China Rising
The Pentagon’s recent report on Chinese military power is a pleasant surprise. The surprise isn’t, as the news coverage would have it, the absence of the tough talk that the Office of the Secretary of Defense reportedly favored. With the White House trying to convince China to revalue the yuan and help halt North Korea’s nuclear program, it was inevitable that the report would strike a diplomatic tone. What is surprising is that the report presents an even-handed (and readable) analysis of China's rising power and its consequences for U.S. strategic interests.
The 45-page report offers little in the way of traditional weapons bean-counting, though those who want to know the state-of-play on anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-radiation weapons should read chapter 5. Rather, the report takes an overarching strategic view of Chinese power.
Two of the report’s findings, one general and one specific, stand out. The first is we don’t yet know where China is headed: “China faces a strategic crossroads. It can choose a pathway of peaceful integration and benign competition. China can also choose, or find itself upon, a pathway which China would emerge to exert dominant influence in an expanding sphere. Or, China could emerge less confident and focused inward on challenges to national security and the Chinese Communist Party’s claim to legitimacy. The future of a rising China is not yet set immutably on one course or another.” This assessment—which, remember, is coming out of Mr. Rumsfeld’s Pentagon—is right if not necessarily reassuring. Whether China is becoming what we want or what we fear is something that not even the Chinese know for sure.
The second finding that stands out is that the potential cost of our pledge to defend Taiwan is going up. “The cross-Strait military balance appears to be shifting toward Beijing as a result of China’s sustained economic growth, growing diplomatic leverage, and improvements in the PLA’s [People’s Liberation Army’s] military capabilities.” Translation: Our deterrent threat is eroding. In a few years we could find ourselves faced with the choice of fighting a major war or reneging on our commitment to defend a vibrant democracy. The odds are good that our friends in the region are not eager for the former, making it imperative to avoid ending up in a position in which we are under pressure to do the latter.
The report makes no recommendations on how the United States should respond to China’s rise nor does it hazard a guess as to how much influence we can exercise over China’s evolution. It is certainly far less than we wish and probably less than we think. China’s choices will be driven by its internal dynamics, many of which we won't recognize at the time or understand very well. But because the parties jockeying for power in China will use what we do to help their cause, our choices could be pivotal.
Getting China right will be Washington’s biggest challenge over the next decade. The strategy we should pursue is easy to sketch in broad outline: Encourage China’s integration into an international economic and political order that serves its interests (and ours) and hopefully promotes its democratization while still making clear to Beijing that the costs of seeking political domination in Asia far outweigh the benefits. Actually implementing such a strategy amidst differing political systems, competing nationalisms, and a blossoming economic rivalry is another matter entirely.
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Did the report say anything about the two big threats to China, AIDS/pandemic disease and global warming? Pandemic disease (e.g., an outbreak of avian flu in the human population) is a current problem that could spiral out of control under current policies, and seriously weaken the nation. The second is a long-term threat to China's bread basket region, with years of extreme drought predicted for southern China. Both could derail China's emergence as a regional or world economic and military power.
July 26, 2005 1:15 PM | Reply | Permalink
China is already absorbing Taiwan by a process of economic assimilation; Taiwanese businessmen are heavily invested in China and increasingly dependent on Chinese manufacturing. A lot of them consider the Taiwanese separatists bad for business. Similarly, the Chinese are managing to suppress anti-Beijing opinion in the Hong Kong press in typical American style: they simply deny advertising revenue to papers that print such things, and so do private mainland companies. As long as the economy continues to boom, a lot of people are happy to get along and get rich.
But the only real claim to legitimacy the Chinese "Communist" Party (it's really a fascist party these days, using Mussolini's definition of fascism as the union of corporate power and state power) has these days is nationalism. Most Chinese think Taiwan and Tibet are part of China and expect their government to fight to keep them. The occasional saber-rattling, my Chinese colleagues assure me, is popular with the public, though no one wants a war.
But let's get real. The day China says it's ready to take Taiwan, what realistic options does the US have to stop them? Nuclear war, when we've already said that there is one China and Taiwan is a part of China? The Iraq war has already exposed to the Chinese the severe limits on American power.
And what would even cold-war conditions between China and the US (e.g. a trade cutoff) mean? We are currently relying on the Chinese to manufacture almost everything; a trade cutoff would crater the American economy, while China could continue to sell to Europe and Japan.
July 26, 2005 2:52 PM | Reply | Permalink
The Pentagon recognizes that China is an emerging world power...it's reassuring that they can grasp the obvious. But without reaching any conclusions what is the point of the report? I am very concerned that we don't seem to have any coherent strategy of how to address China. I think a better analysis should be from State because the main threat China presents is a diplomatic/economic one rather then military. But par for the course the Bush administration neocons view every problem through a military prism. Without this report giving any indications of how we plan on dealing with an emerging China renders it a waste of paper.
July 26, 2005 5:51 PM | Reply | Permalink
The influence that China could have on our economy with its large US bond and dollar holdings is worrisome to me along with the Pentagon's concerns about our strategic interests. I am glad to hear that the Pentagon does still put out some realistic reports.
July 26, 2005 5:58 PM | Reply | Permalink
Joe, I think you make an interesting point about the limits of American military power. Cheney obviously sadly misjudged his pet theory that you only need a small army if you have the technological advantage of advanced weapon systems. Your point is one I don’t think anyone has brought up and I think it is an important one. Basically we have shown a chink in our armor of “superpower” and that may not be a good thing. I think that China is a much bigger problem for America than Iraq but here we are wasting our resources, people, etc. on what is basically a fool’s errand in Iraq. However I suspect that real threat from China will be the economic threat rather than a military one, barring the Taiwan situation.
July 26, 2005 7:47 PM | Reply | Permalink
Lindsay registers "surprise" at the even-handedness of the 2005 report taking recent Sino maneuvering by the administration and, implicitly, the administration's notorious reputation for politicising "intelligence" into account.
But it's unclear if earlier reports were reviewed or compared for similar objectivity. The 2004 report, we thought, was typically objective, tone neutral, similarly focused on analyses for DoD assessments of this type and even, perhaps, more comprehensive. AIDS and SARS, for example, were cited as emerging factors that may adversely affect China's economy, stability, manpower readiness. The 2004 report also offered more nuance with respect to China's geopolitical role in Asia; compare the following segments on South Asia:
cf. 2005:
Otherwise yes, the 2005 report is generally more readable with better formatting, less jargon, somewhat different emphases.
July 26, 2005 10:46 PM | Reply | Permalink
Politically speaking, this China quandary provides a good oppurtunity for Democrats to show their hand in foreign policy. It's been a popular arguement to say that Democrats are only pointing out problems and not offering solutions. While this is not true, responding to this possible threat (not exactly a threat now, but easily could be) before it gets out of hand could help nix this line of thought. American people, as proven by the recent election, respond to military matters and potential threats from other countries. This could be a chance for Democrats to show they have both muscle and vision. At a time when American people are tired of war, preventing a future war seems important both morally and politically.
July 27, 2005 6:06 AM | Reply | Permalink
The report did not address the AIDS crisis or any other public health related potential crises and only made one passing reference to potential ecological crises due to China's virtually unchecked rise in pollution. In my opinion, the document probably abstracted those (I agree with you that they are absolutely vital) items into 'things that will affect the economy'. The report rightly (again, in my opinion) concluded that the evolution of China's grand strategy and doctrine will very much be a function of both its economic power and the growth of its economic power (i.e., both the size of the economy and the value of its first derivative, if you will...), but while the report did directly address the potential weakness of Chinese banking and financial institutions, it did fail to stress the importance of the environment and public health (which Wingfoot rightly asked about).
July 27, 2005 11:10 AM | Reply | Permalink
But what will the response be? Are we in fact going to play on the fears highlighted in the 2004 report that we will work to further encircle China? Also I personally doubt that our government can in any meaningful way positively affect the evolution of China's grand strategy - any perceived interference in China's core security policy will only heighten tensions.
Actually Asia really looks like will be focus of balance of power issues for the foreseeable future; whoever here said that getting China right is America's great challenge for the decade is absolutely spot on (especially when most commentators are getting hung up on Islamic terrorism, which is a grave problem, but in my opinion comes in a close second behind being involved in the construction of a stable Asia). Of course one tangible way of creating a stable balance of power in the region would be to elevate Japan and India to permanent seats in the U.N. Security Council - this is a really good way of signaling to China that it is not the only global power (emerging or otherwise) in the region; India specifically can take on an increasingly important role of intermediary between China and the United States, if it ever becomes necessary.
July 27, 2005 11:27 AM | Reply | Permalink
In the next 5 to 10 years, assuming the world remains relatively at peace, there will be 3 superpowers: China, India and the United States. China and India are taking big strides in developing and improving their military. China especially has devoted large amounts of resources to improving their military technology, refining their policy & strategic thinking and obscuring their intentions. Meanwhile, the U.S. appears confused about it response. But what is most worrisome is the fact that the US Navy, which will be on the front lines of any combination of conflicts in Asia, has reduced its Naval Fleet to a mere 286 war ships. Under a Republican controlled White House and Congress, the Nation’s ability to defend itself has become dangerously depleted.
July 29, 2005 8:30 AM | Reply | Permalink