Politics and Organizing
Yes, we all want Congress to pass the Employee Free Choice Act, but, in truth, unions can take much better advantage of their political relationships than they now do to promote organizing.
For example, in Bushwick, Brooklyn, the RWDSU/UFCW and a grassroots neighborhood activist group have teamed up with New York Atty. General Elliot Spitzer. In essence, the Bushwick activists document state labor law violations by the non-union retailers who are then faced with a choice: accept the right of workers to organize or face store boycotts and action by the AG's office.
Of course, there's nothing new about labor mobilizing political muscle to help them organize or win strong contracts. Smart activists do it all the time.
Yet, too many local union leaders are either squeamish about taking advantage of their politiical relationships, or just clueless how to do it. Some just don't seem recognize the potential.
While working for a newly elected mayor in Cleveland, Ohio, I was approached by one local activist who thought Hizonner ought to name a labor liaison. I bounced the idea of a member of the City Council -- a progressive, no less -- who chuckled that a liason on would end up spending most of his or her time helping local union officials round up free tickets for Cleveland Browns games. He was right.
Sure, few politicians want to get involved in helping workers win an organizing drive or a good contract. Most will avoid it like the plague. All the more reason for the labor movement to train local leaders how to make it happen. As I recall, that was part of the original thinking behind Union Cities. It's an approach that still makes sense today.
Comments (12)
This reminds me of something called the logic of 'collective action'. The short version goes like this:
If everyone is motivated by economic self-interest (which is how economists like to talk about these things in choice theory) collective action is impossible. WHy? Because the cost/benefit of participating in the collective action is less than the cost/benefit of not participating.
Example: for an individual laborer, the cost/benefit (in terms of dollars) of participating in the strike is less than the cost/benefit of working through the strike and reaping the potential gains that result from it. Hence, it is irrational to participate in thestrike.
Now, in reality, things aren't so simple (scabs are pummeled by strikers, for example, and that represents an additional cost), and people in fact will strike for what are clearly non-economic values (eg, quality of life issues, safety issues, etc.).
The take home message is this: unless people are collectively motivated to act in the furtherance of at least one shared non-economic value, collective action will enivitably fail.
(The theory is of course quite intricate and complex. There's lots of writing on it, under Choice Theory, Game Theory, or Collective Action, see especially Mancur Olsen.)
This gives at least one theoretical reason for unions and labor to find leaders from among themselves, people who won't be tempted to trade general principles and other values for their own personal economic gain.
But it also means that if labor cannot organize around some non-economic value which it places above economic value, collective action for that labor-group is hopeless.
July 16, 2005 10:34 AM | Reply | Permalink
You are inventing things. A simple example of Neumann's game theory might have the following rules. 2 people play, they chose one of 2 moves, they each get 1 point if they both cooperate, one gets 2 if s/he refuses to cooperate and the other agress and they both lose 1 point if they both refuse to cooperate.
The ideal strategy depends on who one plays with, but you can see the long term advantage goes to long term cooperators.
In various simulations with a large number of programmed behaviors and more complex point systems, you can lose if you cooperate and the other doesn't, the simple model of "retailiators" who initially cooperate, but remember and don't cooperate wth those who have previously refused turns out to dominate. Failure to cooperate in all cases (parasitism) only works in systems with high levels of trust and they soon rebalance.
Optimum strategies are of course a matter of great complexity and debate, but even with 50 year old concepts of game theory the purely exploitive stance would never be regarded as always the best. Models that proved the value of "altrusism" (iincreased avaerage gains) were well established by the seventies. The "selfish gene theory" was an attempt to explain their development genetically.
July 16, 2005 12:29 PM | Reply | Permalink
The kind of thinking Grossfield sees as lacking in labor leaders (nuts and bolts political thinking) seems to be a pervasive, almost mandatory mind-set among progressives generally. It is so unfashionable to focus on struggling for victory these days. Look at all the discussion, most of it silly, about the assigned (from the Bush Administration) venue du jour of Rove and the Plame outing. The only really key issue is forcing reporters to divulge confidential sources (and Judith Miller is admittedly not the most sympathetic test case, although that is not a substantive issue but an image vulnerability). But issues like this one get ignored.
I would have to add, being tactless, that the issue of labor and politicians has little to do with game theory and, IMHO, a LOT to do with the problem of the way progressives seem to be conditioned to think. You are supposed to follow the flow, do the job of justifying the lying (including the choruses of protestation mobilized against Judith Miller, ostensibly from the left) and NEVER POINT OUT THE ISSUE OF THOSE KINDS OF CHORUSES
because that is the kind of thinking geared to authentic progressives winning, and that's just unacceptable. Needless to say, that's NEVER "the reason".
But the notion of progressives simply not being out there to fight to win, that is would spoil some vast ingenious plan (for what? to wreck the environment and leave a world like that described in Walt Whitman's "Respondez! Respondez!" ????).
I raise these seemingly 'philosophical macro issues because I think that that is where the realpolitik problems lie -- authentic progressives have become inwardly defeatist, no longer inner-directed, no longer the fighting bull mentality of the right, and just go along with often arbitrary definitions of political correctness that weeds out those who will struggle to win and weeds IN those who will just go along to get along, and who aren't really devoted to victory in class struggle. (oooh that's class warfare -- only Repugs are supposed to do that!)
July 16, 2005 12:48 PM | Reply | Permalink
You are inventing things
Wish I were. Maybe you're missing my point.
Social choice theory is premised on rational individuals acting in their best interest. A rational actor will adopt a neutral, abstract value - call them utiles - in order to rank choices between competing value shcemes. Economists - and not without reason - simply adopt dollars as the value of utiles. Thus, the rise of Homo Economicus. And the theory of collective action, insofar as it is a model for social choice theory, presupposes that all individuals values get an economic, dollar ranking.
So my point was that if economic values are all that matters, self-interest and rationality will preclude voluntary (as opposed to constrained) collective action. It is of course possible to artificially construct a game where cooperation is rewarded. But this possibility may reflect only an ideal, and not the reality, of social groups.
the purely exploitive stance would never be regarded as always the best.
You're analysis of the premises of my argument are therefore innaccurate. In your model, the exploitive stance may be irrational over the long term. This merely shows that in some systems based on cooperation, it is rational to take a long term approach.
My premises - like choice theorists - do not include cooperation, but rather tries to show if cooperation can emerge as a rational action in large groups.
The Prisoners Dilemma characterizes one situation where it is irrational to cooperate. Granted, the context is a bit convoluted, but it represents one case where cooperation is irrational.
But there are others. The Tragedy of the COmmons is instructive here because it takes as its premise individual self interest and cooperation, and spits out collective destruction of the rangeland (water purity, air quality, etc, whatever isa common) as its concequence. What the tragedy of the commons shows is not that cooperation can't be advantageous in a game theoretic context, but that people (in this world) will not voluntarily agree to act within the parameters of their contract.
Failure to cooperate in all cases (parasitism) only works in systems with high levels of trust and they soon rebalance.
This point is also something which I disagree with. In the absence of trust, or accountability, (some) people will act very aggressively to secure their individual advantage. But the cases where trust can promote an individuals (economic) self-interest are limited to situations where the players are known (that is, not anonymous) and accountability for honoring your promise to act cooperatively can be maintained. But notice that this is also a form of coercion.
Your game-theoretic example of cooperation is based on individuals remembering the past behaviour of others. So it applies to groups only so big as an individual can remember the players. But what about large groups? What I am saying is that once the size of the group increases to the point where people can act anomyously, it is irrational to voluntarily cooperate and non-coerced cooperative action ceases.
So where am I going with all this? It is only the introduction of additional values - like intrinsically valuing the contract - that compels people to act against their short-term self interst in large groups.
July 16, 2005 2:32 PM | Reply | Permalink
The kind of thinking Grossfield sees as lacking in labor leaders (nuts and bolts political thinking) seems to be a pervasive, almost mandatory mind-set among progressives generally. It is so unfashionable to focus on struggling for victory these days.
I think this raises some central issues about labor in America, and what could constitute a labor 'movement'.
Historically, groups of labor were more or less confined to regions. So was capital. In todays world, both labor and capital can freely move to wherever the short term gain can be maximized. Capital outsources jobs, and uses that as a bargaining weapon in labor disputes. But capitalists can also take advantage of insourced labor flowing in over the borders. This puts a downward pressure not only on wages, but also on the effectiveness of arganizing.
Labor made great gains in the first half of the 1900's preciesly because capital was locked in, in terms of funding the move to outsource, but in terms of paying tarriffs on reintroduced goods.
So what options does this leave the labor movement? Not many. They have no leverage. For example, the force of a strike as a bargaining tool has been reduced if not eliminated (replacements come in at lower wages, government laws have weakened the right to collectively bargain, etc).
So why has it become unfashionable to focus on struggling for victory these days? Because there is no coherent view of the endgame. And how can you struggle for something which can't even be clearly identified?
Think of the contrast: in the olden times, labor 'struggled' to get US workers 40 hour work weeks, a minimum wage, over time pay, paid holidays and vacations, health insurance, etc.
The prevailing view now is that receiving those 'benefits' should be determined by the 'market'. They exist not as a right of workers, but by the graces of employers.
The problem in the movement is not that progressives are unaware of the problem. It's that there's no clear solution that seems articulable, let alone attainable.
July 16, 2005 3:18 PM | Reply | Permalink
Mr. Grossfeld has an excellent point, which I'd like to expand in a different direction. Using political connections to promote labor goals is all well and good, but what if you live in an area where the politics isn't as labor-friendly (such as my home state, Texas)? Leverage is everything in politics, and since labor possesses little leverage in Texas (with the sole exception of the teacher's union) it is generally irrelevant when it comes to political activity.
I've addressed this before, so I'll only briefly rephrase: if the union movement wishes to gain a truly national stage it must develop robust and permanent alliances in anti-Union areas with other varieties of liberal activists. Only then can they wield the political clout to make significant progress.
Compromise will surely be necessary - but in today's increasingly pro-corporate legal environment, whatever compromise is required to attain non-union support for union causes should be a lesser evil than the status quo.
July 16, 2005 5:12 PM | Reply | Permalink
The kind of thinking Grossfield (sic) sees as lacking in labor leaders (nuts and bolts political thinking) seems to be a pervasive, almost mandatory mind-set among progressives generally. It is so unfashionable to focus on struggling for victory these days.
Hmm. Wonder why it's unfashionable? Could it be that folks would rather take pragmatic action to win better lives for their families than become martyrs for the cause? I don't know how to break this to you, but people who work for a living are generally more interested in advancing than struggling. The problem isn't that labor leaders reject "nuts and bolts" thinking; it's that we still need more of it.
July 16, 2005 5:45 PM | Reply | Permalink
Jim-
They're doing it right there in Texas. See <a href="http://www.catholiccharities.org/documents/Peritus5-6-05.pdf"
;>here</a> where politicians and the Catholic church is being mobilized in support of janitors in Houston.
July 16, 2005 6:14 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'm sorry the discussion veered away from your comment's central point, that for labor's political organizing strategy to succeed it has to be about at least one shared non-economic value, otherwise short-term economic interests will derail any hope for successful collective action (I hope I have that right). I think that holds true for any type of grassroots organizing.
In the context of the current debate inside the AFL-CIO, this point may be relevant to the issue of what exactly is the role of the national federation. Is it to broker and enforce jurisdictional arrangements and promote coordinated sector organizing? Or is it to wage political mobilization efforts among union households around issue and electoral politics (it's tough to summarize the positions of the two camps because of the myriad of conflicting motivations, but that's the best I can do after having read the most recent Nation article on this subject)?
Interestingly neither camp is really speaking to the type of non-economic values I think you were alluding to, with the possible exception of the Communications Workers. In the Nation piece Larry Cohen of CWA seems to be saying that the AFL's central focus should be on organizing around the right to collective bargaining in the workplace (the Employee Free Choice Act that the dissenting unions say will never pass in our lifetime -- now how's that for progressive defeatism?). Is the cause of having a meaningful right to organize in the workplace going to produce the type of groundswell of support that will force politicians to reform the labor laws? I don't think so. Can topdown pressure from labor leaders -- in other words, the writing of checks -- make it happen? I'd say "no" on that as well. That doesn't mean we can't reform the labor laws to unleash the explosion of organizing campaigns that would immediately follow. It just means that we'll need a different strategy. The reform has to be part of something bigger, more values-based to be successful.
I don't know the answer but I suspect it lies in recognizing the class oppression happening to working people based on the country's current economic direction. A return to populism in our political agenda would seem to offer a class-based appeal based on the values of community, security, and economic justice. The forces waging this class-based war are clearly bi-partisan. If John Kerry had won in 2004 there's no doubt in my mind that we'd be fighting him instead of Bush to stop CAFTA. And of course, he and other DLC-type Democrats would be telling us to give up on labor law reform as well.
Maybe to some degree both sides of the AFL-CIO debate are right. Maybe coordinated organizing around industries or sectors will be the only means of building the leverage needed to tip the political balance in our favor. But maybe that type of coordination is better left to the unions that want to do it and they should be allowed to go after, through raiding, any other union that stands in the way. And maybe the role of the AFL-CIO should be to mobilize ALL working people, not just union members, around the benefits of collective security -- e.g., national health insurance to go with the national pension and disability insurance that Social Security provides. Maybe class-oriented, issue-based organizing by the AFL-CIO at the national level together with strategic sector-based coordinated organizing campaigns by "coalitions of the willing" (sorry to borrow that term) will be the one-two punch needed to get organized labor back in the game.
July 17, 2005 10:02 AM | Reply | Permalink
July 17, 2005 11:14 AM | Reply | Permalink
Guillermo Perez wrote: for labor's political organizing strategy to succeed it has to be about at least one shared non-economic value, otherwise short-term economic interests will derail any hope for successful collective action (I hope I have that right).
That was indeed the point I was trying to make. It seemed particulary relevant to Jim Grossfeld's initial post in that Jim was advocating the use of political muscle to promote a unions goals. On that point, I agree. If that political muscle can be attained. And it was regarding the likelihood of this that I was expressing some doubts.
For example, Jim says in his most recent comment,
Yes, we want members of Congress to pass the Employee Free Choice Act, but we also want Mayors, City Council members, County Executives, etc. to do their part to create a union-friendly atmosphere in the community.
I agree with you that labor's interests ought to be represented in all levels government. But this will not come about from a politician's good graces. That's not how politics works. So achieving this goal requires leverage in the electorate, and this in turn requires organizing.
Organizing, however, brings us back the central point: what are the values around which labor can organize to get real political representation? On this I have to agree with some points Guillermo made re: a populist uprising around the right to collectively bargain, or leveraging politicians with the promise of campaign contributions for better labor laws.
These are dim hopes, it seems to me, beause the average American won't trade existing values for the chance to form a union; and because having leverage against a politician means - almost definitionally - having more leverage than the other guy (something Rove has made a career out of, BTW). The unions tried this in 2000 and it failed to alter the dems platform one iota.
So it's not that I'm disagreeing with Jim's position. When labor groups have some political representation, they need to capitalize on it. Those are real windows of opportunity. But I also assume that we all would like to see increased representation for laborers. And this means getting working people and wage earners to make their voice heard at election time, and - hopefully - at the collective bargaining table. But this requires identifying a collectively shared value or vision, so that bearing the individual costs of attaining these goals are freely accepted.
July 17, 2005 10:15 PM | Reply | Permalink
In that linked comment you said
Third, Dilan is right to note that the union agenda doesn't neatly coincide with the overall liberal agenda, and the resulting lab-lib split must be remedied. Really, I think this is the Gordian knot in the labor puzzle;
This is an astute observation: coalition building within the progressive community is difficult precisely because each groups target values may, and often will, conflict. For example, labor's goal of retaining manufacturing jobs might be at odds with an environmentalist's goal of reducing manufacturing-related pollution. In this case, labor uses it's collective leverage to sign agreements for decent long-term wages, but others in the progressive community would want to use labors leverage to advance other issues.
However, I don't agree that this problem can be overcome 'by force' on the promise that
If unions would take the lead in creating a new Democratic alliance, aggressively seeking out the middle ground with other Dem interests, I'd bet in short time they'd find themselves again at the vanguard of a politically effective party apparatus.
The scary word here is 'vanguard', and the likelihood - if the coalition comes together - that union values come to dominate the left's political agenda, while the overall goal of political representation for all progressive values is abandoned.
Without the contributions and committments of the individuals within the coalition pursuing their own vision , any coalition building will ultimately fail. Jim from Texas made this point in his linked comment: laborers and acivists must find some vision which makes bearing the cost of contributing to it worthwhile.
Furthermore, this holds for the groups which comprise the coalition itself. One member-group of the coalition cannot be greedily looking to exploit other groups for its own advantage (this merely reintroduces the logical problem addressed above). Instead, the coalition must be centered around a shared vision: for example, it might be that every member-group of the coalition can advance it's goals more if they can (collectively) break the near total control corporate power has over the political process.
If this is the shared goal, then expanding the coalition requires motivating groups to become members based on the premise that opening up the political process is necessary for the furtherance of their particular values. Such a motivation then trickles down, with the collective vision becoming attractive to individuals who have a progressive view on any issue whatsoever.
July 18, 2005 8:10 AM | Reply | Permalink