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Dear Tom:

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I read and then reviewed your book in Blueprint magazine last fall, and praised it as a fine piece of writing and as an incisive and often hilarious analysis of the contemporary Right in Kansas and nationally.  I also challenged your premise that working-class folk had been driven into the arms of the conservative movement by Democratic abandonment in the pursuit of yuppie voters and corporate cash, and unfortunately, had to spend a few graphs questioning your rather counter-factual take on my own Democratic Leadership Council as the Prime Mover in this alleged betrayal.  But I don't want to rehash these arguments here, unless you insist on it.  Suffice it to say that I strongly recommended, and still recommend, your book to anybody who wants to understand the Cultural Right.
I found your TPMCafe post interesting because you sharpened a point that was less explicit, though quite implicit, in your book: that Kansas' radical Populist tradition helps explain the peculiar radicalism of today's Right in the Sunflower State.  Indeed, I would extend that insight to my own native Deep South.  Where I might differ with you is in the assumption that this is an entirely inverted Populism based on the substitution of artificial cultural grievances for "natural" economic grievances.

Like yours, my understanding of Populism is based on personal attachment to a particular place.  I'm from Georgia, a state whose political tradition was long influenced by the legacy of Tom Watson, the great leader not only of Southern Populists, but of the radical Populists nationally who resisted fusion with the Democratic Party and demanded a platform based on a systematic rejection of capitalism as opposed to the prevailing midwestern and western Populist preoccupation with monetary policy. 

Yet Watson's "Left-Wing" radicalism was explicitly rooted in a self-consciously reactionary posture towards capitalism as an invidious Yankee instrument for the destruction of the antebellum agrarian culture of the South.  Watson's heroes throughout his long career were the great southern chauvinists from Georgia, Bob Toombs and Alexander Stephens.  And his descent into racism, anti-Catholicism, and anti-Semitism towards the end of his career may have represented a distortion of the Populist tradition, but not a dramatic departure: both within and outside the Democratic Party, there was a direct and tangible link between the old Populist voter base of the late nineteenth century and the new base of support for the revived Ku Klux Klan in the early twentieth century, in both the South and the Midwest.  It was no accident that William Jennings Bryan ended his national political career at the 1924 Democratic Convention fighting against a resolution to condemn the Klan--just prior to his more famous fight against the theory of evolution in Dayton, Tennessee (a fight more recently revived by the Cultural Right in Kansas).

In other words, it's pretty clear to me that Populism always encompassed right-wing as well as left-wing hostility to capitalism, and always was more closely associated with cultural conservatism rather than cultural progressivism, especially at the grass-roots level.  So I have to wonder: is the association of the Right with the Populist temperament in Kansas--and just as conspicuously, in the South--in recent years really a displacement of "progressive," class-based economic discontents by "reactionary" cultural concerns--or simply a continuation of the same tradition in a different context?   I would be interested in your reaction to this question.

More broadly, I wonder if your book's general distinction between legitimate economic motivations for partisan identification and illegitimate cultural motivations is based on the same oversimplification of political history.

My own reading of political history is that non-class, and non-economic factors have perpetually been important in partisan identification among Americans.  Economics cannot explain why Appalachian southerners, the poorest category of voters, went heavily Republican for more than a century after the Civil War; why midwestern German Protestants and Catholics diverged politically for most of their history; why farm-state voters gyrated from party to party throughout most of the twentieth century, often based on foreign policy issues; why Jewish-Americans have been so heavily Democratic; and why union voters went Republican prior to the Great Depression, and at key points during the Cold War. 
Arguably, today's partisan divide is far more class-based than at most junctures of American history.  Yes, Democrats have made some new inroads among upper-income voters, and Republicans have made some new inroads among white working-class voters, and yes, Democrats are probably getting the short end of that exchange.  But you don't need a Great Betrayal theory to explain that phenomenon, and don't need to prescribe a radical change in Democratic economic policies to react to it. 

To sum up my hypothesis, maybe it makes more sense to deal directly with both cultural and economic concerns of voters as equally legitimate, instead of suggesting that an obsessive and radical approach to the latter will obliterate the former. 

I'm interested in your reaction to these thoughts, and above all, I hope your book will be perceived as a well-crafted and provocative opening argument in a dialogue Democrats need to continue rather than as a manifesto that draws lines and builds barricades.

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While different parts of the country have reacted to political trends in different ways Republicans have dominated the White House since 1860. If not for the Depression it is not obvious to me that we would think of Republicans being in power as an oddity. The Depression allowed all sorts of progressive ideas to be enacted because everyone was suffering. So much of the conversation on the Left, as evidenced by posts here at the Cafe, is that there is still the kind of suffering that was seen in the Depression. That just seems as if it is not accurate. Added to that is the tendency of the Left to find fault with all that America does overseas.

The irony is that capitalism may be the driver for both Al Qaeda and why people in America vote against their seeming economic interests. Capitalism or market economies are destructive and alienating of traditional relationships and values. It is one of the ironies that this past Christmas saw a re-emergence of the anti-semitism of the Right over the issue of taking religion out Christmas when it is capitalism and its emphasis on consumerism that is at fault.

It seems to me that a political fight which is evident in the posts here and the animous directed at the DLC is the shared dislike on the Right and the Left for a consumer driven market economy which elevates individuals over groups.

Good insights.  I wonder if it is simply that we in America have always had the idea of upward mobility, going west, starting over.  We didn't have the rigid classes that Europe had, and we certainly always had at least the myth of upward mobility.  So we never had the class-based politics that Europe had, and instead had a politics more rooted in ethnicity and culture. 

All the more ironic that the mobility escalator seems to have stopped or reversed, so that (whether people realize it or not) Europe now has more mobility than we do.  But because of our history, it is hard to think that a more class-based politics will emerge here.  And if the myth of upward mobility is that ingrained, how much more difficult for the Dems, who are once again in the position of trying to tell hard truths to people instead of pretty myths, making us vulnerable to charges of "pessimism."

Right on, Ed. I couldn't agree more.

Maybe it is a failure of Frank's book to be clearer, but I understood his thesis a little differently:  it's not that cultural issues should are necessarily less important than economic issues, but that the right has banished economic issues from the discussion altogether.  Economic issues have been simplified to "We're all entrepeneurs now, and only a godless communist would feel otherwise."  Once only cultural issues are on the table, the game is played almost exclusively in favor of the true believers.

I further believe that this book provides the underpinning for an important shift in American politics:  Democratic politicians need to consistently argue that the God-fearing, humble man the Republicans present is almost always an arrogant economic royalist without an ounce of Christian charity in his soul.  This requires a "threading the needle" approach where we acknowledge that values play a role, but that emphasizes the strain laissez faire capitalism places on middle class people and enables the most unethical of business practices to go unchecked.  I think the Clinton's "safe, legal and rare" approach to abortion threads this needle nicely, and should be a template for an approach to a wide range of issues important to the middle class. 

Are there any changes in the educational system in America or in various places in America at various times, that might explain some of these phenomena?

Brew,
I agree that Dems should argue that there is no Christian charity in laissez-faire capitalism, but Dems won't gain any traction among the religious right with your argument on abortion.  In the view of the Religious Right, as long as it's legal, regardless of how rare it is, abortion is still the murder of innocent children.  Maybe there are gains to be made with people who aren't so adamant in their beliefs, but it's hard to be reasonable with an unreasonable opponent.

I also challenged your premise that working-class folk had been driven into the arms of the conservative movement by Democratic abandonment in the pursuit of yuppie voters and corporate cash

But this is what the Democratic party did during the 90's and it did hurt them, because now they spend a whole bunch of time trying to thread the needle between the yuppies and the working class.  This is the reason why people think the Democratic party doesn't stand for anything, because they are trying to please too many people. 

On the Republican side of things you see this kind of divide between the libertarians and the religious folks, and the Republicans have to thread the needle on immigration too, but the underlying glue that has kept the Republicans from splitting up is national security,  and 9/11 and the war on terror has been powerful enough to keep the republicans in power.

As we move further away from 9/11 and as the Republicans keep having to thread their needles we will see people looking for answers from another party.  The Democrats need to start selling an agenda now, and here is where you folks at the DLC have been doing the right thing.  You folks are out there talking about the need to sell ideas, you all have ideas to sell, but I think you need to take the ideas to the people.  Start buying ads on tv, radio, and the internet, start doing Townhall Meetings with folks across the country, and spell out your name whenever possible, make sure folks here the Democratic part of the DLC. 

I have not been a big fan of the DLC in the past, but you all are making amends for your past problems, we need an agenda sold, we need to rebrand the Democratic party, and you all seem to want to take the ball and run with it, go for it, it's too bad most active folks on the left are stuck in scandal mode, because this is a great opportunity for the Democratic party to step up and show the people that they do stand for something and tell them just what that is. 

There is also an important thread woven within the economic and cultural sides of these arguments -- the anti government sentiment represented by attacks on progressive legislation.  George Wallace artfully exploited it and Reagan picked up the message.  Government is the problem.  If we can get it out of our way we would all prosper.  We don't need it telling us how to live our lives.  Republicans have interwoven the two threads of free market capitalism and cultural "liberation" by attacking the source that inhibits both -- government regulation and the courts.  It has yet to be shown or demonstrated how extremism in the defense of these liberties for some represent a threat to the liberties of all.  The conservative elites have always thrived on manufacturing unity with their interests by creating a common enemy.  Paint government blue and rule red. 

This is absolutely correct, Reece. Embracing anti-choice candidates is a horrible idea, even in states like mine (KS). First of all, the anti-choice crowd is not large enough to win anyone an election in-and-of-itself. It is really just barely enough to tip a close election one way or the other. To see this it helps to look at the primaries here in Kansas rather than the general elections. However, going after those people's votes would cause a net loss for the Democrats as pro choice people, who even in this state are the solid majority, would just as likely stay home on election day.

But even that doesn't matter. Look, the "safe, legal and rare" crowd are people who do not vote based on abortion at all. Trying to frame your argument in that way doesn't matter. The kind of people who consider a candidate's position on abortion in an election are the people who want it illegal and nothing less. A candidate who personally doesn't like it but wouldn't support a law against it is not going to get anywhere with these people. And any Democrat who would support a law against it still wouldn't get their votes, because they wouldn't trust a Democrat to stand with them when it's put-up-or-shut-up time. They already have a party that they know from history will stand by them on that issue. This is the way it is with all of these so-called "moral values" issues.

But there is an enormous, untapped population of people who are eligible to vote but don't. Who will study these people's habits? Who will write books about them? Maybe they just don't think that anyone's looking out for their interests, and so don't bother. There are also habitual Republicans, that is to say people whose grandparents, parents, etc. were/are Republicans, so they are too. If they can be made to feel as though their party is abandoning them, perhaps they can be brought around. My point is, why must all of these discussions center around a relatively small number of "values voters" when there are so many other kinds of voters (and non-voters)out there in far greater numbers? People who, to be wooed, would not require that the Democratic party compromise its core principles of liberty and economic stability for all?

Thanks to Ed Kilgore for not rehashing the DLC vs. others fight in his review. That's been going on other blogs of late, and it's good to see it avoided here.

He's right about the cultural conservatism of populism. Not only Populists in the US, but also ones in Latin America and Europe have pushed ahead by claiming to avenge insults to God and the real folk, backbone, heartland, honest producers, or some other formulation of the masses versus a venal elite. 

Kilgore could also look farther back in U.S. history to find populism's multifaceted character. Patriot colonists justified their revolution against King George III as the act of a virtuous citizenry against a corrupt administration that had conspired to deprive the people of their liberty. America’s founders harped on the populist theme of simple virtue on one side and metropolitan corruption on the other. The Revolution included elements of both kinds of populism; a struggle for economic fairness on taxes and trade and a cultural war to disestablish the Church of England and show up the Tory snobs.

That said, it's not clear how Kilgore's conclusion that Democrats need "to deal directly with both cultural and economic concerns of voters as equally legitimate" undermines Frank's argument in _What's the Matter with Kansas_. One of Frank's most valuable insights is that the right fights economic issues on cultural ground; i.e. that cultural and economic concerns are intertwined, and should be addressed as equally legitimate and inter-related. Republicans have done this very well, Democrats have not.

Rightwing attacks on abortion, evolution, and homosexuality not only appeal to specific religious values of lower-income fundamentalists, they also address a larger concern felt by poorer Americans that the basic supports of their families and communities are falling apart. Globalization has been a major contributor to that feeling of insecurity, but as that vague catchphrase suggests, making the local global takes many forms, including but not limited to economic changes.

Frank makes this point in several places in his book. One of the best is his discussion of party realignment in Wichita, a city that turned Republican after having been a union-member, Democratic Party stronghold. The long-term loss of good-paying wage labor jobs prepared the ground for the short-term shock of Operation Rescue's mass action in Wichita in the early 1990s. While no one thought that ending abortions would bring back the city’s aircraft industry, Frank does show that the people who turned out at the stadium rallies staged by O.R. came away from them with a sense of empowerment, and a coherent message about how acting on abortion fit into the larger cause of stopping the erosion of the good life. 

The trick was that O.R. and the radical Republicans associated the loss of the good old days with changes in traditional gender relationships and religious values. One of Frank’s points is that the mass media, Madison Avenue, and Hollywood are intentionally condescending to Middle America, and that there is real populist outrage at the way our highly commercialized popular culture attacks the “square” conventions of monogamous churchgoers. In this respect, the populist right’s culture war addresses rational concerns, not “deranged” ones (even if the right's solutions are wrong).

For Frank, what’s “deranged” is not Middle America, but the absence of an alternative political argument about the impact of globalization. Some evangelicals will never be persuaded otherwise, but plenty of church-going pro-life working-class whites who vote Republican could be convinced that issues other than abortion and gay marriage more directly speak to their sense that the world has gone to hell.

We might revisit Kilgore’s example of W. J. Bryan on this point. Bryan not only fought against the corporate crimes of the Gilded Age, he also opposed the acquisition of an empire during the Spanish-American War and resigned his position as Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State because he opposed American entry into World War I. Instead of wondering whether Watson’s racism and Bryan’s fundamentalism overshadowed their progressivism on economics and imperialism, it would serve Democrats better to note that these forerunners of today’s grassroots conservatives were not so shackled by their cultural orientation as to support big business and militarism at every turn.  Kilgore’s right to say that populism is not always progressive, but the populist theme of the people fighting the powerful can still be put to progressive purposes.

Frank’s book isn’t a treatise on how economics are somehow more real than culture (see his reply to Todd Gitlin), rather it’s an indictment of the absence of an alternative to rightwing populism at a time when issues related to economic justice are so very pressing for the kinds of voters who turned Kansas from blue to red.

The working families of Kansas are hopping mad at rich people, but many of them see voting Republican as the most obvious way to express that rage politically.  When O’Reilly, Limbaugh, and company attack liberal snobbery they usually bring up the wealth of a select number of liberal icons, and keep quiet on the many more GOP millionaires or the ways that Republican policies hurt the pocketbooks of working people. 

It's as if the Boston Tea Party had been about a preference for black coffee over snootier  beverages (latte drinking liberals?) rather than about refusing to let a megacorpoartion, the British East India Company, undersell local merchants via a special government exemption for a crony of the King (Walmart and lax labor law enforcement?).  That is, populist conservatives hoodwink their audience by presenting all class issues as cultural conflicts, and only as cultural conflicts.

Frank asks for Democrats to call the Republicans on this phony economic populism, and argues that a consistent alternative populist message could channel that rage into progressive directions.

Finally, Kilgore’s post is great one that raises a lot of good points. It deserves attention. As for Todd Gitlin, beware of recycling old George Will columns (see: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35560-2004Jul7.htm l)

<i>Economics cannot explain why Appalachian southerners, the poorest category of voters, went heavily Republican for more than a century after the Civil War;</i>

 It seems to me that it can, at least partially.  Until at least the mid-twentieth century, the political parties could much better be described as loose coalitions of various, very different, state parties than it could be as any kind of national whole.  State politics was much more important than federal politics until at least the New Deal.  For Appalachians, it didn't really matter that in national politics, the Democrats were in some sense vaguely to the left of the Republicans (this is hard to really argue, in any event - in what way was Grover Cleveland to the left of Benjamin Harrison?).  What mattered was in state politics.  Lowlanders used the Democratic Party as a tool to dominate state politics.  As such, the Highlanders could use the Republican Party to fight this lowland dominance.  Of course, the whole Civil War business played a part in this, but East Tennessee and West Virginia unionism themselves can be explained at least partially in terms of their economic differences from the rest of the state, can't they?  

The idea is to make abortion less of a polarizing issue.  Granted, people for whom abortion is the primary mobilizing issue will never vote Democratic, and I'm not sure I want them to.  However, they are also a small minority of the voting public.

What the Republicans have done is to turn a pro-choice position into shorthand for "godless liberal commie."  If that perception can be ameliorated or disspelled, I think that we can start to win back moderates who are presently voting Republican.  And while I consider myself a liberal Democrat, I also feel moderate to moderate right voters must vote for us in order to sustain a governing majority over the long term.

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