Among Allies ....
"A virtue of having coalition partners with a legacy of shared sacrifice during difficult military campaigns is that they can also share candid observations. Such observations are understood to be professional exchanges among friends to promote constructive discussion that can improve the prospects of the coalition successes for which all strive. It was in a constructive spirit, then, that this article was made available to Military Review. The article is a professional commentary by an experienced officer based on his experiences and background. It should also be understood that publishing this article does not imply endorsement of or agreement with its observations by the Combined Arms Center leadership or Military Review. Indeed, some comments are already dated and no longer valid. Nonetheless, this article does provide Military Review readers the thought-provoking assessments of a senior officer with significant experience in counterterrorism operations. And it is offered in that vein--to stimulate discussion.--Editor"
The Editor is the editor of Military Review, an in-house U.S. army journal. The note introduces an article by British Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster that is sharply critical of U.S. counter-insurgency tactics in Iraq. Read it and weep, but also give credit to the army for being willing to run it and read it.
Comments (17)
I would like to read it -- is it available on-line, or do I have to walk down to my favorite newstand to buy a copy of the Military Review?
January 12, 2006 7:17 AM | Reply | Permalink
Never mind -- I see the link now. It was hiding.
January 12, 2006 7:18 AM | Reply | Permalink
There have been credible studies which estimate levels of mortality caused by the Iraq War and occupation at over 150,000 by this date. George W. Bush threw out an estimate of 30,000. The American armed forces claim outrageous 160 to 1 kill ratios.
The one thing that no one talks about is what is America doing to that country. What is America doing to the lives of ordinary Iraqi's. The evidence is that you are steadily destroying the country.
The Brookings institute maintains something that it calls the 'Iraq Index', which is an attempt to track the progress of the occupation. It is hardly unbiased, at points it arbitrarily weights its data to support the notion that things are improving under the occupation. For instance, in discussing the unemployment rate, it shifts from 50% to 40-25% with the notation that this adjustment isn't supported by anything other than wistful thinking. It incorporates a series of opinion polls from varying times and sources which aren't necessarily reliable or useful.
Nevertheless, the Brookings Institute Iraq Index remains one of the few (if biased in favour of the occupation) sources which provides an opportunity to look at baseline data.
There is very little that is hopeful when these statistics are examined with a critical eye. The insurgency seems undiminished, operating at increasing levels of intensity. It has varied from month to month, rising and falling, but the overall trend has been steadily upwards. The estimated numbers of the insurgency have climbed. There is an indication of evolution of tactics. There is a relatively constant, somewhat upward trending mortality for American forces. Add American and Iraqi military & police together, and the upward trend is far more pronounced. The statistics in no way indicate success for the American military venture, despite many of these statistics being self reported, and clear indications that some of these statistics are being fudged.
Stepping outside of the statistics and examining the American military posture in Iraq, the picture grows far worse. Essentially, American forces are committed to force protection - hiding in fortified enclaves, going out on increasingly infrequent patrols and search and destroy missions. It keeps troop casualties down, but forfeits the territory to the enemy. Occasional American raids do nothing more than inflict civilian casualties, driving civilians into the arms of the enemy. The shift to using air strikes will only drive up civilian casualties. Collateral damage is collateral damage.
Turning to the social side, the statistics are trickier. There is built in weighting, real problems with reporting, and a considerably more ambiguous and impenetrable format. But the results are chilling.
Electricity is probably the best concrete and measurable indicator of quality of life. Electricity is necessary for a modern urban city, it powers the water pumping systems, it keeps the schools and hospitals going, its the lifeblood of offices, of commerce and industries, of businesses. The statistics show that the American occupation has been consistently unable to even reach or maintain the levels of electricity production of the era of Saddam under sanctions. This suggests it is well below the level of Saddam prior to sanctions. And it is far, far inadequate to the countries needs.
Moreover, the indications are that the electricity situation is even worse. Bagdad is the largest urban center by far, containing a fair chunk of the countries population. Under Saddam, it consumed 2/3rds of the countries electricity, and arguably, needed it to support its economy and infrastructure. The statistics for Bagdad are frequently not reported, but when they are, it appears to be less than a third of Saddam under sanctions. Reports from the city itself support the perilous state of electricity. As a city of something like four or five million people, repository of something like a quarter of the nation's population, and the economic engine of the country, the dearth of electricity suggests a state of devastation.
There are other indicators. An unemployment rate of 25 to 40%, an estimated inflation rate of over 20%, a murder rate at leat 50 times higher than neighboring countries. All this adds up to hell on earth.
The American strategy is not only not winning, but it is clearly causing immense suffering and hardship.
January 12, 2006 7:51 AM | Reply | Permalink
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/10/A R2006011001456.html
In it U.S. Army Col. Kevin Benson responds to Aylwin-Foster's article, "I think he's an insufferable British snob"
Lovely. It looks like the Bush administration's penchant for name calling and rhetoric is spreading.
January 12, 2006 9:27 AM | Reply | Permalink
Some fair comments but the Army and the administration have done a good job of adjusting and adapting; remarkable in light of the fact that this is a deeply held cultural problem rather than the result of specific decisions by Bush.
January 12, 2006 9:38 AM | Reply | Permalink
What's really striking about this piece's analysis is that it so often sounds like Aylwin could be talking about American NGOs, government aid agencies, or software companies rather than the US military. Consider:
* High levels of emotivity, combined with a strong sense of moral authority, could serve to distort
collective judgement and invoke responses to insurgent activity that ultimately exacerbated the situation.
- Despite its own multi-cultural nature, the Army was not culturally attuned to the environment.
- U.S. Army personnel instinctively turned to technology to solve problems.
I have heard exactly the same critiques, over and over, of US-run programs to combat AIDS in the third world. And these critiques, too:Commanders and staff at all levels were strikingly conscious of their duty, but rarely if ever questioned authority, and were reluctant to deviate from precise instructions. Staunch loyalty upward and conformity to one's superior were noticeable traits. Each commander had his own style, but if there was a common trend it was for micro-management, with many hours devoted to daily briefings and updates. Planning tended to be staff driven and focused on process rather than end effect.
And anyone who has ever worked on a Hollywood feature film, or in many American workplaces (Enron, anyone?), will recognize this one:
The U.S. Army's laudable and emphatic `can-do' approach to operations paradoxically encouraged another trait, which has been described elsewhere as damaging optimism. Self-belief and resilient optimism are recognised necessities for successful command, and all professional forces strive for a strong can-do ethos. However, it is unhelpful if it discourages junior commanders from reporting unwelcome news up the chain of command.
This is the real resemblance between the Vietnam and Iraq wars; has been from the beginning. It's not that the enemy or the population is the same. But we are still us.
January 12, 2006 10:54 AM | Reply | Permalink
A great article. It goes along way toward explaining the failure of the Hyperpower's finest.
January 12, 2006 3:02 PM | Reply | Permalink
J Man, Colonel Benson has retracted his remark, citing momentary passion. No one likes having their institution and life's work criticized by an outsider.
January 12, 2006 3:07 PM | Reply | Permalink
The Brigadier acuses the US forces of of institutional racism, moral righteousness, misplaced optimism, rigidity of command, and of being ill-suited to engage in counter-insurgency operations.
At the risk of cros and double-croiss posts, William Lind, former LA to Sens Hart and Taft and COIN consultant to the USMC, has made many of the same points repeatedly over the past year or two for eg
- August 18, 2005: Getting Swept
- September 15, 2005: Blunders and Opportunities http://www.military.com/opinion/0,,77172,00.html
- June 29, 2005: Doing It Right http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,,Lind_062905,00.html
- May 11, 2005: The Reality Gap http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,,Lind_051105,00.html
- April 15, 2005: On Strategy http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,,Lind_041505,00.html
- December 22, 2004: Little Stalingrad http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,,Lind_122204,00.html
- Tactics of the Crescent Moon http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,,Lind_111704,00.html
There are only two strategies by which to defeat a counterinsurgency. Area control/hearts and minds (which Alwyin-foster calls the W"estern strategy") or wipe em all out ("attrition strategy")The USA, in trying to do both, does neither at all well.
So when I hear idiots like Rep Harold Ford say we have to suck it up for 5-10 years, I wonder perhaps that Bush isn't right after all
Ignoring congress I mean
We need a thorough house cleaning for this is the very Icon of Disaster.
http://americaabroad.tpmcafe.com/story/2005/10/10/181851/23
January 12, 2006 4:41 PM | Reply | Permalink
After reading the article, then reading the subsequent comments, I wonder if anyone here has been in a uniformed service? Articles such as this one are actually more comman than you might think. The military is always interested in how it can improve how it operates. That is why after everything we do, we conduct an After Action Review. An AAR can be quite enlightening, and extremely humbling (even if you did things you thought were right).
Barring statistics on electricity, and casualty rates, et al., I can only speak on what I have experienced. I know that at least in units I have served (or am serving in), we have been focused on the idea that we will NOT be involved in a straight shooting war. The last unit I was in, our commander actually told the unit leadership that we should starting learning about such things as water and sewage plants, power plants, etc., incase we were called upon to put on into operation. Additionally, we trained on how to perform non-combat operations on a regular basis. This was a National Guard unit NOT EVEN SLATED FOR DEPLOYMENT YET.
Some of the statements made by the Brigdadier are older, and somewhat out of date. As for the cultural issues, I agree he has a valid point. That's why we have Special Forces. They are specifically trained in cultural and language issues, and are designed exactly for these types of issues. Standard military forces are not. Hence the difficulties in changing the mindset. Going from sheer violence to police operations is a slow process, and one that can be difficult to make, especially for frontline types of units. However, I would argue that ths shift has been occuring, and we are seeing more of a leaning to straight SASO type operations (Stability And Security Operations).
Oh, by the way, we have dropped the term OOTW. SASO is the term in use, and I think that has actually been replaced as well. Provides a certain dating to the article.
While my viewpoints may not conform to the idea that I am widely seeing on this board, that the government is bad, and the military is nothing but a bunch of hard-headed, over-the-top automotons, I thought that an opposing view might be useful for discussion purposes. Isn't that the point of a democratic society anyways?
January 13, 2006 5:58 AM | Reply | Permalink
Your comments are welcome. On the other hand, if you are military, then why the self pity. Is whining part of standard military tactics these days?
January 13, 2006 6:22 AM | Reply | Permalink
If he's a combat officer, he'd better drop that attitude. The enemy always gets a vote and a critique on the plan. The Iraqi guerrilla's have been performing some very effective criticism.
January 13, 2006 10:02 AM | Reply | Permalink
As is often a problem with the written word, sometimes meaning or emotion can be misconstrued. None of what I wrote was meant to be taken as "whining", but rather a way to provide my personal insight. While I admit, the first sentence or two may have been a bit on the harsh side, I didn't consider it whining. Perhaps you have a different perception of it then I do, and would welcome yours and others' impressions. If I offended anyone, then they have my apologies.
January 13, 2006 11:13 AM | Reply | Permalink
Self pity is never a positive trait and whining is never a good introduction. How exactly did you intend this to read:
>After reading the article, then reading the subsequent comments, I wonder if anyone here has been in a uniformed service?
That's a pretty passive aggressive way of saying none of us know what we're talking about, don't you think. Actually, to be fair, that can be read in a neutral manner, so I don't put too much stress on it. It only becomes whiny and sniffy in the context of the overall piece.
>While my viewpoints may not conform to the idea that I am widely seeing on this board, that the government is bad, and the military is nothing but a bunch of hard-headed, over-the-top automotons,
Boo Hoo Hoo! We're all a bunch of government-hating, anti-military liberals and you know that we hate you and won't give you a fair hearing! Waah!
>I thought that an opposing view might be useful for discussion purposes.
But... But... But... you have a right to your own point of view.
>Isn't that the point of a democratic society anyways?
Please please please Mr. Evil liberal establishment, please listen to me. sniff.
Okay, so I have to ask you: What were you thinking? Did you think this was going to make a good impression? Did you think you weren't going to get a hearing, and you were climbing up on your cross in anticipation of getting martyred?
For god's sakes man, this is a discussion, and as far as I can tell, anyone can post. If you have something to say, just go ahead and say it. Don't dress it up in all this droning self pity. What are you, a soldier or a transvestite?
As near as I can tell, your main thesis isn't all that objectionable: That this sort of review is fairly common and is part of the military process of improvement.
I mean geez? So my response is, "Uhmm.... okay? How's that working?" Or, "Hmmm.... doesn't seem to be working?"
Listen, I post on left wing sites, I post on right wing sites, I have friends in the military and in the peace movement. Half the time I talk, I've got someone disagreeing with me. I don't whine about it. I don't complain about how everyone disagrees me so I might as well go home and eat worms. I just say what I have to say and let my opinions and facts speak for themselves.
I've been in some knock down drag out discussions, but that's what its for. Once in a while, I've realized I was wrong and admitted it. More often, I convince the other guys. Frequently, whether I convince my opponent, I win the audience, and that's good enough.
I can be a pretty vicious debater. I'm not above using sarcasm, mockery, going for the jugular, indulgin in irony, and just making it hurt. But the one thing I never use is self pity. Because the thing with self pity, is that you are walking onto the stage admitting to yourself that you've already lost the discussion. Well, if you won't have faith in your opinions, then why should anyone else.
So, listen up Ford, it might feel like I'm beating you up... Actually, yes, I suppose I am beating you up. But what I'm saying is, stand tall and hold forth. Truths are truths regardless of whether people like them or not. If you have an argument, don't dress it up, just go ahead and make it.
No harm, no foul. Hope to see you around.
January 13, 2006 12:14 PM | Reply | Permalink
Faith is no guarantee that an argument will succeed. But lack of faith is the surest guarantee of its failure to persuade.
Have faith in yourself man.
January 13, 2006 1:07 PM | Reply | Permalink
Den - advice is good but the tone here is condescending. Derisive comments such as "What are you, a soldier or a transvestite?" serve no purpose in a good discussion.
January 14, 2006 1:12 PM | Reply | Permalink
You are correct, Irishkg. That comment was inappropriate. On the other hand, I am not inclined to respond politely to what I see as rhetorical tricks. A civil discussion only works if both parties embrace civil standards - passive aggressive whining is not a civil standard. Exageration, hyperbole, irony, colloquialism and humour can have their place.
January 14, 2006 4:41 PM | Reply | Permalink