The Future of Preemption

Jim Steinberg and I have an article in today's LA Times in which we argue that it "would be unfortunate if President Bush's doctrine of preemption were a casualty of the Iraq war. We should avoid waging unilateral preventive wars of regime change. But circumstances will probably arise in which the option of using force preventively should be available -- whether to kill terrorists, prevent weapons proliferation, halt genocidal killing or stop the spread of deadly disease. The task is to make the idea a more limited and more legitimate tool for dealing with new security threats."


The piece summarize an article that appears in the Winter 2005 issue of The American Interest. Unfortunately, in the Times Select age, this article is accessible to subscribers only. (I'll email a copy to anyone who contacts me directly.)


Below you'll find the unedited version of the piece that appeared in the LA Times.

Among the many casualties of the Iraq War may well be the Bush doctrine of preemption. While many will greet the apparent death of preemption with relief, it would be unfortunate if the entire concept were abandoned. For the problem with the Bush strategy has been less the idea of preventive force, than its unilateral application. Unilateral, preventive wars of regime change should rightly be relegated to the past. But circumstances will arise in the future where policy makers will want to have the option of using force preventively -- be it to kill terrorists, prevent weapons proliferation, halt genocidal killing, stop the spread of deadly disease, or deal with other such dangers. The proper task, then, is not to bury the concept, but to make it a more limited and more legitimate tool for addressing new security threats.


The Bush doctrine represented a major departure from internationally agreed rules governing the use of force. Those rules, enshrined in the UN Charter, limit the use of force to self-defense in case of an armed attack or military actions authorized by the Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security. Following 9/11, the Bush administration argued that the right to self defense must include the right to use force against terrorist and rogue state threats before they had "fully formed" -- before terrorists had struck, rogues had used nuclear weapons, or dangerous technologies had fallen into the wrong hands.


In response to the Bush administration's challenge to the agreed rules, the UN Secretary General appointed a high level panel to examine the consequences new threats posed for the old rules governing the use of force. The panel's December 2004 report represented an important evolution on the critical question of whether and when to use force. It argued that states had a right to defend themselves not just against actual threats, but also against those that were imminent. It also recognized that force might be appropriate to deal with latent threats (like terrorism and proliferation), but only if its use was authorized by the Security Council. It thus declined to endorse the Bush administration's claim that states could act on their own in such circumstances. That, the panel argued, was a recipe for international anarchy rather than international order.


Welcome as this evolution in international thinking was, it failed to resolve the more fundamental problem created by the fact the threats we face today are very different from the threats states faced at the time of the UN's founding in 1945. Then, states worried about aggression across borders and external interference in their affairs. Now the main worry is about what states do within their borders -- how they treat their citizens, whether they harbor terrorists, or if they are developing weapons of mass destruction -- rather than what they do beyond them.  


The UN System was not set up to deal with these type of threats, given that it stresses both the sovereign equality of states and the principle of non-interference in their internal affairs. So it is hardly  surprising that it has proven difficult to gain consensus within the Security Council, let alone among the wider UN membership, on what constitutes the new threats and how best to respond to them. Yet, the answer to this failure is not to ignore the rules and to go it alone, but rather to work towards adapting the rules to a world in which sovereignty is increasingly conditional on how states behave internally.


The notion of conditional sovereignty is central to the emergence of a new norm of state responsibility. In September, the UN members embraced the idea that states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from genocide, mass killing, and other gross violations of human rights. The same logic suggests that states also have a responsibility to prevent developments on their territory that pose a threat to the security of others -- such as developments relating to weapons of mass destruction (like their acquisition or the failure to secure weapons, materials, or deadly agents against possible theft or diversion); the harboring, support, or training of terrorists; or environmental dangers (like failing to prevent the spread of dangerous diseases or the destruction of the rain forest).


When states fail to meet their responsibilities, the international community will need to do so. Oftentimes diplomacy and economic pressure will be sufficient, but their will also be times when the most effective way to address an emerging threat is through limited military action undertaken before threats are imminent -- before enough fissile material has been produced to make nuclear weapons; before weapons in unsecured sites or deadly diseases in laboratories have been stolen; before terrorists have been fully trained or are been able to fully hatch their plots; before large-scale killing or ethnic cleansing has occurred; before a deadly pathogen has mutated and spread around the globe


One problem with the Bush doctrine, then, is not that it relies on preventive force too much, but that it has conceived of its use too narrowly -- primarily to deal with terrorism and as a means of forcible regime changes.


The other problem with the Bush doctrine is its insistence that individual states -- or at least the United States -- must have the right to decide when preventive force is justified, even though the threats it seeks to address are global in scope and affect the security of many. The decision to use force in these instances cannot be one state's alone.


Who, then, should decide? The Security Council remains the preferred vehicle for authorizing such action, because since the end of the Cold War it has emerged as the most legitimate forum for deciding these questions. Consider this: prior to the Gulf War in 1991, the Council authorized the use of force beyond traditional peacekeeping operations on only two occasions (Korea and the Congo); since then it has authorized force no less than seventeen times. Even in the case of the Iraq War, the Bush administration maintained that force was authorized under prior UN Security Council resolutions.


Yet, even as it has acted more frequently, states have not always been able to count on the Council to make timely decisions. It acted late in the case of the former Yugoslavia, ineffectively in response to Darfur, and not at all during the genocide in Rwanda. It has refused to take up the matter of North Korea's non-compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and wants no part in deciding how to address similar compliance concerns with respect to Iran. None of the proposed reforms on the table are likely to improve this record soon.


One alternative to Security Council approval, is to accept the legitimacy of preventive interventions authorized by regional organizations. The model for this is Kosovo, where NATO decided to intervene to prevent a worse humanitarian calamity even though the Council had failed to authorize the action. Regional organizations are a particularly appealing venue for deciding these questions, since there is likely to be a great deal of convergence between those who bear the costs and those who reap the benefits of the action. Moreover, when all of the countries in the region reach a similar conclusion as to the necessity and efficacy of a preventive action, there is a greater chance that there is a valid factual predicate for acting. Of course, reliance on regional organizations is no panacea. Some threats are global rather than regional in scope and thus beyond the purview of any one regional organization to handle. And in other cases there may be no meaningful regional organization to authorize a decision to use force.


Which leaves the alternative, should the UN or regional route fail, of creating a coalition of like-minded states. Since democracies should have a particular interest in upholding the norm of state responsibility, a coalition of democracies might provide such an alternative. Given that the governments involved are themselves legitimate by dint of having been elected, their decision to act in concert would carry more legitimacy than a decision of any one of them acting alone. Moreover, if it proves impossible to convince any or most of one's democratic peers that a state has failed to live up to its responsibilities and that intervention is therefore justified, that should in and of itself give one pause about proceeding. Iraq was a case in point. Finally, the knowledge that an alternative decision-making body exists may provide the Security Council or a regional organization with sufficient incentive to act in the first place.


There is a role for preventive military force to address the security challenges of the global age.  But understanding that role is only the first step. Establishing agreed standards for its use is the second, and embedding those standards in an institutional setting that can function effectively is the third. The Bush administration has got the first step right, and the logic of its arguments builds toward the second. But it has gotten the third step wrong. Unilateralism is not the only alternative to the UN Security Council -- regional organizations and a new coalition of democratic states offer ways to legitimize the use of force when the Council fails to meet its responsibilities.


Comments (63)

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If by "doctrine of preemption" it means letting loose the "dogs of war" again the way this madman who talks to Jesus to get foreign policy ideas did in Iraq- forget-about-it. Why can't we just have as sane reasonable policy that targets terrorists like Bin Laden instead of targeting nation-states. The Japanese launched Pearl Harbor to preempt the US from becoming the predominant power in the Pacific. We didn't see that as very reasonable, did we. Other people in the world think we are loony and scary when we talk about this kind of kooky stuff. Bush's insane doctrine of preemption will hopefully be the first casualty of this war. Then we can go back to a rational containment policy that served us well since the the times of George Kennan. And we can also focus on terrorists because we won't be involved in unnecessary wars.

I find the discussion misses the point.

When any nation feels threatened it will act. The world judges. What was wrong with the policy is exactly that one doesn't announce a normal response to threat as a new policy without raising eyebrows, since others wonder if it is an attempt at preemptive justification. No need to worry that we won't act about a perceived threat.

The argument, as it was recently, and should be, was whether there was a threat. That argument will exist, or not, notwithstanding discussions about policy. The discussions are essentially war-gaming and useful, since they explore situations and outcomes.

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I like the part about prevention from dangerous diseases. I guess that includes The Night of the Living Dead, as it has been fortold by Romero. Heretics are a rum lot.  I would assume then that the state could use military solutions internally and even outside of its borders to keep the imminently diseased carriers, the Health Threat Population, from entering its borders. Even if such a people were immently about to cross borders. Think of it.  People of Mass Destruction.  We can bug the Guatemalans just to play it safe.

 So many things you can do with a Warthog
It makes a Minuteman wanna lay down an'cry.

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US in Hell. 
by viggo 

In the past of history, many strong nations have used pre-emptive wars, to reach their goals.

Germany made a pre-emptive war against Poland in 1939. USSR made pre-emptive war against Estonia, also in 1939. US made a pre-emptive war against Iraq in 2003.

Strong nations can split all kinds of international order and use all kinds of force. They can kill and bomb innocent civilians to reach their goals.

That’s the nature of wars. Killing and destroying in the interests of the strong nations.

We have seen this in centuries. It was the hope after 1945 to create a system, which could protect international order. Or at least some rules for regulation of wars.

This is the UN charter.

120 member nations in UN today, out of all 190-member nations, are democracies.

We have now seen a very powerful nation, US, leaving the path of democracy, leaving the UN Charter and the international order for war. 

The Security Council in UN is the only legitimate institution in the world today, which can legitimise war.

Any other systems will create chaos.

The war in Iraq is clear example.

Insurgence, civil war, sectarian strife, American arrogance and American war crimes and breach of Geneva Convention no.4, are results of a war, started unilateral by US, against the majority in UN Security Council.

And against the big majority among the 120 democracies in the world, who constitute half of the world’s population.

We know US use 500 billion dollars now each year on military.

A lot of destruction and killing can be done for this amount of money.

We know American's are ignorant and arrogant and start wars in other parts of the world (Vietnam and Iraq), with no clear ideas, about the local cultures and the local conditions.

So - only UN should decide, if a war is legal.

We don't want US to turn to a dangerous state like Nazi-Germany in 1939 or Communist-USSR.

But we fear such a development, if US go on with the pre-emptive strategy, like the one used in the Iraq War.

War, with such kind of preparation, and done in such a kind of arrogance, can only be a danger to the future of democracy and freedom in the World today.

US should start with some humility.

After all, US population, 300 millions, represent just 10% of the population in 120 democratic countries, with a total population of 3 billion.

And only 5% of the worlds total population of 6 billion people.

The Iraq War has made US detested in Europe, Asia, Latin America and the Arab countries. Don't proceed in this way. Drop all kinds of pre-emptive strategies in principle and try to be (again) a member of the Democratic Community on this Planet.

Thank You!

Or go to Hell.

Viggo
 

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Hidden in that mass of what I consider to be odious garbage was the suggestion that preemptive war is a solution if other countries see a country mistreating its citizens. Our country mistreats our citizens as seen by Europeans, for example. We are barbaric with our love of killing prisoners. We select mostly minority prisoners for that killing. So, is it ok for European states to start a preventative war against us to stop that?

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We should avoid waging unilateral preventive wars of regime change.


I have it on good authority -- the president of the United States and his toadies told me so -- that Iraq wasn't a "unilateral" war, but was one fought with a giant "coalition of the willing," and sanctioned by the U.N.  This same group of the president and his toadies claim that Iraq wasn't about "regime change," but to remove a dangerous threat to the U.S.  In fact, I can think of a certain book co-authored by a certain person that, among other things, argued to bolster that claim, but I digress.  


What happens, of course, is that slippery people (the kind of people who argue, for example, that Bush didn't lie about the threat Iraq posed to the U.S.), simply pretend that a war isn't unilateral.  Paint the target country as evil and menacing, bribe or threaten a few countries to jump on board, and you have a "legitimate" intervention by your definition, just as happened with Iraq.


Don't get me wrong: in theory, I like the idea of humanitarian intervention.  But if the country can decide that Rwanda and Darfur don't warrant intervention, but Iraq, and Syria or Iran, for example, do, while things like Bosnia and Kosovo were (and are) argued as questionable, then it looks to me like "preemptive intervention," and "humanitarian interventions" will be nothing more than window dressing.  It's essentially imperialism by another name, and I want no part of it.      

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Greetings Ivo,
I have several more questions and comments, which I wll post through the next week.
For now: 
1. To which other regional organizations do you refer? Aside from NATO that is. 
2. Which democratic states would make up the new coalition?
3.  Which body evaluates the legitimacy of & grants the authority for these regional organizations and coalition of democratic states to conduct a preventitive military action? Or will they be formed on an ad-hoc bases?  
4. Are you implying that we require yet another institution to deal with killing terrorists? 
I gather that there are many agencies now. I'm worried on this score, given the recent publicity about those camps in Europe as well as the adjudication of the Padilla and Hamdi cases.
5. Finally, to which 'agreed upon standards' do you refer? The December 2004 Panel Report? If so, how much more UN discussion has transpired about Panel's recommendations? The President of the General Assembly said that more discussion was in the making.
SD  


 
 

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Mr.  Daalder,

This essay seems to run a lot of things together that should be kept conceptually swparate.  Because it fails to distinguish consistently importantly different kinds of intervention, it fails to address head on the troubling issue of preventive war.  We might provisionally break interventions down into two specific categories, and one catch-all category:

1. Preemptive war

2. Preventive War

3. Other kinds of armed interventions undertaken for other kinds of reasons

Preemtion occurs when one attacks an adversary that poses an immediate threat - one that is preparing an attack against you, an attack which is imminent.  Preemption is generally recognized as legitimate - the degree of legitimacy going with the degree of imminence.


A preventive war is a war launched against a merely potential threat, in asituation where there is no immediate danger of an attack from that potential threat.  Defenders of preventive war think we should sometimes attack other countries that are neither attacking us, nor organizing and preparing (in any serious way beyond the contingency paln statge) an attack against us.

General acceptance of the propriety of preventive war would indeed be a recipe for anarchy, since the world is full of rivals who are potential adversaries.

But many of the sorts of interventions you describe are neither preemptive wars nor preventive wars in the generally accepted sense.  If you invade a poor and ineptly governed country to prevent a militia from carrying out a massacre against its own people, few would call this a "preventive war".  In such a case, it is unlikely that the poor country poses even a potential, long-term threat.

Of course, just about any kind of armed intervention at all can be dressed up by propagandists as an exercise in "preventive self-defense", since one can always choose to see the bad situation you are attempting to rectify as a "breeding ground for terrorists" or some other hyperbolical threat.  Some global germophobes might be inclined to view everything bad in the world as a dangerous contamination, and might argue that until the world is totally cleased we are all at risk from innumerable threats.

But this is not what the debate about preventive war was all about.  That debate was specifically about attacking states because of the perception of their potential to develop into dangerous adversaries, with the capacity to attack us in the future.

leaving out the humanitarian interventions, disease quarantines and other actions you contemplate, should we understand you as defending the legitimacy of preventive war? 

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Hopefully we can prevent genocide & war through some appeal to monitoring the rhetoric that leads up to it. There is a method to its madness. 
See
http://www.paulbrass.com
SDaniels

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Precisely what Mr. Dalder advocates.  If you don't like the verdict in the trial, move the venue and have a new trial.  How long will it be before we are trying to make nice with the OAS to legitimize our foolishness?

Dalder, IMHO, you are just way off the mark.  If you want to know why the UN doesn't work, just look at the frame of your post- it doesn't work fast enough for us.  When have we supplied leadership?  Was our UN Rep making an impassioned plea for the people in Rwanda?  Have we made an impassioned plea for the women and children of Darfur?  Has our President made anything more than a begrudging, going-through-the-motions swipe at the UN?  Did the UN body pretty much have it right when they were so skeptical about our Iraq claims?

If you want to know why the UN doesn't work for us, the answer is pretty simple:

They aren't our employee- they aren't supposed to work for us. We are supposed to work for the principle and the greater good of humanity.

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I'm glad you raised these additional points, some of which I was going to tackle later in the week. Heck, this makes me want to go work for the UN. That commute into the city is the pits though. I'll have to weigh the merits and demerits to such an option. 

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Also what makes anyone think that a 'limited' intervention can halt disease? What happened to an alternative, like a good old fashioned quarantine, for crying out loud? Or will soldiers be vaccinating by force-legitimate force? Oh man!
I'm going to bed! G'nite
SD

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I was glad to see Mr. Daalder refer to "Bush's  DOCTRINE of preemption." Not one of those nasty little wars of aggression to rearrange the oil and power in the middle East. That is the sort of things the "other" uncivilized nations do to achieve the goals they want when they have overwhelming power. Daalder and his academic colleagues dress it up so nice. We can also discuss the justifications for torture, maybe the "Bush doctrine on coercive interrogations" made popular by Dershowitz and Yoo. I am sure that the "Bush doctrine on the necessary use of concentration camps" probably shouldn't be jettisoned entirely as Mr. Daalder and others might even come up with a sensible scenario where they might be the more "benign" alternative to hypothetical disaste. Oh but in this last case didn't the Nazis euphemize  their  "concentration camp doctrine" ("Arbeit macht frei"). Gee even they knew how to dress up odious policy. No, Mr. Daalder there is no need for a preemption "doctrine". There are mechanisms which do exist for such problems (as in the UN) and any powerful country that feels its existence truly threatened will always exercise preemptive acts; there is a need not to glorify or encode such things but to try to stigmatize them and minimize their use. Ditto for torture. Ditto for the use of chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons. (Note the US has used nuclear weapons on primarily civilian targets; it has used napalm and now white phosphorous), the CIA uses torture and renditions. Yet in all of this, Mr Daalder is worried about the Bush doctrine of "preemptive war" being a casualty of Iraq. This is one strange world.

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"In September, the UN members embraced the idea that states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from genocide, mass killing, and other gross violations of human rights. The same logic suggests that states also have a responsibility to prevent developments on their territory that pose a threat to the security of others -- such as developments relating to weapons of mass destruction (like their acquisition or the failure to secure weapons, materials, or deadly agents against possible theft or diversion); the harboring, support, or training of terrorists; or environmental dangers (like failing to prevent the spread of dangerous diseases or the destruction of the rain forest)."

I am a big proponent of the emerging Responsibility to Protect , but I think you've twisted it almost beyond recognition. The logic that argues that the international community can act to prevent or halt genocide is not the same logic that would argue for a militarized response to environmental degredation and potential pandemics. The Responsibility to Protect is predicated on international human rights and humanitarian law and on the emerging concept of universal jurisdiction for genocide and other crimes against humanity. There is no such body of law in place for protection of the environment (Kyoto hardly qualifies in this regard) or disease response.

The underlying premise of your post is that military intervention is effective. I believe, that this is by no means a settled point. Even humanitarian interventions have a decidedly mixed record. It seems to me that the very suggestion that military intervention could be an effective way to protect the environment is ludicrous on its face. Not only is it completely untenable in the domestic and international political reality we inhabit, it is also ridiculous on its own merits - war is an extremely destructive project, and is hardly suited for protecting the land on which it is fought (e.g burning oil fields in Kuwait, depleted uranium, Hiroshima and Nagasaki).

War and disease also tend to go hand in hand. Military spending has a way of redistributing resources away from civilian use (especially in developing countries, but also in the U.S.), and the practice of war has a way of drastically limiting civilian access to humanitarian resources (witness Darfur). Guns, bullets, and bombs cannot possibly create a suitable climate for responding to an emerging pandemic. Further, if recent history is any guide, the country that would most likely need to be prodded into a better response to an emerging disease would be China - are you really suggesting that the best course of action if (when?) bird flu mutates into a disease targetting humans might be to invade China to get them to react faster?

You also lament the weakness of the UN in responding to global crises. But the problem at the UN isn't structural, it is very much political. No amount of institutional reform will change the fact that there is often insufficient political will among the major players to deal with the types of crisis you cite. For instance, you complain that the UN has not been active enough in Darfur. Since you have ignored the fact that the UN has a considerable humanitarian presence on the ground responding daily to the crisis there (an effort that is chronically underfunded by funding countries), and that the UN is actively backing a peace process between the major parties, I presume that you are referring to the absence of a UN force (I'm assuming too that the UN-authorized African Union force doesn't count for you either?). The absence of blue helmets in Darfur is not a symptom of UN incompetence, but of a lack of political will on the part of Security Council members. The U.S. talks the big talk about genocide in Darfur, but is in no hurry to do anything about it - through the UN or otherwise. Other Council members, notably China, are none to excited about the emergence of conditional sovereignty, and tend to resist humanitarian interventions across the board - a problem that would not go away if the Security Council was marginalized.

You can get all agitated about the UN, but the political problems it faces aren't going to go away if regional bodies or 'coalitions of democracies' are empowered to act military without UN sanction - in fact, I think your political (and military) problems would only multiply.

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This appears to be just another "face" to the "Vulcan Philosophy" on the use of force dressed up for liberal consumption. Protect the rain forest with military intervention. You gotta be kidding?

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Will Mr. Daalder please site a couple of examples of pre-emptive wars that turned out well for the attacking country? If he can I may listen to his argument. But of course there has been no such thing. The argument is all fantasy.

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During the Cold War we essentially took war-making powers away from Congress, and under Emergency constructs, gave them to the executive.  We burped in 1974 with the War Powers Act, but neither that nor proceedures based on it really returned proper constitutional oversight and responsibility to congress. 

With Iraq we have illustration of Preemption within that construct as Bush re-cast it as Bush Doctrine.  What we now know is that Congress received little relevant intelligence in a timely way, congress had no possibility for debate and consideration, and the folk who elect congresscritters also had no access to useful intelligence or a reasoned debate. 

The only way Preemption could ever work in our democracy where afterall some citizens have to fight these wars, and all of us have to help pay for them -- is to resolve what was not resolved in the 47-48 period when what was assumed an emergency national security state was roughed together. 

If your argument does not get back to these constitutional basics and offer something useful given out experience throughout the Cold War and now with Mess-o-potamia, you are not getting there. 

In fact, I'll even steal the slogan -- "No Premption without Representation." 

Why can't we just have as sane reasonable policy that targets terrorists like Bin Laden instead of targeting nation-states. The Japanese launched Pearl Harbor to preempt the US from becoming the predominant power in the Pacific. We didn't see that as very reasonable, did we.

History lesson for the teacher. The Japanese attacked to prevent us from being able to stop them, in their imperialism, and no that wasn't reasonable. We attacked the Taliban Government in Afghanistan when they refused to turn over Osama, or shut down the terrorist training centers. We attacked Sadaam's regime when he failed to comply with the security counsel resolutions, and the cease fire agreements reached after he invaded Kuwait. We told him we were coming if he did not comply. We lined up and said "we are really serious here" (he chose to listen to Dominique de Villapan and think Bush was "blustering." He was wrong.

Other people in the world think we are loony and scary when we talk about this kind of kooky stuff.

Maybe that's why ole Momar Khadafi gave up his weapons programs so quickly after the fall of Sadaam (I know, I'm sure he would have done that too if we had just sat back and let those sanctions work for another week, everthing would have changed peacefully).

Then we can go back to a rational containment policy that served us well since the the times of George Kennan

Isn't the containment policy of Mr. Kennan, the "birthplace" of this entire problem? Wan't it the alliances of the coldwar, that fueld the hatred of the US in the middle east? Isn't this where Sadaam got his "chemical weapons" and shook hands with Donald Rumsfeld. Then we supplied weapons to the Mujahadeen and gave Al-Qaeda its start. Remember? I'm not making this stuff up, it's found in numerous postings (not by me) all over this site.

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I think the point that the effectiveness of preemptive military action is questionable has been raised successfully by some of the other responses (and history).  What are the preferable options to disolving or changing regimes with poor humanitarian records?  Are trade sanctions useful?  Are there steps that we could take that would reward desirable behavior rather than simply looking to punish the evil doers?  Are there policies that would work that don't involve killing people? 

These aren't rhetorical questions.  I never tire of criticizing this administration, but I'd like to have a viable alternative for spurring change that would function without military invasions.  I'm violently opposed to war.  

avatar Thank you Mr. Daalder for reminding us that in fashioning the greatest strategic folly of our time,  the Bush Neocons did not act alone.   They had, in you and your fellow liberal hawks, willing accomplices, forebears of disaster.  Accomplices who, even now shamelessly flaunt the old pre-war sophistry, without apology or shame.


Nor should one underestimate the geographic expansion of legitimate intervention zones. Because any desert and any jungle can harbor a fac­tory for weapons of terror, a superpower must have eyes everywhere in order to be tranquil at home. Every attack it launches on the other side of the world becomes an act of self-defense, and it is therefore possible to be both neo-isolationist and omni-interventionist, as the defensive perimeters of Los Angeles and Chicago are now situated in sub-Saharan Africa, the Red Sea, and perhaps, tomorrow,


You title your comment "the future of preemption" yet in the very first paragraph we see that title for the rhetorical ruse it so clearly is. There you speak not of premption but prevention. Premptiive war rests, as the UN has recognized, upon the bedrock of national self defense. Preventive war is something else entirely and although you know this full well, you employ the two interchangeablity throughout.  Let's be clear what you are about. Let's be clear that you wittingly conflate to confuse, to obsure the discredited, immoral foundation which differentiates legitimate preventtive war from its bastard distant cousin, preventive war.

We see this sleight of hand in the first paragraph:

Among the many casualties of the Iraq War may well be the Bush doctrine of preemption. While many will greet the apparent death of preemption with relief, it would be unfortunate if the entire concept were abandoned. For the problem with the Bush strategy has been less the idea of preventive force, than its unilateral application. Unilateral, preventive wars of regime change should rightly be relegated to the past. But circumstances will arise in the future where policy makers will want to have the option of using force preventively -- be it to kill terrorists, prevent weapons proliferation, halt genocidal killing, stop the spread of deadly disease, or deal with other such dangers. The proper task, then, is not to bury the concept, but to make it a more limited and more legitimate tool for addressing new security threats.

If, as you claim the proper task is not to bury the concept of preemption, why do you do so consistently from the outset?  You know the answer as well as I do. Preemptive war is morally justifiable as self defense and perforce is subject to strict requirements, the traditional just war strictures, without which preemptive war becomes preventive war, an act of national self defense becomes the moral equivalent of mass murder and that is the policy you wish to sanction by sleight of hand.

This becomes apparent in your sloppy list of "threats" which as quoted range from actual killings in progress as in Kosovo to harboring "terrorists" and even to killing rain forests. That last left me wondering just what might a proportional response to US global warming involve? EU blockade of US ports?  Nuclear attack?  Greenpeace?>

This is not a matter of changed international conditions. This is about the difference between morally justifiable killing on a mass scale and morally reprehensible mass murder.




You seek cover to the latter by means of deliberate deception. I get the message  and won't let you get away with it:

<h3 align="center">Principles of the Just War</h3&gt
  • A just war can only be waged as a last resort. All non-violent options must be exhausted before the use of force can be justified.
  • A war is just only if it is waged by a legitimate authority. Even just causes cannot be served by actions taken by individuals or groups who do not constitute an authority sanctioned by whatever the society and outsiders to the society deem legitimate.
  • A just war can only be fought to redress a wrong suffered (or imminently threatened). Whether acutal or threatened the risk of harm must be lasting grave and certain. For example, self-defense against an armed attack is always considered to be a just cause (although the justice of the cause is not sufficient--see point #4). Further, a just war can only be fought with "right" intentions: the only permissible objective of a just war is to redress the injury.
  • A war can only be just if it is fought with a reasonable chance of success. Deaths and injury incurred in a hopeless cause are not morally justifiable.
  • The ultimate goal of a just war is to re-establish peace. More specifically, the peace established after the war must be preferable to the peace that would have prevailed if the war had not been fought.
  • The violence used in the war must be proportional to the injury suffered (or imminently threatened). States are prohibited from using force not necessary to attain the limited objective of addressing the injury suffered.
  • The weapons used in war must discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. Civilians are never permissible targets of war, and every effort must be taken to avoid killing civilians. The deaths of civilians are justified only if they are unavoidable victims of a deliberate attack on a military target



    Yet from your vague overbroad list of threats what you really seek is cover for aggressive endless wars of national aggrandizement. "Security threats" justify everything, they exclude nothing. You seek what Nesta Crawford of Brown, called a slippery  slope from preemption to preventive war,  
For example, the U.S. definition of the self to be defended has become very broad. The administration, in its most recent Quadrennial Defense Review, defines “enduring national interests” as including “contributing to economic well-being,” which entails maintaining “vitality and productivity of the global economy” and “access to key markets and strategic resources.” Further, the goal of U.S. strategy, according to this document, is to maintain “preeminence.”<sup>6</sup&gt The National Security Strategy also fuses ambitious political and economic goals with security: “The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the fusion of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better.” And “today the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing.”<sup>7</sup&gt


If the self is defined so broadly and threats to this greater “self” are met with military force, at what point does self-defense begin to look like aggression? As Richard Betts has argued, “When security is defined in terms broader than protecting the near-term integrity of national sovereignty and borders, the distinction between offense and defense blurs hopelessly. . . . Security can be as insatiable an appetite as acquisitiveness—there may never be enough buffers.”<sup>8</sup&gt The large self-conception of the United States could lead to a tendency to intervene everywhere that this greater self might conceivably be at risk of, for example, losing access to markets. Thus, a conception of the self that justifies legitimate preemption in self-defense must be narrowly confined to immediate risks to life and health within borders or to the life and health of citizens abroad.


Where indeed does self-defense begin to look like aggression? In Iraq, in your writings, on the pages of the Weekly Standard, the LA Times, the New Republic for truly the Neocon and Liberal Hawk are distinctions with very little difference.

Hopefully America will bury your gravely disordered concept of preventive war and right alongside, in the strategic rubble of the Iraq War the hucksters left and right ...They fooled us once.

  Only fools make the same mistake twice.  .

Note to KC...I bit tongue so hard it bleeds.

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 It is not a  matter of process.  Alliances of democracies? Democracies such as the US and Britain perhaps? Killed dozens of times more Iraqis than all "terror" attacks combinded in an illegal, immoral, and broadly condemned aggression. Representative governments are responsible?

It is not a matter of process it not a matter of logic abuilding either. Daalder refers to a point previously made & easily demolished by his own words no less:

The notion of conditional sovereignty is central to the emergence of a new norm of state responsibility.

1. In September, the UN members embraced the idea that states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from genocide, mass killing, and other gross violations of human rights.


2.  The same logic suggests that states also have a responsibility to prevent developments on their territory that pose a threat to the security of others -- such as developments relating to weapons of mass destruction (like their acquisition or the failure to secure weapons, materials, or deadly agents against possible theft or diversion); the harboring, support, or training of terrorists; or environmental dangers (like failing to prevent the spread of dangerous diseases or the destruction of the rain forest).



The logic of the first undermines the entirety of the second.  Actual mass killings, gross human rights vioations and mere threats are hardly equivalent. The duty in the first is narrower than the second...Yet duty does not follow ability does it?

Bush has built nothing. Daalder's built a logic fallacy. to cover aggressions yet to fail


 

Many posts have dwelt on Daalder's discussion of environmental and public health threats as the basis for prevention.  I'm not clear what the intention was in bringing these up: is Daalder really suggesting military action to address pandemics, acid rain or the desecration of the rainforest?  Because this seems outlandish and overweening to me, I guess I assumed that he had in mind some less severe violations of state soverignty.  I'm not sure what these might be, or whether there are international legal mechanisms in the offing to make them possible.  But I just don't see the OAS invading Brazil.  And I don't see anyone sending troops in to China (or the U.S.) to curb those greenhous gases.  

For what it's worth, it seems to me that there are gradations in what a preemption could be that might make the discussion clearer:

1. Preemptive or Preventive War (and whatever else) - where the goal is military action targeting the state itself.

2. Humanitarian (or environmental??) intervention - military action where the goal is not war with a nation, and where such conflict may or may not be avoidable.

3. Non-military intervention - UN inspections regimes would be the clearest model; perhaps as international law develops, similar mechanisms will come into being for the other kinds of threats Daalder discusses. 

avatar Thanks JMACSF for another well thought out post. Take care of that tongue. This Daalder post had me taking a cold shower to cool off. I would love to hear Daalder's take on the Dershowitz-Yoo theory of justifiable torture. I am sure he has found a way to disapprove, but not throw away such an important "tool" that he, once installed as a Democratic security analyst might want to use (only for the bestof purposes of course...not like Bushco.) One has to ask Daalder et.al. also, what elements in the Nazi-playbook, can we absolutely dispense with?
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Whoa!  I'm reunited with my commentating buddies, once again. Thank goodness! Thanks for being here. Gosh, WHAT A RELIEF! I have felt like a caged bird here in DC.
There is hope yet. 


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I would suggest that the problem is not  preemptive or preventive war versus reactive war or defensive war.  The problem is limited war or a political war versus total war.


In one of the great ironies the Right and the Left share a view that the people of countries we find, for whatever reason, objectionable, but the leadership is evil.  Decapitate the leadership or avoid harming the people and you have the moral basis for war.  


The problem with this theory is that it seems faulty on the ground and it is inconsistent with American character.  I point out that the insurgency according to Joe Klein is as a result of Saddem Hussein organizing and paying his Sunni supporters. Needless to say we could bring it to an end in the same way we brought German and Japanese resistence to an end.  (Please don't tell me that this is not WWII, I know)


However, neither Right nor Left wants to destroy Iraq and then rebuild it.  It would seem to me that Americans need a debate not about when we start wars but about the type of wars we choose to fight and how we think about the people we fight.  Was Saddem imposed on his people or was he an organic outgrowth of Iraq?  

tlees2:

 By calling Iraq a "nation-state" I'm assuming, then, that you acknowledged Saddam Hussein as the legitimate leader of Iraq despite the fact that he was every bit the terrorist that Bin Laden is.  Hussein, in fact, came to power as a common street criminal; which is precisely why he was not recognized by most nations.

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No doctrine of national security can be democratic, safe or effective if a blank check of war powers is handed to the White House. This outrageously unamerican and terrifying trend has got to be stopped before any new doctrine, most especially preemption, can be adopted.

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Yes chschmitt, there are. I'm formulating the constructs to be cascaded, although I admit that I paid little heed to the less than transparent means used to pillory and twist past constructs into a tortured paradigm for the future. I've been a wound up bundle of naivity for a very long time. I'm learning.  

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The Security Council remains the preferred vehicle for authorizing such action, because since the end of the Cold War it has emerged as the most legitimate forum for deciding these questions.....Yet, even as it has acted more frequently, states have not always been able to count on the Council to make timely decisions.


I think I'd like to quote Mick Jagger: you can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need.


It's very clear to me. Either you're for unilateralism or you're for trying this thing progress, community of nations stuff, whether it's the U.N. or something new and different in the future.


You don't like the results of the system you're working at, keep working at it. Don't have a temper tantrum and sulk off to do your own thing.


China doesn't agree something should be done about this or that potential genocidal situation and you think they are wrong? Well, tough. Work at it, like grown-ups. History might show that China was right and you were wrong, that intervening would have made things worse.


Can't you see the clarity of the difference between Gulf War I and Gulf War II? There is strength in numbers, there is wisdom in numbers. Yes, history shows frenzies can happen with coalitions of nations states, that the world can go mad. But there is much much more danger of madness in unilateralism. Checks and balances, you know? What else is there?


How can you even consider anything else? Rule of law! If it's wrong sometimes, it's wrong sometimes. Mistakes will be made, but it's the best answer humankind can present so far.


Suggestion to go back and read some Dag Hammarskjold for inspiration.

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At one time I thought that this was largely a matter of Congress endowing more and more powers to the President. It is really far more complicated than that explanation can cover. Perhaps at one time, the explanation made more sense. However, in a generalized sense, I think it has lost some of its utility, which is not to say that it is not so in its particulars.  

I'm generally in agreement with Ivo on matters of humanitarian intervention, but advocacy for preventive war troubles me.

I think Ivo is correct that there may be future situations that call for military action even though they don't rise to the standard of imminent threat that justifies preemptive war.  To my mind, these need to be situations where the feared outcome is probable, and utterly catastrophic in the relatively short-term (so that you can't take a slower, nonmilitary approach - this proviso would rule out military action to solve any environmental problem I can imagine).

But surely, the kind of situation that calls for such strong stuff will be exceedingly rare, and I wonder if building legal mechanisms to justify it is the right way to approach it.  

Suppose the statistics play out such that we can be assured that one such situation will arise every 25 years (that strikes me as unrealistically frequent).  Do we really need to bend international law to accommodate that?  Further, once we build the deliberative system to make preventive war possible, shouldn't we be concerned that its existence is a sort of invitation to potential aggressors to hide more nefarious designs by seeking justification for 'preventive' war? 

On the other hand, if we have no such system, and preventive war remains outside the law, it seems to me that the diplomatic community can devise ad hoc responses on the occasions where some nation sees fit to launch a preventive war. Steps to take would range from relatively toothless condemnations to sanctions to a coordinated military response like in the first Gulf War.  But to the extent that a nation can demonstrate that the threat was probable, catastrophic, and sudden once launched, the international community might judge that taking no action is appropriate. 

It seems to me that preventive war is such an extreme measure that should remain outside the law.  But, as with individuals, justice may require bending the rules sometimes to account for self-defense.

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The US should reaffirm to the world that it is bound by the UN Charter, and that the US has no right to act as a vigilante or as the world’s policeman.
The US should renounce hegemony and work for an egalitarian UN. (Or stop blathering about democracy.)
The US should seek a UN-led reconstruction of Iraq, the mid-East, and indeed the entire world. It is a crime that half the planet is living in squalor.

JMACSF:

 It would appear as if the United States war in Iraq is justified by six of your seven points.  Only point one, regarding the need for last resort, can be legitimately argued as not being in compliance with U.S. actions.

Point 2:  Clearly the United States government is as legitimate authority as exists in the entire world.

Point 3:  Undoubtedly Saddam Hussein's support of Hezbollah and Hamas clearly add to the epistemology of hate being promulgated by Al Qaeda following the 9/11 attacks.  Furthermore, there was no way of knowing if terror attacks were already in planning for other U.S. sites or those of our allies.

Point 4:  Clearly the U.S. had a very good chance of defeating the army of Saddam Hussein.  Indeed, Mr. Hussein's standing army had been defeated in well under 1 month.  The insurgency and foreign fighters presently in Iraq cannot be considered in the same breath as Mr. Hussein's common army.

Point 5:  The entire purpose of the war is to eradicate terrorists and their enablers.  If Saddam Hussein was not housing terrorists in his nation, he was certainly funding them.

Point 6:  Although Iraq had not personally "injured" the United States, it is the "imminent threat" clause which is of use here.  By funding Hamas and Hezbollah, Mr. Hussein was feading an insurgency who's main aim was manipulating allies of the United States.  A look at the Israeli/Palastinian conflict will provide just reasoning.

Point 7:  All collateral damage is purely accidental.  Indeed, as was seen by Saddam Hussein in years past, mixing his militants with women and children was a common strategy; as was filling his palaces with the latter so as to prevent military air strikes.  The U.S. relies on covert/special operations to limit any collateral damage.
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The original post is a policy in search of a problem.  The reason the vast majority of the world did not support us in Iraq had nothing to do with lack of an applicable policy on the part of the UN.  It had everything to do with a rogue government intent on commiting violnce on a massive scale in order to satisfy certain domestic political (9/11 revenge), geopolitical (enchancement of security for Israel, i.e. "remaking of the Middle East"), and economic (oil) interests. 

Arguing on favor of preemptive war only serves to make war more likely as an option, when it should make it less likely to be so used.  Criminal behavior by its definition can only be dealt with after the fact.  I, of course, qualify "criminal behavior" by including conspiratorial crimes, where intent and actions in furtherance of the contemplated bad act can be demonstrated. 

avatar Iraq you say?  I wasn't talking about Iraq in this post but rather attempting to illustrate the fundamental differences between a preventive war and preemptive one and why it was necessary for Mr. Daalder to employ all of his considerable tricks of logical legerdermain to make them disappear.
Nonetheless in the holiday spirit of giving...
Looks like you lost the game before you even started to play....Pickett's Charge mean anything to you?
All requirements apply at one and the same time...

But I got game,  I shall play
Let's do it Letterman style

#7 - All collateral damage is purely accidental
In your Lincoln Group press releases and Green Zoned dreams perhaps.
With 500 pound bombs and thermobaric weapons that even make Marines squeamish, collateral damage is inevitable as of course it also is with white phosphorous, with armor, with mortar and small arms fired into urban combat zones...
We are speaking of course here of an issue that is tangential to the immorality ad bello of preventive, pretextual war of the sort Mr. Daalder advocates. Strictly speaking the conduct of the war is something else...that said..
It is also inevitable in the course of counterinsurgencies and this one is no exception:
What our opponents are doing is brilliantly simple. By relying mostly on IEDs to attack us, they have created a situation where our troops have no one to shoot back at. That, in turn, ramps up the troops’ frustration level to the point where two things happen: our morale collapses and our troops take their frustration out on the local population. Both results have strategic significance, and at least the potential of being strategically decisive, the first because it affects American home front morale and the second because it drives the local population to identify with the insurgents instead of the government we are trying to support.
......

The second operational effect, getting U.S. troops to take out their frustration on the local population, was illustrated in what an officer whose unit recently came back from Iraq said to me. “We were hit 3000 times and in only fifteen of those attacks did we have anyone to shoot back at,” he told me. He quoted another officer in the battalion who had gone out on patrol many times as saying, “We are worse than the SS in the way we are treating these people,” meaning Iraqi civilians. This is a classic result of “the war of the flea:” as morale collapses, so does discipline, and poorly disciplined troops often treat local civilians badly. Operational IED's
Happens all the time but don't tell your Swiftboating friends.
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Ivo's attempt to blur the distinction between pre-emptive and preventative war is inexcusable. Recall that the latter was known as "anticpatory self-defense" and condemned as a war crime by the Nuremberg tribunal.


I'm with JMACSF on this one.


And to think that Steve Clemons suggested that  Ivo succeed Brookings VP and Foreign Policy Director James Steinberg.


What was he thinking?

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So, is it ok for European states to start a preventative war against us to stop that?

Not so far fetched.  The naive idea that we can continue to be the world's unilateral super bully without provoking the time honored tradition of alliances against bullies is just one of the neocon utopian fantasies. 

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Additionally, the rest of the world, having cooler heads more amenable to objective review of facts, did not believe in faith-based WMD.  They expected a nation with our power and our devotion to intelligence agencies to produce some facts before shock and awe bombing and invasion.  The preemptive (really preventive) war theory promotes cowboy, shoot from the hip, foreign policy and there are even worse things we have the power to do than Iraq -- and I no longer trust my government not to do them.

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The concern voiced about the future and possibilities of the UN is one I have been seeing in a lot of literature lately; specifically, Francis Fukuyama and G. John Ikenberry make a similar shift to regional organizations as a smaller point in their  PPNS report of the Working Group on Grand Strategic Choices.  I have a hard time accepting a willingness to push the UN aside in favor of smaller regional multilaterals.  Obviously the UN needs A LOT of reform, noone would argue otherwise.  However, it has been and remains the only institution that brings every country in the world to the table.  It is the only forum for multilateral discussion and decision-making in which no country is excluded and in which states like those in the group of 77 can have a strong voice.  I agree that regional multilateral institutions are an important part of creating an interconnected world to realize security and economic goals, but I strongly believe that the UN is not to be pushed aside and has an important role to play.  Even if we only look at its symbolic role, it is important in that it is the only truly global international institution, and as long as it survives, so will the norms of international cooperation it represents.

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Very Nice.  Wonder why preemptive war, or rather attack, is not simply considered a stratagem, not a strategy, let alone a policy. . . but I guess that takes all the fun away.

Also in dealing with non-state entities that engage in violent acts, why give them legitimacy by referring to their actions as "war"?  Why not keep the definition more limited?  I was one of the ones arguing for use of the term "war" in connection with 9/11, but I don't think so any more.  We would have been better off dealing with it as a police/intel matter and leaving the military out of it, at least for the most part.

Just finished Rupert Smith's Utility of Force - highly recommended. . . 

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Actually his first glimpse of power came in 1963 when he was part of a CIA supported coup. The guy's a mass murderer. However, we were sold this war as something that had to be done in March 2003 without another UN resolution because we were on the verge of being attacked. That was bogus and the Bushies knew it. That war was launched for a variety of reasons. Wolfowitz even said they pushed the WMD angle because they thought it would be the most effective argument.

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Actually, Hussein did comply with the resolution that the weapons inspectors be allowed to re-enter Iraq and check where they wanted. The UN didn't find anything & asked for more time. The UN was right. He had no WMD. We were wrong, even though Rummy knew exactly where the WMD were hidden. This war is illegal and immoral. Try Hussein as a war criminal. Also try Cheney, Bush, and the entire WHIG group as war criminals.

Actually, Hussein did comply with the resolution that the weapons inspectors be allowed to re-enter Iraq and check where they wanted. The UN didn't find anything & asked for more time.

Sorry, wrong again UN Security Counsel Resolution 1441 clearly reads:
...Iraq did not provide an accurate, full, final and complete disclosure...of all aspects of its WMD and ballistic missle weapons, production facilities locations...that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to sites by UNSCOM and IAEA... and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA...Iraq has been and remains in material breech of its obligations... (and here's the best part) to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations...the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations...

Sadaam didn't take his final opportunity, he did not comply, and certainly never let inspectors "check where they wanted."  Again, it's fact, it's history, it can't be changed to make your point mpre feasable.
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1441%2
0(2002)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC

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Not correct. The reason Bush didn't go to the UN for another resolution to invade Iraq was that he knew in spite of all his bribery and bullying he wasn't going to be able to sell this to the UN Security Council. Hussein had let the UN inspectors in and they found nothing . Bush wanted to invade in March because of the climate cahnge coming if he waited longer.

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Ivo,congrats on a good article. it's thoughtful and nuanced and courageous given the inevitable reaction from certain quarters, some of which is on display here. it's important that moderates like yourself and Jim stand up to the Deans and other more radical elements of the party if we're ever to get back into power and be in a position to govern responsibly.

Not correct. The reason Bush didn't go to the UN for another resolution to invade Iraq was that he knew in spite of all his bribery and bullying he wasn't going to be able to sell this to the UN Security Council. Hussein had let the UN inspectors in and they found nothing .

You can't just say "not correct." Well you can but it doesn't make it true. Security Counsel resolution 1441 exists, I have provided you a link. Simply read it. It's true that Bush didn't go back to the UN to get a vote to invade, however that doesn't change the fact that Iraq was in violation of the resolution for not providing a complete accounting, and not providing unfetterd access to the inspectors. That, again is what we call a fact. It is irrefutable (that means you can't just say "not correct").

P.S. 1441 also said not taking the final opportunity could lead to serious consequences i.e. removal of your regiem.

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" By calling Iraq a "nation-state" I'm assuming, then, that you acknowledged Saddam Hussein as the legitimate leader of Iraq despite the fact that he was every bit the terrorist that Bin Laden is.  Hussein, in fact, came to power as a common street criminal; which is precisely why he was not recognized by most nations. "

Gettysburg: what is saddam's terroristhistory? Do words matter? Whatare you talking about? He was not recognized by most nations? Which ones? The United States recognized his regime and did business with him. What are you talking about?

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"The original post is a policy in search of a problem. " I strongly agree. This post of Mr Daalder suffers from its concern for form over substance. Having spent my life in academia, it distresses me no end to come upon such an arid academic exercise when the world is going to hell on the Bush Express.

People tend to forget the reason why the UN Security Council rejected the call to arms by Bush.  France had lucrative oil contracts with the Hussein Government for their northern oil fields.  Chirac knew that with a diposed Saddam Hussein, those contracts would likely be null and void in the eyes of the United States.  In point of fact, notice how China and Russia, who were both AGAINST using force, merely abstained from voting rather than using their veto.  France, realizing they were going to lose billions of dollars in oil revenue, decided to bring the U.S. down with them.  Had they not vetoed the UN vote, it likely would have passed.  And the irony is terrific when noting that France was outraged when the U.S. did not let any of their companies bid for Iraqi reconstruction contracts.  Bravo Mr. Bush!

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I'm probably more hawkish than most people on this thread but i'm sorry, this comment (about France being motivated by oil) is just plain silly and as ill informed as remarks about the US being similarly driven. French trade with Iraq constituted only a tiny fraction of a fraction of French interests. trade with the US was much more important. Moreover, if France only wanted the contracts I'm sure the Bush admin would have given them a disproportionate slice of the action in exchange for a vote. The fact of the matter is that France had a different strategic take on things, one that was more concerned about the precedent that would be set and likely future US behavior than with a threat from Saddam. Any knowledge of France and French politics would make this much obvious.

Architect

 I must admit I haven't heard of many French apologists lately.  To opine that the reason for French opposition was out of a desire for peace is out of the question.  And if they were, "concerned about the precedent that would be set and likely future US behavior," as you surmise, had they not vetoed the resolution it would have been an international operation, not the feared unilateral offensive by the U.S.  The oil contracts with Iraq were not small, and when taking into consideration the geographical size of France itself, made it even more lucrative.  To further illustrate Chirac's anti-U.S. plan, his courtship with Germany (who had no vote at the time) as well as constant lobbying with Russia (which ultimately failed because Putin abstained from voting) provides quantatative proof that Chirac wanted to create a seperate bloc within the free world astride of the United States.  He too ultimately failed, but he did succeed at tarnishing the character of George W. Bush.   

avatar We're  still hearing them.  We've heard at least 5-6 by my rought count since 2001.  Bush in his Naval Academy pep talk came up with another - "complete victory". The never ending chain of new pretexts for this war in Iraq reveals the fundamental weakness in Daalder's argument. In fact, it reveals it for what it is - an intellectual cover for naked aggression. Because that is what the Iraq War is - preventive war, transparent  aggression in which war aims only appear to change because the powers-that-be dare not tell us the truth.

While some may scoff at going to war against Brazil to save the rainforest, who could quarrel with stopping the mutation of a deadly pathogen from Iraq! Well, that's one reason we went to war in Iraq isn't it? Saddam's mad scientists working on bio terror in secret labs?  Who (other than Ken Pollack) knows what they might come up with?

The point is that once war aims and justification are allowed to be disconneced from the self-defense conceppt of "imminent threat of grave harm", anything is possible.  And ulitimately, as we now see,  this NeoCon/LibHawk trope underines the public support necessary to sustain the perpetural war that a preventive war easily becomes.

In this regard, consider article by David Westphal, One War: Many Rationales

"They had decided to go to war against Iraq before George Bush was elected," [Jimmy] Carter told reporters on his recent book tour.
Indeed, two months before the 2000 election, a prominent neoconservative think thank, Project for the New American Century, issued a report that made the case for a bigger military presence in the Middle East.
"The United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security," the report said. "While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein."
It's unclear to what extent Bush and his advisers saw long-term prospects for maintaining troops in Iraq. But Jay Garner, the first U.S. administrator in Iraq, told the National Journal in 2003 that Iraq would play the same "coaling station" role performed by the Philippines for the U.S. Navy during most of the 20th century.
"That's what Iraq is for the next few decades," he said, "our coaling station that gives us great presence in the Middle East."
The idea of having an American military footprint in Iraq has plenty of tangents. In his book, "Against All Enemies," Clarke said some administration officials sought it because it would strengthen Israel's military position; others feared a growing risk to American oil imports.
Whether U.S. officials remain hopeful of a long-term Iraq presence for American troops isn't clear. Officially, the White House says the troops will come home when the Iraqi military is strong enough to maintain stability.

The fundamental flaw in Daalder's rather confused analysis, purposely confused analysis, right there.

And right here:

The Bush administration’s arguments in favor of a preemptive doctrine rest on the view that warfare has been transformed. As Colin Powell argues, “It’s a different world . . . it’s a new kind of threat.”<sup>1</sup&gt And in several important respects, war has changed along the lines the administration suggests, although that transformation has been under way for at least the last ten to fifteen years. Unconventional adversaries prepared to wage unconventional war can conceal their movements, weapons, and immediate intentions and conduct devastating surprise attacks<sup>2</sup&gt. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, though not widely dispersed, are more readily available than they were in the recent past. And the everyday infrastructure of the United States can be turned against it as were the planes the terrorists hijacked on September 11, 2001. Further, the administration argues that we face enemies who “reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.”<sup>3</sup&gt Although vulnerability could certainly be reduced in many ways, it is impossible to achieve complete invulnerability.
Such vulnerability and fear, the argument goes, means the United States must take the offensive. Indeed, soon after the September 11, 2001, attacks, members of the Bush administration began equating self-defense with preemption:
The character of potential threats becomes extremely important in evaluating the legitimacy of the new preemption doctrine, and thus the assertion that the United States faces rogue enemies who oppose everything about the United States must be carefully evaluated - (Crawford 2003) The Slippery Slope to Preventive War,

Pickett's Charge was actually grounded in sound logic.  On July 2nd (the second day of Gettysburg), Lee sent Longstreet to hit the Union left while General Ewell was to his the right.  Longstreet bitterly protested such an action but carried out the order late in the afternoon and very nearly broke through the Union line--the exposed gap was plugged just in time by the 1st Minnesota, while Chamberlain and the 20th Maine held the heights of Little Round Top.  The point being, the next day, Lee reasoned that since he had hit both flanks hard the previous day, surely the Union center must be weakened in lieu of Meade sending reinforcements to the flanks.  Lee, for the one and only time in the war, was horribly mistaken.  He allowed George Pickett to send his eager, and as yet under-used division, men toward the Union center.  Meade had re-arranged his men accordingly as if anticipating Lee's move.  The result was the biggest Confederate disaster of the war--not necessarily in terms of casualties, but certainly for morale.

 The Iraq War, on the other hand, was intended to be fought, in the long run, as a Guerilla War.  The difference being the Pentagon thought it would be fought by actual Guerilla fighters--not roadside bombs. In this, the Pentagon made a huge mistake--like Lee did at Gettysburg.  The difference, however, is that the U.S. has almost infinite resources with which to wage war.  Iraqi troops are beginning to fight albeit slowly.  If U.S. soldiers are frustrated at not having anyone to fire back at, they should keep in mind that the sooner the Iraqi's are trained, the sooner they can leave and not have to worry about firing on anyone.

avatar Messrs Daalder and Steinberg begin:
"Among the many casualties of the Iraq War may well be the Bush doctrine of preemption" - a disingenuous, illogical, and dishonest start to an essay that gets rapidly worse.
In a transparent attempt to both describe a need for a "preemptive doctrine" where no need exists, and to resurrect their own sullied reputations, besmirched by their unprincipled flogging of this disasterous, pre-destined to fail war, they adopt a philosophical and political line all-too-typical of the neoconservative academic elite (or rather, neo-liberal warhawk elite...or is there really any difference??) who apparently learned all they need to know about foreign policy from all-night Risk sessions in high school.
Warhawks is perhaps too macho sounding a label for a class of ivory tower academics whose muddied thinking, delusions of grandeur, and penchant for crafting bad policy in search of a problem take into account precisely zero known history, military theory, or foreign policy experience.
First of all, the "right" to preemptive war is already incorporated in international law, and the Nuremberg and Geneva accords - nations under demonstrated imminent threat are already accorded the power and right to defend themselves.
Second, is