Most folks assume that Iran's nuclear programs and international diplomacy are controlled by Iran's hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  

But what if he doesn't? Creating a sense of crisis with Iran might actually strengthen Ahmadinejad's control over these decisions.

Who controls Irans nuclear programs?  Who controls the diplomatic efforts surrounding those programs?

In an earlier post, I pointed to evidence suggesting that, within the Iranian government, differing factions were debating which policy was best - including an episode where Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, accused his predecessor of "swapping a pearl for a candy" in negotiations with the EU-3.

We have - or ought to have - a relatively thorough understanding of how decisions are made.  For example, Larijani's predecessor, Hassan Rowhani, gave a lengthy interview where he explained the bureaucratic process by which the Iranian leadership makes decisions.

(The full text of that interview is available at my blog, Arms Control Wonk.com)

Abbas William Samii has a fantastic article, "The Iranian Nuclear Issue And Informal Networks," in the most recent Naval War College Review.  If that is too wonky for you, Radio Free Europe has a very readable summary.

The basic argument - without getting into the weeds - is that the September 2003 IAEA Board of Governor's resolution caught the attention of the Iranians, leading them to consolidate control over the nuclear programs and diplomatic effort within a Council of Heads, led by the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and support by a Committee of Ministers and an experts group.  

That move produced winners and losers, leading to the inevitable backbiting among various bureaucratic losers.  Rowhani publicly complained about "disharmony and sabotage" from various factions within Iran, including members of Iran's parliament.  That suggests that Iran's more hard-line elements - those opposed to negotiations - were, at least initially, sidetracked.

Then came Iran's election of Ahmadinejad - a man who has apparently done everything he can to sink Iran's relations with the West.

Why would he do that?  Just how much power does Ahmadinejad have over the nuclear program?  The question is an interesting one in light of criticism leveled by the man Ahmadinejad defeated for Iran's presidency, Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

If Ahmadinejad has relatively little control over nuclear policy, there is the possibility that he might deliberately stir up a crisis to consolidate his control - something that has been noted by journalists and policy wonks.  

It seems just possible that Ahmadinejad thinks, by stirring up a crisis, he and his allies might find themselves with more say over Iran's nuclear policies.  That, at least, is what one senior Iranian official seemed to imply to a colleague of mine during a informal meeting recently.

If that is true - and it is hard to tell - than the most appropriate strategy with Iran might be to buy time and see if the Iran's political system either marginalizes or moderates Ahmadinejad over time.