemed to be on Arab history, culture, religion and economics.  My lord, at least they could have read Lawrence or, perhaps easier than that,  seen "Lawrence of Arabia."  But, that's an ideologue - don't confuse me with the facts.

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Neither the Declaration of Independence nor the Constitution say anything about our role around the world.  If not for the French getting involved in our war with Britain needless to say we would never have won our war of independence.

Since we need to buy oil  What should we have done about the Shah of Iran and now with the governemtns of Saudi Arabia and Egypt? 

 The problem with the neo-cons is not that they do not have a philosophy grounded in Americanism.  The Piigrims brought with them the idea of exceptionalism and by the Jefferson Adminstration we were at war with the Barbary Pirates.  We were junior partners to the British Navy almost from the start.

What the neo-cons lack is American optimism.  They see a Munich at every turn and believe that Americas leaders have been Neville Chamberlain.  It is not their philosophy or ideals that are unAmerican it is they see military solutions as  the only solutions to every problem.


Daniel A. Greenbaum

I've wondered how much the attempted appeasement of Hitler by Chamberlain has driven our foreign policy since.  Maybe we learned the lesson too well and have become myopic.  The newest test for us is Hamas.  Do we give them a chance or act aggressively before we've even seen what they might do?  But I've introduced a tangent; sorry.

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Jenkins: What was terrifying about Soviet power in the cold war was not its mega-tonnage but the incompetence of those controlling it.

Actually, my impression was that Soviets at the start of Cold War were rather competent Stalin could commit serious blunders, but as a rule, these were not blunders of an idiot.   It is actually instructive how what Soviets were doing when they were incorporating a country into their zone of influence which is really necessary, and which our neo-con crew blithely neglected.

As the years went by, Soviet bureacracies were increasingly inward looking and inefficient, and of course their economic model stank and they had much fewer resources that we do.    But even the misbegotten Afghan adventure was infinitely more competently run that our Iraqi war.  Just look at these parameters:

how much Soviets could spend on Afghanistan and how much we can spend in Iraq

how much regular assistance Afghan insurgents got from abroad, in money and weapons (a lot of money, state of the art weapons) and how much Iraqi insurgents are getting (some scraps at best)

to what extends Soviets could rely on "their Afghans", and to what extend we rely on "our Iraqis" (hard to say who "our Iraqis" are?  well, this is a major part of the strategic problem there). 

I agree that "cultural competence" is a necessary element to effective foreign policy.  Should we try and instill this competence throughout the general populace, or is it only necessary at the higher levels, e.g., diplomats, executive branch people, and high ranking military officers?  How can the need for cultural competence be effectively communicated to our citizens  as something of value and not as liberals suggesting that terrorists need therapy?

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Well first of all, I didn't claim that the Declaration or the Constitution "say anything about our role around the world."  I said we should be guided by the principles cited in both documents in our foreign policy.  If we believe that these are truths, then we should have no problem extending those truths universally. 

 

The neocons do not understand Americanism, American exceptionalism or the American character.  They look for philosophy every place BUT America.  They truly believe in a ruling elite (primarily themselves) that should govern foreign and domestic affairs.  Their writings drip with contempt for democracy and the democratic process.  Read any work by Gertrude Himmelfarb or Irving Kristol and what leaps out at you is the misunderstanding and general disaffection for self determination. 

 

As to your comments about the French getting involved in our war or the Jefferson administration's war with the Barbary Pirates, neither in any way refutes my argument that neoconservatism lacks a principled policy.  In fact, it underlines their inability to articulate a purpose for power and not just the accumulation of it.  Now, it seems to me that a military solution is in and of itself "un-American" in that we are a nation grounded in the rule of law based on a mutually satisfying contract between those governed and those governing.  This is why a war of aggression and pre-emption is anathema to everything we profess to believe as a people.  In fact, it is so "un-American" that there is no mechanism in the constitution that allows for unilateral aggression by one branch of our government.  Constitutionally the executive branch must seek the consent of the people to wage war, the consent of which acts as a balancing bar to blatant power grabs by one branch over the others. 

 

Above all, neocons prize their own personal safety, which is why they're so willing to give up rights in order to maintain the illusion of safety  This is without a doubt a misunderstanding of Americanism.  Historically, Americans have understood that with maximum freedom comes maximum danger and sometimes a very heavy price.  That was understood by the founders of this country who were willing to risk their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honour to attain freedom.  It seems that the neocons are willing to risk one of the three but I can guarantee you it isn't their lives or their fortunes and as to their honour, well, I don't see that in any abundance.

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While not inaccurate, the term "cultural competence" is far too polite a famework for analyzing the actions and core beliefs of neoconservatism.

 


NEOCONSERVATISM IS BIGOTRY AND RACISM -- there is simply no politically correct way to say it.

 


If you honestly think that you can support Saddam Hussein for years as he slaughters anyone he pleases within his borders and uses chemical weapons on the battelfield, trade arms for hostages to Iran, wage war against Saddam when he invades Kuwait, then invade and occupy Iraq while killing and maiming tens of thousands of innocent civilians in the process, and at the end of it all expect Iraqis to react with gratitude and obedience toward you, you are not merely "culturally incompetent."

 


At a most basic level, you have assumed that Arabs and Muslims are profoundly stupid human beings.

 

They are not stupid. They know exactly what has been going on for the past few decades, they know that Western governments are as responsible for their misery as was Saddam Hussein, and they're still pissed-off about it.

 


Arabs and Muslims don't stand around saying, "oh, gee, you blew-up my neighborhood, maimed my wife and killed a couple of my kids when you cleared-out Fallujah? Well, that's okay because now I have such a wider selection of newspapers to read than when Saddam was in power..."

 


Anyone who believes --as the neocons do-- that such actions constitute "idealism" or will bring people closer to "Democracy" must first assume that the targets of such actions are basically idiots.

 


NEOCONSERVATISM OBJECTIFIES HUMAN BEINGS -- Fukuyama's choice of clinical words like "project" to describe the carpet-bombing, napalming, invasion and occupation of Iraq is revealing.

 


Like so much of neoconservative "theory" it is part of the objectification of human life that the perpetrators need in order to go forward with what they know will be the inflicting of mass-killing and mass-suffering upon innocent human beings.

 

For starters, the neocons knowlingly sent US troops into combat in insufficient numbers and with insufficient equipment. Since the invasion, neocons have made extensive efforts to downplay and conceal the loss of human life and human suffering --refusing to conduct body counts, censoring photos of Iraqi civilian deaths, prohibiting the media from recording soldiers' caskets, etc.

 


NEOCONSERVATISM IS MORAL RELATIVISM -- although their marketing strategy has always been to present themselves as a reaction against relativism, neoconservatives ascribe to and practice nothing more than age-old relativism dressed-up in modern day PR, spin and sophistry.

 


They'll claim to oppose "social engineering" as exemplified by busing and affirmative action, while simultaneously championing the "social engineering" that produced Israel. They'll claim that invading Iraq is about "liberating Iraqis" and see no contradiction when occupying troops fight and kill the same Shiites in Najaf they allegedly fought Saddam's troops to liberate... in practice, neocons pick and choose their facts & language to justify whatever is their preferred course action in a given situation, even when it completely contradicts their professed beliefs.

 


The important question for all Americans now is how to hold these neocon snake-oil salesmen accountable for their misdeeds.  Unless and until we are prepared to honestly criticise neoconservatism for what it truly is, we will invite future power-hungry extremists to repeat their actions under a different name.

The arrogant sycophancy -- and here, that's not an oxymoron -- displayed by careerist opportunists like Daalder and Wilson working overtime to catch the latest Fukuyama wave is marvelous to behold.

 

Neoconservatives didn't get us into the Iraq War; Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice, Libby, Hadley, and Matulin did.  The idea that this cabal is neoconservative is ludicrous.  Neoconservatives didn't even provide the rationale; Bush didn't need one.  Back in 1999 he himself told us he wanted to be a war time President, and the WHIG without a neocon in sight made it happen.

 

And the idea that we're losing in Iraq, because we're attempting to impose a political system foreign to Iraqi culture or because our attempt is insufficiently culturally sensitive is ivory-tower anthro-socio-pablum.  Sunni insurgents are killing Americans because it's in their interest so to do.  Americans took power from them, and unless they want to commit societal suicide, they know they'd better recapture that power.

 

There isn't a dime's worth of practical difference between Kristol and Perle and Fukuyama, Daalder, and Wilson.  Each of them will, in his own rhetorical style, "nuance" us into war after war. 

 

 

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I am sorry if I misunderstood you. 

 I think you are mistaken about the neo-cons not having an underlying philosophy.  Wolfowitz wanted the war in Iraq to bring liberty to the Middle East.  He and his fellow neo-cons had too arching a philosophy and not enough interest in the realities on the ground.  This is what got us into Vietnam as well. However, you are definitely right about everything else.  Gertie and her husband definitely are not too concerned about personal liberties.  They perfer the comfort of order over the messiness of liberty. 

 

One of the things that I find scariest about our time is how many people are willing to sacrifice our liberties in order to protect the safety.  However, it does not follow that advocating freedom around the world should not be the liberal and Democratic policy.  It just need not be done by military action as the first chiolce.  1030s England and Germany is not always the correct model of world events. 


Daniel A. Greenbaum

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Ellen

I think except for their agreed upon activism it is a bit harsh to associate the neo-con and liberal internationalists.

Sunni's do kill Americans in Iraq but they are mainly killing Iraqis especially Shiaa.  Do you reject the idea, that has partially driven American foreign policy since the end of WWII, that peoples are good but leaders may be evil?  Thus decapitate the leader and democracy or liberal society will follow? 

One of the problems with the "Munich" paranoid model of foreign policy is that what follows from it is the crushing of Germany and Japan, as we did, not just the removal of Hitler and Tojo.

 I recognize that you might want to say who cares about Iraq we had no business going to war there under any circumstances.  My question is not about the wisdom of the war but the underlying view of how we proceed.  The contrast is my friend, who has his Ph.D in military history who believe Iraqis don't feel beaten and we should change that rather than win them over.


Daniel A. Greenbaum

Your friend sounds like Spengler:  "More Killing Please"

 

Fifty years of our foreign policy might better be described as the natural result of a bunch of people (careerists and extroverts all?) having too much time on their hands and using that time to "solve" problems which would, left alone, have solved themselves.

 

As Calvin Coolidge said, “If you see ten troubles coming down the road, you can be sure that nine will run into the ditch before they reach you.”  And “Never go out to meet trouble.  If you just sit still, nine cases out of ten, someone will intercept it before it reaches you."

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While I have gotten into big arguments with my friend is argument is that is how you win wars.  If you don't want to win them don't start them.

Daniel A. Greenbaum

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Ellen,

there is a difference between liberal imperialists and conservative/neocon imperialists.  Both agree that we should preserve the exceptional position of USA, in particular, the ability of disregarding the international law utterly and getting away with it.

However, from what I read, liberals, even imperialists, tend to worry more about practical aspects of the policies.  Can it go wrong?  As it happens. reckless plans allow to predict plemty of things that can go wrong.   So liberals were, as a rule, much less reckless when it was their hand at the rudder.

The issue of "cultural competence" is very crucial.  Liberal hawks tended to see limits of their cultural competence.  Neo-cons thought that they would be able to control Iraq "as we did it in El Salvador" (I am pretty much paraphrasing their apologists).

Where I agree with Ellen is that the intelectual position of liberal hawks placed them on a slippery slope and it rendered them incapable to resist neo-con onslaught (partly, because of lack of will, partly because of lameness of their arguments).

By the way, are Cheney and Rumsfeld neo-cons?  To me, they are the true neo-cons, Wolfowitzes and Perles are hangers-on who made carriers saying and writing what serious chieftains from the military/industrial complex wanted to hear.   Rumsfeld selected Wolfowitz and not vice-versa.

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"Wolfowitz wanted the war in Iraq to bring liberty to the Middle East."

 No, the neo-cons wanted to set up a bunch of puppet states in the Middle East, with more control than the US usually exercises.  As did Bush, Cheney, etc.   None of them wanted democracy, and all of them worked against it, accepting it only when democracy was forced upon them.

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As Calvin Coolidge said, “If you see ten troubles coming down the road, you can be sure that nine will run into the ditch before they reach you.”  And “Never go out to meet trouble.  If you just sit still, nine cases out of ten, someone will intercept it before it reaches you."

Wow, c'est si bon! Danke! I didn't know these!

 

I do realize that my continual use of Washington's Farewell Address to attack most I.R. folks and their discipline had grown tiresome.  What fabulous substitutes, and ones that will also seem to be more understandable to the youthful idealist mind of 21st century type, yano, those lacking whazzit called, the wisdom of age, something like that.

 

You'll no doubt be seeing them in my next interchange with Professor Blackton on questions of supposedly benign infernal meddlin'. (Hope he's coming back here soon.) Hope you don't mind if I don't credit you. Thanking you in advance, ma'am. :-)

 

P.S. Wonder how Cal would react towards professional team sports as it is these days....as well as the whole delusionary/illusionary "masters of the universe" thing.

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Not really-try this link for one example.

 

Making up simplistic propagandistic one-line stories about why they as a group wanted to do it, picking out the name Wolfowitiz and then responding with the generalization "the neo-cons," when all of the individual motivations of pro-war people were different, that doesn't help anyone understand or avoid similar happening in the future.

 

Why do you feel the need to do that? You're not going to convince any of the liberal hawk contributors here with that, they know the truth, and the majority of the membership here is anti-war with much more sophisticated objections.

 

Just trying out possible bumper sticker slogans, or what?

Interesting New Yorker mini-profile.  On the assumption that Wolfowitz is an example/exemplar/avatar of neocons, generally, permit me a bit of psychobabble.

 

              Adolf Hitler, Saddam Husein and Paul Wolfowitz

 

Wolfowitz, a son of a taciturn (or perhaps, self-censoring) Holocaust survivor, says that as a boy, he read Holocaust and Hiroshima literature -- "probably too many."  Is that likely?  Were not the 1950s -- Wolfowitz was 7-16 in that decade -- a time of Holocaust suppression -- not denial but rather a sort of collective post-traumatic stress response in which it seemed right to "forget" the horror at least for some period of time.  Did not Holocaust literature get going only with the Eichmann trial?  That is, after Wolfowitz's boyhood?

 

Rather, the 1950s were a time of subterranean suspicion of the honor and character and bravery of the Jews who died in the Shoah; indeed, a sometimes voiced claim that the Jews themselves were pacifists (read cowards in some locales) who conspired in their own demise.  How does such a calumny affect the psychology of a growing Jewish boy who, given his father's survival and his unwillingness to talk about his experiences, must suspect the possibility of the charge.  And thus, the grown boy's reference to Holocaust literature rather than reference to his own youthful judgmental disloyal thoughts about his father.

 

Never again.  Never again stand passively silent as a monster begins to "move its slow thighs."  Because?  Because "History" will deem you a coward and because your son will be ashamed of you.  As Paul Wolfowitz was of his father?   

 

 

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Sorry Barry but you are just mistaken.  The neo-cons wanted to bring democracy to the Middle East.  The mistakenly thought that knocking over a easy target would lead to a domino effect.  Wolfowitz brought this idea to Clinton and to the Israelis both of whom rejected it.  Daniel A. Greenbaum

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Artappraiser

Thanks for the link.


Daniel A. Greenbaum

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Ellen

You might want to dip into the Kagans' Why America Sleeps.  You probably want to throw it against th wall but Donald and Frederick Kagan give a pretty thorough review of the neo-cons view of the England's mistakes after WWI and America's equivalent mistakes after the end of the Cold War.


Daniel A. Greenbaum

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With all due respect to your sincerity, Daniel, the neocons did not want to bring "democracy" to the Middle East. Democracy was merely their cover-story (it's "Project for a New American Century," not "Democratic Century").

 


If somebody comes to you and proposes helping to cure your chronic arthritis with bloodletting and surgically amputating your feet, they not really looking out for your health.

 


There is absolutely no logical connecetion between the proposed action (mass-bombing, invading & occupying Iraq) and "democracy."  The latter does not and cannot follow from the former --as all honest analysts & observers stated before the invasion, and as we now see in Iraq.

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With all due respect, Munguza, if people on the left continue to look for cynical conspiratorial motives like you and then try to fit a bunch of individuals into that narrative, dismissing all complexities involved, insteading of actually studying the complex beliefs and motives involved,

 

then you may be at risk for the next bleeding heart begging Kanan Makiya type that comes along under a Democratic president, begging you to help his people and telling you that his people will welcome you with flowers and candies.

 

Cynicism is no good unless you combine it with actual scholarship and truly understanding the situation. It's not Daniel that's naive here, mho. The greatest failing of the neo-cons is perhaps starting with liberal dreams derived from Trotskyism and combining that with isolating themselves into echo chambers where they repeated narratives to each other and reinforced each other's assumptions. Beware you don't fall prey to the same thing.

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If we believe that these are truths, then we should have no problem extending those truths universally.

Well, no. Because "extending those truths universally" means, in practice, ramming them down people's throats at the point of a gun. For the sake of argument, let's grant that we are talking about "truths." Nothing follows about how we should get other people to recognize them as such. Nothing. See?

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yes! much more well said than my at length comments on same! There's people in those countries, countries are not an ideological chess board with their leaders as playing pieces. Except for when someone tries the option of genocide, even without the help of democracy, history has shown that "the people" will manage to change things in ways you can't hope to expect. If you study and observe those people, you have at least a better chance in any goals you might have than a crap shoot.

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If in 1939 you wanted to bring democracy to Europe you would have stood up to Hilter and if necessary gone to war with Germany then. That is the model, Munich, that drives the neo-cons. If you read the Kagans' book you will see the the neo-cons do not separate an American century and democracy. They are not as cynical as Bush and Cheney just as parnoid.

Andrew J. Bacevich in "The New American Militarism" he very much opposes the war in Iraq and the increase in the size of the U.S. military, argues that the mass bombing "shock and awe" was not a product of the neo-cons but the Pentagon "gurus" who wanted to use American technology to make war safe in a nuclear era.

Daniel A. Greenbaum

I've never quite understood this loyalty to the Munich meme.

 

Suppose Britain and France and said, "Go ahead Czechs and Slovaks.  Don't let that tin-pot dictator tell you what's what."  Why does everyone (do they?) assume that Hitler would have been dissuaded from his purpose?  He'd just come off successes in the Rhineland and with the Anschluss.  Poland and Hungary might have joined him to pick up parts of Slovakia.  And Britain and France were unprepared for war and couldn't have done much more to help Czechoslovakia than they did to help Poland later.

 

So, what's all this about Munich? 

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It is very much assumed that Hilter kept pushing, and being surprised that no one stopped him. Britain with the aid of France was in a position, before Germany rearmed, to stop him. Poland and Hungary were more afraid of Germany and France was terrified as well but only England had the forces to oppose Germany. Chamberlain allowed Hilter to take the Sudetenland unopposed.

By the time German moved into Poland England had no allies available and Germany had rearmed.

The Munich idea is if you stop a tyrant early you can forstall a greater catastrophe. To get the neo-con's views of the parallel between post WWI England and post Cold War America you might want to look at Donald and Frederick Kagan "Why America Sleeps." It has a number of flaws and errors of judgement but you get the neo-cons fully laid out.

Daniel A. Greenbaum

That's why the "Munich idea" has always puzzled me.  It appears to be based upon a misreading of history combined with wishful thinking -- thinking usually employed to rationalize our elites' desire for a "strong" if not preemptive foreign policy -- the elites' desire to become players on the stage of History.

 

1.  In 1938 Germany was militarily more superior to England and France than it was 18 months later.  Hitler wasn't wrong when he said Chamberlain had outfoxed him at Bertechsgaden.

 

2.  Poland and Hungary were quite happy to accept parts of Slovakia in 1938 post-Munich.

 

3.  Hitler didn't keep pushing.  Hitler was faced with the necessity of defending Germany which meant controlling Bohemia -- the cockpit of Europe per Bismark -- and eliminating Poland, always a weak and duplicitous aristocratic semi-dictatorship and Russia's favored route to empire.  Britain and France threatening him wasn't likely to stop him from doing his duty to the Fatherland as the "Madman" understood it.  

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I'm not sure who all the people on the so-called "left" are you're referring to. Brent Scowcroft? Gen. Anthony Zinni? Richard Clarke? Gen. Merill McPeak? Col. Lawrence Wilkerson? Gen. Wesley Clark? Gary Berntsen? Eric MassaRobert Baer? Pat Buchanan? Paul O'Neill? Zbigniew Brzezinski? James Webb?

 

Because these are the people I'm citing when I challenge this gobbledeygook that the neocons were sincere "idealists" interested in nothing more than "liberating" Iraqis and "democratizing" the Middle East.

 


Anyone can exploit the language of liberation to advance their agenda --either for external marketing purposes or to overcome their own cognitive dissonance toward what they actually advocate (see "Communist China invades Tibet" for nifty details).

 


There is simply no way any honest person could possibly believe the USA could unilaterally invade & occupy Iraq on false pretenses of WMDs, slaughter tens of thousands of innocent Iraqis in the process, and get "democracy" as the result (let alone candy and flowers).

 


This was not Germany in 1939, it was Iraq in 2003. Neocons don't oppose the military aggression of past dictatorships -- they just think the wrong people were in charge.

 


As for scholarship, you appear to be the one coming up short here. I'd suggest you bone-up by reviewing the public statements of the "lefties" I linked to above, as well as this rather notorious "liberal" whose admonitions apparantly have vanished down the neocon memory hole...

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Iraq in 2003 was Iraq in 2003, not Munich in 1939.

 

Saddam was a hobbled, aging despot boxed-in by post-Gulf War no-fly zones and sanctions, popping viagras and getting ripped-off by his own subordinates. He had been supported militarily by the West for years before the Gulf war, even after he'd used chemical weapons on the battlefield against Iran and after one of his jets killed 37 US sailors on the USS Stark.

 

Iraq's decrepit third-world military couldn't even get a single plane off the ground during the March '03 invasion... And besides, we were supposedly in hot pursuit of the religious terrorists who attacked us on 9/11, not one of whom was a secular Baathist from Iraq.

 

When you bomb cities and shoot them up with artillary, cluster bombs and depleted uranium shells, innocent people die, are wounded, orphaned and displaced in large numbers. In a legitimate war against an enemy who has attacked or is about to attack you, this may be a necessary evil in order to stop them.

 

Such was not the case in Iraq, who hadn't attacked us, wasn't about to attack us and had no ability to attack us. Thus, the people who were involuntarily "liberated" by being blown-up, dismembered, orphaned, made homeless, etc. reacted with bitterness, rage, and vengeance --not gratitude.

 

It was pointy-headed neocon elites with zero combat experience who advocated the view we could beat and terrorize Iraqis into submission unilaterally with military firepower --even though our most respected military and foreign policy experts warned them this would be a formula for failure. 

 

Nevertheless, they approved this method for invading and occupying Iraq, knowing full well the risks and costs. Was there anything more absurd than watching US troops in Najaf killing "liberated" Iraqi militiamen loyal to Moqtada al Sadr --whose own dissident father was murdered by Saddam?

 

Le plus que change...

My recollection is that the Vulcans did a massive switch and bait of historic proportions. "We're going in to find WMD and stop a threat to US national security.  Oops, no WMD? No real threat from terrorists there? Nevermind.... we really went in to promote 'democracy'.

The democracy thing was a cheap fall back ex post facto justification.

It is certainly the case that the motives were always consistent - but complex.  To say they just went in to grab the oil is naive. To say they went in just for democracy is even more naive. To claim US hegemony as the motive is closer. And some really did think it was WMD. Some wanted the Big Pay Back to SH bec they failed to whack him in Desert Storm.

In other words, as several have said, the individual motives can't be reduced to a single bumper sticker -- BUT they certainly did all point in the same direction - go in and get Saddam.  That's their arrogance - and their cultural incompetence -- talking. Those who were more culturally competent and realistic and who understood the risks were deliberately marginalized from having any policy impact.

Policy makers start with their experiences and their ideologies and their interests. Cultural competence at the margin can make a difference.  The hope of enlightenment optimists (and social engineers?) is that if you really do educate people properly, if you expose them to knowledge about other peoples, others cultures, and give them the tools they need, THEN they are smart enough to make their informed choices. Under those circumstances of greater knowledge and skills (brought by CC) policy has a better chance of being more open to the world, more 'progressive' and dare I say it, also more 'realistic'.

CC is a requirement for the new realism. 

 

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Hitler did keep pushing. He did not have to defend Germany as virtually all of their neighbors were afraid of them. It is not clear that in 1938 that Germany was militarily suprerior to England and France combined. Their threatening Hilter might not have done anything but their opposing his annexing the Sudentenland might have.

Hungary and Slovakia did not really exist as countries prior to the end of WWI so it is hard to know exactly what the border should have been. This was part of the problem with Central Europe. The empires were shattered, and Germany has no natural border to its east.

The real misreading of history is forgetting how much France and Germany did not want to go to war again after WWI. They both had publics that did not want to go to war again.

Daniel A. Greenbaum

You may be of the opinion that Hitler "did not have to defend Germany."  But he wasn't, and his predecessors -- Bismark, Caprivi, Bulow, Bethmann-Hollweg -- would have agreed with him.

And the reason not mentioned?  That George Bush understood that a President who serves during a time of war has maximized his political power (and Karl Rove agreed).

 

It is common for IR types to believe, selfinterestedly, that theories direct policy whereas it is the case that theories -- and the careers of those who espouse them -- live and die insofar as they provide rationalizations for policies undertaken for non-theoretical reasons.

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Prior to Bismark there was no Germany.  What was Hilter defending Germany from?  He and his immediate predecssors were trying to undo the Verseilles Treaty.  England and to a lessor extent France were willing to ignore the treaty as long as Hilter was only taking "german" lands. 

Here is my basic understanding of "appeasement" of Germany.

 

"

Appeasement and Chamberlain

Appeasement was the policy of giving in to some of the demands of dictators like Hitler and Mussolini in the hope that they would be satisfied and not ask for more. This policy has been most closely identified with British and French foreign policy in the 1930s. The leading figure in Britain was Neville Chamberlain.

British politicians traditionally held the view that Eastern Europe fell under Germany's sphere of influence; Chamberlain wanted to turn Germany eastwards to act as a bulwark against Communist Russia.

After 1919 the British policy towards Germany was to recognise that there were a number of German speaking peoples outside Germany who would one day want to be part of the Reich. Appeasement aimed to achieve German reunification peacefully. Britain would and could not effectively defend the new countries of Eastern Europe e.g. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and therefore encouraged these states to make concessions to Germany in a peaceful way.

Chamberlain's mistake was the failure to recognise that Britain was declining in power and prestige and he also failed to recognise that Fascism and Nazism were unappeasable.

Appeasement was a very popular part of British foreign policy. No one wanted a repeat of the First World War. Chamberlain had total faith in the policy of appeasement and believed that eventually Hitler could be controlled. His hopes deceived him as he admitted with the outbreak of hostilities:

‘Everything that I have worked for, everything that I have hoped for, everything I have believed in during my public life, has crashed into ruins.’"

[www.redruth.cornwall.sch.uk/departments/history/gcse/peacetowar/peacetowar1919-1939.htm]

This site has more on France, the taking of the Sudentland by Germany and Germany's invasion of Czechoslovakia and then of Poland.

 The real problem with the Munich analysis is seeing a "Munich" in every foreign policy situation.  Hilter was a mass murderer leading an industrialized country.  A country fuelled by depression, resentment and ideology.  The neo-cons' view of Munich fuelled their paranoid foreign policy analysis and closed off other choices.  It was also a problem with the analysis prior to Vietnam.

Daniel A. Greenbaum

IMO what you're engaged in is repeating the "Munich idea" -- which you acurately set forth -- without, upon due review of the history, deciding for yourself whether the "idea" has substance or indeed, has ever been anything but "helpful propaganda" favoring the muscular IR crowd.

 

You yourself often talk about national interests including interests in trade (freedom of the seas, for instance).  If you were Chancellor of Germany in the 1930s, what would you have made of the potential threats to your economy stemming from the British Empire?  Would you not decide your best course of action was to dominate middle Europe in order to, if necessary, establish an economic autarchy?

 

How confident would you be that the Soviet Union and France (post-Ruhr occupation) presented no military threat?  A Germany without allies -- the case in the 1930s* and not in the 1950-1970s -- must control central Europe to be and, just as importantly, to feel safe.

 

*  Please don't throw Mussolini up.  His value as an ally had already been proved in Ethiopia not to mention the fact of his not altogether straightforward foreign policy.    

 

 

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The neocons were longtime advocates of gaining control of Iraq to use it as a platform to increase US power & presence in the region. While ordinary Iraqis might experience a secondary democracy benefit as a result of US invasion & occupation, this was never the neocons' primary goal.

 

Protecting America from any type of security threat analagous to pre-WWII Germany was not even remotely a factor --it was a cover story, replete with fake WMD "evdence."  Wolfowitz has since admitted as much, as have other administration insiders like Paul O'Neill, Richard Clarke and Larry Wilkerson.

 

The underlying assumptions of such a course of action are far more grotesque than people like to admit --more dehumanizing and morally relativisitc than mere "cultural competence." Sure, on one level, neocons looked at Iraq as place unlikely to hold together in the long-run and thought "hey, the world will be a better place if we take charge of what happens there before someone else does."

 

On the other hand, as ivory-tower elites and academics, they regarded the lives of Arabs and Muslisms as mere objects, strategic obstacles like pieces on a neocon Risk game board. They had no concept of (or interest in, frankly) how Arabs and Muslims would respond to being carpet-bombed, dismembered, orphaned, naplmed, invaded and occupied by the same powers who had supported their tormentor Saddam during some of his worst killing sprees (not to mention the likes of Mubarak, Sharon, and the Saudi dictatorship). "Democracy" cannot result from such actions anymore than curing pneumonia can result from bloodletting.

 

The analogy for the neocons in Iraq is Vietnam, not Germany. They have officially revived the Vietnam syndrome -- "destroying Iraq in order to save it." 

 

I give you Robert Mcnamera's 11 Lessons from Vietnam

.  .  . as ivory-tower elites and academics, they regarded the lives of [objects] as mere objects .  .  .  .

 

An unappealing occupational trait of elitists everywhere no matter what their profession and in this case as evident among realists, Wilsonians, and humanitarians as it is among neoconservatives.  When you deny "agency" to "subjects" -- and elitists who always know better usually do -- those "subjects" quickly become (by definiton?) "objects."

The MCNamara link was remarkable, and right on time. The 11 points shd be required reading for anyone who thinks they want to give advice on the way the world works...The sad part is it took thousands of deaths to learn those lessons..and here we go again...Now the modern-day MCN's are coming out with their own mea culpas & lessons painfully learned,..again at the cost of thousands of lives, American and others, and billions of dollars best spent on other purposes.

A cultural competence curriculum shd maybe start with Mac's 11.

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Maybe a CC curriculum should begin at home. Understanding where "they" are coming from should imply an adequate sense of whence "we" came --some basic knowledge of our own cultural history; how about Mark Twain, Henry James and James Baldwin on American innocents abroad; Reinhold Niebuhr's (indispensable) Irony of American History; more recently, Andrew Bacevich's thoughtful study of the growth of an American culture of militarism (which E. Wilson's cohort of global internationalists might welcome as a bridge to their island from that of the national security traditionalists) would also make the reading list.

For extra credit, students may audit my course, Born Again in the USA: American Penitents from George Wallace and Robert McNamara to Jimmy Swaggart and Randy Cunningham            

I don't know Andrew Bacevich's book, but will go out and get it.

I would like to enroll in Mr. Good's class on the chastened and the sorry....regretfully, a long and rich reading list awaits...Those mea culpas are a peculiarly American style of cultural in/competence... kind of a "Gee, I guess I wasn't as competent as I thot I was, who cd imagine.....

J. McCutchen "JmacSF"

San Francisco. CA

The New Ivory Towers: Think Tanks, Strategic Studies and “Counterrealism”

 Leila Hudson 

.

"That’s not the way the world really works anymore…. We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality — judiciously, as you will — we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do."
Anonymous Bush administration official1

"I said, why don’t we get together and call ourselves an institute?"
Paul Simon, “Graceland”

In his 2001 attack on Middle Eastern studies in the United States, Martin Kramer provided a provocative if superficial institutional history of academic area studies.2 He wrote Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America as a scholar in residence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), one of several ideologically narrow think tanks that have colonized the intellectual terrain first opened up by interdisciplinar y area studies, providing policy recommendations, media performances and even intelligence channels for U.S. interventions in the Middle East. Kramer’s accusation of an academic “culture of irrelevance” is ironic considering that the think tanks systematically foster what might be called a “culture of counterrealism,” with arguably disastrous results on the ground. For all their bellicose claims to the contrary, privately funded think tanks have - à la Ibn Khaldun – occupied the ivory towers of area studies and adopted an even more otherworldly culture than they accuse their academic colleagues of indulging in.3 From the RAND Corporation to the American Enterprise Institute’s Project for the New American Century, these institutions have substituted strategy for discipline, ideological litmus tests for peer review, tactics and technology for cultures and history, policy for research and pedagogy, and hypotheticals for empiricals.

The success of these institutions in drowning out the voices of academic Middle East studies has contributed to a culture in which serious inquiry into the real world is pushed aside in favor of fear, imagination and faith. It is a culture in which investigation into the historical background of the crimes of September 11, 2001, is systematically avoided.4 It is the culture in which the Iraq War was justified by a series of lies and forgeries. It is the culture in which intelligence professionals from Coleen Rowley to Valerie Plame are sidelined, in which torture is seen as a defensible and logical means of intelligence gathering. It is a culture in which academic researchers are silenced in the name of free speech. It is a culture in which the mainstream media have forsaken their constitutional role of checking government. It is a culture of looming logical inconsistencies in which the public is assured by the chattering elites that no price is too high to pay for the illusion of Iraqi freedom, while no American political freedom is too dear to be sacrificed to the illusion of homeland security. As defenders of the Bush policy assert, this is far too much to lay at the doorstep of the philosopher Leo Strauss and the simplistic concept of the noble lie.5

The current generation of Middle East think tanks and the strategic discourse that emanates copiously from them can be traced back to the Cold War. Strategic- studies think tanks functioned as incubators for hypothetical responses to hypothetical scenarios by scientists largely immune to the intimacy with the object of study that flourished in the postwar academic landscape. By steady work on the periphery of the academy and outside, they were able to quietly build a base from which to reclaim the territory opened up by area studies for interdisciplinar y work.

J. McCutchen "JmacSF"

San Francisco. CA

Orientalism 25 Years Later

 

Worldly Humanism v. the Empire-builders

By EDWARD SAID

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