After Iraq -- Unfinished Foreign Policy Debates
Four years ago, soon after September 11, I recall attending several lively meetings at the Brookings Institutions at which folks around the table – including some of my fellow America Abroad contributors – debated whether an American "war on terrorism" should be made the center-piece of American grand strategy. I recall a lot of skepticism at the time. But our debate – and the nation’s as well – was soon cut short by the Bush administration’s rush to war with Iraq. The serious debate about terrorism and national security ended.
What the Bush administration gave us was the Great Conflation. To justify the Iraq invasion, the Bush administration conflated a lot of dangerous security problems on the horizon – Saddam, rogue states, WMD proliferation, and jihadist violence – and collapsed America’s response to them into a "war on terrorism." When the war in Iraq didn’t go well the administration gave us new explanations for why we were in Iraq – and the "war on terrorism" turned into a great neo-Wilsonian democracy campaign. Justifications for the Iraq war kept changing and the underlying "theories" of terrorism were adjusted accordingly.
As a result, the country has never had a serious post-911 debate about national security threats. The campaign to sell the Iraq war to the American people and allies replaced what might have been an honest and systematic debate by the nation’s leaders and experts. As journalists begin to dig into the Bush administration’s deliberations in the lead up to the war, we learn more and more about the profound lack of probity with which our president and his advisors grappled with the facts. In a meeting in Berlin soon after the Iraq invasion, I recall one of Germany’s most renowned security specialist shaking his head at the Bush spectacle – he could not recall any time in his lifetime when American leaders played so fast and loose with threat analysis.
There are a lot of unfinished grand strategy debates – including the question we debated at Brookings after 911, namely whether a "war on terrorism" should be the centerpiece of American global strategy. I don’t think it should – and indeed the Grand Strategy Report I recently did with Francis Fukuyama calls for an Asian-centric grand strategy – but I will try to make that argument later. In the meantime, the most immediate unfinished debate is this one:
What in fact are the sources of transnational jihadist violence?
We are coming up on the 60th anniversary of George Kennan’s "long telegram." This was the 8,000 word memo -- dispatched from Moscow to Washington on 22 February 1946 -- that articulated with extraordinary depth of knowledge and judgment how to think about the Soviet Union. It brilliantly laid the intellectual foundation for American foreign policy during the Cold War. Where is the long telegram of the Bush administration that informs its war on terrorism?
What we have gotten instead are slogans and pop theories. The early post-911 view seems to have been that the terrorists are evil and hate us for who we are – and we need to kill them before they kill us. There was also a theory floating around in Bush and neo-conservative circles that 911 terrorism was caused by Clinton-era failure to vigorously use American power and send signals of resolve. In this view, invading two Islamic countries in 18 months was an effort to send a more forceful message to extremists and push them back into their caves.
As the Iraq war turned into a debacle, a new line emerged describing our foes as this era’s fascists – anti-American, anti-Western, anti-modern, unappeasable and bent on our destruction. (As Bush said in his October 6<sup>th</sup> speech to the National Endowment for Democracy: "Some call this evil Islamic radicalism, others, militant jihadism; still others, Islamofascism.") The most phantasmagorical version of this thesis is Norman Podhoretz’s "World War IV" manifesto, although it may have been Christopher Hitchens who coined the term Islamofascism.
In any case, if the enemy are modern-day fascists and totalitarians, the Bush administration can now see themselves walking in the footsteps of FDR and Truman – who actually did wage war against such foes. Condi Rice has hung Dean Acheson’s picture in her office at the State Department. "My predecessor’s portrait is a reminder that in times of unprecedented change, the traditional diplomacy of crisis management is insufficient." This historical parallel also helps buttress the argument that terrorism is caused by an absence of freedom and democracy in the Middle East – and so American national security it tied to the long-term democratic transformation of the Middle East. But I wish I could be confident that the insight behind this momentous strategic decision is sound – or even confident that the insight itself is driving policy and not some sort of ex post facto attempt to legitimize a failed Iraq adventure.
There are important alternative arguments in play about the sources of jihadist terrorism – and they suggest very different American grand strategies. One is the argument made by Olivier Roy, Gilles Kepel, and others that Islamism and its radical jihadist offshots were movements that were failing before 911. These 2001 attacks give the movement a new lease on life as did the Iraq war. It is not the type of religiosity that is the root of present-day terrorism. The jihadists are a product of what Roy calls "deterritorialized" Islam, in which individual Muslims find themselves cut off from authentic local traditions, often as uprooted minorities in non-Muslim countries. This explains why so many jihadists have come not from the Middle East, but have rather – like Mohamed Atta and the London bombers – had established lives in Western Europe.
Francis Fukuyama makes this point: "We have tended to see jihadist terrorism as something produced in dysfunctional parts of the world, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan or the Middle East, and exported to Western countries. Protecting ourselves is a matter either of walling ourselves off, or, for the Bush administration, going ‘over there’ and trying to fix the problem at its source by promoting democracy. There is good reason for thinking, however, that a critical source of contemporary radical Islamism lies not in the Middle East, but in Western Europe."
Another major argument about the sources of terrorism is advanced by Robert Pape. After compiling the most systematic data base yet on suicide bombers, the concluded that the single most important trigger of this lethal form of terrorism is military occupation. The data show that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any religion for that matter. What contemporary terrorism has in common, Pape argues, is a specific secular strategic goal – to compel liberal democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland. Religion is rarely the root cause but rather an organizing tool. As Pape sees it: "Since suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation and not Islamic fundamentalism, the use of heavy military force to transform the Muslim societies over time, if you would, is only likely to increase the number of suicide terrorists coming at us." Pape argues that if his analysis is right, the United States should move toward an "offshore balancing" grand strategy that entails reducing America’s military footprint in the Middle East.
My point is simply that we have a major unsettled debate on the sources of jihadist terrorism. The Bush administration has launched America in a great campaign to confront Islamofascism and democratize the Middle East on slogans and ideological constructions of the world that are largely unexamined – and widely disputed. If either Fukuyama or Pape is right, the Bush administration is not just pursuing the wrong grand strategy but pursuing a strategy that will make America’s national security problems worse, not better.
Bush’s "war on terrorism" has now lasted longer than America’s involvement in World War II – from Pearl Harbor to VJ day. It is probably too late for the president to rethink his grand strategy – but it is never too late for the country to finally have a great conversation about its global strategy.
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What debate?
Everyone recognizes 1) that the goal of societies threatened by terrorist organization is to limit the damage they can do and 2) that to do so, countries must put in place effective "police procedures" -- including without limitation international coordination in the gathering of intelligence, border security, financial and banking controls, extra-judicial sanctioning of terrorist leaders, inventorying and control of mass-death weapons, etc.
The idea that anyone -- and that includes Cheney and Rumsfeld -- ever thought that ridding Iraq of Saddam Hussein would make a significant contribution toward the goal of protecting American or western society from the acts of terrorists is an invention of experts and pundits who need a controversy to stay in business.
December 14, 2005 7:44 AM | Reply | Permalink
I am grateful for Senator Feingold's stance on the renewal of the Patriot Act and the debate he has started over what our national security priorities should be.
Our founding fathers recognized that the power of the government must be checked. Over time all governents will abuse its power for polical gain and to perpetuate its own authority. We need more politicians like Senator Feingold who will stand up for the system of checks and balances that are fundamental to our country.
With respect to national security priorities, we have limited resources to fight the war against terrorism. Going into debt over Iraq is a serious drain on our ability to confront the real dangers facing our country. An honest assessment of Iraq and how it ties into the larger national security threats facing us is needed--not some after the fact justification just to save face on a bad decision. Hats off to Sneator Feingold for starting a healthy debate over what policies need to be re-thought and re-adjusted.
December 14, 2005 8:59 AM | Reply | Permalink
I look forward to your comments on US Asia policy escpecially in light of the recent nrews reports that the US is not invited to the SE Asian summit.
Robert Pape in a radio interview a few months back, likened Bush's anti-jihad strategies to a SuperTanker 180 degrees off of its course. "Do you know how hard it is to turn a Supertanker around?"
The Bush administration has launched America in a great campaign to confront Islamofascism and democratize the Middle East on slogans and ideological constructions of the world that are largely unexamined – and widely disputed. If either Fukuyama or Pape is right, the Bush administration is not just pursuing the wrong grand strategy but pursuing a strategy that will make America’s national security problems worse, not better
In addition to the slogans and dubious ideological constructs, I would add a third element - implementation through a brutish unilateral application of US military, economic and political power which equally pernicious - together a Triad of Strategic Disaster we must dismantle if for no better reason than the US is incapable of staying Bush's strategic tangent
In a recent FT article Anatol Lieven tackles the third leg, the problematic of US power - the Imperial course that we cannot sustain
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</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2"><span class="pagetext">US global power, as presently conceived by the overwhelming majority of the US establishment, is unsustainable. To place American power on a firmer footing requires putting it on a more limited footing. Despite the lessons of Iraq, this is something that American policymakers--Democrat and Republican, civilian and military--still find extremely difficult to think about.
The basic reasons why the American empire is bust are familiar from other imperial histories. The empire can no longer raise enough taxes or soldiers, it is increasingly indebted and key vassal states are no longer reliable. In an equally classical fashion, central to what is happening is the greed and decadence of the imperial elites. Like so many of their predecessors, the US wealthy classes have gained a grip over the state that allows them to escape taxation. Mass acquiescence in this has to be bought with much smaller--but fiscally equally damaging--cuts to taxes on the middle classes.
The result is that the empire can no longer pay for enough of the professional troops it needs to fulfil its self-assumed imperial tasks..... The result is that the US is incapable of waging more wars of occupation, such as in Iraq. It can defeat other states in battle easily enough but it cannot turn them into loyal or stable allies. War therefore means simply creating more and more areas of anarchy and breeding grounds for terrorism.
It is important to note that this US weakness affects not only the ambitions of the Bush administration, but also geopolitical stances wholly shared by the Democrats...., can present US strategy against Iran--supported by both parties--be sustained permanently without war? Indeed, given the nature of the Middle East, may it not be that any power wishing to exercise hegemony in the region would have to go to war at regular intervals in defence of its authority or its local clients?
Furthermore, the relative decline in US economic independence means that, unlike in 1917 or 1941, really serious war risks US economic disaster. Even a limited US-Chinese clash over Taiwan would be likely to produce catastrophic economic consequences for both sides.
In theory, the desirable US response to its imperial overstretch is simple and has been advocated by some leading independent US thinkers such as Professor Stephen Walt of Harvard.* It is to fall back on "offshore balancing", intended to create regional coalitions against potential aggressors and, when possible, regional consensuses in support of order and stability. Not just a direct military presence, but direct military commitments and alliances should be avoided wherever possible.
When, however, one traces what this might mean in practice in various parts of the world, it becomes clear how utterly unacceptable much of this approach would be to the entire existing US political order. In the former Soviet Union, it could mean accepting a qualified form of Russian sphere of influence. In Asia, it could mean backing Japan and other countries against any Chinese aggression, but also defusing the threat of confrontation with China by encouraging the reintegration of Taiwan into the mainland. In the Middle East, it could involve separating US goals from Israeli ones and seeking detente with Iran.
Impossible today, some at leastof these moves may, however, prove inescapable in a generation's time. For it is pointless to dream of long maintaining an American empire for which most Americans will neither pay nor fight. My fear though is that, rather than as a result of carefully planned and peaceful strategy, this process may occur through disastrous defeats, in the course of which American global power will not be qualified but destroyed altogether, with potentially awful consequences for the world.
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December 14, 2005 9:10 AM | Reply | Permalink
The Iraq War, as a consequence to the China Problem, was designed by men who no doubt blame President Clinton, like you mentioned, for his "Hands Off" foreign policy which served us so well during the 1990's. During the 8 years of Clinton, these men (Cheney, Rove, et al) were busy in the private sector drawing-up plans for their "grand strategy." Being business-savvy, these men no doubt had oil at the top of their agenda. With Earth's oil within a century of exhaustion, China is clearly the primary antagonist which could offset America's hunger for oil. Therefore, when looking at the Iraq War, I find it hard to believe more people aren't pointing to China. Cheney and Rove no doubt had Iraqi invasion plans well before Bill Clinton left office. What they didn't have was a justification. Enter September 11th and the so-called Islamofascism which you describe. This essentially gave the administration the motive it needed for invading Iraq and securing crude stores for American oil companies, as well as those favorable to U.S. markets.
The way the war has played out is very predictable. The combat operations in Iraq are of secondary importance to the administration. Rather, whether we win or lose is not of primary concern. Bush, in reality, dumped the war bundle at the doorstep of the Pentagon and told Donald Rumsfeld to "wage and win the war." That the Pentagon has been left alone to fight the war is the main reason why the management has been so atrocious. Think of it like this: Bush does not care how many people die in Iraq or whether Democracy prevails. All he wants is a stable government with enough pro-American legislators to ensure lucrative oil contracts. Once that happens, the U.S. will have won the war (at least in the eyes of Rove and Cheney, who will have achieved their ultimate goal). Average Americans may well view the war as total defeat, but that will mean little in the eyes of the Administration.
In the end, you assertion that an "Asian-centric Grand Strategy" would benefit the U.S. is absolutely correct. I am surprised that you don't see the China connection to the Iraq War. The real question becomes to what extent does the administration view China as the real threat as opposed to Islamofascism. This I do not have an answer for. Surely terrorism is a large problem for the Bush, but is it larger than the China Problem?
December 14, 2005 9:48 AM | Reply | Permalink
I absolutely agree that terrorism should not be the cornerstone of our Grand Strategy, primarily because a war on terrorism is never winnable. Declaring one merely sets the U.S. up for a) continued failure and embarrassment and b) a perpetual state of aggression and offensive behavior. Either one of those hurts our international position; the two of them together are disasterous and leave us seeming less powerful than we are right now but acting more aggressively. If that doesn't scream balancing coalition, I don't know what does. The report on Grand Strategy basically convinced me that China is in fact the up-and--comer, although I still think we may be chasing a paper tiger here. I think the most important thing the United States can focus on in the near future is repairing our damaged relationship with Europe, while actively engaging with the rest of the world in such a way that we can more easily identify and dealing with any rising threat and in such a way that such threats are less likely to arise. For example, in case Asia is the next big thing, we cannot afford to have Condi skipping the ASEAN Regional Forum. My main point here, in any case, is that although we may not know what our future threat may be, we should not endeavor for it to be terrorism and should instead pursue a policy of engagement and multilateralism that hedges our bets against whatever state or region it may be.
December 14, 2005 8:45 PM | Reply | Permalink
Besides, we dont need to understand root causes to formulate a grand strategy for American foreign policy. What we need is a Grand Goal that would provide an overall purpose and direction to American policy, and which would then, within the parameters defined by the Grand Goal, be broken down by more in-depth anslysis of specific regions and issues. A Grand Goal such as this would be something on the order of "Contain Communism" or "Defeat Fascism" which guided our policy in previous eras.
The current administration has proposed a Grand Goal: "Defeat Terrorism." They justify very many of thier more specific foriegn policies in terms of this over-arching strategy, including most obviously the war in Iraq. The problem with this grand strategy for Center-Left Americans is that this goal seems unrealistic, even absurd (we also suspect the motives of those who propose it, but that is another issue). It isnt possible to 'defeat' world terrorism in anything like a military sense. Thus, it isnt so much a grand goal or strategy, as Ikenberry points out, so much as a slogan.
"Contain Terrorism" might work, but so far no one seems to have seriously suggested it. One would suppose that to take this as a strategy would imply a far greater investment in international border security, including American Homeland security, than has so far been the case.
Another possibility that has also been suggested by the Bush administration has been "Spread Democracy." Although this also has much to recommend it as a Grand Goal, there are some unresolved issues that so far have not been extensively debated in public. What kind of democracy? American style, parelementarian, or does this not matter? How centralized or decentralized? Do we support the spread of democratic institutions such as elections and federalism or do we also actively promote the cultural attitudes that go with it? If so, how would we do this?
In spite of the unanswered questions, promoting democracy is not a bad idea, so far as Global Grand Strategies are concerned. The fact that the Bush administration currently uses it as a justificiation of some of their policies should not prevent Center-Left from considering adopting some version more consistent with our values. One can easily imagine a program of democratization that is intended to authentically empower people and promote their self-determination. And there seems little doubt that we would all be safer in a world like that. One caveat is worth noting however- constructively promoting something good is much more complex and nuanced than defeating or containing something bad. It will take a clear articulate and consistent public message to generate the degree of political support such a program would need.
December 15, 2005 1:15 PM | Reply | Permalink
I was slacking off writing my final paper on the "Clash of Civilizations" in the GWOT, when I came across your posting and it gave me the focus that I needed.
Thanks.
If you are interested in the dynamics of defining yourself religiously against an "other", check out Clifford Geertz's Islam Observed. It traces the evolution of Islam in Indonesia and Morocco, from the beginnings - when it was adapted to indigenous religous ideals, to the onset of colonialism - where it developed in a more militant traditionalist direction. Geertz's conclusion is that in colonialism religion becomes a marker of non-negotiable difference between colonized and colonizer. When defining one's self against the colonizing other, the impulse becomes to become very religious - adopting an extreemly conservative character that was not necessarily a part of traditional religious practice.
This would seem to be a variation on that. I saw Geertz speak last year, and asked him if this was the case. He misunderstood my question, though (the mic was on the fritz) but agreed with what he thought I said. He thought I asked if an increase in religious fundamentalism in the US was a reaction to al Queda.
December 17, 2005 8:56 AM | Reply | Permalink
There is an undercurrent to the argument about dealing with terrorism that has a counterpart in domestic policy. When there is some kind of criminal activity one side will suggest looking for causal relationships that might be open to amelioration through social actions such as jobs programs and Head Start. The other side will disparage this as coddling criminals and ask for stronger police power and higher penalties.
The analogues in the terrorism question are disengagement or engagement, as applicable, against militarism and diplomatic/economic coercion. I think you will find that proponents of addressing causes also have that approach to social problems. Proponents of militarism also pursue increased state power in domestic action. This debate will not resolve, only swing back and forth, until more data on the efficacy of the two approaches is collected.
Even then, the force faction is resistant due to their view that it is a black-and-white moral question. We're right, they're wrong, what's the issue?
By contrast, the knowledge-seeking faction avoids the moral dimension as clouding the question of whether it works. It also is likely to accept the existence of a range of valid moral postitions, thus weakening the value of narrow moral arguments.
December 17, 2005 9:00 AM | Reply | Permalink
Not sure if you are replying to me or to Ikenberry. If me, then youre welcome. I would like to know more about your paper. By the way- what is "GWOT"?
December 17, 2005 6:02 PM | Reply | Permalink
Of course it would be nice if the transatlantic relationship improved, but it maybe rather would be a means to achieve certain goals than a goal per se. :-)
Recently visiting the United States for a couple of months, I started to think about the strong corporative influence over the American democracy. If one accepts as a fact that opinions and election results can be produced by means of PR investments, then the question "What does the American voters want?" become rather irrelevant, and instead the question ought to be: "What does the American corporation want?"
But in a deregulated globalized world economy, the concept of Grand Strategy may seem odd. Corporations are not limited by territorial borders and maybe less and less associated with particular states.
This gets me confused.
If investments in, say, China would be more profitable than in, say, South America, then it ought to be a chief interest to ensure supply of oil to China. But China is typically depictured as a potential adversary that one must cut of from supply...
I am lost.
December 19, 2005 5:15 PM | Reply | Permalink
Actually Vic, I love that point about 'constructively promoting something good is much more complex and nuanced than defeating or containing something bad.' Really excellent. We need to remind people of this because they fall so easily into the blame game, which is of marginal utility, at this juncture. I run in the other direction when people go off in this track. Thank you for your wise comments. Plus I'm glad to see John Ikenberry posting here.
Wow i feel so humble around such fine minds. Yahoooooooo!
December 20, 2005 7:40 AM | Reply | Permalink
Ummm! Really I don't run in the other direction. Rather I find myself in the thick of trying to urge a more complex and nuanced approach. However it is not easy because many people resist it. They want a 'succint' answer but it often functions as a quick fix.
December 20, 2005 7:44 AM | Reply | Permalink