Iran and the IAEA - Part I
A word regarding comments...I'm hoping that Jeffrey and I will cover the important ones in our posts during the week. We do read them.
As an aside, the introductory post was an attempt to scope out the issue. That may not have been clear. Judgments on questions like "Is Iran actually pursuing nuclear weapons?" will be addressed in future posts.
A brief post on the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran is coming, but I thought I'd address the question of IAEA safeguards in response to some comments.
Some key points:
--The NPT recognizes 5 nuclear-weapons states - the same countries who constitute the UNSC P5. There are 3 countries (India, Israel, and Pakistan) who are not party to the NPT. They all have nuclear weapons. North Korea is a bit of a different animal, but I won't go into that here.
All other countries are states-parties to the NPT. As such, they are required to have comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements. This essentially means that the IAEA can monitor all of their nuclear facilities. Countries who do not belong to the NPT have safeguards on specific nuclear facilities.
Iran has signed an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement. These protocols give the IAEA greater access to information about a state-party's nuclear programs, as well as more investigative power.
--Article IV of the NPT does say that NPT signatories can use nuclear energy peacefully. But they have to do so in conformity with Article I-III - those articles which form the "don't build, buy, beg, borrow, or steal nuclear weapons" part of the treaty.
--Article VI of the NPT says that the 5 nuclear weapons states should "[undertake] to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."
It is the case that non-nuclear weapons states think that the P5 need to do more to fulfill this obligation. I agree, but Iran still doesn't get to violate its international obligations.
[I am simplifying this for the sake of discussion. Look here, here, and here for more information.]
Anyway, Iran has violated its safeguards agreement and needs to provide more information and access to the IAEA in order to clarify several issues. Absent that cooperation, the agency can't give Iran a clean bill of health. These two interviews with IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei summarize the issue nicely.
Does Iran have to prove a negative? No. The IAEA has been clear about the information and access it needs to clarify several uresolved issues about it Tehran's nuclear activities (more detail on this is forthcoming).
It is the case that Iran is being asked to undertake some measures which go beyond its obligations. For example, Iran's additional protocol is not in force because its parliament hasn't yet ratified it. However, Iran has agreed to act as if the protocol is in force. Similarly, Iran has given IAEA inspectors access to certain non-nuclear (as far as we know) facilities, although Tehran is not obligated to do so.
Nevertheless, I don't think the Iranians are being treated unfairly, especially given their sketchy nuclear history. After all, the point of Iran's safeguards agreement is to provide confidence that it is not going to produce fissile material.
Now, it is unlikely that even if Iran's full compliance with the IAEA will erase everyone's suspicions about Tehran's nuclear program. No matter how you slice it, we will likely have to live with some Iranian nuclear ambiguity for some time to come. The key will be to minimize that ambiguity as much as possible.
Right. The agency is required and authorized to give Iran a clean bill of health because of the unratified additional protocols. If Iran withdraws its cooperation, with the additional protocols, the agency is left with the requirement and authorization to certify that no materials have been diverted towards a weapons program. Which has already been done.
So what happens if it goes to the Security Council? Iran explicitly opts out of the additional protocols which never had any more than voluntary force and legally there are no unresolved issues.
It is widely speculated that Japan has plans with which it could quickly build nuclear weapons if it chose to. Japan has not signed the additional protocols so the IAEA has no requirement or authorization to prove that Japan has no weapons program. Legally Japan could not be brought to the security council for this.
Japan sounds to US ears as a unimpeachably responsible nation, but to China, Japan is a strategic rival. Japan is at least as much a direct threat to China as Iran is to the US. China would love to impose new restrictions on Japan that would make China feel more confident, but legally it cannot and unlike the US, China deals with that fact.
Iran has no international obligation to stop enrichment. If the West could say "you do not have to stop enrichment but if you do stop enrichment we give you substantial specific compensation for doing so". Iran may well be able to make an agreement.
If the West says "if you do not stop enrichment we will take you before the security council to punish you for not fulfilling the additional protocols that you never ratified". Iran will say bring it on. Better now than later, when we can turn Iraq against you. When it gets to the security council, the US stands a good chance of being embarrassed.
The explicit connection the west draws between stopping enrichment and bringing Iran to the security council - though other countries including South Korea and Taiwan have been caught doing more explicitly weapons oriented research and were not been brought before the council makes it clear that Iran's crime is not the experiments in the 1990's which never enriched uranium beyond civilian levels, but Iran's enrichment which is completely legal.
January 24, 2006 4:20 PM | Reply | Permalink
Oops Japan has signed additional protocols to its NPT agreement. Use Brazil instead.
January 24, 2006 4:51 PM | Reply | Permalink
Good info. What can the US hope to get from the UNSC regarding Iran, besides some public embarrassment? China and Russia are not likely to vote sanctions. What legal basis would the UNSC have for any action? It is highly probable that Iran would withdraw from the NPT if brought to the UNSC, so what advantage to anyone (other than Iran) occurs if they do so?
A senior figure in the Iranian parliament is quoted in the press as saying that Iran would seal off the entire Persian Gulf if they are subject to sanctions. They probably have the means to do this, so how does the world respond if they chose to carry out this threat?
January 24, 2006 4:53 PM | Reply | Permalink
Japan has not violated its safeguards agreement. Iran has. For that reason, Iran has been refered to the UNSC.
I would rather Japan not reprocess nuclear fuel, but that's not a reason to ignore Iran.
January 24, 2006 5:02 PM | Reply | Permalink
I doubt they'd do that just for sanctions. But there is a lot they can do. At sanctions the amount of US soldiers dying per day in Iraq starts going up but without clear ties to Iran. At a blockade, when US ships block Iranian ships, the Persian gulf would be a bad place to be. When Iran is bombed, a lot of other places are bombed, the mid-east becomes very chaotic and a good amount of oil is taken off line, not only in Iran.
The parliament quote is just acting crazy for strategic reasons, Israel says its crazy enough to bomb Iran to pressure the security council to install sanctions. Iran says its crazy enough to block the gulf to pressure the security council the other way.
But once it starts escalating, it really can escalate quickly, and it is in Iran's interests for it to escalate quickly rather than slowly. So just for strategic reasons, other than legal reasons there is a lot of hesitation to starting the process.
January 24, 2006 5:05 PM | Reply | Permalink
South Korea and Taiwan have violated their safeguards agreements. Where is the reason to ignore them?
Whether or not Iran stops enriching uranium, its safeguards violations are the same. Why refer Iran if it enriches uranium but not if it does not enrich uranium?
Iran experimented with enriching uranium. Unlike Taiwan and South Korea, Iran did not produce uranium enriched beyond normal levels used in peaceful power production.
Iran's experiments have stopped. There is no indication they were part of a weapons program. There is no nuclear material unaccounted for.
The former experiments that are fully accounted for are not a threat to world peace. The position of the West is that any enrichment by Iran is a threat to world peace, but there is no international law that supports the West's position.
I'm sure China would not agree that Iran's experiments are more to be ignored than Taiwan or South Korea's.
January 24, 2006 5:12 PM | Reply | Permalink
The problem is that there is not a clear connection between Iran's crimes, its 1990s experiments and the punishment the West wants to impose, a permanent cessation of Iran's right to enrich uranium.
Is it true that either Iran is banned from enriching uranium or else Iran is ignored? The West implies the answer is yes. There is no support for that position.
Iran in May 2005 offered a small scale enrichment facility under a stricter than usual safeguard regime. The counteroffer was that Iran cease enriching and that in ten years, if the EU agrees, (it won't) Iran may be able to begin enriching then.
It is a false dilemma to say that anything but a full cessation of enrichment is ignoring Iran.
January 24, 2006 5:25 PM | Reply | Permalink
"Nevertheless, I don't think the Iranians are being treated unfairly, especially given their sketchy nuclear history. After all, the point of Iran's safeguards agreement is to provide confidence that it is not going to produce fissile material."
Excuse me, but the simple fact is that this is an impossible task. It was impossible for Saddam and it is impossible for Iran.
Certainly, Iran can set up their nuclear energy program so that it is completely monitored. Saddam in fact would have been required to do that had the US allowed the UN inspectors to complete their work and certify that there were no WMDs in Iraq.
Beyond that, it is completely impossible for any state to prove that it is not and *never will* attempt to conceal nuclear weapons activities.
It's just nonsense to even consider this a rational argument for threatening a state with sanctions and military attack. It IS trying to "prove a negative."
ElBaradei has stated that he needs certain things cleared up - it boils down to examining some documents, making some tests on specific locations, etc. But every time the Iranians have complied with the IAEA's demands, the demands have escalated - due to pressure from the US which is providing the same crap "intelligence" they provided on Iraq from Iraqi defectors - only now they are relying on the Mossad (surely an unbiased source - not!) and Iranian defectors.
Why should Iran be forced to put up with this indefinitely while their nuclear energy program languishes?
Why is it that ElBaradei will not acknowledge the the primary reason for Iranisn intransigence on minor points is the intransigence of the US government on continually pushing the issue with threats?
Why is that Iran is expected to bend over backwards to satisfy every little detail of the IAEA when Israel has ignored the IAEA entirely for thirty years? Do you think the Iranians are unaware of this situation? Do you think you would be cooperative if you KNEW that your interrogators were being coached by your enemies in the US and Israel?
Get serous.
"Now, it is unlikely that even if Iran's full compliance with the IAEA will erase everyone's suspicions about Tehran's nuclear program. No matter how you slice it, we will likely have to live with some Iranian nuclear ambiguity for some time to come. The key will be to minimize that ambiguity as much as possible."
It would seem to be that that has already been done. The amount of ambiguity that ElBaradei talks about seems quite small. He has said that all they need is some more documentation, some tests on a few given locations, and interviews with specific individuals. Nowehere has he suggested that there is any evidence *for* the idea that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. All he has said is he can't be *certain* that Iran has no program.
Again and yet again I have to ask: why is this a "crisis"? Why is it that ElBaradei insists that March 6 is the "deadline" for cooperation? What exactly is the difference between March 6 and a week later? A month later? A year later? Just because the IAEA has been studying this issue for three years now - with no results whatsoever to even hint that Iran is conducting a weapons program?
What's wrong with this picture?
What isn't ElBaradei telling us?
To me, he's telling us that he has until March 6 because the Iranian oil bourse goes into operation in March - and the US and the Israelis are not going to allow that - period.
So he intends to wash his hands of the whole affair in March - just as the IAEA backed down and off when the US decided to invade Iraq regardless of the UN's wishes.
Why? Because war with Iran is *already a done deal* - that's why. And he knows it.
January 25, 2006 12:53 AM | Reply | Permalink
In other words, the sovereignty of nation-states is the building block on which the NPT is based. The non-nuclear nations agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons because they did not think that they were going to be invaded in offensive wars by the nuclear states. Otherwise, they would have NEVER, EVER signed the treaty.
The US post-Cold War policies of "regime change", begun in the Clinton Administration and expanded and implemented by Bush, change the calculus completely. Acquiring nuclear weapons is the only way to protect national sovereignty when the US is asserting the right to go wherever it wants and fight a preemptive war.
Anyone who thinks that the Iran situation can be solved without a serious retrenchment of the global, unilateral ambitions of the US is living in a dream world.
January 25, 2006 12:49 PM | Reply | Permalink
Two things. First, Iran is probably aware, or at least should be, that Israel is not a signatory to the NPT.
Next, what do you think is the nature of the enmity between Israel and Iran, anyway? Does Israel reject Persian national rights? Does Israel fail to recognize Iran's national legitimacy? Does Israeli leadership issue public calls for Iran to "whiped off the map"? No, no, and never; while the Iran obviously rejects Jewish national rights, does not recognize Israel's national legitimacy, and routinely calls for the eradication of Israel.
Further, there are some strange bedfellows in this politics.
January 26, 2006 3:38 PM | Reply | Permalink