Richard Haass and American Grand Strategy
I just finished Richard Haass’ new book, The Opportunity, which makes a good case for an American grand strategy of pragmatic internationalism. Haass was Director of Policy Planning during the first Bush term and therefore had a front row seat to watch as Colin Powell and other moderates got run over by hardliners on North Korea, Iraq, Kyoto and most other issues.
The book is interesting for a variety of reasons. First, Haass really is one of those increasingly rare Republican internationalists – a descendent of the Rockefeller wing of the party that runs through Kissinger, Scowcroft, Hagel and others. What is interesting is how different Haass’ moderate-realist worldview is from that of Republicans who run foreign policy today – Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, the neo-cons, the conservative nationalists, etc. The book argues that the U.S. should seize this unipolar moment to build a cooperative great power order. His model is the Congress of Vienna where major states agreed on the "rules of the road" and coordinate policy to keep the peace. At each turn the book talks about how the U.S. needs to use its power to facilitate cooperation to tackle targeted global problems. The U.S. should be using its power, he says, to "persuade the major powers of the day, along with as many other countries, organizations, corporations, and individuals as possible, to sign up to and support a set of rules, policies, and institutions" that can advance collective goals. To read this book is to see how far adrift American foreign policy is from the old mainstream.
Second, the book provides a reminder about how all the "big positions" on American grand strategy – realist, neo-con, and liberal – need to wrestle with post-911 and post-Iraq realities and lessons. A- The realist-internationalist position that Haass represents has had to rethink the importance of global institutions for a tool of American primacy. As I indicated, the Haass book really does embrace a pragmatic multilateralism that most liberals would find agreeable. Haass’ "doctrine of integration" – which he argues should be the new strategic orientation for the U.S. – is not unlike what I call "liberal grand strategy." It is a one world vision of integration, great power cooperation, and expanded multilateral cooperation. Increasingly, classical realists tend to agree with this vision. B- Neo-conservatives need to rethink the costs and benefits of the direct application of American power in the promotion of democracy around the world. The Iraq-style approach to making the world safer and more democratic is over with, done, finished. Neo-conservatives are going to need to look more carefully at how liberal internationalists have talked about democracy promotion, institutionalized cooperation, etc. C- Liberal internationalists are going to need to rethink the UN and the way in which cooperation is structured to achieve specific-targeted goals. Anne-Marie’s book on networks pushes new thinking of this sort. Liberals also need to make their peace with American unipolarity. We don’t need to be building a global order apart from and above the U.S. so much as using American power to facilitate cooperation and promote the provision of public goods. It is an obvious point, but we want a stable and progressive global order – and we will only get such an order when the American pursuit of its enlightened national interests coincides with the building and strengthening of a rules-based international system. The "American project" and the "global project" must be brought together again. More on this line of discussion in future posts.
Third, Haass’ book is also interesting in that it provides one of the best discussions of what an alternative strategy for dealing with Iraq might of been short of war. Haass argues that the alternative to war was not inaction but sanctions and the degradation of Iraqi military and regime capacities. Haass has this to say: "If the United States had stuck with sanctions and eschewed war, Saddam would almost certainly still be in power today. Many have posed the question as to whether Iraq and the world are better off without Saddam Hussein. It is and we are, but this is not a terribly useful question. What matters in business as well as foreign policy is the balance or relationship between costs and benefits. It is this assessment that leads to the judgment that the war against Iraq was unwarranted."
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Clinton used to complain about the Democrats becoming Eisenhower Republicans.
Democratic party friendly IR academics welcoming Rockefeller Republican recommendations for foreign policy would seem to be another step in the process.
June 30, 2005 2:53 PM | Reply | Permalink
Actually, I, for one, sort of like this trend...
There has been a lot of talk from some of the younger-generation Democrats proposing some sort of "muscular idealism" as the new direction for the party's foreign policy thinking -- which has caused me a good deal of concern because it sounds a lot like warmed-over neoconservatism.
I'm certainly not suggesting that we all start trying to channel Prince Metternich's ghost, but I also don't want some sort of American-Exceptionalism-on-Steriods becoming our party's new mantra.
Count me with the "Party of Pragmatists." And I'd argue, contrary to Rachel Kleinfeld's argument in the last linked piece, that in the aftermath of the Iraq fiasco, that's where the "base" of the Democratic party will be as well.
June 30, 2005 3:45 PM | Reply | Permalink
Dear Otto:
I thought my point was that moderate Republican internationalists -- to the extent they exist anymore -- are coming our way.
June 30, 2005 3:51 PM | Reply | Permalink
The problem with each particular school of foreign policy thought is that it is just that: its own particular school. There is a grossly insufficient level of recognition in each of the virtues of the others.
America's role in the world is large; it contains multitudes of oft-contradictory interests. We cannot afford a foreign policy dictated by a single ideology with a terror of inconsistency. The choice isn't always good vs. evil. A great deal of the time it's Paper, Scissors, Stone.
What we need is a foreign policy that takes a good hard look at what all approaches and ideologies suggest for a given situation, and makes a sound judgment of what action is appropriate.
The truth is that there are critically important lessons in both wisdom and folly to be drawn from examining every approach.
Pragmatism/realism keeps us free of folly and minimizes dangers to America. It would have prevented the disaster in Iraq. It preserved the Iron Curtain. It avoided nuclear war with the Soviet Union. It dictated the destruction of Cambodia. It led us to recognize Vietnam. It keeps us out of Darfur. It has no claim to morality. National interests trump morality.
Liberal Internationalism/Multilateralism protects us from lonely folly, extreme folly and accountability. It is generally effective in avoiding or minimizing inter-state violence. It provides a means to ameliorate and sometimes even resolve conflicts between countries. It might have avoided, and would certainly have mitigated, the disaster in Iraq. It has led to treaties that have restrained nuclear proliferation, fostered trade, and saved species from extinction. It whined and wrung its hands as genocide ripped Yugoslavia to shreds. It whines and wrings its hands now over Darfur. Consensus trumps national interests.
Neo-Conservatism protects us from the cowardly status-quo/inertia follies that we can't make a real difference in the world, that it's wrong to call evil regimes evil and to plot their demise, and that intense foreign displeasure is a foolproof indicator that something's a bad idea. It created the disaster in Iraq. It called for the rollback of Communism before it was popular. It yearns to destroy the Saudi kleptomonarchy and the stifling Iranian theocracy, though without any realistic thought given to post-overthrow scenarios. Morality trumps consensus.
Really, it all comes down to Robert Fulghum's "Everything I Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten." Stay safe, play nice, and stand up for what's right. And when it's hard to figure out how these go together, use good judgment. It's on this last bit that too many people (read:entire Administration) fall down.
(And yes, I realize that this omits important aspects of current foreign policy, e.g. neoconservatism's fetish of force, strong focus on and narrow definition of national self-interest, selective use of moral arguments to advocate courses of action favored for non-moral reasons, etc.)June 30, 2005 7:35 PM | Reply | Permalink
Here's a test for the new order: An Arab country is building a nuclear reactor under IAEA supervision for peaceful purposes. Israel bombs the nuclear reactor. What does the USA do?
June 30, 2005 8:10 PM | Reply | Permalink
Given the existing political realities with Bush and the neocons, in that they never compromise, don't play well with others, are exceedingly arrogant and definitely unwilling to take advice from anyone other than one of their own, Mr. Haass' book is wonderful fantasy, right up their with Harry Potter.
July 1, 2005 12:22 PM | Reply | Permalink
>>>>>rethink the importance of global institutions for a tool of American primacy
---- It would be good to do this, and it's not an academic question over the IAEA and an Arab nuclear reactor. When the Israelis bombed Osiraq, they accelerated the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. In fact nobody has found evidence of such a program related to Osiraq before 1981 (the bombing).
The response of the REagan administration was to condemn Israel in the UN, but both Republicans and Democratic congressional parties condemned Reagan and took the side of the Israelis.
Now we have the Iranian nuclear complex at Bushehr. The Israelis obviously want to bomb it, or have the USA bomb it. Does the USA respect the IAEA? Respect the non-proliferation treaty? Or go it alone?
Bush's instinct is clearly to go it alone. This is the purpose of Bolton at the UN -- to make it clear that the world can do what it wants, as long as the USA wants it first.
Unless Haas or the Democratic versions of Haas can be mature enough to respect the treaty, then there's really no difference between you guys and Bush. For all practical purposes, what really is the difference? You all want to tell the world what to do.
July 1, 2005 7:33 PM | Reply | Permalink
“Clinton used to complain about the Democrats becoming Eisenhower Republicans.”
I find this claim somewhat ironic given that Clinton’s foreign policy from Haiti through Kosovo embraced the ideas of realist-internationalism. American foreign policy from 1994 – 2000 provided test cases for many of the ideas of realist-internationalism and even of many of the policies Dr. Haass has advocated in his articles and books.
One of the things I believe to be true about the Clinton foreign policy is that, for all its flaws, it did work towards bi-partisanship. Clinton did work together with Congress, he did seek input from the other party, and he did have members of the other party on his foreign policy team (namely SecDef William Cohen). This is in stark contrast to the current foreign policy where the dominant wing of the Republican foreign policy apparatus seems reluctant to reach out event to the moderate wing. There has been pragmatism, and there have been moves by this team towards different ideas, but they have been incomplete and generally uninspiring.
As a party, the question is should we embrace the ideas of Dr. Haass and his compatriots, and seek to find a foreign policy that rises above partisan labels. Should we be seeking the ideal that foreign policy is not Democratic or Republican, but in fact, a conglomeration of all the ideas and schools of though that are out there?
July 7, 2005 12:54 PM | Reply | Permalink