After Savagery

Via Ross Douthat, a Thomas Powers article from 1995 available to Atlantic subscribers that makes what is, I think, the salient point about the Hiroshima controversy:

Fifty years of argument over the crime against Hiroshima and Nagasaki has disguised the fact that the American war against Japan was ended by a larger crime in which the atomic bombings were only a late innovation

Needless to say, thanks to technological improvement it would only be easier nowadays for the United States military to defeat adversaries through such tactics. But technological improvements have also made it much easier to accomplish the reverse. Today's bombs (and, for that matter, artillery) are by no means incapable of going astray and killing some civilians. But compared to those of the 1940s they are vastly more precise and targetable. It now is possible to do enormous damage to military targets while mostly sparing civilian ones, and for that reason it seems incumbent upon us to try and do it. And while we don't always do it as well as one might like, we do do things very differently from how Curtis LeMay and Bomber Harris did them.

We could vaporize Falluja, Ramadi, and all the rest tomorrow if we wanted to without any real difficulty. But we don't. Because we don't want to. Because it would be wrong.

And good for us. But people need to seriously consider the possibility that such moral constraints place real limits on what can -- and should -- be accomplished through force of arms. The methods morally available to us are very good at destroying an enemy's weaponry, but not so good at utterly wrecking his country, his worldview, his spirit. Max Boot thinking along similar lines last week went horribly awry:

Does this make us more enlightened than the "greatest generation"? Perhaps. We certainly have the luxury of being more discriminating in the application of violence. But even today, there is cause to doubt whether more precision is always better. During the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003, the U.S. was so sparing in its use of force that many Baathists never understood they were beaten. The butcher's bill we dodged early on is now being paid with compound interest.

This sort of thing needs to be called what it is -- barbarism of the most repugnant sort. The mask here has slipped, and not for the first time, from the allegedly humanitarian nature of the mission in Iraq. What was arguably justifiable in pursuit of a war of self-defense at a time when existing technology did not offer many alternatives is most certainly not justifiable as a war of choice undertaken in the name of idealism at a time when the techniques of war provide us with options.

But here we face the central paradox of humanitarian warfare. Our new, more humane techniques are perfectly adequate to meeting purely military objectives. Destroy a tank. Destroy an airbase. Destroy a missile silo. A weapons lab. A communications center. They are not, however, nearly so good at achieving what one might call the humanitarian fringe benefits that accrued following the Allied victory. But to use mass slaughter of civilians as a technique of humanitarian warfare is absurd, repulsive, and unacceptable.

Which is not to say that modern, moral methods of warfare can never be used to humanitarian ends. High-tech airpower sufficed to secure Kurdistan a large measure of liberty from Baghdad for many years. Other analagous circumstances may well arise. But as a means of remaking a nation -- as opposed to securing the independence or security of an already separate one -- the methods we may use don't seem up to the job. So much the worse for the methods, says Boot, but that's insane. That it is incumbent upon us to find other, better ways of helping those who could use help than dropping bombs is the only reasonable conclusion.


Comments (50)

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That it is incumbent upon us to find other, better ways of helping those who could use help than dropping bombs is the only reasonable conclusion.


Peacenik!


But seriously: great post. One of your best.

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I agree with Realish completely, Matt--this is an excellent, thoughtful and thought-provoking post. Good work, and thanks.

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An analogy has been made that 9/11 was like Pearl Harbor.  When WWII began for us, the atomic bomb was just a theory.  I wonder if the analogy thread runs true and there are generally unknown or little used technologies that will evolve from our reaction to 9/11 and will one day -- like the atomic bomb -- affect everyone ever after.  Snooping into people private lives for national security, allowing the CIA and FBI to work together for the same reason, smart bullets, even smarter bombs, are just a few I can come up with.  Of course, it's those theories like the atomic bomb that few people know about that are being testing even as you read this that could have the greatest effect on all our futures.


In our 3rd year of the Iraqi War, let us remember that there is a time in any major aggression after which the outcome is greatly different than what was expected by those that initiated the war.  Go ask the Japanese about their expectations when they thought they were giving the U.S. a knock-out blow.  I don't know when that critical time is or whether we've passed it, but it's something to keep in mine.  That's what I liked about the Powell Doctrine.

avatar Keep in mind that Japan and Germany were clearly aggressor nations. I don't imagine there were many germans or japanese who didn't believe that they had invaded france, russia, china, etc. there was a clear line from "we attack you and kill lots of people" to "you bomb the shit out of us". so you can understand that there might be some contrition.

the line from "that nutjob dictator of ours supposedly harbours terrorists and is building nuclear weapons" to "you bomb the shit out of us" wouldn't be so clear.

an unrelated point that someone made somewhere else (brad delong's blog or comments?) was that the rate at which japanese activities were killing other civilians was pretty high and any of those lives that could be saved by ending the war sooner need to be balanced against the japanese lives lost in bombing raids in japan.
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With regard to the war in Europe, postwar analysis seems to suggest that in fact the bombing of cities was rather ineffective, and when the bombers were eventually directed at oil refineries and synthetic-fuel plants they made a much more significant contribution.   It may well have been a "more brutal" time in Stalingrad and the Pacific, but even so "Bomber" Harris' approach was considered morally dubious by many, and he didn't receive the same honors as other leaders.

In spite of the improvement in accuracy, if you drop a 500lb bomb exactly where you want it in an urban area, you're still going to kill a lot of innocent people (from the specs I've seen for the Mark 82 ? bomb, 50% of people within 60 yards radius suffer fatal injuries).  And while we didn't "vaporize" Fallujah, we did in fact cause substantial damage to a high proportion (at least 30%) of the buildings.


Plus ca change ...

 

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"<span class="Apple-style-span">Ultimately, the question of whether we should condemn the strategic bombing writ large or not strikes me as an issue that's almost too momentous to resolve.</span&gt"
Yeah, that sounds about right to me re: retrospective judgements on WWII.  We are certainly in no position to *condemn* Truman's decision, I think, even if we cannot fully endorse it.  Things have changed, and we have Churchill, FDR, and Truman to thank for that.

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<i>That it is incumbent upon us to find other, better ways of helping those who could use help than dropping bombs is the only reasonable conclusion.</i>

For many peoples and places, these alternatives don't exist.  Your choices are only two: (1) help those who could use help by dropping bombs, or (2) just don't help those who could use help.

If you disagree, please tell me the "better ways" of helping, say, Iraqis from 1980-2003.

Your utopianism is touching, though.

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"despite Grand Theft Auto"

Nice touch.

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You make some pretty decent points here, but on the other hand, you are also setting yourself up: "Yglesias thinks that atomic bombing is no worse than normal carpet-bombing!" Although you make the case quite well, and I admit that I am convinced, I think you then take the discussion in a more savage direction.


In particular, I cringed at your definition of a "purely military" target. A communications center? And the people in that communications center, then, are "purely military", by virtue of being in a communications center? If we make a decision to stop here and justify these killings, then we are on a slippery slope which will lead us right back to considering the women and children of Hiroshima "military" targets -- after all, killing them did convince the military to surrender!


No. Killing the people in a communications center, or in a tank, is barbaric and wrong too and should be avoided if at all possible. If we eventually develop technology that will let us blow up a tank, leaving the crew lying on the ground, dazed and unharmed, then it would be a savage and barbaric crime to blow it up the old-fashioned way. Wouldn't you agree?


Relating this to general opposition to the Iraq war would make a good subject for a post. It's really a shame that so many people allowed themselves to be tarred as "Saddam-lovers" simply for thinking it's wrong to kill people.

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You wrote ... "That it is incumbent upon us to find other, better ways of helping those who could use help than dropping bombs is the only reasonable conclusion. "

I think we should always be looking for ways to peacefully resolve conflicts. We should have continued to look in Iraq before resorting to war.

However, I think that the situation changes when we are attacked.

Anyone who is foolish enough to attack us, or knowingly harbor those who do, should know that annihilation is always a possibility.

The way they can avoid that possibility is to not attack us, or not harbor those who might.

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Al,

You seem to have left an important word implicit. Shouldn't it read:

Your choices are only two: (1) help those who could use help by dropping bombs on them, or (2) just don't help those who could use help.

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It is a staple of conservative thinking that the reason the American campaign in Vietnam was not successful was that the generals were not allowed to win. That is, political decisions interfered with the ability to make military decisions, with the implication that those decisions would have meant military action on a far more ferocious scale than what we saw. But for the politicians, we could have really kicked their ass!




We are now seeing the same sort of thinking emerging with respect to the Iraq War. What we are missing, according to this line of reasoning, is the will to go all out to fight the enemy.




In purely military terms, this analysis is true as far as it goes. We could indeed flatten Fallujah just as the Russians flattened Chechnya. We could have nuked Hanoi. But we don't because it would be unsustainable politically to fight with the level of savagery needed to do that.




So Matt raises an important issue. In a modern democracy, we do not have the stomach to fight with the level of ruthlessness needed to win against a determined enemy, especially in wars of choice.




But this is really only half the story. The other issue is the nature of guerilla warfare vs. international warfare. Germany and Japan were unified states. Once they surrendered, those nations were ours to remake. There were sporadic incidents during the occupation, but no sustained insurgency. We also occupied those countries totally and dominated every aspect of their lives until their societies were totally remade. In both Vietnam and Iraq, the adversary was and is a determined insurgency who wins simply by not losing. Furthermore, our occupation is a very light one.

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The WWII Allies agreed that their common goal in regard to the Axis countries was 'unconditional surrender'.  In retrospect it is clear that in the case of Japan, the big issue for the Japanese government was somehow preserving the emperor as head of state, and the allies' demand prolonged the war because of that.  Immediately after surrender the US yielded on the emporer issue, and allowed the emporer to remain as a powerless head of state.


In the case of Germany, the unconditional surrender demand played into Hitler's propaganda to the German people that they would be enslaved and returned to the conditions that followed WWI, and to that extent hardened the people's resolve to fight to a bitter ending.


As for strategic bombing in both Germany and Japan, the evidence seems to be that the fighting potential of both countries was reduced but not materially in regard to the willingness to fight and resist surrender. The use of the atomic bomb was just an extension of the strategic bombing concept since it included targeting of civilian populations. Evil in degree but not in kind.


Recall also, that when faced with the prospect of building a 'neutron bomb' in the cold war that would kill people but not destroy property, the public pressure on the US government was not to develop and deploy the bomb on moral grounds.  


It is not clear to me that we have come as far as some think we have in regard to the issue of attacking civilian populations and civilian targets.  The number of civilians killed in Iraq appears to be approaching the number of people killed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki through the use of the atomic bomb.


Is there a lesson here?  It seems to me that the most cogent argument is that entering a war is truly a momentus decision that in the case of WWII wasn't a hard choice because we were attacked, but is dubious at best in the case of Iraq.  Once a war is entered, the popular pressure to win and defeat the enemy is such that moral restraints are highly likely to be disgarded to achieve that goal.  


To me, the tragedy of the "War on Terror" is not just a misunderstanding of the real nature of what is needed to repel terrorists, but the fact that use of the War terminology once again casts civilians (including our own people through loss of freedom) as appropriate targets for the engines of war - which are not likely ever to evolve toward anything that can be considered humane.

avatar Yeah, that sounds about right to me re: retrospective judgements on WWII.  We are certainly in no position to *condemn* Truman's decision, I think, even if we cannot fully endorse it. 

There is a difference between making a retrospective judgement on history.  And making a more informed decision based on better information about the past.

The best evidence now indicates that:

a) Japan had been making overtures to surrender for months before Hiroshima

b) Russia's imminent entry into the war would almost certainly have precipitated that surrender

c) there was at the time of the bombing no serious belief at the upper echelons of govt that a land invasion would be necessary

d) Truman was strongly influenced to use the bomb as a demonstration to the USSR and also to prevent it from gaining control of territory in the East, as it had done in Europe.

Bearing all that in mind I think we are certainly in a position to evaluate Truman's decision in terms that might involve condemnation, even if that condemnation might be qualified by the recognition that Soviet domination of the East would hardly be a purely desirable outcome.


 
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The hard truth is that humans rarely surrender until the most stubborn among them are eliminated and the cost of continuing to fight is too steep for those who remain. Take Japan, for example.

Even after the Tokyo firebombings and Hiroshima the Japanese leadership wanted to continue to fight.

They wanted to fight on despite the loss of the bulk of their army, their navy and their air force.

They did not surrender until after Nagasaki and the loss of their army in China to the Russians.

And even then there was a fierce debate within the Japanese leadership over whether to surrender and an attempted coup after the decision was made.

Obviously, the Japanese leadership did not value the lives of its citizens to the same extent that we now do. In war, though, it is a luxury to be able to think about how merciful one can be to one's enemy. That luxury is created by winning the fight and avoiding a truly desparate situation.

Remember this when thinking that a bomb that would destroy the tank but leave the tank crew intact would be effective. It most likely would not be as the tank crew would likely just return to the fight.

War, at its essence, is about killing. It is about causing harm and suffering to want to make the opponent stop wanting to fight. The winner is often the most merciless, whether or not the cause of the merciless is just or not.

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MY, just want to say, that was a pleasure to read. Nice work.

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It was total war, and they started it.

To the extent that total war has now gone out of fashion, and is generally regarded as immoral, well, we can attribute that encouraging development to the fact that we won the last total war.

Although, of course, we have NOT renounced total war, nor should we. What deters an attempted first strike by, say, the Russians against our nuclear arsenal? Of course, it is the likelihood that no first strike could succeed in eliminating our capacity for massive retaliation--and by massive retaliation, we mean the destruction of the other side's civilian population.

avatar Even after the Tokyo firebombings and Hiroshima the Japanese leadership wanted to continue to fight.


They wanted to fight on despite the loss of the bulk of their army, their navy and their air force.


They did not surrender until after Nagasaki and the loss of their army in China to the Russians.

Alternatively:

June 18, 1945 the President's Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy--the man who presided over meetings of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined U.S.-U.K.Chiefs-- recorded his own judgment in his diary (seven weeks prior to the bombing of Hiroshima):

It is my opinion at the present time that a surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provisions for America's defense against future trans-Pacific aggression.

What changed after the atomic bombs was not so much the disposition of the Japanese, but the terms of acceptable surrender.  Once it was understood that the Japanese Emperor could remain in place this vastly altered the Japanese decision-making dynamic.  (As Truman had been advised it would on many, many occasions)

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, of course, concluded that "in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

* As noted above, an internal 1946 War Department study discovered a few years ago asked what would have happened had there been no atomic bomb. It concluded that:
The Japanese leaders had decided to surrender and were merely looking for sufficient pretext to convince the die-hard Army Group that Japan had lost the war and must capitulate to the Allies. This official document judged that Russia's early August entry into the war
. . . would almost certainly have furnished this pretext, and would have been sufficient to convince all responsible leaders that surrender was unavoidable.

So it is correct to note that the Russian entry into the war might have been significant in speeding up the surrender.  (For some time Japan had harbored faint hopes of convincing Stalin to enter the war on their side)

What you fail to note is that this would have been so regardless of the use of the bomb.

The notion that the atomic bombs were dropped by Truman out of a sad necessity to prevent a greater loss of life is a myth that is not borne out by the reality.

The key factors in inducing the Japanese to surrender were Russia's entry into the war, but mainly changing of the terms.  The bombs were not instrumental, nor at the time they were dropped, did the US leadership believe that they would be.

"In retrospect it is clear that in the case of Japan, the big issue for the Japanese government was somehow preserving the emperor as head of state, and the allies' demand prolonged the war because of that.  Immediately after surrender the US yielded on the emporer issue, and allowed the emporer to remain as a powerless head of state."


The pre-surrender demand of the Japanese for preserving the sovereignty of the emperor was explicit code for not allowing an occupation.


The U.S. most certainly did not yield on this issue.

"The best evidence now indicates that:.."


BrianOC,


The best evidence I've read in the past few years contradicts your points pretty convincingly, IMHO.

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"what moral principle could condemn the means by which Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed that wouldn't also condemn earlier actions (Dresden, Tokyo"

Someone in the thread mentioned a 500 pound bomb. 500, 1000, 2000 pound bombs are the usual maximum in our useful arsenal. These are big bombs.

In our less useful arsenal are the 10,20,50 Megaton hydrogen bombs. 10 million times 2000 pounds. Yes, means themselves, unleashing this technology that we are still threatened with, is itself a moral question.

Great post, Matt.

"For many peoples and places, these alternatives don't exist.  Your choices are only two: (1) help those who could use help by dropping bombs, or (2) just don't help those who could use help."


Unfortunately, as Matt capably explicates, strategic bombing can only achieve rather limited objectives.


"If you disagree, please tell me the "better ways" of helping, say, Iraqis from 1980-2003."


As the purged US Generals and ignored State Department studies all foretold, the "better ways" of helping the Iraqis involved putting about double to triple the boots on the ground that we actually did.


Nation building is labor intensive, but it can achieve objectives that are impossible with strategic bombing.

"No. Killing the people in a communications center, or in a tank, is barbaric and wrong too and should be avoided if at all possible."


If you want to be a pure pacifist, fine.


But the rest of us sane folks find an important distinction between military targets and civilian targets.

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Petey, I would be interested if you could cite it.

To be precise: can you give evidence that Truman and top military brass  believed that the bomb was necessary to effect a Japanese surrender?






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There is a difference between bombing modern nations like Germany and Japan into submission, then helping them rebuild as democracies, and thinking you can bomb Iraq into the 21st century.

 

Iraq, and much of the rest of the Islamic world, needs to become a modern nation, and that means equal rights for women. You can bomb a nation into the stoneage, but you can't bomb them into an egalitarian democracy.  

avatar In some sense, certainly, the conservatives who preach more ruthlessness in Iraq are right. If we were willing to be more brutal, we could probably "win" in some sense. The problem with that argument is that, to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, we go to war with the country we have, not the country we want. The country we have is a country that's unwilling to accept a near-genocidal level of brutality.

I don't know exactly why that's so. Perhaps it's the emergence of human rights philosophy, or advances in communications technologies that make it impossible to hide away atrocity as effectively as we used to, or perhaps it's simply that we know, in our gut, that our cause in this case is not anything worth dying or killing for on that scale.

The point, though, is that the Bush administration knew this about us. It knew we were too soft, or too humane, or too easily distracted, to fight a brutal war of occupation. If the war they brought us proves to be a war we're incapable of winning, then while it may be true that we deserve blame for being unprepared to be ruthless, they're absolutely to blame for not making sure that we were sufficiently ruthless, and for not telling us honestly that we must be prepared to be ruthless.

They don't get to lie to us about what's going to be necessary and then blame us for not living up to the standards they never were honest enough to articulate in the first place. If you want your team to beat the New York Knicks, to use a bizarre sports analogy, don't recruit a team from the local Unitarian Church and tell them they're playing a pick-up game against the fellas from B'nai Israel.

<cite>Anyone who is foolish enough to attack us, or knowingly harbor those who do, should know that annihilation is always a possibility.</cite>

 I believe the re-election of one George W. Bush thoroughly debunks this chest-thumping. No population--not even a democratic one--can be held entirely culpable for the actions of their government, or independent conspirators in their midst.

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BrianOC, you are failing to take into consideration what kind of surrender. Remember, we were demanding unconditonal surrender. There is no indication that the Japanese were looking to unconditionally surrender until after the second bomb and the entry of the Soviet Union into Manchuria.

We were very smart to demand unconditional surrender of Japan and Germany in WWII. We needed to break the spirit of the Japanese and German people, and break it totally. Any other solution would have perpetuated the evil cults around Hitler and Hirohito.

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"War, at its essence, is about killing. It is about causing harm and suffering to want to make the opponent stop wanting to fight."

This is 99% wrong.  War is about making it clear to the enemy that they have to do what you want: most often that is achieved by destroying the enemy's capacity to fight effectively - "killing" is one approach, but interruption of supplies, disruption of command and control, and destruction of weapons are at least as important. 

 

avatar Dan, the Japanese were unwavering in not wanting to surrender unconditionally.

Truman had been encouraged from many quarters to change the surrender formula. But he did not do this until after the bombs were dropped.

Japan maintained the emperor, and did not unconditionally surrender, the same conditions of peace they had sought for some time.


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You find an important distinction, but of course you don't make any attempt to say what it is. Perhaps it's like obscenity.. you know it when you see it?


There is no such thing as a purely military target where human life is involved, unless there is such a thing as a purely military human. The soldiers in the communication center are, perhaps, more military than the citizens of Hiroshima, but the difference between destroying the communication center and destroying the communication center plus everybody inside it is one of barbarism, to use Matthew's well-chosen term. We don't, right now, have the technology to do the former, but if we had it, choosing not to use it would be making a choice in favor of barbarism.

I cannot get past that term because in my view there is no such thing.

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And the people in that communications center, then, are "purely military", by virtue of being in a communications center? If we make a decision to stop here and justify these killings, then we are on a slippery slope

 

Setting side Iraq (i.e. Just v.s. Unjust War), ...

The answer is yes. An enemy communications center that is sending logistical support to enemy fighters is indeed fair game. Yes, the military might weigh the consequences of bombing this target from a collateral damage point of view, but who might be in that center is completely irrelevant. Whether this decision is moral or not, is irrelevant. The support that center is giving could cause Americans to lose troops or battles. A commander should have no quams about taking it out if so. Your slippery slope is tilted the wrong way. Whether we like it or not, that decision is indeed justifiable in war.

I don't like war anymore than you do. And we must do everything that is possible to avoid it. (Real measures, not half assed measures like the Bush Administration claimed they did.) But if it becomes a reality, and some would say war is inevitable, we can't be making decisions based on your criteria or we will never win.

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You wrote ... "Japan maintained the emperor, and did not unconditionally surrender, the same conditions of peace they had sought for some time."

Maintaining the emperor as the Japanese first wanted meant that the emperor would still be in charge of Japan, the top authority. To some it even meant that there would be no occupation by foreign troops. After the bombs, the emperor was allowed to stay but had to answer to the occupation authority. That is quite a bit of difference. It was unconditional surrender with theexception that the emperor was left as a figurehead (but not as a god) and he was exempt from war crimes charges.

avatar Sounds like more convenient rationalization to me.

Here:

In 1948 Sec. of War Henry Stimson published his memoirs, ghost-written by McGeorge Bundy. In them Stimson revealed, "It is possible, in the light of the final surrender, that a clearer and earlier exposition of American willingness to retain the Emperor would have produced an earlier ending to the war".

And bear in mind that is Stimson - making an admission against interest.

In fact Truman was repeatedly encouraged to clarify the US position on the future of the emperor before the dropping of the bombs and he declined to do so. 

the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff also asked the British Chiefs of Staff to persuade Prime Minister Churchill to approach President Truman about the surrender formula.

If Truman had really desired a surrender he would have been quite clear in advance what he was prepared to concede, and what was non-negotiable.  Not after the bomb, but before it.

"The Japanese military... interpreted the omission of any commitment on the Throne as evidence of the Allied intention to destroy forever the foundation stone of the Japanese nation. Here was an invaluable trump card unintentionally given them by the Allies, and the militarists played it with unfailing skill."

The fact that the US did not clearly spell out its terms was exploited by the more hardline factions of the Japanese military.

When it came the Japanese were forced to make clear the terms that they had been waiting to hear from Truman:

"unconditional surrender" ... "with the understanding that the said declaration does not compromise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler."

So it was clearly unconditional surrender... but with a condition.  And that condition was accepted by the US.  So this whole notion that "unconditional surrender" was achieved through the use of the bombs and would not have been otherwise is just another myth.

(I'd be very interested in hearing this refuted with reference to actual historical documentation)
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cite please.

The best evidence now indicates that:  .  .  . c) there was at the time of the bombing no serious belief at the upper echelons of govt that a land invasion would be necessary  BrianOC

I'm unsure of what you're saying.

Is it that before August 6th the U.S. was pretty certain that Japan would shortly surrender unconditionally and permit total occupation together with war crimes trials?

Or that with the USAAF daily destroying Japan's weapons industry and with the USN dominating the western Pacific, Japan was no longer a threat?

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You asked ... "I'd be very interested in hearing this refuted with reference to actual historical documentation"

If you can turn back history, then we can answer that question. Otherwise, we are left with history, and there is no documentation for what course history would have taken had we decided to not drop the bombs. All we do know is that there was no documentation of an official radio broadcast or official diplomatic correspondence from Japan outlining unconditional surrender, or any kind of surrender, that was delivered to US authorities prior to the dropping of both bombs.

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I don't know exactly why that's so. Perhaps it's the emergence of human rights philosophy, or advances in communications technologies that make it impossible to hide away atrocity as effectively as we used to, or perhaps it's simply that we know, in our gut, that our cause in this case is not anything worth dying or killing for on that scale.




I tend to think that the reduction in our capacity for savagery is one of the great contributions of Western civilization. And yet every time I say that, I am reminded that prewar Germany was widely considered the most cultured, educated, "civilized" place in Europe. So that theory certainly only takes you so far. Most of us are capable of more savagery than we know.




The point, though, is that the Bush administration knew this about us. It knew we were too soft, or too humane, or too easily distracted, to fight a brutal war of occupation. If the war they brought us proves to be a war we're incapable of winning, then while it may be true that we deserve blame for being unprepared to be ruthless, they're absolutely to blame for not making sure that we were sufficiently ruthless, and for not telling us honestly that we must be prepared to be ruthless.




I think this is off the mark. Every indication shows that the Administration thought the war and occupation would be a piece of cake. Or, more precisely, they didn't want to hear from anyone who thought otherwise, convinced as they were that niggling doubters were just antiwar types in disguise.




Having thoroughly misread the situation in the postwar occupation, they were then confronted with the political need to minimize the impact on the American people as well as put an optimistic (Pollyannish) gloss on things. Now they are trapped between the need to keep the war out of the lives of most Americans and the need to defeat the insurgency. It's an unresolvable conundrum so its no wonder their polls are so low.

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I happen to think that the dropping of the atom bombs was a justifiable (not necessarily correct, but justifiable) choice at the time. I also know that individuals who engage in even justified killing are often stricken bu it at some point and that angst over the atomic bombs did not begin recently, we've been haunted since it happened. So we get some keyboard commando who claims not to be bothered by killing, almost certainly never having seeing it, who doesn't understand that being bothered by it is one of the signs of civilized behavior, who is now pushing the argument that we might fail in Iraq because we didn't blow their cities to pieces and kill them by the hundreds of thousands? I believe this is the argument Osama might be making in regards to 9/11, it wasn't bloody and dirty enough, didn't get enough children and all the rest...

avatar If we had lost a war and been occupied, I don't think what you think would matter one whit. That's the reality of war and conquest.

"Petey, I would be interested if you could cite it."


BrianOC,


While I certainly don't have everything I've read on the topic at hand, this Kevin Drum post, and the linked Richard Frank piece are excellent places to start.


Also, the relevant Wikipedia entry is a good summary of both sides of the issue.

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Al,

Here is one possible "better way" to have helped the Iraqis "from 1980-2003": Expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait in the spring of 1991, and then follow through on President George H.W. Bush's encouragement to the Iraqi people to rebel by supporting that rebellion once it got under way (it enjoyed substantial success before being brutally crushed). The timing of U.S. military force and its integration with indigenous action can be morally as well as practically crucial. The "cooperation" we employed in the current Iraq War -- with an often-questionable group of Iraqi exiles (an admittedly diverse group) rather than with any sizable portion of Iraqis in Iraq -- has been one of the more disastrous decisions we made this time.

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How is the communications center different than the tank, or the airbase, or the missle silo? Those have people we're killing too, no? We aren't bombing these items to convince an opppoent to surrender by inflicting casualties--we're bombing these items to take away our opponent's capacity to fight. This is precisely MY's point: today it is acceptable to target the means a military has at its disposal to inflict harm, while it is unacceptable to target civilian populations as a means of inducing surrender.

I would guess MY would agree that, if we could invent some magic technology that would eliminate the means of making war without killing, we should use it.  In fact, your point seems to be a fantasy-land corrolary to his point regarding our technological capabilities now as compared to WWII.  So I'm frankly befuddled at where your disagreement with him lies.

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For one thing, the alleged "democratization" of Japan after the war never happened.  Witness that the Japanese still have no understanding of the real history of the Second World War, because their educational system was never forcibly reshaped, as was that of Germany.  I well remember a Japanese friend of mine 40 years ago sitting across the table with his mouth gaping as I told him the history of the Rape of Nanking, the Bataan Death March, etc., etc.  I suspect I could still have that conversation with any typical 20-year old Japanese male or female today.


Not only that, but the "Liberal-Democratic" Party of Japan today is the old establishment, never changed other than to "demilitarize" it, at least publicly.

And unfortunately, as was reported in the newspapers this past weekend, the "lesson" that the American bombing allegedly taught the Japanese is passing as those old enough to remember those events pass on.  As was pointed out in one article, Japanese students today take a visit to the Atomic War Museum in Hiroshima as something to be endured, about an event they fail to understand and have no interest in.  And as a friend of mine who lives in Japan notes, the Japanese right wing is far more publicly assertive nowadays than ever before since the end of the war.

I remember 40 years ago, when I visited both Ground Zero at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that the attitudes were far different.  Hiroshimans went out of their way to make an American gaijin feel some sort of guilt for even being there, while the people of Nagasaki were genuinely committed to trying at every opportunity presented to them in their personal lives to advance the cause of "international brotherhood," which the city had decided after the war was the only way to insure such an event never happened again.  I genuinely hope that the people of Nagasaki still believe that - given the history of their city (which makes it truly ironic that the most pro-western place in Japan for literally centuries would have been the place bombed by a crew unable to release their weapon over "real" targets because of weather) I think it likely they will maintain their tradition even if the rest of Japan forgets.

40 years ago, it was still possible to come across the ruins of the fire raids, in areas still to be rebuilt.  They were shocking and jarring because they were unexpected, and - trust me - there was far greater evidence of violence beyond what one can imagine in those sites than at the two Ground Zeros - even given that in those days one could pick up the helmet at the entrance to the Nagasaki Atomic Museum and stare personally at the "ivory" inside - the remains of the soldier's skull, melted into the helmet by the blast.

And some of the Americans of that time had a very good idea what they had done.  Curtis LeMay said in 1946 that, had the war gone differently, it might have been he standing in the dock of the war crimes trials.  My old flight instructor of 30 years ago, who was the lead pilot for his Bomb Group on the Tokyo fire raid, said that of course the raids were a war crime - he then said that in his mind War Is A Crime, so how does one differentiate?  Leonard Cheshire, the British bomber pilot who flew 100 missions over Germany and won the Victoria Cross, visited Hiroshima a month after the bombing, went home and resigned his commission and spent the rest of his life running a hospice for the victims of war, and said he did so as atonement for the crimes of his youth.  

As has been discovered since 1995 with the publication of the unredacted Magic intercepts from that summer of 1945, Japan was not a country looking to surrender, and the US Navy was ready to withdraw its support for the coming invasion of Kyushu when it became known that the Japanese had sent enough troops to the invasion zone that they would have met the invaders 1:1 (usually a fatal condition for invasions).  It turns out that the bombs really were the only thing we had that might make the Japanese sue for peace.  

The more one knows about the end of the Pacific War, the less one is certain of any overall "Truth" to it.  For me, the only truths I know are that my father - whose radar picket destroyer was sunk off Okinawa by the kamikazes and who reported aboard his second DDR on August 8, bound for Kyushu - and my retired Marine father-in-law who was set for the First Wave at Kyushu after surviving Guadalcanal, Saipan and Okinawa - both lived to have fruitful and worthwhile lives (you ride on freeways without worrying the pre-stressed concrete will crumble beneath you thanks to a post-war patent by my father) because of the A-bombs.  As did my Japanese friends who didn't die as the country was led to destruction by a military too moronic to understand "stop."

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Actually, Brian OC, the "best evidence" - which is the unredacted "Magic" intercepts from the summer of 1945,  which were made public in 1995 - makes each and every one of your points to be b.s.

The Japanese were not attempting to surrender.  They in fact were only willing to negotiate a "truce" similar to that of WW1 with Germany, that preserved the Emperor with all his prerogatives and kept the military in power.

The Russian entry into the war did not push the Japanese to surrender.

There was no belief inside the American government or among the allies that a land invasion would be unnecessary.  There was, however, growing evidence that the proposed invasion of Kyushu would be impossible due to the fact the Japanese had reinforced the island to the point where the defenders would have matched the invaders 1:1.  That July, Admiral Nimitz had privately withdrawn the Navy's support for the invasion as planned.  They had idea how to launch an invasion force that would be big enough to overcome this defensive force.

Truman was not "demonstrating" the bomb to the USSR.

You need to read more contemporary history, since "history" changes as facts emerge. 

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we are left with history, and there is no documentation for what course history would have taken had we decided to not drop the bombs.

That is not the question.  The question is - did Truman and US top brass believe the bomb was necessary to effect a Japanese surrender

And that's something we can answer with reference to historical documentation.  (Referencing Eisenhower, Leahy, Stimson, Churchill, etc, etc)

And the answer - if we are honest - is no, they did not.

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Here's Kevin Drum:
one piece of evidence has always struck me as conclusive: the fact that we had to drop two bombs. If Japan had really been prepared to give up on terms close to unconditional surrender — which, for better or worse, was what the Allies demanded — surely the demonstration of American power at Hiroshima would have been more than enough to tip them over?

This doesn't show much comprehension of the nuances of the Japanese surrender protocol.  The Japanese did not want the Emperor deposed, they were seeking assurances to that effect.  Truman consistently refused to give those assurances until after the bomb dropped.

The key question is did the US top brass including Truman believe that the bomb was necessary to effect a surrender.  There is clear evidence that Chief of Staff Leahy, Eisenhower, Churchill, Stimson did not.

The Frank piece is interesting but I'd need to look over it again in conjunction with Gar Alperovitz's Atomic Diplomacy.

(I do think it's worth pointing out that Frank is writing in the Weekly Standard, which is not normally a location I would look to for honest assessments of American foreign policy.  To say the very lease)

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Is it that before August 6th the U.S. was pretty certain that Japan would shortly surrender unconditionally and permit total occupation together with war crimes trials?

Or that with the USAAF daily destroying Japan's weapons industry and with the USN dominating the western Pacific, Japan was no longer a threat?

Mainly the former, though the latter case could also be made

I suspect that Iraq is still a diversion and sideshow to the domestic power-grab fueled by the specious claims of justication of every invasion of privacy as necessary during a time of "War on Terror", a misguided sham if there ever was one.

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