Where's Muqtada?
Press coverage of Muqtada al-Sadr has been shockingly scant over the past year or so. My guess is that this is because the US government basically doesn't want to think about him, and as Robin Wright's recent article makes clear, it's hard for western reporters in Iraq to move far outside official circles nowadays. Be that as it may, Edward Wong has a fascinating look at his growing influence in today's New York Times:
Men loyal to Moktada al-Sadr piled out of their cars at a plantation near Baghdad on a recent morning, bristling with Kalashnikov rifles and eager to exact vengeance on the Sunni Arab fighters who had butchered one of their Shiite militia brothers. . . .
. Sadr has made no move to disband his militia, the thousands-strong Mahdi Army. In recent weeks, factions of the militia have brazenly assaulted and abducted Sunni Arabs, rival Shiite groups, journalists and British-led forces in the south, where Mr. Sadr has a zealous following. At least 19 foreign soldiers and security contractors have been killed there since late summer, mostly by roadside bombs planted by Shiite militiamen who use Iranian technology, British officers say. The latest killing took place Nov. 20 in Basra. . . .
Members of the Mahdi Army have also joined the police in large numbers, while retaining their loyalty to Mr. Sadr. Squad cars in Baghdad and southern cities cruise openly with pictures of Mr. Sadr taped to the windows. On Nov. 17, the American Embassy demanded that the Iraqi government prohibit private armies from controlling the Iraqi security forces, after American soldiers had found 169 malnourished prisoners, some of them tortured, in a Baghdad police prison reportedly under the command of a Shiite militia. . . .
Partly because of his uncompromising attitude, Mr. Sadr, who is in his early 30's, is immensely popular among impoverished Shiites. That has made him the most coveted ally of the governing Shiite parties as they head into the December elections. Mr. Sadr used this leverage to get 30 of his candidates on the Shiite coalition's slate, as many as the number allotted to each of the two main governing parties, the Dawa Islamic Party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
Mr. Sadr's aides have already negotiated with those parties for executive offices and ministry posts in the next government. Bahaa al-Aaraji, an influential Sadr loyalist who was secretary of the constitutional committee, said in an interview that Mr. Sadr had urged him to take an executive office after the elections.
Spencer Ackerman thinks Sadr may actually be the best hope for national reconciliation in Iraq, since he's a Shiite Arab with anti-American and nationalist sentiments that have allowed him to build some ties with anti-occupation Sunni Arabs. Only time will tell, I suppose. One way or another, this serves as just another reminder that much as the insurgent leaders may be black hats, that doesn't magically transform the leaders of the other side into inoccuous democratic sorts.
Or not.
November 26, 2005 1:38 PM | Reply | Permalink
Oh, it's a fine mess that Bush has dropped our troops into the middle of.
November 26, 2005 2:16 PM | Reply | Permalink
<span class="Apple-style-span">>> it might eventually make sense for all sides to reach a peace of exhaustion.<<
We won't get to that point until we leave. Until now most groups, including the jehadis, are focused on foreign troops. Once we are out of the picture, various possibilities can happen, including the three or more groups slugging it out until they reach some kind of steady state. Also, groups like the SCIRI, Mahdi and Sunni nationalists could very well unite against the jehadis.
</span>
November 26, 2005 2:41 PM | Reply | Permalink
Once we are out of the picture, various possibilities can happen, including the three or more groups slugging it out until they reach some kind of steady state. Also, groups like the SCIRI, Mahdi and Sunni nationalists could very well unite against the jehadis.
November 26, 2005 3:12 PM | Reply | Permalink
Right, and unless we leave, our troops will keep on dying and hundreds of billions of dollars will keep on going down the drain of this adventure.
Southern Iraq is already destined to be a mini-Iran, kind of like Lebanon became a Syrian playground. SCIRI, Dawa etc. spent enough time in Iran in exile to do too much that will go against Iranian wishes. Sadr is firmly entrenched in Iraq's future, we have beaten up his Mahdi army twice, and he just keeps on coming out strong, now he is rubbing shoulders with the other Shiite bigwigs.
Whatever the outcome, other than the Kurdish areas, we will have an anti-US Iraq in the near future. If we stay or not, it won't make a difference. Better to leave now.
Ultimately, let's see what we accomplished - we overthrew a dictator who was firmly boxed in, with little ability to do much damage in the Middle East or beyond, instead we now have a Sunni triangle that is a new center for international jehad, and we have a southern Iraq where pro-Iranian and anti-American militias rule the roost. And so what if its a democracy?
November 26, 2005 3:45 PM | Reply | Permalink
Re: <span class="Apple-style-span">Ultimately, let's see what we accomplished - we overthrew a dictator who was firmly boxed in, with little ability to do much damage in the Middle East or beyond, instead we now have a Sunni triangle that is a new center for international jehad, and we have a southern Iraq where pro-Iranian and anti-American militias rule the roost. And so what if its a democracy?</span>-----------
Actually from this point forward, we will be able to deal with whatever occurs.
Just to add, I was not a great fan of the containment & sanctions policies. Nor were many other analysts. In some part, the Iraq intervention was a less than optimum way to put an end to them. Assuming though that it was a way to close one chapter in Iraq's history, I think it is best to let the Iraqis determine their own destiny.
What I am less clear about is the make-up of the security forces because I have heard contradictory accounts. If indeed they are predominantly Shiites, then the make-up may pose a problem. Nor am I clear, at least anymore, about the kind of training they received. That may require more scrutiny.
November 26, 2005 4:25 PM | Reply | Permalink
Now that the debate seems to be over as to if we should withdraw, Democrats would be well served to explore how this tripartite division of the country can be realized in the near term. I assume the Pentagon has already gamed this scenario. These discussions need to start now for a 2006/2007 draw down.
Any other vision concerning the future of Iraq is nothing but a fantasy.
November 26, 2005 4:34 PM | Reply | Permalink
Was Sadr at any poiint kind of like was in the early days, Fidel Castro -- a guy we could have made into a useful figure -- or am I just being naive? I seem to remember the early, post invasion cocverage describing him as so charismatic that I was surprised we didn't try to influence him and sway him, if not to our side, then close enough that he could be useful.
November 26, 2005 5:37 PM | Reply | Permalink
I think there's more than a little truth to what you're saying, but I'm not so sure how Iraq can be neatly divided in the short term into three separate ethnic and religious enclaves when each section of the country is fairly diverse (to say nothing of multi-cultural Baghdad). The elephant in the room is that there is little reason for Iraq to exist other than the division of oil revenues, and while democratic states are to be sure less likely to go to war with each other, and the citizens of certain countries may be less likely to attack us when granted political freedom, the notion of democracy-as-panacea to the troubles of the twenty-first century strikes me as wildly naive.
What we are doing in Iraq today I think, much as what we have done in the former Yugoslavia (which looks set to become five separate nation-states) is not nation building but nation un-building. I detect distinctively little appetite in Iraq for the construction of strong national institutions and the subsuming of sectarian (ethnic, religious, and tribal) identities to a broader national identity (both of which have often been a brutal process for minorities within a country; just as the Jews of Europe or the Basques). Given the chance, it appears Iraqis are more inclined to dissolve their own country and their own responsibility to others outside their own tribe (in the broad sense of the word).
This fragmentation may not mean so much (at least in the near term) for America, but will almost certainly mean something for Iraqis. Apart from the obvious prospect of intra-national conflict, who or what - sans a strong national government and institutions - will protect the citizens of Iraq from some of the predatory forces - legitimate and illicit - of globalization? It seems to me that the rich and some of the middle class will be able to buy themselves protection from economic dislocation and rising crime in gated communities with private security, and there will likely be cohesive (often religious, and conservative) communities better able to whether the storm, but what about everyone else?
The old dystopias of the twentieth century were brtually repressive authoritarian states, but the vision of the post-cold war world brought to us by the New Apostles of Democracy really - and depravedly - ignores many of the rather dark forces shaping that world, sub-national forces (ethnic, tribal, religious, sectarian), and trans-national (economic, cultural, criminal, environmental, terrorist). The prospect that the average Iraqi will no longer be disappeared in the dead of night by state security forces, or drafted into some insane border war with a neigboring state must come as some relief, but it is a transitory comfort I think, and new realities - sectarian violence, exploding crime, disputes over land and water, the loss of state supports and job security, terrorism, environmental degradation (desertification, pollution, eroding top soil) leading to dislocation, refugee migrations, and conflict - will darken this new "utopia".
November 26, 2005 6:01 PM | Reply | Permalink
Look, there is no alternative outcome in Iraq other than a three part division of the country. Kurds, Sunni's and Shiites will support, kill, and die for this in numbers and with a commitment that the limited U.S. presence can only delay.
While I agree with the first sentence, I think that the second is wrong. Kurds want a partition, and the Shiite Arabs would be willing to have a partition (they would probably prefer to be in charge of everything, but could get along on their own), but the Sunni Arabs want a unified Iraq where they are in control (they would gain nothing in a partition, as they have little or no oil in what would be their section).
A partition may be the only way to keep the iraqis from killing each other, but I don't think that all three groups are activly pushing for it.
November 26, 2005 6:05 PM | Reply | Permalink
The problem is that American officials and all of the analysts believe America has some God-given right to invade a sovereign country that was not and never has been a threat to us in order to impose a government more to our liking. Of course, this is what the administration believed and the damage has been done.
The only discussion in D.C. is how to minimize our costs of blood and money while extracting our forces and rewriting it to save face. If that includes letting Sadr and other insurgents run free (remember, we were fighting him before), rehabilitating the spy and crook, Chalabi, screwing the Sunnis, ceding influence to Iran, and clearing the way for a future de facto partitioned state, so be it. As long as it can be spun as liberation.
November 26, 2005 6:07 PM | Reply | Permalink
Sorry, first paragraph should have been italicized, as I am quoting another poster.
November 26, 2005 6:10 PM | Reply | Permalink
Right now Coalition/Iraqi force are concentrated on offensives in Anbar. I expect we might see a campaign against the Shia militia in 2006 after they are finished mopping up in Anbar.
November 26, 2005 6:34 PM | Reply | Permalink
There aren't enough mops in the world to "mop up" all the unnecessary blood that is going to be spilled if we don't stop these counter-productve "mop up" opereations that simply create more insurgents.
November 26, 2005 7:44 PM | Reply | Permalink
In a way, I agree. Imbalances of power always lead to groups out of power using guerilla tactics and going for broke. Balances of power, at least, obvious balances of power like during the Cold War, lead to detentes and a fear of action on all sides. So, when you say "or not," you're quite right, since a failure of mutual fear can lead to catastrophic results, but you were also right to suggest the scenario, since mutual fear can also keep sides from taking any action at all. It's a big gamble, though. It almost failed so many times between the US and the Societ Union that the world was far too often at risk.
November 26, 2005 8:01 PM | Reply | Permalink
And, of course, this is the core and only issue. In my view, it is the source of almost all the violence that is happening in Iraq, and always has been. Until this point is successfully negotiated, everyone is whistling (and dying) in the wind.
What should the Sunni's be left with? Or better yet, what will they (whoever they are) accept. I realize this is fairly simplistic in the face of a complex set of motives from an international cast of actors. Still, I see it as the bottom line.
The U.S. (particularly Dem leaders) should now start pushing this negotiation.
November 26, 2005 9:14 PM | Reply | Permalink
But Najaf is a hardcore Dawa party stronghold. Sadr's main base is in Sadr city and Basra, which are both considerably larger than Najaf.
Sadr has quite a large following in Iraq, although there are certainly places where he isn't popular. Look more closely at the issue and Sadr's history before you post next time.
Ben P
November 26, 2005 10:24 PM | Reply | Permalink
I THINK I FOUND HIM:
MSNBC Home
November 27, 2005 3:58 AM | Reply | Permalink
I detect distinctively little appetite in Iraq for the construction of strong national institutions and the subsuming of sectarian (ethnic, religious, and tribal) identities to a broader national identity
Iraq already had those before we gleefully took them all apart to make way for the New and Improved Halliburton McGovernment.
I will admit to not even having a Bachelor's degree in anything but what would have been so difficult about marching into Iraq, picking a top general of their army, telling him he's our friend now and the new leader of Iraq and making sure the country didn't fall apart? I know, I know - the NeoCon dream of a corporate utopia. How'd that work out anyway?
November 27, 2005 5:27 AM | Reply | Permalink
Seems like you and te Neocons have a lot in common; although they're probably somewhat more liberal than you are.
November 27, 2005 7:04 AM | Reply | Permalink
If it's not too late already, I think individuals who have cross-cultural support, like Muqtada, could avoid the civil war that everyone says our occupation troops are preventing. As stated above, the occupation itself is creating the civil war.
And as was stated above, the fact that there are so many armed groups may convince the majority of "nationalists" of the futility of fighting among themselves and find a political solution between the Shia and the Sunni.
The Kurds, on the other hand, have been self-governing for more than a decade and are not going to give that up.
November 27, 2005 7:25 AM | Reply | Permalink
Re: <span class="Apple-style-span">The problem is that American officials and all of the analysts believe America has some God-given right to invade a sovereign country that was not and never has been a threat to us in order to impose a government more to our liking. Of course, this is what the administration believed and the damage has been done.</span><span class="Apple-style-span">------------</span><span class="Apple-style-span">In short, nearly all decision-makers were co-opted to endorse regime change. Reaching a consensus took about 8 to 10 years, if you retrace the conversations leading up to the 1998 Liberation of Iraq Act. </span><span class="Apple-style-span">
</span><span class="Apple-style-span">Still </span><span class="Apple-style-span">not much information was publicized before 1998, at least in a detailed way, for a post Saddam Iraq. I presume that the information may have been held as classified and, in the alternative, reflected confidence in Iraqi exile community recommendations. </span><span class="Apple-style-span">
</span><span class="Apple-style-span">Then in 2001 or so, </span><span class="Apple-style-span">decision makers, on both sides of the aisle, appeared to leap to a debate, a protacted and heady one, over the optimal number of troops to be deployed to Iraq, I posited that the decision to intervene was as much a test of the concept of 'transformation of the military' and what that might entail strategy-wise as well as a debate about civil vs. military control of theory and strategy. </span><span class="Apple-style-span">
</span><span class="Apple-style-span">These are just impressions. If I'm wrong in the whole or in the particulars, I add the caveat that I am not an expert in military or policy matters. </span>
November 27, 2005 7:31 AM | Reply | Permalink
I have no idea why my previous post looks like an apples full of holes. Yikes!
s
November 27, 2005 7:34 AM | Reply | Permalink
In his article, Mr. Ackerman says:
<span class="articlecontent">Sadr is nationalist enough for the nationalist insurgents and pious enough for the Islamists.</span>
While Sadr's rhetoric may be parallel to what those two groups espouse, they do not share Sadr's ultimate goals. As Ackerman points out, Sadr was sponsered by <span class="articlecontent">Grand ayatollah, Kazem Al Haeri</span>. Al Haeri is based in Qom and follows the Khomeinist teaching that clerics should run the state, adhering to the concept of Velayat-i Faqih.
Sunni Islamists may approve the centrality of Shari'a that such a regime would deliver but would never accept the governance of Shi'a Ayatollahs. A similar incompatibility prevents the agreement among the extreme "nationalists": They may agree that Iraq should be united by a strong central government but will never agree on who should administer it.
With these conditions in mind, the federalism that is being proposed in the constitution permits greater oppurtunities for mutual interest and compromise. Sadr may have a lot of influence now but I don't think he can really be a kingmaker because of the extent his strength depends on those who feel marginalized. If he becomes a part of the regime, he will lose that moral authority. If he stays outside the regime, his cronies will be purged from the government and he will only be the leader of a mob.
November 27, 2005 7:35 AM | Reply | Permalink
Since the occupation is recruiting Shia and Kurds to fight the Sunni, maybe the idea is to maintain a high level of sectarian strife so no Iraqi group will be able to defeat the occupation. Divide and conquer.
Of course Bush's first solution would have been to find another dictator to take Saddam's place that took orders from Washington. From the royal reception Chalabi got in Washington, maybe that's still the plan.
November 27, 2005 7:47 AM | Reply | Permalink
In one Brookings forum, J. Steinberg made a suggestion, which was to have C-Span like coverage of the Iraqi assemby process. Without somethng like that, I am somewhat hesitant to offer short or long term predictions. On the other hand, such coverage may reinforce the very same inclinations to control that are the subject of discussion here in the US.
In some sense, the question that continues to surface is:
Whether polarization and conformity through debates and deliberations are producing value added thinking for the future? I am not sure that we are. So that is something I am still wrestling with.
November 27, 2005 9:08 AM | Reply | Permalink
November 27, 2005 9:19 AM | Reply | Permalink
It's borne out by all of history. You are going to kill some innocents in these operations. Their relatives and others who observe this are going to turn against you. As soon as we leave these towns the former and the newly created insurgents come out of the woodwork. It's all pretty obvious and has been throughout history.
November 27, 2005 9:28 AM | Reply | Permalink
In general I agree with your post, the key point though is to define "quite a large." I think the appetite for an Iranian-style government among Iraqis is not too strong and is held down by first-hand reports from iranians about their theocracy.
I am curious, but was unable to find what percentage of the vote Sadrist candidates got nationwide in January. Anyway we will have another data point very soon.
November 27, 2005 9:43 AM | Reply | Permalink
from juan cole...
Young Shiite nationalist Muqtada al-Sadr on Saturday announced his "National Honor Pact" (Newt Gingrich has nothing on this guy). The pact included working to end the foreign military occupation of Iraq, gaining the release of the "sons of the noble Resistance" now in US custody, rejection of normalization of relations with Israel, and implementation of the debaathification law. Other planks are implementation of Islamic law, distribution of Iraq's wealth in accordance with need, and rejection of foreign interference in Iraqi affairs. He said that a Saturday-Sunday weekend off from work should be rejected [in favor of Thursday-Friday, which suits some Muslims better]. The sovereignty and unity of Iraq must be preserved. Judicial and security institutions must be independent. Iraqi loans must be forgiven, and any move to implement a loose federalism must be postponed.
He urged all of Iraq's political parties to adopt the Pact.
November 27, 2005 11:26 AM | Reply | Permalink
It is an unpleasant fact that while ultimately the war ends with a poltiical solution, the right political solution requires 20 or 30 thousand dead jihadis and insurgents.
November 27, 2005 12:29 PM | Reply | Permalink
November 27, 2005 12:31 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thats because the Sadrists boycotted the election, at least at the national level. They refused to participate and Muqtada explicitly forbid it. At the local level, Sadr-endorsed candidates did quite well.
The bottom line, however, is that ideologically there isn't much that separates Dawa, SCIRI, the Virtue Party and Al-Sadr. So making Sadr out to be a "bad guy" and Dawa and SCIRI as "good guys" misses the point. If anything, I think Sadr is probably better because he does not have the quite explicit ties to Iran the others have.
Ben P
November 27, 2005 12:49 PM | Reply | Permalink
Your reply to my comment is confusing two different issues: Whether we should have invaded in the first place and what we should have done once we invaded.
For the record, I would have preferred there to be no invasion at all considering the fact that Iraq had been pretty effectively contained since Gulf War 1. However, if the invasion was as forgone a conclusion as the Bush Administration seemed to make it, then it would have made much more sense to make sure the country did not fall into chaos. Keeping the streets safe and people employed would have gone a long way in winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people.
November 27, 2005 2:53 PM | Reply | Permalink
I duno man. One thing that spearates them is that Sadr has used his cypto-fascist militia to attack US troops, probably in coordination with the Baathists and the Al-Quaeda in Iraq jihadis. That's a line that DAWA and SCIRI haven't crossed. Sadr seems less committed to the democratic process and just more of a thug than the other conservative Shia Islamists. Certainly between Sadr and Sistani, I know who I thnk is a better choice for the future of freedom and democracy in Iraq. If that is something you want. you know...
November 27, 2005 5:19 PM | Reply | Permalink
I bet you weren't even awed....
Wong's article was good..and American s need to hear the turth as much as possible these days..
But you weren't shocked and I wasn't awed..
If only the Democratic Party...strike that
If only one Democratic "Leader" had half the pair of Muqtada Sadr
November 27, 2005 5:29 PM | Reply | Permalink
The Badr corps, which is basically the same as Sadr's Mahdi Army. They fight each other for control of various cities. I don't know about Dawa.
The main difference, as I see it, between the two, is one of strategy. Not so much one of ideology. SCIRI hasn't attacked US troops mainly because they were in a stronger, more institutionally organized position and thus could leverage Sistani's backing - as well as Iranian state support - to a strong position without resorting to challenging US troops outright. I have no doubt they'd also fight the US if they felt it was in their long-term interest to do so.
November 27, 2005 6:22 PM | Reply | Permalink
"Most observers" did their observing from the safety of the green zone, or even from the US, so they are hardly a good source of information about the size of anyone's "army" in Iraq. All they really have to go on is the US military authorities statements, which are far from unbiased. As far as how many were killed at Najaf, that too can only be based on what the military authorities chose to tell them. Let's face it - we really have very little known facts about just exactly what goes on it Iraq. Our best source is probably the foreign press, but even they are badly handicapped.
November 27, 2005 8:13 PM | Reply | Permalink
Nelson,
The import of the Wong article Matt cites is precisely to highlight Sadr's influence. Whatever the exact size of the militia, his access to violence and a groundswell of Shiite support makes him a political force and his organization arguably almost a de facto government in pockets of the country. Viz. "The country's rulers had come courting him, and he had forced them to meet his terms." "Mr. Sadr has made no move to disband his militia, the thousands-strong Mahdi Army." Et cetera.
November 29, 2005 8:12 PM | Reply | Permalink